Belgium–Israel Relations

Belgium voted in favor of the 1947 United Nations General Assembly resolution to partition Palestine and create a Jewish state, placing it among the early supporters of Jewish statehood.[4] When Israel applied for UN membership in December 1948, however, Belgium abstained in the Security Council vote. The application was rejected because it received only five of the required seven affirmative votes.[6]

When the UN General Assembly took up Israel's admission on May 11, 1949, Belgium again abstained. Resolution 273 (III) passed with 37 votes in favor, 12 against, and nine abstentions.[7] Despite those abstentions, Belgium recognized Israel on January 29, 1949, and granted de jure recognition on January 18, 1950, when it appointed a minister to represent it in Israel.[2][8] President Chaim Weizmann, receiving the Belgian minister, praised Belgium's achievements in natural resources, industry, and science.[8]

A 1956–57 account described Belgium's general attitude toward Israel as sympathetic, while recording criticism within Belgium of the pace of Israel's withdrawal from Sinai following the Suez crisis.[9] Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak argued in parliament that the UN could not assess the final act of aggression without considering its origins and causes. Israel also agreed to participate in the Brussels Universal Exposition, proceeding with a pavilion devoted to Jewish history and Israeli achievements despite economic concerns and unsuccessful fundraising among Belgian Jews.[9]

Bilateral trade grew substantially in the decades following recognition. By 1980, Belgian exports to Israel reached $404 million, while imports from Israel stood at $236 million.[10] A U.S. State Department profile published in 2009 listed Belgium among Israel's notable export destinations and import sources, although it supplied no specific bilateral value and used 2008 trade estimates.[11]

In May 2024, Belgium was described as Israel's fourth-largest trading partner within the European Union, mainly because of the Antwerp diamond trade.[12] In December 2004, Israel and Belgium signed a customs treaty establishing administrative arrangements between their customs authorities. It provided for sharing information about law-enforcement methods, customs evasion, suspected smugglers, and smuggled goods, subject to Israeli domestic law and exclusions for security and diplomatic matters.[13]

In December 2017, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited EU headquarters in Brussels, the first such visit to EU institutions.[14] Israel's presence in Belgium has included its embassy and EU delegation in Brussels and honorary-consul consulates in Antwerp and Liège.[3]

Beyond formal diplomacy, ties between Belgium and Israel are sustained by longstanding Jewish community connections. Many thousands of Belgian Jews have immigrated to Israel since 1948 and established the Association Originaires de Belgique en Israël, linking Belgian-born Israelis to their country of origin.[1]

At a Brussels ceremony marking Israel's 70th anniversary in April 2018, Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel highlighted the Jewish community's contributions to Belgium in the arts, sciences, research, innovation, and economic and social life.[2] He condemned antisemitism and Holocaust denial and recalled that 1,731 Belgians had been recognized as Righteous Among the Nations. Michel said that "extremely strong links have been forged between our two countries" over the preceding seven decades.[2]

In January 2023, Israeli President Isaac Herzog visited Brussels for two days and met King Philippe at the Royal Palace. Herzog thanked the king for Belgium's "warm attitude toward its Jewish community" and called for deeper bilateral relations.[15] He also visited the Jewish school Athénée Ganenou and was scheduled to address the European Parliament on International Holocaust Remembrance Day. The visit took place against the backdrop of what the report described as a robust trade relationship.[15]

The most acute diplomatic rupture before the Gaza-war era arose from Belgium's universal-jurisdiction law. Enacted in 1993 and amended in 1999, the law allowed prosecutions concerning war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed abroad without requiring a connection to Belgium.[16][17]

In June 2001, 24 people of Palestinian or Lebanese origin filed a complaint against Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, formerly defense minister, and Israeli Defense Ministry Director-General Amos Yaron. The complaint alleged genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in connection with the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacres.[17] Lebanese Christian militias carried out the killings. An Israeli inquiry found Sharon indirectly responsible, leading to his resignation as defense minister; the Belgian proceedings produced no conviction and did not reach trial.[16][17]

One account says a Belgian court dismissed the charges against Sharon on June 26, 2002.[16] Another says Belgium's Supreme Court held that Sharon could not be charged while serving as prime minister but left open the possibility of later prosecution.[4] In 2003, the Court of Cassation overturned a requirement that an accused person be present in Belgium and allowed proceedings concerning Yaron to continue, after which Israel recalled its ambassador.[17]

Ambassador Jehudi Kinar recalled: "I arrived in Brussels as the new Israeli ambassador on 7 January 2003. Five weeks later I was recalled by the Israeli Foreign Ministry."[18] Belgium subsequently amended the law to require a connection between Belgium and either the victim or accused and gave the Federal Prosecutor broad oversight.[17] Kinar returned in April 2003 and later said bilateral relations "became normal again."[18]

Belgium's complex federal structure, involving six parliaments and no political party representing both French- and Dutch-speaking communities, has contributed to differing regional approaches toward Israel. Former ambassador Jehudi Kinar assessed that Israel had more political friends in Flanders than in Wallonia. He described relations with some Flemish Liberal and Christian politicians as positive and relations with some Walloon Socialist leaders as more difficult; these were his observations rather than a neutral survey of Belgian opinion.[18]

Kinar also said Flemish parliamentary bodies maintained commercial and cultural treaties with Israel, while comparable agreements had been rejected by the Walloon and Brussels parliaments.[18] In 2015, after the EU decided that goods produced in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and the Golan Heights should be labeled accordingly, Israel considered measures against Belgium and five other countries it regarded as leading supporters of the policy.[19]

In July 2026, Antwerp's city council voted 27 to 24, with four members not voting, to keep Israel's flag on the city hall façade after left-wing and far-left parties sought its removal.[20] N-VA council member and federal lawmaker Michel Freilich argued that removing it would send a political signal about Israel's right to exist, while Mayor Els van Doesburg resisted calls for its removal.[20]

Following the March 2016 terrorist attacks on Brussels's airport and train station, Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and Security Minister Jan Jambon traveled to Israel with security officials to study Israeli airport-security practices.[10] Jambon subsequently said vehicle checkpoints with license-plate scanners similar to those used at Ben-Gurion Airport would be installed at Brussels airport.[10]

Belgium's 2025 coalition agreement called for action against extremist and terrorist groups threatening Israel's security and for ending the distinction between Hezbollah's political and military wings in favor of an updated European terror designation.[21] The agreement supported a diplomatic two-state solution guaranteeing Israel's security, while advocating further sanctions against settlers involved in settlement expansion in Judea and Samaria.[21]

Within the coalition, Defense Minister Theo Francken said Belgium would continue purchasing arms from Israel.[21] On the third anniversary of the October 7, 2023 Hamas terrorist attack, he posted "Am Yisrael Chai" with blue-and-white hearts at 6:29 a.m., the time the cited report associated with the start of the attack.[5] MR president Georges-Louis Bouchez attended an October 7 memorial with Israel's ambassador and voiced support for Israel's right to defend itself and for the Jewish community.[5]

Another source of friction concerned Belgian-funded development projects in Judea and Samaria. In November 2020, Belgium's Foreign Affairs Ministry condemned Israeli demolitions of structures built with Belgian funding, stating that the projects met urgent needs and had been carried out in accordance with international humanitarian law.[22] Belgium called for the demolitions to stop and for affected projects to be repaired or compensated. It said it had coordinated a group of partner countries that had intervened with Israeli authorities on such cases since 2017.[22]

Israel's Foreign Ministry responded that aid should fund legal construction planned in coordination with Israeli authorities.[22] The legality of the construction and demolitions remained disputed between the two governments. The episode illustrated how Belgian development activity in areas under Israeli administration could generate direct diplomatic confrontation.

The Hamas terrorist attack of October 7, 2023, and the subsequent Israel-Hamas war produced a sustained deterioration in Belgian-Israeli relations. Belgium became one of the EU states most active in proposing or adopting measures affecting Israel.[5][12]

In January 2024, Foreign Minister Hadja Lahbib and Development Cooperation Minister Caroline Gennez accused Israel of bombing the offices of Belgium's federal development agency, Enabel, and summoned Israel's ambassador to express condemnation.[23] Gennez also announced Belgian support for the International Court of Justice's provisional-measures order in South Africa's case against Israel.[24] Wallonia later suspended two licenses for gunpowder exports from a Liège factory to Israel.[24][4] An INSS assessment characterized the regional measure more broadly as a full suspension of military exports.[25]

Belgium joined EU countries calling for the EU to re-examine its association agreement with Israel, stop arms sales, and seek a ceasefire.[12] In May 2025, it joined at least ten member states seeking a discussion of Israel's commitment to human-rights and democratic principles under Article 2 of the EU–Israel Association Agreement. Opening the discussion required a majority, whereas suspending the agreement would require unanimity.[26]

In November 2024, Belgium stated that it would comply with International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defense minister Yoav Gallant.[4] In December 2025, Belgium joined South Africa's International Court of Justice case against Israel. Its intervention concerned the interpretation of Genocide Convention provisions, including genocidal intent; the case remained an ongoing proceeding rather than a final judicial finding.[4]

In January 2026, Belgium restricted arms exports to Israel and moved to limit services for Belgian citizens living in West Bank settlements.[5] In April, Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot criticized Israel's military conduct in Lebanon while also condemning Hezbollah's initial attacks. He called for at least a partial suspension of the EU–Israel Association Agreement while acknowledging that full suspension was probably unattainable.[27] A Congressional Research Service report placed Belgium among countries that limited some exports to, or imports from, Israel during the conflict.[28]

On September 1, 2025, Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot announced a Belgian political commitment to recognize a Palestinian state in connection with the UN General Assembly and a French-Saudi initiative.[29] He said the step was intended to support a two-state solution rather than punish Israeli citizens. Prévot stated that administrative formalization by royal decree would occur after the last hostage was released and Hamas no longer governed Palestine.[29]

Prévot also announced twelve measures aimed at the Israeli government, including proposed restrictions on settlement-product imports, public procurement involving Israeli companies, consular assistance for Belgians living in settlements, military or dual-use transit, and possible judicial proceedings.[29] Belgium said it would support EU moves concerning the association agreement, research programs, and technical cooperation. Later reporting described Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich as having been declared persona non grata.[30]

At the September 22 UN conference, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas thanked Belgium among countries he said had recognized an "independent and sovereign Palestinian state."[31] The State Department report recording his remarks likewise grouped Belgium with countries that had recognized Palestinian statehood. The available sources do not resolve how that political recognition related to Belgium's earlier statement that administrative formalization by royal decree was conditional on hostage release and Hamas losing its governing role.[29][31]

The settlement-product import measure advanced slowly. In July 2026, Belgium's federal government approved it as part of a broader package following coalition disagreements.[32] Reports differed over its status and scope: The Jerusalem Post described an adopted royal decree covering West Bank settlement goods, while JNS described a decree being advanced that would also cover eastern Jerusalem and Gaza, with a 120-day transition and exemptions for Palestinian producers and humanitarian supplies.[33][4] A September 2026 account said the Council of Ministers had approved an order covering Judea and Samaria and East Jerusalem, but that it had not yet taken effect; goods from Palestinian entities were exempt and the Golan Heights was excluded.[30]

The formation of Belgium's coalition under Prime Minister Bart De Wever in early 2025 introduced greater variation into a relationship that had become increasingly antagonistic under the previous government. European Jewish Press assessed the new coalition as more balanced toward Israel, while noting significant internal differences and continuing tensions.[21][21]

Defense Minister Theo Francken said Belgium would continue purchasing arms from Israel.[21] The N-VA and MR were described as the coalition's more pro-Israel partners, while other members adopted more cautious or critical positions. Foreign Minister Prévot continued to emphasize international law and Palestinian self-determination as guiding principles.[21]

Israel's new ambassador, David Saranga, presented his credentials to King Philippe on October 7, 2026, the third anniversary of the Hamas attack.[5] Saranga introduced himself in French, Flemish, and Arabic through AI-generated videos and called for an end to boycotts of Israel.[5] He also warned that extremist Islamic networks existed in Europe, some active and others dormant, and argued that democratic states had a responsibility to confront them.[5]

A separate 2026 dispute concerned Belgium's indictment of three Jewish circumcisers over allegations involving ritual circumcision. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar criticized the prosecution, while Prévot disputed claims about how the case had been initiated.[20] The legality, circumstances, and competing descriptions remained contested.

The universal-jurisdiction proceedings produced no finding that Sharon or Yaron committed the alleged crimes.[17] Sources describe the procedural history differently: one reports dismissal of the Sharon charges on June 26, 2002, another says later prosecution remained possible, and a third links the ambassador's recall to the 2003 Court of Cassation decision concerning Yaron.[16][4] These accounts should not be collapsed into a single definitive chronology.[17]

Sources also differ over whether Wallonia suspended two specific gunpowder licenses or military exports more broadly.[24][25] Belgium's Palestinian-statehood policy contains a similar distinction between political recognition reported at the September 2025 UN conference and administrative formalization by conditional royal decree.[29][31] The 2026 settlement-goods measure was likewise described as adopted, advancing, or not yet in effect, apparently reflecting different reporting dates and levels of detail.[33][30]