Israel–Netherlands Relations

The Netherlands was among Israel’s strongest early European supporters, combining diplomatic recognition with public solidarity and assistance in international institutions.[1][3] Its support included opposition to the Arab boycott, help in developing Israel’s connections with the European Economic Community, and representation of Israeli interests in countries where Israel lacked diplomatic relations.[3] The Netherlands maintained an embassy in Jerusalem until 1980; Israel’s embassy in the Netherlands is in The Hague.[4][1]

Bilateral cooperation has extended well beyond diplomacy, encompassing trade, agricultural expertise, water technology, scientific research, healthcare innovation and military equipment.[2][3] Dutch political support for Israel nevertheless became more fragmented, with increasingly vocal backing concentrated on the political right and greater support for Palestinian recognition among left-wing parties.[2] The relationship consequently combined continuing practical cooperation with sharper disagreements over Israeli government policies and the conditions governing European engagement with Israel.[2][4]

The Netherlands voted for the United Nations partition plan for Palestine on November 29, 1947, and formally recognized Israel in 1949, when diplomatic relations were established.[3][1] Its early diplomatic representation was located in Jerusalem rather than Tel Aviv, distinguishing the Netherlands from other Western countries.[2]

Israel established its legation in The Hague in summer 1950, and its first minister to the Netherlands, Michael Amir, presented his credentials to Queen Juliana that September.[5] The establishment of the legation reduced the need for Dutch Zionist organizations to make representations to the Dutch government on Israel’s behalf; relations between those organizations and the government were described at the time as excellent, alongside a sympathetic Dutch attitude toward Israel.[5]

Several circumstances encouraged early affinity: the Netherlands had relatively few competing interests in the Middle East, while the experience of German invasion and occupation made identification with a small country surrounded by larger neighbors especially resonant.[2] Dutch Labor admiration for Israel’s socialist ideals, Christian parties’ religious and emotional attachment to the land, and Dutch Atlanticism—the orientation toward the United States rather than France and Britain—also supported the relationship during its first decades.[2]

When the Soviet Union severed relations with Israel in 1953, the Netherlands represented Israeli interests there and contributed to the restoration of ties.[3] Following the Six-Day War in 1967, it again represented Israeli interests in the Soviet Union and also in Poland.[3] Dutch representation in Moscow continued for years after the Soviet break with Israel.[4]

Public solidarity during the Six-Day War included blood drives, church prayers, rallies and a widely visible “I stand behind Israel” bumper-sticker campaign.[6] Corporations and trade unions mobilized fundraising, while Dutch residents raised approximately $4.2 million for Israel after the war.[6][1] Ronny Naftaniel, then a young Amsterdam Jew, recalled widespread anxiety about Israel’s survival and relief at its victory.[6]

During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Netherlands and Portugal were the only European countries to permit American aircraft carrying military equipment to Israel to pass through.[1] The Netherlands also vetoed a proposed European Economic Community declaration demanding Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories.[2] Arab oil producers extended their embargo to the Netherlands, Portugal and South Africa because they regarded these countries as supporters of Israel.[7] The embargo involved restrictions on petroleum exports and production and was lifted in March 1974 as prospects for a negotiated end to hostilities improved.[7]

Retired Israeli diplomat Avi Pazner later linked the specific oil ban against the Netherlands both to Dutch support for Israel and to Rotterdam’s importance as a northern European port.[8] He also recalled Dutch truck drivers working in Israel after Israeli drivers had been mobilized, arguing that their presence generated sympathy for the Netherlands, even though some Israelis mistakenly understood them to be volunteers.[8]

From the 1970s onward, Dutch policy moved closer to the European Community’s more critical approach toward Israel while retaining a friendly bilateral relationship.[3] The Netherlands sometimes helped moderate draft UN resolutions and was among 16 countries opposing a December 4, 1985 resolution demanding Israel’s unconditional withdrawal from territories occupied since 1967.[3] It also voted for a resolution declaring Israel’s incorporation of Jerusalem unlawful and criticized the Israeli bombing of PLO headquarters in Tunisia.[3] The PLO did not receive Dutch diplomatic recognition, and the Palestinian office opened in The Hague in July 1983 had only information-office status.[3]

During the 1991 Gulf War, the Dutch parliament approved lending Israel eight Patriot systems with 70 instructors and maintenance personnel.[3] They arrived after Iraqi Scud attacks had ended and were not used.[3] The Dutch government also provided additional funding for Palestinian food supplies in the administered areas and donated 10,000 gas masks.[3]

In 2013, Dutch Foreign Minister Frans Timmermans and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to establish a Dutch-Israeli Cooperation Forum, bringing business, academic, civil-society and government representatives together around innovation and further cooperation.[9] Its first meeting took place that December during a meeting between Prime Ministers Mark Rutte and Netanyahu.[10] Close political relations continued during Rutte’s 14 years as Dutch prime minister, even as professional foreign-ministry officials increasingly emphasized international law, human rights and settlements.[11]

Palestinian recognition became a prominent domestic question in 2014, when more than half of Dutch political parties supported recognition, principally on the left.[2] On November 25, Foreign Minister Bert Koenders reaffirmed support for a two-state solution but opposed unilateral recognition, arguing that it would not restart negotiations and that recognition should occur “at a strategic moment.”[1] In September 2016, Israeli officials visiting the Netherlands reached an agreement on joint work to improve Gaza’s water and energy supplies.[12] In late 2018, the Dutch parliament voted to reduce funding to the Palestinian Authority by 7 percent, an amount based on an estimate of the PA budget devoted to payments to imprisoned terrorists and families of “martyrs.”[12]

Following Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, FIU-Netherlands co-chaired the Counterterrorist Financing Taskforce-Israel, intended to disrupt international money flows to Hamas through coordination and financial-intelligence sharing.[13] Israeli President Isaac Herzog attended the opening of the Dutch National Holocaust Museum on March 10, 2024.[14] Approximately 2,000 people protested his presence; some chanted antisemitic slogans, and 13 people were arrested after the demonstration became violent.[14] The episode occurred amid increased antisemitic incidents in the Netherlands following the October attacks and Israel’s subsequent response.[14]

On November 7, 2024, Israeli supporters were attacked in Amsterdam after a Maccabi Tel Aviv–Ajax soccer match, with masked assailants harassing and beating Israelis around the city; injuries and arrests followed.[12] Israeli officials condemned the violence as antisemitic and called it a “pogrom,” while Dutch Prime Minister Dick Schoof pledged to pursue those responsible.[12] Later that month, after the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and former defense minister Yoav Gallant on November 21, the Netherlands confirmed that it would act on them.[12] Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar expressed disappointment, and a planned visit to Israel by Dutch Foreign Minister Caspar Veldkamp was canceled.[12]

In May 2025, Veldkamp called for an urgent review of Israel’s compliance with Article 2 of the EU–Israel Association Agreement, which concerns human rights and democratic principles.[15] Linking his demand to Gaza, he said the Netherlands would suspend progress on a future EU–Israel Action Plan while Israel continued to refuse humanitarian aid entry; the Netherlands had previously opposed a similar review proposed by other EU countries.[15] He described Gaza’s humanitarian situation as “catastrophic” and said the Netherlands was “drawing a line in the sand,” prompting criticism from governing-coalition party leader Geert Wilders.[16] The Action Plan requires unanimous approval from the EU’s 27 members.[16]

In July 2025, 16 other EU member states joined a Dutch-initiated discussion about exploring suspension of the Association Agreement, citing an alleged breach of Article 2.[17] The foreign ministers’ meeting ended without a vote on concrete measures, following an EU–Israel understanding under which Israel was expected to improve Gaza’s humanitarian situation.[17] Veldkamp said implementation would be monitored and future sanctions remained possible.[17] That month, the Netherlands also barred Israeli ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich from entering, citing their support for prolonging the Gaza war and promoting Palestinian emigration.[12]

By September 2025, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark were seeking suspension of the EU–Israel free-trade agreement.[18] Veldkamp resigned after the Dutch government declined to impose sanctions on Israel, and his successor supported the proposed European measure.[18] These developments represented efforts to change EU policy rather than a completed suspension of the agreement.[18]

The Dutch coalition agreement of 2026 pledged to retain national and European sanctions against the Netanyahu government, its members and associates until significant steps toward peace and adherence to international law were taken.[19] It also committed to opposing settlement expansion, supporting Gaza reconstruction and renewing cooperation with UNRWA.[19] The government distinguished the Israeli government from the State of Israel, supported a Palestinian state alongside a secure Israel, condemned Hamas’s October 7 attack and called for Hamas to disarm and have no role in Gaza’s future government.[19]

On September 22, 2026, a Dutch ban took effect covering imports, purchases, sales and commercial brokering of goods originating in settlements in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — as well as East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.[4] Adopted nationally after efforts to secure a joint EU measure failed, it was scheduled to remain in force for three years and excluded products originating within Israel’s pre-1967 lines.[4] The decree also covered goods containing parts or ingredients from the designated areas, applied to Dutch citizens abroad and carried a maximum penalty of six years’ imprisonment.[20]

Customs enforcement included goods carried by private passengers, with travelers arriving from Tel Aviv on El Al reporting luggage searches.[4][21] Israel issued a travel advisory warning of potentially lengthy baggage inspections and legal penalties for prohibited goods.[21] On September 28, Israel required Dutch diplomats working with the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah to return Israeli-issued credentials within seven days, after which their Israeli-granted privileges and immunities would expire.[21] Dutch Foreign Minister Tom Berendsen called the response unnecessary and said the goods restriction concerned Dutch international-law obligations rather than opposition to Israel as a state.[11]

An August 2026 announcement by Sa’ar had also called for removing Dutch representatives from the International Support Center for Gaza in Kiryat Gat in response to Dutch settlement-related legislation.[22] In an October interview, Israeli Ambassador Zvi Vapni assessed relations as likely at their lowest point in history, citing unfavorable Dutch policies and a lack of substantive governmental dialogue.[23] He traced the deterioration to a gradual shift that included Veldkamp’s proposal to examine Israeli compliance with the Association Agreement.[23]

Bilateral trade reached $75 million in 1966 and $84 million in 1968, with Dutch exports to Israel somewhat exceeding Israeli exports to the Netherlands.[3] From 2006 through 2009, the Netherlands was Israel’s most important export market within the EU.[2] Israeli exports to the Netherlands totaled $2.1 billion in 2013, equivalent to 4.4 percent of Israel’s exports that year, and the Netherlands was then Israel’s fifth-largest trade partner after the United States, Britain, China and Turkey.[10] A 2026 estimate placed the Netherlands’ share at approximately 5 percent of total Israeli exports.[20]

Agriculture and water technology have been important cooperation fields in which both countries developed leading expertise.[2] Israel also learned substantially from Dutch agricultural knowledge.[11] The Netherlands–Israel Research Program (NIRA) began in 1992. It carried out 35 joint studies in 1997, including 25 in Africa and two in the Palestinian Authority, and 19 studies in 2003, nine of them in Africa.[24]

A 2014 healthcare innovation event in Amsterdam connected Israeli companies with Dutch business interests around healthy aging.[10] It also reflected interest in expanding scientific cooperation alongside Israel’s participation in Horizon 2020.[10] Israel’s Economy Ministry selected a Teva Pharmaceuticals–Philips joint venture to operate an incubator for pharmaceuticals and medical devices, particularly digitally enabled products.[10]

In February 2016, the countries marked the second anniversary of a joint economic-development statement, while The Hague hosted an Israel–Holland Innovation Day focused on smart cities.[25] Participants included industrialists, government representatives and Israeli firms Mobileye, Checkmarx and Cellint; Dr. Racheli Kreisberg had also been appointed innovation attaché at the Dutch Embassy in Israel.[25] Cooperation included Sanara Ventures, the Philips–Teva medical-device investment venture developed after an earlier aging-focused Innovation Day, as well as ventures involving Orbotech and startups.[25]

Prince Constantijn van Oranje, head of StartupDelta, visited Israel with Dutch investors and angel investors in September 2018 to strengthen connections with Israeli venture-capital funds and encourage Israeli companies to establish themselves in the Netherlands.[26] The delegation sought Israeli experience in building technology and innovation centers, with interests spanning cybersecurity, agritech, food technology and medical technology.[26] Some Israeli companies had already established European headquarters in the Netherlands.[26]

Israeli defense procurement became another substantial component of cooperation.[12] In 2023, Elbit Systems contracted to provide the Royal Netherlands Army with a $305 million artillery rocket system, described as Israel’s first defense-export contract with that army.[12] Elbit later signed a $55 million contract for a multilayered counter-drone system.[12] A separate 2024 Israeli export comprised Elbit aircraft self-protection suites valued at $175 million.[27]

By September 5, 2024, the Dutch Army had purchased more than 200 Rafael anti-tank missile launchers for up to €250 million.[12] The Army and Marines were to use Rafael’s Integrated Command Launch Unit, compatible with older Spike missiles and capable of firing Spike LR2 missiles with a stated range of 5,000 meters.[12]

In the opposite direction, the Netherlands participated in the U.S.-produced F-35 program and hosted a regional components warehouse at Woensdrecht supplying participating users, including Israel.[28] A 2016 general permit allowed deliveries without separate shipment-by-shipment authorization, subject to Dutch obligations governing military exports.[28] In reviewing that arrangement, the Dutch minister considered Israel’s right to defend itself and the importance of relations with Israel and the United States.[28]

On February 12, 2024, the Hague Court of Appeal ordered exports of F-35 parts to Israel stopped within seven days, finding a “clear risk” of use in serious violations of international humanitarian law and concluding that the government had not properly applied the required risk test.[28] The case was brought by three nongovernmental organizations and overturned a district-court dismissal from December 2023.[28][29] The Dutch government appealed, maintaining that export policy belonged to the executive; it had also argued that the United States could supply Israel through other warehouses and bases.[30][29]

The Netherlands amended its general F-35 hub license to exclude Israel as a direct destination.[31] A 2025 English High Court judgment distinguished that restriction from a separate challenge to parts routed through the United States, which was then pending before the Dutch Supreme Court.[31] In October 2025, the Supreme Court ruled that the appeals court had exceeded its authority and directed the government to reassess the license.[30] The suspension remained during reassessment, and the government said it would retain the ban under the circumstances then prevailing.[30]

In April 2025, the Netherlands also changed rules for military and dual-use exports to Israel, requiring individual permits and checks instead of general licenses.[12] No military goods had been exported under a general permit since October 7, 2023, although lower-risk products such as network-security routers had previously used that mechanism; the new system was expected to involve 50 to 100 permits.[12]

More than 7,000 Dutch Jews have immigrated to Israel since 1948, giving the relationship a continuing personal and communal dimension.[1] A 1952 account already described a steady flow of Jewish emigration from the Netherlands, chiefly to Israel, although statistics were unavailable because most emigrants financed their own passage.[5]

Dutch tourism to Israel increased from 7,983 visitors in 1966 to 9,308 in 1967 and 14,047 in 1968.[3] Cultural exchanges included exhibitions of Dutch and Israeli art, Israel Philharmonic Orchestra performances in the Netherlands and reciprocal participation in annual marches.[3] Later innovation forums and business delegations added institutional connections between researchers, entrepreneurs and investors to these older cultural and communal links.[9][26]

Dutch media attention has concentrated heavily on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.[32] A study of six widely distributed Dutch daily newspapers counted more than 350 Israel-related articles from January 2016 through February 2017, the 14 months preceding the March 2017 general election.[32] Of these, 221 addressed settlements, including 103 in NRC Handelsblad and five in Metro; recurring themes included settlement legality and the relationship between settlements and peace negotiations.[32] These findings describe the specified newspaper sample and period rather than Dutch public opinion as a whole.[32]

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict was the only international conflict mentioned in the coalition agreement of the Dutch government announced in late 2017.[32] Rutte was among political leaders quoted in newspaper coverage criticizing Israeli settlement policy.[32] Dutch policy also reflected differences between relatively close political leadership ties and a foreign-ministry establishment increasingly focused on settlements, human rights and international law.[11] Dutch officials had warned companies about settlement-related economic activity for approximately 15 years before 2026, while ministry employees and former diplomats protested what they considered inadequate pressure on Israel.[11]

Commercial controversies could mobilize supporters as well as critics of Israel: after a Dutch woman objected to Hema selling Efrat wine under an Israeli label, pro-Israel advocates bought the wine in quantities that caused it to sell out within hours.[2] At the institutional level, however, the University of Amsterdam suspended its student exchange with Hebrew University of Jerusalem in March 2025 after an internal collaboration review.[12] The university cited concerns about human rights and military misuse of research, including Hebrew University’s defense-industry and army-training connections.[12]

The 2026 goods restrictions raised concerns extending beyond the immediate trade in settlement products.[20] Israeli sources feared Dutch companies might avoid Israeli business partners to reduce legal exposure and that other countries could adopt similar measures.[20] Settlement-origin exports to the EU were estimated at approximately $200 million annually, but the immediate direct economic effect of the Dutch measure was difficult to estimate.[20]

The principal disputes concern territorial policy, Gaza, arms-export obligations and the use of European economic or diplomatic measures against Israeli government policies.[2][19] The February 2024 F-35 ruling addressed the risk that exported parts could be used in serious violations of international humanitarian law; it did not adjudicate whether Israel had committed such violations.[28] The ICC warrants and their legal implications also remain contested.[12] Ambassador Vapni’s description of a historic low represents his assessment rather than an independently measured ranking of bilateral relations.[23]

Disagreements have also extended to proposed limits on cooperation: a Dutch foreign-policy advisory council’s recommendations to freeze or restrict relations, especially economic and military ties, drew criticism from Israeli officials and Dutch politicians in 2013.[9] In a retrospective interview, former European Commissioner Frits Bolkestein said he and then Israeli industry and trade minister Ehud Olmert agreed that products from the occupied territories would not benefit from the EU–Israel free-trade agreement; this was his account of their discussion, not a complete statement of the agreement’s legal terms.[33]