Israeli–Lebanese Maritime Border Dispute

Before the 2022 settlement, Israel and Lebanon had neither a formally agreed land boundary nor an agreed maritime boundary.[5] They lacked diplomatic relations and remained technically in a state of war, making delimitation a negotiation between states without normal bilateral relations.[5][4] The disagreement concerned overlapping claims to offshore waters and economic rights rather than the extension of an already mutually agreed international land boundary.[6] Different understandings of where the maritime line should begin in relation to the 1949 Israel–Lebanon Armistice Line also contributed to the dispute; that armistice line was not a final agreed border.[7]

Following Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, the United Nations mapped the Blue Line on land but did not establish an equivalent maritime boundary.[5] Israel subsequently maintained a buoy line extending approximately five kilometers into the Mediterranean from Ras Naqoura/Rosh Hanikra and patrolled it as a security measure.[5] This near-shore line later became an important component of the 2022 agreement’s preservation of the existing security status quo.[1][2]

The competing maritime claims formed a triangle in the Mediterranean, with its coastal vertex near Rosh Hanikra and its offshore base toward Cyprus’s southeastern maritime boundary.[6] Before Lebanon advanced a more extensive position in 2020, the principal overlapping area was approximately 860 square kilometers, or 330 square miles.[7] The boundary-drawing approaches differed: Israel proposed projecting a line at a right angle, while Lebanon favored continuing the direction of the land boundary into the sea.[8]

Natural-gas discoveries and the prospect of offshore exploration increased the importance of resolving the overlapping claims.[8] The dispute impeded Lebanese offshore development when companies holding exploration rights, including rights in the disputed area, indicated that they would not operate there.[8] In 2018, a consortium comprising Total, ENI, and Novatek received exploration licenses for Lebanese Blocks 4 and 9, with Block 9 partly overlapping an area claimed by Israel.[7] Israel’s defense minister at the time, Avigdor Liberman, called the move a provocation and a serious mistake.[9]

Cyprus’s separate dealings with the two countries helped shape their competing positions.[10] The 2007 Lebanon–Cyprus line ended at Point 1, while the 2010 Israel–Cyprus line began there and extended farther south. The Washington Institute reported that an equidistant intersection among the three countries would lie about eleven miles south of Point 1, leaving a contested triangle of more than 300 square miles.[10] Reconciling the maritime claims therefore involved the relationship among three countries’ proposed lines rather than only a bilateral disagreement about an isolated stretch of water.[10]

Lebanon submitted maritime-boundary documents to the United Nations in summer 2010.[9] After Israel and Cyprus signed their agreement that December, Lebanon objected at the United Nations in June 2011, arguing that the arrangement violated Lebanese sovereign and economic rights.[9] Israel responded on July 12, 2011, by submitting coordinates for its maritime boundary with Lebanon.[9] The eventual 2022 agreement identified particular points in that Israeli submission and in Lebanon’s October 19, 2011 submission that its new coordinates would supersede.[2]

Resource-related objections had already reached the United Nations in January 2011, when Lebanese foreign minister Ali Shami requested protection for Lebanon’s claimed hydrocarbon rights and opposed Israeli exploitation within Lebanon’s claimed economic zone.[11] Israeli infrastructure minister Uzi Landau responded that the gas discoveries were wholly within Israel’s exclusive economic zone.[11] The United Nations stated that UNIFIL’s mandate did not include delineating maritime borders and that Security Council Resolution 1701 did not cover that task.[11] In July, Israel’s cabinet approved coordinates for its claimed exclusive economic zone, while Lebanese president Michel Suleiman warned against unilateral demarcation.[12]

U.S.-mediated indirect negotiations began in 2011.[8] During the 2011–2012 effort, Lebanon’s official position was Line 23, while the gap between its claim and Israel’s was approximately 860 square kilometers.[13] American mediator Frederic Hof proposed dividing the disputed area approximately 55 percent to Lebanon and 45 percent to Israel.[7] Israel accepted the proposed compromise, but Lebanon did not provide an official response.[13] A later mediation idea involved creating a buffer zone in which petroleum activity would be restricted.[9]

The early mediation did not produce a settlement.[8] Further talks were forestalled after Lebanese prime minister Najib Mikati resigned in early 2013 and the government subsequently collapsed.[7] U.S. diplomacy intensified over the following years and eventually produced a common framework for renewed maritime discussions in 2020.[14]

In 2019, intensive efforts by U.S. assistant secretary of state David Satterfield led the parties to agree to renew negotiations, with talks planned for the United Nations facility at Naqoura.[8] Lebanon opposed American mediation at that stage, and the United States was expected to participate as a facilitator.[8] Lebanon’s serious economic difficulties and the potential benefits of offshore gas development formed part of the context for its willingness to return to discussions.[8] By October 2020, the United States had secured a framework under which it would mediate and facilitate talks hosted by the United Nations in Naqoura.[14]

The United States sent both parties a framework letter on September 29, 2020, setting out its role as mediator and facilitator.[2] The framework provided a basis for discussions, not an agreement on the eventual boundary or the sharing of resources.[14] The United Nations would host the talks in Naqoura, while the United States mediated and facilitated the process.[14] Both parties understood that an eventual maritime-boundary agreement would be deposited with the United Nations.[2]

The first round opened on October 14, 2020.[15] The American team was led by Assistant Secretary David Schenker and Ambassador John Desrocher, and the meetings were hosted by UN special coordinator for Lebanon Jan Kubis.[15] Israel’s delegation was headed by Energy Ministry director general Udi Adiri; Lebanon’s was headed by Brigadier General Bassam Yassine, deputy chief of staff for operations in the Lebanese Armed Forces.[15] The representatives committed to continuing negotiations following the opening discussions.[15]

During the late-2020 negotiations, Lebanon advanced Line 29, extending its claim farther south and adding approximately 1,430 square kilometers beyond the area previously disputed.[13] The expanded position included a small portion of the Karish field.[13] President Michel Aoun froze approval of the expanded line, which was not completed as Lebanon’s official position, and the talks stopped.[13]

American mediation restarted in fall 2021 and early 2022, following the effective suspension of negotiations in 2020.[4] By June 2022, Aoun presented U.S. mediator Amos Hochstein with a proposed compromise returning to Line 23, Lebanon’s earlier United Nations claim.[16] The proposal linked Lebanon’s position on Karish to its demands concerning the Sidon-Qana prospect: Aoun would not claim Karish if Israel accepted Lebanon’s demands regarding Sidon-Qana.[16] The eventual negotiating approach moved away from Line 29 and toward a settlement based on Line 23.[1]

The arrival of a production vessel near Karish intensified tensions in 2022.[13] Lebanon claimed that part of the field fell within its position, while Israel and the United States maintained that Karish lay outside the area under negotiation.[13][4] Hezbollah threatened action against production and launched four unarmed drones toward the field—one on June 29 and three on July 2—which Israel intercepted.[13] These developments unfolded alongside Lebanon’s economic and political crisis.[1]

On October 11, 2022, the parties announced that the final version of the agreement was acceptable to them.[1] Israel’s cabinet and government approved the agreement the following day as the domestic review process continued.[1] The settlement was concluded through indirect dealings mediated by the United States rather than direct bilateral negotiations.[4] Its entry-into-force mechanism likewise depended on separate acceptance by each party and an American notification confirming that both had accepted the terms.[2]

On October 27, Prime Minister Yair Lapid signed for Israel, while President Michel Aoun signed a letter confirming Lebanon’s acceptance.[17] Delegations delivered signed documents to American officials at the United Nations base in Naqoura and provided the boundary coordinates to United Nations officials.[17] Lebanon required separate signatures without a joint signing ceremony or photograph.[17] The parties then completed the final steps needed to bring the agreement into force and submitted the final paperwork to the United Nations in the presence of the United States.[18]

The agreement established an offshore maritime boundary using four coordinate points connected by geodesic lines in the WGS84 datum.[2] Beyond the coastal area, the boundary followed Line 23.[1] Its geographic definition applied seaward of the easternmost agreed point and expressly left the status of the land boundary unaffected.[2] The arrangement described itself as a “permanent and equitable resolution” of the maritime dispute.[2]

The new coordinates superseded Israel’s points 34, 35, and 1 and Lebanon’s points 20, 21, 22, and 23 in their specified 2011 United Nations submissions.[3] Neither party was to make a future United Nations submission inconsistent with the agreement unless both agreed to its contents.[2] Each side was required to submit the agreed coordinates on the day the United States issued its confirmation that both governments had accepted the settlement.[2] This replaced the relevant competing submissions with a common offshore delimitation.[2]

The near-shore area remained undelimited pending demarcation of the land boundary.[2] In that area, the parties preserved the status quo, including the existing buoy line, notwithstanding their different legal positions.[2] The arrangement covered approximately the first five kilometers from shore and did not turn the buoy line into a finally agreed land-connected political boundary.[1][2] The settlement therefore distinguished a permanent offshore boundary from a coastal security arrangement whose final delimitation remained linked to the unresolved land boundary.[2]

Karish remained entirely within Israel’s exclusive economic zone.[1][4] Lebanon received rights to develop the prospect commonly called Qana or Sidon-Qana, which extended across the agreed boundary into Israel’s Block 72.[1][3] The agreement itself called this hydrocarbon area “the Prospect,” rather than using either Qana or Sidon, and described it as located at least partly within Lebanon’s Block 9 and Israel’s Block 72.[3] Its commercial viability was unknown when the arrangement was concluded.[3] American officials also emphasized that the extent and location of any gas deposits remained unknown.[4]

Development was assigned to a Lebanese Block 9 operator comprising one or more reputable international corporations that were neither Israeli nor Lebanese and were not subject to international sanctions.[3] The operator also had to be compatible with continued American facilitation.[3] Exploration and exploitation were to follow good petroleum-industry practices, including conservation, operational safety, environmental protection, and applicable laws.[3] Reasonable and necessary activity immediately south of the maritime boundary could proceed with prior notification to Israel.[3]

The intended development framework involved a consortium led by Total, with Israel’s economic rights handled through a separate financial arrangement rather than direct compensation from Lebanon.[1] Under the agreement text, Israel and the Block 9 operator were to determine Israel’s rights to potential deposits separately, with a financial agreement signed before the operator’s final investment decision.[2] Lebanon was neither a party to nor responsible for that arrangement, and it was not to diminish Lebanon’s economic rights under its own agreement with the operator.[3]

Subject to implementation of the financial arrangement, the operator would develop the prospect exclusively for Lebanon.[3] Israel agreed not to develop hydrocarbon deposits in that prospect or exploit deposits extending across the boundary there.[3] The agreement did not specify a payment rate, fixed sum, or percentage for Israel’s remuneration.[2] Lapid publicly described an anticipated Israeli share of approximately 17 percent, but the financial terms were left to the separate arrangement with the operator.[5] Regular extraction was expected to require several years after initial exploration.[1]

Other natural-resource deposits extending across the maritime boundary were addressed through a separate cooperation mechanism.[3] If exploitation on one side could deplete resources on the other, the parties intended to request American facilitation of discussions about allocation and development.[3] They also agreed to share information with the United States about known and subsequently identified cross-boundary resources.[3] Differences over interpretation or implementation were to be addressed through discussions facilitated by the United States, giving Washington a continuing role after conclusion of the boundary settlement.[3]

Israel’s High Court of Justice unanimously rejected petitions seeking a Knesset vote or referendum on the agreement on October 23, clearing the way for final government approval.[19] The petitions had challenged the authority of a transition government to approve the settlement and argued that it diminished territory subject to Israeli law and jurisdiction.[19] The agreement was signed on October 27, shortly before Israel’s November 1 election.[17]

The settlement’s institutional legacy was an agreed offshore line reached despite the absence of diplomatic relations and through an explicitly indirect American-mediated process.[5][4] Rather than resolving the entire relationship between Israel and Lebanon, it established rules for maritime delimitation, a particular cross-boundary hydrocarbon prospect, and future resource-related discussions.[2] Its continuing American facilitation mechanism extended to communications and implementation disagreements, not simply the original negotiating phase.[1]

The agreement brought together two distinct sets of interests: Israel retained Karish and the near-shore security status quo, while Lebanon obtained a framework for developing the prospect associated with Block 9.[1] It also separated resource development from the unresolved land boundary, expressly preventing maritime demarcation from prejudicing that question.[2] The potential economic benefits remained dependent on exploration results, the prospect’s commercial viability, and the separate financial arrangements required for development.[2][3]

The agreement’s political meaning produced different interpretations. INSS argued that agreement on a permanent maritime boundary could be seen as Lebanese recognition of Israel, while also noting that the text did not address the broader relationship between the states.[1] The Washington Institute reported that Lebanon sought to avoid presenting the arrangement as normalization and that the agreement was not expected by itself to establish diplomatic relations or prevent hostilities on other fronts.[5] Lapid nevertheless publicly described the signed agreement as recognition of Israel by an enemy state.[17]

Within Israel, supporters emphasized security, stability, and offshore development, while critics argued that accepting Line 23 conceded too much.[5] Lapid’s government argued that the agreement would avert war with Hezbollah, and senior IDF, Mossad, and Shin Bet officials supported it.[20] Benjamin Netanyahu argued that the agreement made excessive concessions and indicated that he might seek to undo it if he returned to office, although his later statements became more qualified.[5][17] Supporters also argued that prospective Lebanese gas income could reduce Iranian leverage in Lebanon.[5]

The domestic legal controversy centered on whether a transition government could conclude the agreement during an election period and whether a referendum or approval by 80 of the Knesset’s 120 members was required.[19] Israel’s attorney general maintained that a Knesset vote was not legally obligatory, although she considered a vote preferable and the government presented the agreement to the Knesset for review.[19] The High Court’s unanimous rejection of the petitions resolved those legal challenges, while the wider debate about the agreement’s concessions and security merits remained political.[5][19] The settlement did not itself establish diplomatic relations, settle the land boundary, or guarantee the prevention of hostilities on other fronts.[1][5]