Israel's Next War: Strategic Scenarios and Planning

The phrase "Israel's next war" is an analytical shorthand rather than the official designation of a single conflict or military operation. Studies use it to examine the nature, triggers, and likely course of possible future conflicts involving Israel.[1][2] The scenarios extend from Lebanon and Syria to Gaza, the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — Iraq, Yemen, Iran, and the Gulf. They are planning frameworks rather than confirmed predictions.

One component of this planning is the "campaign between the wars," a term applied to Israeli actions intended to prevent enemy force-building and delay a larger confrontation. The Washington Institute describes Israeli strikes against arms shipments and Iranian facilities in Syria as part of this campaign, which carries an acknowledged risk of unintended escalation.[2] The INSS memorandum likewise treats continued limited operations against precision missiles and other core capabilities as one strategic alternative while emphasizing that Israel must also prepare for the possibility that prevention will fail.[1]

The concept reflects a threat environment shaped by Hezbollah's arsenal, Iranian entrenchment in Syria, precision-guided weapons, drones, advanced air defenses, and the possibility of simultaneous fighting on several fronts. The INSS assessment concludes that a future northern war would be more difficult than its predecessors and could substantially harm the economy, civilian resilience, and the IDF's freedom of action.[1]

Systematic institutional planning for a future major conflict became more visible after the 2006 Second Lebanon War, when the IDF reviewed and upgraded its training, weapons, and operational plans.[3] A 2009 Ynet interview with senior IDF officers described preparations for a possible war while emphasizing that preparation did not mean war was imminent. The officers assessed that improvements in enemy capabilities, including quality, quantity, and range, could threaten the military rear and civilian home front throughout the country.[3]

Chief Artillery Officer Brig.-Gen. David Savisa said the entire country could come under threat and rejected the idea that tens of thousands of rockets could be destroyed instantly.[3] Engineering Corps Commander Brig.-Gen. Moshe Shelly warned that an attack on central Israel would bring devastating consequences for the perpetrator, while the report stated that the IDF's capabilities were ten times greater than those used in Gaza.[3]

The October 7, 2023 attack broadened the planning debate. Ortal treated the Gaza war as a possible prelude to a larger northern war, while a 2026 Congressional Research Service assessment examined Israeli buffer zones in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and southern Syria, direct operations against Iran, and the sustainability of simultaneous fronts.[4][5] In March 2026, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly said that Israel's revised security concept included IDF control over zones deep inside enemy territory in eastern Gaza, southern Lebanon, and southern Syria.[5]

These post-October 7 assessments therefore connect the hypothetical "next war" with lessons drawn from an active multi-front security environment, while continuing to disagree about the timing and likelihood of a larger northern conflict.[1][4]

The concept is applied through planning that combines military readiness with economic, civilian, political, diplomatic, and cognitive preparation. The INSS recommends accurate intelligence, offensive precision capabilities, layered defenses, prepared ground forces, public resilience, civilian continuity, and advance coordination with major international partners.[1]

Ortal argues for concentrating approximately two years of force-design work on four or five major projects and for preparing to defeat Hezbollah as a military organization rather than conducting another limited deterrence operation.[4] The Reichman study adds public education, neighborhood emergency units, improved shelters, stronger local defense, larger ground forces, a dedicated missile corps, faster Iron Beam development, and improved passive defenses.[6]

Civilian logistics are another practical component. By April 2024, Israel had increased emergency stocks of food, medicine, and medical equipment by more than NIS 2 billion. Officials also warned that a northern war could disrupt maritime supply chains, electricity production, natural-gas infrastructure, and access to essential services.[7]

Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror's Jerusalem Center analysis recommends preventing large military threats from forming near Israel's borders during periods of quiet, strengthening border obstacles and buffer areas, integrating civilian communities into defense planning, maintaining minimum troop levels, and developing local air-defense capabilities.[8] A separate Jerusalem Center assessment gives priority to close U.S.-Israeli coordination against Iran and to preserving Israeli freedom of action against Hamas and Hezbollah.[9]

The most consistently developed scenario is a future major conflict on the northern front, centered on Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian-backed forces in Syria.[1] The INSS memorandum The Next War in the North: Scenarios, Strategic Alternatives, and Recommendations for Israel, based on planning begun in early 2019, explicitly examines threats and preparation requirements without predicting whether or when war will occur.[1]

The memorandum identifies Iran-led entrenchment in Syria and Lebanon, the creation of a land bridge from Tehran to Lebanon, Hezbollah's growing capabilities, and Iranian efforts to supply precision-guided missiles as central threats.[1] It anticipates rocket and missile salvos, precision weapons, drones targeting military and civilian sites, advanced air defenses, and attempts to infiltrate Israeli communities or military outposts. Its conclusion is that "the next Northern War will be different and more difficult than its predecessors."[1]

Hezbollah's arsenal is central to these assessments. At the time of its 2018 analysis, the Washington Institute estimated that Hezbollah possessed more than 100,000 rockets and missiles in Lebanon.[2] The Reichman University study projected approximately 2,500–3,000 launches per day for about three weeks from an estimated arsenal of roughly 150,000 rockets and missiles.[6] A separate preparedness assessment used an estimate of approximately 5,000 rockets per day.[7]

A Ynet analysis assessed that Hezbollah might open a war with its heaviest and most accurate missiles against the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, infrastructure, and possible military targets, including Syrian-supplied M-600 missiles with GPS-aided inertial navigation.[10] Based on Hassan Nasrallah's speeches and information from people studying Hezbollah, it projected that the opening barrage could continue for several hours and described possible anti-tank attacks, bombs, mortars, and raids by special units against Israeli communities and roads near the border.[10]

The INSS presents three broad alternatives: continuing the campaign between the wars to reduce core capabilities, conducting a limited war to weaken Shi'ite-axis forces in the northern arena, or initiating a general war intended to remove the threat and produce fundamental strategic change.[1] Its preparations include intelligence, precision strike capabilities, multilayered defense, prepared ground forces, civilian resilience, economic continuity, and diplomatic coordination.[1]

Syria adds a second potential theater. The Washington Institute outlines a Lebanon war involving Iran and foreign Shi'a fighters, a war in Syria involving Israel, Iran, Hezbollah, and possibly Syrian forces, and a simultaneous two-front war that could draw in actors from western Iraq.[2] It assesses that Israel might begin with an intense air campaign but would probably require large-scale ground operations to address rocket forces, infiltration attempts, and possible attacks on Israeli villages or military outposts.[2]

Israeli strategic analysis also considers simultaneous warfare across several theaters. The Reichman University report Israel's Preparedness for a Multi-Arena War examined a severe, though not extreme, scenario involving five arenas without Iran directly entering the war. It was prepared before October 7, 2023 with the participation of approximately 100 former senior security officials.[11]

The projected participants included Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed groups from Lebanon, pro-Iranian militias in Syria and Iraq, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, and the Houthis in Yemen.[11][6] Concentrated barrages could target major IDF bases or densely populated areas, while precision missiles could strike power plants, electricity infrastructure, desalination facilities, ports, weapons factories, emergency warehouses, and hospitals. The scenario also included cyberattacks and raids by hundreds of Radwan commandos.[6]

The study assessed that Iron Dome interceptor stocks and David's Sling missiles could be depleted within a few days, leaving Israel exposed to continuing fire.[6] Dispersed and concealed launchers could hinder air-force suppression efforts, while a ground maneuver into Lebanon might not stop launches from other locations. The projected conflict was described as strategically damaging and unprecedented but not existential for Israel.[6]

On the civilian side, the study found the home front inadequately prepared for the opening days. Projected consequences included casualties, infrastructure damage, electricity and water interruptions, rescue delays, difficulty obtaining food and medicine, psychological distress, disinformation, unrest among Arab citizens of Israel, possible violence in the West Bank, riots in mixed cities, and heavy pressure on local authorities.[6]

A 2026 Congressional Research Service assessment describes Israel's post-October 2023 posture as increasingly focused on degrading threats near its borders, creating buffer zones in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, and conducting direct operations against Iran.[5] It also reports concerns about simultaneous fronts, reserve capacity, material resources, the economy, and popular morale, and identifies a possible future choice between sustained military assertiveness and a partial return to deterrence because of manpower and supply constraints.[5]

The same assessment identifies several possible future arenas: renewed fighting with Hezbollah if disarmament and buffer arrangements fail, renewed Israel-Hamas fighting if Gaza negotiations collapse, confrontation with Syria over Israeli demilitarization demands, and strategic rivalry with Turkey over influence and weapons deployments in Syria. These are presented as scenarios and unresolved questions rather than fixed predictions.[5]

Iran is a central element of both northern and multi-front scenarios. The Washington Institute identifies Iranian military entrenchment in Syria, missile-production efforts, proxy warfare, and the possibility of direct Israel-Iran escalation as drivers of a broader conflict.[2] Amidror's 2026 Jerusalem Center analysis similarly argues that Iran could become Israel's principal direct adversary if immediate border threats are reduced, while retaining capabilities in conventional warfare, cyberattacks, terrorism, espionage, and internal subversion.[8]

Possible escalation pathways include an Iranian action from Syria, an Israeli strike in Lebanon or Syria, an attack on Iran's nuclear program, or a Gulf conflict that spreads to Israel's borders.[2] The Washington Institute characterizes unintended escalation as the most likely general pathway and also outlines a low-probability, high-impact regional war involving Gulf states, attacks on oil infrastructure, and possible U.S. intervention.[2]

Dr. Dan Diker warned that at least 40% of Iran's missile inventory had not been destroyed in the June 2025 joint U.S.-Israeli attack. He also described the possibility of a coordinated air, ground, and sea assault led by Iran and conducted through proxies including Hamas and Hezbollah.[12]

A separate Jerusalem Center assessment presents two possible sequences: a coordinated U.S.-Israeli operation against Iran followed by action against Hamas and Hezbollah, or Israeli action against Hamas and Hezbollah before regime change in Iran.[9] It argues that Israel should seek American legitimacy for renewed operations in Gaza and avoid allowing restrictions there to become precedents limiting action against Hezbollah or in Syria.[9]

Gaza and Judea and Samaria constitute recurring dimensions of the broader concept. In 2016, a senior Israeli defense official said that the next Gaza conflict should aim to remove the Hamas government and destroy its military wing, while Israel should avoid controlling Gaza without an alternative governing authority.[13] The official described another conflict with Hamas as unavoidable and said it should be the last one fought against a Hamas government in Gaza.[13]

A 2017 Jerusalem Center analysis described Hamas as rebuilding and expanding its capabilities after Operation Protective Edge. It cited Israeli security officials who estimated that Hamas had several thousand rockets and dozens of attack tunnels, and also described booby-trapped drones, naval commandos, cyber warfare, and infiltration operations.[14] The analysis characterized the quiet on the Gaza border as temporary and deceptive.[14]

In Judea and Samaria, Diker assessed that an October 7-style attack could originate there in 2026, citing large quantities of weapons and what he characterized as Palestinian Authority incitement and indoctrination.[12] He also described "prevention" as a new element of Israeli security doctrine under which Israel would act against detected adversary movement regardless of the perceived threat level.[12]

A 2026 Jerusalem Center assessment identifies Hamas's continued armed presence and Hezbollah's Iran-backed rehabilitation as unresolved threats.[9] Its stated priorities include renewed efforts to dismantle Hamas and demilitarize Gaza, confronting Hezbollah in Lebanon, coordinating closely with the United States against Iran, and preserving Israeli freedom of action across the various arenas.[9]

Brig. Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal's post-October 7 document The War of October 7 – and the One to Follow argues that a future war in the north, primarily involving Lebanon and Hezbollah, should be treated as a major planning priority. It assumes such a war should be expected within the next few years and recommends approximately two years of preparation focused on four or five major force-design projects.[4] Ortal states: "No military-size terror threat should ever again be allowed anywhere on Israel's borders."[4]

Ortal proposes defeating Hezbollah as a military organization and removing its ability to threaten Israel's home front rather than conducting another limited deterrence operation.[4] His recommendations include reducing ground forces' dependence on centralized intelligence and air support, strengthening border communities and reserve forces, improving counter-drone and electronic-warfare capabilities, protecting forces from precision weapons, and improving the ability to locate and destroy underground infrastructure.[4]

The INSS likewise recommends multilayered air defense, offensive precision capabilities, accurate intelligence, and prepared ground forces, together with economic, political, diplomatic, and civilian-front preparation.[1] The Reichman study adds public education, neighborhood emergency units, improved shelters, stronger local defense, larger ground forces, a dedicated missile corps, accelerated Iron Beam development, and improved passive defenses.[6]

Brig.-Gen. Yoram Laredo of the National Emergency Management Authority reported that Israel had increased emergency stocks of food, medicine, and medical equipment by more than NIS 2 billion.[7] He warned that war could disrupt supply chains because 99% of goods arriving in Israel come by sea. Electricity officials projected national, regional, and local outages, interruptions to natural-gas pipelines, and the loss of thousands of megawatts of generating capacity.[7]

Amidror's Jerusalem Center analysis recommends preventing major threats from forming near Israel's borders during periods of quiet. Its proposals include preemptive operations against force-building, stronger obstacles and buffers, integrated civilian-military planning, minimum troop levels maintained throughout the year, local air defenses, and intelligence systems that treat terrorist organizations as military threats.[8]

Future Israeli conflicts are expected to be increasingly shaped by artificial intelligence and advanced technology. Current U.S.-Israeli priorities in drones, missile defense, and cyber capabilities could evolve toward hypersonic missiles, AI-driven warfare, and directed-energy systems.[15]

Israel's military advantage is described as depending on integration among start-ups, universities, elite military units, and defense companies.[15] Unit 8200 is reportedly advancing artificial intelligence to process signals intelligence, identify hidden patterns, and assist human analysts, with the goal of shortening decision cycles while retaining human strategic control. The same analysis identifies Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Sunni jihadist movements, Muslim Brotherhood-inspired networks, Qatar, and Pakistan as possible future rivals or theaters.[15]

The Washington Institute assesses that a major conflict could span land, air, sea, information, and cyber domains, including cyberattacks against missile defenses and critical infrastructure.[2] The Reichman study similarly projects attacks against transportation, communications, government, local-authority, and traffic-control systems.[6]

Technological superiority does not ensure accurate strategic understanding. A Jerusalem Post analysis uses the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the October 7, 2023 attack as examples of warning signs interpreted through mistaken assumptions.[16] It argues that satellites, cyber systems, surveillance networks, missile defenses, and artificial intelligence can create an "illusion of omniscience" unless intelligence organizations continually challenge their analytical frameworks.[16]

Information and cognitive operations appear in the strategic literature as supporting dimensions of future warfare. The INSS recommends developing a cognitive strategy tailored to the Israeli public, Hezbollah and other members of the Shi'ite axis, the Lebanese public and establishment, and regional and international audiences.[1] The Washington Institute likewise assesses that conflict could extend into information and cyber domains.[2]

Public diplomacy forms a distinct but related non-kinetic arena. The Jerusalem Post's Hasbara topic page defines hasbara as Israeli public diplomacy and presents it as part of efforts to counter delegitimization campaigns such as BDS.[17]

These concerns connect information management with civilian resilience and international support. The INSS treats public preparedness and functional continuity as integral to war planning, while Amidror's Jerusalem Center analysis argues that military preparedness must be accompanied by economic, social, and diplomatic strength.[1][8]

The concept occupies a central place in Israeli national-security discourse because analysts regard the consequences of military defeat as unusually severe. Amidror's Jerusalem Center analysis argues that Israel must prepare for the next conflict after every war because a single defeat could threaten the survival of the Jewish national state.[8]

The IDF chief's December 2019 warning that "the next war will hit our home front extremely hard" encapsulates a recurring concern.[18] The prospect of attacks on Israeli cities, infrastructure, and civilian life affects resource allocation and home-front policy, while large missile arsenals and dispersed launchers could complicate both defense and efforts to bring a war to a rapid conclusion.[3][6]

The scenarios also reflect a broader and more complex threat environment than the 2006 Lebanon War. The Washington Institute projects more actors, fronts, theaters, and domains, while the INSS anticipates precision-guided missiles, drones, advanced air defenses, and infiltration attempts.[1][2] Planning has consequently expanded beyond combat forces to encompass civilian resilience, economic continuity, diplomacy, intelligence, and information management.[1][4]

The Reichman study's conclusion that a major multi-front conflict could be unprecedented and strategically damaging but not existential provides one benchmark for the scenarios' severity.[6] Across the literature, the recurring concerns are the scale of missile fire, the vulnerability of the home front, the demands of simultaneous theaters, and the difficulty of escalation management.

The analyses are scenarios and forecasts rather than descriptions of confirmed future events. The INSS explicitly declines to predict whether or when war will occur, whereas Ortal assumes that a northern war should be expected within the next few years.[1][4] The Washington Institute presents several possible triggers and theaters rather than one definitive course of events.[2]

Projected Hezbollah launch rates also differ. The Reichman scenario estimates approximately 2,500–3,000 rockets and missiles per day, while a separate emergency-preparedness assessment uses approximately 5,000 per day.[6][7] These figures reflect different models rather than verified operational plans.

Assessments of Hamas's capabilities in the 2017 source describe conditions at that time and should not be read as a current inventory.[14] The Ynet description of Hezbollah strategy is based partly on Nasrallah's speeches and information from people studying the organization, not on a confirmed Hezbollah operational plan.[10]

Claims concerning Palestinian Authority incitement and Turkey's possible future role are attributed assessments rather than settled facts.[12][15] Predictions about Russian or American conduct in a regional war are likewise presented as open questions.[2] These limitations do not negate the value of scenario planning, but they mean that "Israel's next war" remains an analytical framework rather than a settled forecast.