Israel–Oman Relations

High-level access and practical cooperation, rather than a sustained exchange of embassies, have characterized Israel’s relationship with Oman.[1][7] Israeli prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Benjamin Netanyahu visited the sultanate, while an Israeli commercial representation operated there during the 1990s.[1][3] These contacts developed alongside Oman’s support for a comprehensive Arab–Israeli peace process and its emphasis on resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.[1][8]

Under Sultan Qaboos, Oman pursued a foreign policy of balancing relationships, including friendly ties with Iran and engagement with Israel.[2] Its relationship with Israel consequently developed within a regional policy that did not require Oman to abandon its Iranian connections.[2] Political engagement with Israeli leaders also coexisted with particular attention to Palestinian statehood and negotiations.[1][2]

Water research, desalination, and economic representation supplied concrete areas of contact.[1][3] Aviation became another practical channel in 2023.[5] The Middle East Desalination Research Center in Muscat has provided an institutional setting for regional cooperation and, at times, direct meetings between Israeli and Palestinian Authority officials.[1] These practical channels have not amounted to Omani participation in the Abraham Accords or the establishment of full diplomatic relations.[1]

Contacts between Israel and Oman date to the 1970s, following Sultan Qaboos’s accession and during the conflict in Oman’s Dhofar region.[2] British officials initiated the relationship, and Israeli military and political advice supplemented British and Iranian assistance to Oman; Israel also helped address water shortages.[2] This early relationship remained secret and sensitive for roughly two decades before the public initiatives of the 1990s.[2]

The Arab–Israeli peace process launched in 1991 provided a broader framework for engagement.[1] Oman and the other Gulf Cooperation Council states participated in its multilateral talks.[1] In its account of regional cooperation, the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs places Oman among the Arab participants when the multilateral talks formally convened in Moscow in January 1992, describing working groups on the environment, water, regional security, refugees, and economic development as mechanisms for cooperation and confidence-building.[9]

In April 1994, Oman hosted a plenary meeting of the Water Working Group, becoming the first Gulf state to host such a meeting.[3] The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs also identifies an October 1994 Environmental Working Group meeting in Muscat as the occasion on which regional participants agreed on the Bahrain Environmental Code of Conduct for the Middle East.[9] Its account describes principles covering preservation of natural resources, the relationship between comprehensive peace and environmental protection, and cooperation on water, coastal and marine environments, air, waste management, and desertification.[9]

The 1994 Israel–Jordan peace agreement was followed by a more public phase in Israel–Oman relations.[2] That year, Rabin flew directly from Tel Aviv to Muscat and met Sultan Qaboos, making Oman the first Gulf state officially to receive an Israeli prime minister.[1][2] Both governments agreed to publicize the visit, bringing a previously discreet relationship into public view.[2] Oman also became the first Gulf state to approve an Israeli diplomatic mission.[2]

Contacts continued after Rabin’s visit.[10] In 1995, shortly after Rabin’s assassination, acting prime minister Shimon Peres hosted Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi in Jerusalem.[10] Peres then visited Oman in April 1996.[1] These exchanges preceded or accompanied arrangements for trade representation that gave the relationship a more visible institutional form.[1][10]

The two governments negotiated reciprocal trade representative offices in the mid-1990s, and an Israeli office began operating in Muscat in 1996.[3][10] The agreement signed in Muscat involved an Israeli delegation led by Deputy Director-General Yoav Biran and Foreign Ministry official Rafael Barak, who were received by Yusuf bin Alawi.[11] The office’s stated purposes included developing economic and trade relations and cooperation in water, agriculture, medicine, and communications.[11] The agreement was described as Israel’s seventh with an Arab country since 1979 and its second with a Gulf state, after Qatar.[11]

Commercial cooperation was an important part of Oman’s regional approach during this period.[8] Oman supported a comprehensive Arab–Israeli peace process while treating trade and practical economic activity as preferred avenues for regional cooperation, rather than focusing chiefly on the diplomatic rank of representatives.[8] The Israeli office in Muscat operated much like a regular embassy, although it did not fly an Israeli flag.[10] The relationship nevertheless did not develop into an enduring exchange of embassies.[1][7]

Oman closed the Israeli Trade Office in October 2000 amid public demonstrations against Israel at the beginning of the Second Intifada.[3] Israeli officials expressed regret, arguing that keeping communication channels open was particularly important during a crisis.[10] The closure ended the period of visible commercial representation, and the trade offices remained closed in subsequent years.[1] Water cooperation and quieter political contacts nevertheless continued.[12]

In 2008, Tzipi Livni met her Omani counterpart, demonstrating continued diplomatic outreach without reopening the trade office.[12] Israeli scientists also cooperated with Oman on desalination techniques during the period following the closure.[12]

The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs reports another discreet encounter in November 2009, when Israeli Foreign Ministry Director-General Yossi Gal and other senior officials met Omani officials in Muscat, including Yusuf bin Alawi.[9] Its account gives attendance at the desalination center’s annual conference as their stated reason for visiting, illustrating the connection between technical institutions and political access.[9]

Netanyahu’s October 25, 2018 journey to Muscat was the first public visit by an Israeli prime minister to Oman in 22 years.[1][13] He traveled at Qaboos’s invitation after lengthy contacts between the countries, accompanied by his wife Sara and senior government and security officials.[10] The delegation included Mossad Director Yossi Cohen, National Security Adviser Meir Ben-Shabbat, Chief of Staff Yoav Horowitz, Foreign Ministry Director-General Yuval Rotem, and military secretary Avi Blot.[14]

The joint statement said the discussions concerned advancing the Middle East peace process and shared interests relating to regional peace and stability.[10] The visit followed a visit to Oman by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.[13] Preparations had lasted approximately a year and a half and involved numerous telephone calls.[15] Netanyahu also said that the discussions covered air, sea, and land transportation, including a proposed rail network linking Oman to Haifa.[15] The encounter was not presented as Oman formally assuming the role of mediator between Israel and the Palestinians.[15]

In February 2019, Yusuf bin Alawi stated that Oman was not normalizing relations with Israel and characterized its contacts as a diplomatic process aimed at a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian issue.[16] He described an independent, sovereign Palestinian state as a basic condition for normalization or a future relationship between Israel and the Arab region.[16] Later that year, the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs reported that Israeli Foreign Minister Yisrael Katz had raised a proposed non-aggression agreement with bin Alawi in September, presenting it as a possible step toward full normalization.[17]

Oman publicly welcomed the UAE’s decision to establish relations with Israel in August 2020.[4] Its statement supported the UAE’s decision but did not announce Omani normalization.[4] That month, Israeli Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi also spoke by telephone with bin Alawi, who supported comprehensive regional peace and the resumption of Israeli–Palestinian negotiations.[18]

In 2021, Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad al-Busaidi said Oman would not then follow the UAE and Bahrain in normalizing relations.[19] He affirmed Palestinian rights, supported a two-state solution, and called for respect for Oman’s sovereign decisions.[19] In June 2023, he said Oman was open to relations with Israel but that full relations should accompany an agreement recognizing a Palestinian state.[20] He also expressed willingness to assist the peace process while saying that the necessary willingness was not then apparent on the Israeli side.[20]

The Middle East Desalination Research Center in Muscat emerged from the multilateral water-cooperation process and became a lasting institutional link involving Israel and Oman.[1][3] The initiative addressed regional water data, supply, management, and cooperation.[3] It has also facilitated direct meetings between Israeli and Palestinian Authority officials on water issues, giving technical cooperation a role beyond research alone.[1]

The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs identifies Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Oman, and Qatar among the center’s regional participants.[9] Its account describes desalination research and education, grants, and engagement with more than 200 experts worldwide, and argues that the institution served as a point of contact between Israel and Oman after 2000.[9] Israeli experts participated in the desalination research center’s work, and Israeli scientists cooperated with Oman on desalination techniques after the trade office closed.[9][12]

Water cooperation continued during periods when open relations between Israel and Gulf states were severed over the Israeli–Palestinian political impasse.[13] Israeli military support was also reportedly provided during such periods, although the available account supplies neither operational details nor a specification of its scope.[13] The documented areas of civilian cooperation are more concrete: the trade-office agreement explicitly envisaged collaboration in agriculture, medicine, communications, and water alongside economic exchange.[11]

Civil aviation provided another practical opening in February 2023.[5] On February 23, Oman’s Civil Aviation Authority announced that its airspace was open to all carriers meeting its overflight requirements.[5] The statement did not name Israel, but Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen announced that the decision permitted Israeli airlines to overfly Oman and thanked the sultanate.[1][5] The announcement followed months of talks between Israel’s Foreign Ministry and Omani authorities.[5]

Combined with Saudi Arabia’s earlier approval, Omani permission created a shorter corridor for Israeli aircraft flying east.[21] Estimates differed by destination and routing: some flights, including services between Israel and India, were expected to be shortened by around two hours.[21] The opening thus had a direct commercial application without requiring full diplomatic relations.[1][21]

On February 26, 2023, an El Al Boeing 787 flying from Tel Aviv to Bangkok became the first Israeli commercial aircraft to cross Omani airspace.[22] The route was expected to reduce Israel–Thailand flight times by about three hours, while a flight to India was reported to take five and a half hours rather than eight and a half.[22] Shorter routes were also expected to lower operating costs, although ticket-price reductions had not yet appeared at the time of the initial report.[22] Other anticipated possibilities included lower fares and service to more distant destinations such as Australia.[12]

The opening followed an earlier unrealized announcement: after his 2018 visit, Netanyahu had said Oman would open its airspace to El Al, but that did not happen at the time.[12] The February 2023 decision therefore marked an implemented change rather than merely a renewed statement of intent.[5][22]

The aviation opening did not endure through the Gaza war.[6] Permission for Israeli aircraft to cross Oman was withdrawn after the war began in October 2023.[6] El Al paused using Omani airspace on flights to Southeast Asia during the 2023–2025 Israel–Hamas war.[1] By 2025, Israeli airlines were again awaiting Omani permission, with the route expected to shorten Israel–India flying time from about nine hours to seven.[6] In November 2025, Israel had asked Oman to restore access for Israeli carriers.[23]

Oman’s reception of Rabin in 1994 established a Gulf precedent for publicly hosting an Israeli prime minister.[1] Subsequent visits by Peres and Netanyahu demonstrated that senior-level engagement could recur even without full diplomatic relations or a continuously operating Israeli representative office.[1][13] The relationship has consequently been classified as informal normalization: bilateral ties maintained without diplomatic relations.[7]

The combination of political access and technical cooperation distinguished this relationship from a simple choice between full normalization and complete disengagement.[1][7] Water institutions maintained opportunities for meetings, commercial representation provided a temporary framework for economic contact, and the 2023 aviation decision briefly produced a tangible improvement in Israel’s connections to Asian destinations.[1][21] Israeli scientific expertise in desalination was one of the practical contributions sustained beyond the office’s closure.[12]

Oman’s support for the UAE–Israel agreement did not mean that it accepted the same diplomatic course for itself.[4] It remained outside the Abraham Accords and repeatedly advocated a two-state solution, including an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.[1] Its officials treated Palestinian statehood as a condition for full relations rather than viewing technical cooperation or meetings with Israeli leaders as substitutes for a political settlement.[16][20]

Domestic political constraints also affected the relationship.[3][24] In December 2022, Oman’s Majlis al-Shura voted on an amendment expanding the first clause of the Israel boycott law to cover sports, cultural, and economic contact, as well as in-person and online interactions with Israelis.[24] The proposal still required consideration by the legislative committee and a final vote, so this was an interim parliamentary action rather than completed enactment.[24]

The Gaza war brought stronger official criticism of Israel and widespread opposition to Israel and the United States within Oman.[1] Some Omanis boycotted U.S. corporations to protest American support for Israel.[1] In 2024, senior Omani diplomatic official Sheikh Khalifa bin Ali al-Harthy said Oman had no intention of normalizing relations, denied direct communication with Tel Aviv, and denied that Oman was transmitting messages between Israel and Iran.[25] He instead described contacts with regional states and the international community to reduce tensions, while calling for an end to the Gaza war and Palestinian statehood.[25]

In November 2025, Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi stated: “We have long known that Israel, not Iran, is the prime source of insecurity in the region.”[1] This explicit criticism stood alongside the history of cooperation and public visits, rather than replacing the record of earlier engagement.[1][2] As of October 2026, Oman still had no full diplomatic relations with Israel, despite the contacts maintained over previous decades.[26]

The principal documentary dispute concerns how to characterize the relationship’s formal status in the 1990s.[1][27] Some accounts describe official diplomatic relations, including an Israeli government publication, while other accounts distinguish trade offices and informal normalization from full diplomatic relations.[7][27] A reference account dates diplomatic relations to 1993, whereas the more specific institutional descriptions emphasize commercial representation rather than exchanged embassies.[1][28] These descriptions should not be treated as interchangeable.[1][7]

There is also disagreement over whether Oman actually opened a reciprocal trade office in Israel: some accounts describe an exchange of offices, while others say the Omani office never opened.[1][12] The establishment dates likewise range across agreement, exchange, and implementation stages in 1995–1996.[1][3] The clearest common institutional milestone is the operation of the Israeli office in Muscat and its closure in October 2000.[3][10]

The scope and continuity of discreet contacts remain less clearly documented than public visits and civilian projects.[2][13] Reports of Israeli military assistance provide limited details, while retrospective accounts of unofficial channels coexist with an Omani official’s 2024 denial of direct communication.[13][25] Such accounts establish different reported episodes and official positions, not a verified picture of an uninterrupted private relationship.[13][25]