Israel–Somalia Relations

Israel's interest in the Horn of Africa dates to the late 1950s and was shaped by what analysts have described as Israel's "periphery policy"—an effort to cultivate alliances and cooperative relationships around the edges of the Arab world, including in East Africa.[1] Somalia, however, was among the exceptions. During the 1960s, Israel established diplomatic relations with 33 newly independent African countries; Somalia and Mauritania were the notable absences, described in one analysis as Muslim countries under Arab influence that joined the Arab League in 1974.[2]

Before modern diplomatic contacts, small Jewish trading communities existed in the northern Somali ports of Berbera and Zeila. Yemenite Jewish merchants settled there during the late 19th century, but the communities declined by the mid-20th century, with many members emigrating to Israel after its establishment in 1948.[3]

Declassified U.S. government documents from the late 1960s and 1970s illuminate the strategic calculations at play. An interdepartmental study on the Horn of Africa identified Israel's core interest in the region as protecting passage through the Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea, routes important for Israeli oil imports and trade.[4] The same study recorded Israeli concern about growing Soviet military activity and facilities in Somalia, and assessed that Arab unhappiness with Ethiopia's close ties to Israel was being exploited by Somalia in its border dispute with Addis Ababa.[4] A National Intelligence Estimate from the same period described Russian influence in Somalia as considerable and noted that Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie had sought closer relations with both Israel and the United States partly in response to what he saw as an emerging alliance among the Soviet Union, radical Arab states, and Somalia.[5]

By the late 1970s, a U.S. policy review described Israel as concerned about developments in the Horn of Africa, particularly the risk that Arab or Soviet influence would increase Israel's isolation and threaten its strategic position.[6] The document stated that Israel supported Somali exile groups opposed to the government of Siad Barre, though it did not name the groups or specify the form or scale of that support.[6] Contacts between Israel and Somalia during this period were limited, covert where they existed, and secondary to Israel's stronger alignment with Ethiopia.

The first documented high-level contacts between Israeli and Somali officials occurred in the mid-2010s. A lower-level meeting between Israeli Economy Ministry representatives and Somali officials took place in Jerusalem in December 2015.[7] In July 2016, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu undertook a tour of Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and Ethiopia; the Jewish Virtual Library described a first-ever "high-level contact" between leaders of Somalia and Israel during this visit, associated with a summit in Uganda where Netanyahu met leaders of seven African countries to discuss counterterrorism, energy, agriculture, and water technology.[8] The Washington Institute later reported that Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met Netanyahu in Nairobi in 2016.[9]

A revealing episode came in March 2019, when Somalia abstained from a UN Human Rights Council vote condemning Israel over the Golan Heights, while voting in favor of three other anti-Israel resolutions the same day.[10] A senior Somali government official described the abstention as surprising and "at odds with the official government position," and Somalia's UN envoy was summoned home; Somalia subsequently reiterated its rejection of Israeli claims over the Golan Heights.[10] The episode exposed a genuine division within Somali officialdom. Senior Somali diplomat Abdullahi Dool publicly advocated diplomatic relations with Israel, writing that they could promote peace and cooperation; Foreign Minister Ahmed Isse Awad dismissed him two days later.[10] Presidential spokesman Abdinur Mohamed declared that Somalia would never have diplomatic relations with Israel while Israel held "Muslim lands" and Jerusalem and denied Palestinians their rights.[10]

When Hassan Sheikh Mohamud won Somalia's presidential election in 2022, analysts took note of his apparent openness to Israel. A Washington Institute analysis described him as apparently open to normalization and observed that his close ties with the United Arab Emirates could help facilitate communication with Jerusalem.[11] An unnamed Somali diplomat close to Mohamud told The Times of Israel, "The group that is against normalization with Israel is out."[11] The analysis cautioned that this remark did not constitute an official government position. The Washington Institute later reported that worsening Somali security conditions and Mohamud's reliance on Turkish and Qatari military support led to the suspension of the normalization dialogue.[9]

At a Jerusalem conference held March 27–29, 2023, Somali Ambassador Idd Bedel Mohamed spoke under the title "Somalia Is Heading to Join the Abraham Accords."[12] He described debate within Somalia over the accords, characterized the indications as positive, and predicted that Somalia's president and prime minister would join an agreement at a time of their choosing.[12] The ambassador also recalled that, when he had served as Somalia's ambassador to the United Nations, Israel had voted with Somalia at the General Assembly when Somalia had a candidate for the International Court of Justice.[12]

Ambassador Mohamed further claimed that a strategic relationship between Somalia and Israel had existed even before Somalia's independence in 1960, and that Somalia's president had invited Israel's foreign minister to the independence celebration that year.[13] These historical claims were the ambassador's own account; the conference record does not independently corroborate them, and they stand in apparent tension with other sources documenting Somalia's absence from the list of African states that established formal diplomatic relations with Israel in the 1960s.[2] He predicted, "There will come a time that the leadership in Somalia will somehow have formal or informal relations with the State of Israel."[12] His remarks were notable as a public statement by a Somali diplomat favoring normalization, but remained a personal prediction rather than a formal government commitment.

Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991 and has since maintained its own governing institutions, elections, and security apparatus.[14] It was formerly the British Somaliland Protectorate, briefly independent in June 1960 before uniting days later with the former Italian Somaliland to form the Somali Republic.[3] Somalia's federal government regards Somaliland as an integral part of its territory; the African Union and United Nations have not recognized Somaliland and have adhered to Somalia's territorial integrity.[14]

Contacts between Israeli and Somaliland officials began quietly years before any public announcement. Somaliland's president made a confidential visit to Israel in 2024 to meet senior Israeli political and security officials.[3] In October 2025, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi met discreetly with Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar at Israel's Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, a meeting Sa'ar later described as part of broader 2025 talks with Abdullahi and his senior team.[3] Months of confidential contacts involved Sa'ar, the Mossad, and former National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi; teams visited Somaliland and hosted its leaders in Israel.[15] Somaliland reportedly requested time to prepare for possible Houthi attacks before the mutual recognition was announced.[15]

On December 26, 2025, Israel formally recognized Somaliland's independence and signed a joint declaration establishing full diplomatic relations, becoming the first UN member state to do so.[3] Netanyahu and Sa'ar signed the agreement with Abdullahi, citing shared values, mutual respect, and strategic interests; Israel also invited Somaliland to consider joining the Abraham Accords framework.[3] The recognition declaration cited concerns related to Houthi activity in Yemen, and Israeli analysts suggested possible roles for Somaliland in intelligence cooperation, maritime security, and countering Iranian-backed threats given its location near Red Sea shipping lanes.[3] Somaliland described the security cooperation as focused on counterterrorism and maritime security; its president denied discussions about hosting a permanent Israeli military base.[3]

Following the December 2025 recognition, Israel–Somaliland relations developed rapidly across 2026. On January 6, Foreign Minister Sa'ar made an official visit to Hargeisa—the first by a senior Israeli official—and announced plans to open an Israeli embassy there. Abdullahi was expected to visit Israel to open Somaliland's embassy.[3]

In February 2026, Somaliland President Abdullahi indicated that Somaliland expected to sign a partnership and trade agreement with Israel, identifying lithium, oil, gas, meat, and fish as potential offerings and seeking Israeli investment and technology in return, though no economic deal had yet been finalized at that stage.[3] Israel appointed Michael Lotem as its first ambassador to Somaliland in April 2026, and in May, Israeli President Isaac Herzog received the credentials of Somaliland's first ambassador to Israel, Mohamed Hagi.[3] Somaliland President Abdullahi then made an official visit to Israel in June and opened Somaliland's embassy in Jerusalem; Israel announced plans to open a reciprocal embassy in Hargeisa.[3]

By October 2026, Somali President Mohamud claimed that Israel planned to establish a naval base in Berbera and use the city's airport.[16] Somaliland rejected the allegation, calling claims that Berbera would be used to attack other countries unfounded.[16] Israel did not confirm a base, and available reporting did not establish that Berbera was being used for operations against the Houthis.[16]

Somalia's government condemned Israel's December 2025 recognition of Somaliland as a violation of Somali sovereignty. President Mohamud called the move unacceptable, a breach of international law, and a serious infringement of Somalia's sovereignty.[17] Somalia's parliament subsequently approved a law declaring the Israeli recognition void and rejecting any Israeli action purporting to recognize Somaliland as sovereign or independent.[17]

The reaction extended beyond Mogadishu. In a joint statement, the foreign ministers of Somalia, Egypt, Turkey, and Djibouti rejected the recognition and affirmed support for Somalia's unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.[18] The African Union, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Arab League, and Gulf Cooperation Council also criticized the move, arguing that it violated international law and Somalia's sovereignty.[3] In April 2026, Somalia joined the foreign ministers of 14 other Arab and Muslim states in a joint declaration condemning Israel's announcement that it would send a diplomatic envoy to Somaliland, calling the decision a "flagrant violation of Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity."[19]

Public anger in Somalia was visible on the streets. Following the recognition, demonstrations took place in Mogadishu and other Somali cities including Lascanod, Guriceel, and Baidoa.[20] In Mogadishu, thousands marched and gathered at a stadium, carrying Somali and Palestinian flags and anti-Israeli placards.[20]

The recognition also produced a concrete commercial consequence: after Sa'ar's January 2026 visit to Hargeisa, Somali aviation authorities did not renew Arkia airline's periodic approval to use Somali airspace for February flights.[21] The Israeli Transport Ministry said Somalia had not explained the refusal, and the view that the delay represented retaliation was reported as an assessment rather than a confirmed Somali explanation.[21] A later Globes report said Arkia regained approval after approximately two weeks and resumed its shorter route over Somalia.[22]

The available sources do not report formal diplomatic relations between Israel and Somalia's federal government; instead, they describe exploratory normalization contacts that were later suspended.[9][23] A 2022 Washington Institute analysis presented Somalia's possible inclusion in the Abraham Accords as an opportunity and recommended that the United States, Israel, Somalia, and the UAE work toward it.[11] Separately, the American Jewish Committee reported that Israel had held initial conversations with Somalia following the Abraham Accords, without specifying when the conversations occurred, who participated, or what resulted.[23] Mohamud's spokesmen made public statements about a desire for normalization, but worsening security conditions and his government's reliance on Turkish and Qatari military support led to the suspension of those discussions.[9]

Israel's December 2025 recognition of Somaliland substantially complicated any path toward a broader Israel–Somalia relationship. Somalia regards the recognition as an act of aggression and has taken active diplomatic steps at the African Union, among Arab states, and within its own parliament to push back against it. Whether Israel's strategic foothold in Somaliland and the resulting rupture with Mogadishu can coexist with a future normalization effort remains an open question that the available record does not resolve.