Israeli Support for Iran During the Iran–Iraq War

Before Iran’s 1979 revolution, Israel and Iran had extensive commercial relations, discreet political and intelligence ties, and shared concerns about Soviet influence and expansionist Arab nationalism. The Islamic Republic severed formal relations, transferred the former Israeli embassy building to the Palestine Liberation Organization, cancelled oil shipments to Israel, and ended direct El Al service between Tehran and Tel Aviv.[3] Despite the new ideological divide, Israel continued to see strategic value in maintaining some connection with Iran.[6]

Iraq invaded Iran on September 22, 1980. After the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, the United States imposed an arms embargo that included equipment Iran had purchased under the Shah but not yet received. The embargo remained after many other restrictions were lifted in January 1981. Following Iraq’s invasion, Washington declared neutrality, refused to send arms to either belligerent, and discouraged other countries from supplying Iran through Operation Staunch.[2]

Iran’s wartime access to equipment was constrained. A Library of Congress country study says Iran lacked significant military support from a friendly state, apart from tactical support from Syria, and was driven to deal clandestinely with states it regarded as enemies, including Israel and the United States. It estimates that 50 to 60 percent of Iran’s land-force equipment was destroyed during the war.[7] Iran urgently sought U.S.-origin TOW antitank and HAWK antiaircraft missiles to counter Iraqi advantages in armor and air power.[2]

Israeli calculations included the prospect of Iraq defeating Iran, the possibility of preserving a foothold in Tehran, and concern for the Jewish community in Iran. In 1982, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon confirmed reports that Israel had aided Iran and explained the policy as keeping a “small window open” for a time when the war ended and someone might again wield influence in Tehran. He described Iraq as “implacably hostile to Israel.”[8] A later account also identifies Israeli concern about the war’s outcome and the arrival of Jewish refugees from Iran among the considerations behind the policy.[1] These motives help explain the relationship’s strategic logic, but the sources do not establish a single uncontested explanation for every sale.

Reporting on assistance before the Iran-Contra channel describes Israeli sales and arrangements from the early years of the war, though the scale and particulars are less securely established than the documented 1985–1986 transfers. The Jerusalem Post reports that an early 1980 transaction involved tires for F-4 Phantom fighter aircraft. It says that on October 24, 1980, a shipment of Scorpion tank parts and 250 F-4 tires was dispatched to Iran, and that additional equipment stored in Europe—including aircraft, helicopter, and missile-system spare parts—was clandestinely sent to Iranian ports such as Chabahar, Bandar Abbas, and Bushehr.[4]

The same report describes a 1981 operation called Operation Seashell, under which Israel sold Iran $75 million in arms, including antitank guns and shells. Cyprus served as a transit point; Argentine airline Transporte Aéreo Rioplatense initially carried arms by air, and shipments shifted to sea after a mid-air collision incident. The report also describes a separate $136 million deal signed that year by arms dealer Yaakov Nimrodi with Iran’s Ministry of National Defense, involving Lance and Hawk missiles.[4]

Estimates of the scale of early sales differ and do not necessarily measure the same period or categories of trade. The Jerusalem Post attributes to the Jaffe Institute for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University an estimate of roughly $500 million in annual Israeli arms sales to Iran in the early 1980s, including aircraft spare parts, artillery, and ammunition, predominantly financed with Iranian oil. It separately reports that West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl raised concern in 1982 about Israeli sales valued at $500 million, without specifying the period represented by that figure.[4]

A March 1982 New York Times account, as recounted by the Jerusalem Post, said documents indicated that $100 million to $200 million in arms, spare parts, and ammunition had reached Iran from Western Europe over the preceding 18 months. Intelligence sources cited in that account attributed about half of the value to Israeli supply or arrangements; the rest was handled by independent arms dealers, some of whom might also have had Israeli intelligence connections. The underlying documents were described as including telex messages, contracts, and bills of lading.[4] These figures are not directly comparable to the annual estimates, and the available sources do not reconcile them.

Sharon described the 1982 sales as “largely symbolic,” while a U.S. State Department spokesman put their value at approximately $27 million. The two descriptions reflect a difference in characterization and estimate, rather than a settled accounting of all Israeli assistance.[8] There was also disagreement over whether Washington had been informed in advance: Sharon said it had, while the State Department denied this.[8]

A 1987 U.S. government report gives the strategic and commercial context for the transfers. It said Israel had long-standing interests in maintaining a relationship with Iran and promoting its arms-export industry, and that sales could strengthen Iran against Iraq, which the report called Israel’s “old adversary.” Israel held U.S.-origin TOW and HAWK weapons and was willing to supply them if Washington approved the transfers and agreed to replenish Israeli stocks.[2] A 1994 account likewise identifies Israel’s wish to prevent an Iraqi victory and to maintain communication with Tehran as motives for its later intermediary role.[3]

Other accounts describe Israeli arms support during the war in general terms without providing transaction details. The Library of Congress study lists Israel among countries from which Iran made selective purchases during the war and says Iran circumvented the U.S. embargo to some extent through third-party purchases of spare parts and additional U.S. missiles.[7] The Jewish Virtual Library similarly says Israel supplied some arms despite the revolutionary government’s anti-Zionism, citing the Iraqi threat and concern for Iran’s Jewish population as reasons.[6] These broad descriptions establish that support extended beyond a single diplomatic episode, but they do not by themselves determine the precise scope or chronology of all early transfers.

The best-documented Israeli assistance occurred through covert arrangements in 1985 and 1986, when Israel served first as an intermediary for U.S. contacts and arms transfers to Iran. The effort joined several aims: opening communication with figures in Tehran, obtaining the release of American hostages held in Lebanon, and supplying Iran while the United States publicly pursued an embargo. Israel’s role as a channel reflected its own strategic interests as well as U.S. policy objectives, which were not always identical.[1][2]

Messages from Iranian figures described as “moderate elements” reached U.S. officials through senior Israeli intermediaries in June and July 1985. The secret U.S.–Iran engagement continued from June to November. U.S. officials considered replacing Israel’s intermediary role, or “cutout,” with a direct but secret U.S. envoy. Secretary of State George P. Shultz warned about “blessing an Israel-Iran relationship in which Israel’s interests and those of the United States are not necessarily the same.”[1] The exchange illustrates how Israel’s role was both useful to Washington and a source of concern within the U.S. administration.

The initial arms arrangement was described in one account as a proposed exchange of 100 TOW antitank missiles, delivered by Israel, for the release of hostages. That account carefully says the trade “seemed to be” 100 missiles and does not establish that this specific shipment was completed.[1] A U.S. government report later gives a dated account of TOW transfers in August and September, but sources disagree about the quantities and the purpose attached to the first delivery.[2][5]

The 1987 report says Israel delivered 100 TOW missiles on August 30, 1985, and another 408 on September 14. It characterizes the August and September operations as managed by Israel, with the United States in a supporting role.[2] A separate National Archives chronology instead lists 508 missiles delivered on August 30 and another 508 on September 14, with U.S. endorsement for the latter shipment. The chronology notes confusion over the first shipment and suggests the missiles may have been defective and replaced in September.[5] The records therefore offer inconsistent totals, rather than a single reconciled shipment history.

The transfers were discussed in connection with both an emerging U.S.–Iranian channel and efforts to free American hostages in Lebanon. The 1987 report records different accounts of whether a particular delivery was conditional on release. One proposal presented 100 TOWs as a good-faith gesture that might lead to hostage releases; intermediary Manucher Ghorbanifar said the first 100 were not linked to a hostage release.[2] Reverend Benjamin Weir was released on September 15. The report says U.S. and Israeli officials appear to have expected other hostages to be released as well, but they were not.[2]

In November 1985 the planned Israeli shipment of 80 HAWK missiles encountered transit and logistical problems; only 18 arrived in Iran, on November 25. Unlike the earlier TOW transfers, the United States was directly involved in this shipment.[2] The missiles carried Israeli markings and did not meet Iranian military requirements. Iran returned 17 to Israel; the eighteenth was test-fired at an Iraqi aircraft over Kharg Island. The shipment resulted in no hostage release.[2] The failed delivery became a turning point in the arrangement: U.S. officials moved toward direct control of subsequent arms deals, rather than leaving deliveries in Israeli hands.[9]

The channel shifted further in 1986 toward direct U.S. sales, while Israel continued to assist with arrangements and particular deliveries. On January 17, President Ronald Reagan signed a finding approving a plan for the CIA to buy 4,000 TOWs from the Department of Defense and transfer them to Iran, with Israeli help in arranging the transaction. The first 1,000 arrived in two February deliveries. A cover memorandum connected further transfers to hostage releases, but no hostages were released as a result of those deliveries.[2]

Israeli involvement continued through shipments of HAWK spare parts and TOWs. A pallet of HAWK parts accompanied a U.S. delegation to Tehran in May; the balance was delivered on August 3 after Reagan approved a proposed shipment.[2] On October 29, Israel delivered 500 TOWs to Iran because payment had not yet cleared the U.S. account. On November 7, the United States supplied 500 TOWs to Israel as replacements.[2] The October transfer followed a proposal linking arms and other items with Iranian efforts to secure hostage releases, but no further hostages were freed after David Jacobsen’s release on November 2.[2]

One later report gives a different figure for the 1986 TOW assistance: Globes, citing a report by U.S. radio commentator Daniel Schorr and Israeli intelligence sources, says the last known shipments included 2,008 Israeli-supplied TOW missiles sent in 1986 in return for American hostages held in Lebanon. It describes the deal as later reported to have been undertaken on the initiative of Reagan aides Robert McFarlane and Oliver North as part of Iran-Contra.[10] The report does not provide a shipment-by-shipment reconciliation with the National Archives account, so its aggregate figure should not be treated as resolving the differences in other records.

A separate Washington Institute account identifies Fereydoun Verdinejad, also called Mehdinejad, and Ahmad Shah Cheraghi, known as Ahmad Vahidi, as supervisors of Israeli deliveries of arms and spare parts to Iran during the mid-1980s. It says they briefed Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who authorized American hostage releases in Lebanon after receiving each shipment.[11] That account does not specify dates, weapon types, quantities, or values, and therefore complements rather than replaces the more detailed government chronology.

A secret meeting in Paris on August 30, 1986, illustrates the broader political aspirations attached to the channel. Ynet reports that Israeli counterterrorism adviser Amiram Nir met Hassan Rohani, then a senior Iranian parliamentarian and national security official. Iranian arms dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar arranged and translated the meeting. Iran was seeking renewed supplies while at war with Iraq, and Rohani asked for money and assistance to help Iran finish the war; the account reports a request, not that Israel provided assistance in response.[12]

Nir reportedly favored restoring strategic ties among the United States, Israel, and Iran to the level of the Shah’s era. He believed that he should help Iranian moderates build an underground movement that might eventually overthrow the Ayatollahs’ rule. The plans discussed at the meeting did not come to fruition after the Iran-Contra scandal became public.[12] This episode shows that some participants envisioned a political relationship extending beyond immediate arms transfers, although the available account does not establish that these ambitions were implemented.

The arms channel became a central part of the Iran-Contra affair, which surfaced publicly in November 1986. The Reagan administration publicly opposed bargaining with terrorists and aiding Iran in its war with Iraq, yet secretly pursued arms sales to Iran beginning in early 1985 and continuing through further transactions in 1986.[13] Israel’s earlier role as a supplier and intermediary linked the covert initiative to the wider U.S. effort to communicate with Iran and obtain the release of hostages held in Lebanon.[3][14]

The affair also involved the diversion of proceeds to support the Contras in Nicaragua. Nicholas Rostow’s account describes the covert arms trade as occurring while the United States publicly pressed for an arms embargo on both Iran and Iraq. It characterizes stated U.S. neutrality as favoring Iraq in practice, because the embargo harmed Iran more than Iraq, and says funds generated by the Iran-related operation were diverted to the Contras.[1] Britannica reports that Iran paid $48 million for arms and that a portion was diverted by Oliver North, with John Poindexter’s approval, to the Contras. It says the diversion violated the second Boland Amendment of 1984, which prohibited direct or indirect U.S. military aid to the insurgency.[13]

Accounts describe different roles for Israel and the United States across successive transfers. Israel managed the August and September 1985 TOW shipments, while the United States had a supporting role; the United States was directly involved in the November HAWK transfer and subsequently moved toward direct sales.[2] Israel’s participation in the initial channel was also described as conditional on explicit U.S. consent. A Jewish Virtual Library account, citing the congressional Iran-Contra report, says Prime Minister Shimon Peres agreed to assist after National Security Council consultant Michael Ledeen requested help, and that Israel required “a clear, express and binding consent by the U.S. Government.” It reports that Robert McFarlane said he first received Reagan’s approval in July 1985 and that Reagan orally authorized the first sale in August, over objections from Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger.[15]

The authorization record is not consistent across the sources or across the different stages of the operation. The 1987 report says the review board considered prior presidential approval of the initial Israeli transfers likely but could not conclusively resolve the question.[2] Britannica’s summary of the congressional committees’ majority report says the National Security Council’s arms transfers and related actions occurred “all without presidential authorization.”[13] An Encyclopedia.com account of contemporary statements by Attorney General Edwin Meese says Reagan was not informed of a 1985 shipment from Israel until after it had been completed.[14] Britannica’s account of Reagan’s later conduct says he authorized a secret initiative in early November 1985 and accepted responsibility for the arms-for-hostages deal while denying knowledge of the Contra diversion.[16] These statements do not establish one uniform account of who authorized or knew about every shipment.

The sources also recount changes in U.S. policy toward Israeli involvement. The Jerusalem Post reports that Israel sought and received covert consent after Reagan took office to continue supplying U.S.-made equipment, but that the administration later rescinded consent after evidence of violations, while Israeli sales continued.[4] A Jewish Virtual Library account says Rabin sought specific U.S. approval for the November 1985 HAWK shipment, and that by December Reagan had decided future sales would be made directly from U.S. stocks rather than through the Israeli channel.[15] Weinberger’s notes, as reported by Ynetnews, describe the HAWK shipment as prompting U.S. officials to take direct control and record his warning to Reagan that routing a transaction through Israel would not make it legal.[9]

The legal and institutional conclusions were contested. Britannica’s summary of the congressional majority report says senior administration officials misled Congress and that the operation disregarded constitutional requirements for congressional oversight of government funds. The minority report rejected the majority’s broader interpretation, describing the affair as errors of judgment rather than a constitutional crisis or administration-wide conspiracy.[13] Ynetnews reports that associate independent counsel Christian Mixter’s 1991 final report concluded that, although Reagan had been briefed in advance about 1985–1986 transfers, prosecuting him for violating congressional-notification requirements for third-country transfers would be difficult. It also reports that Mixter found neither Reagan nor Vice President George H. W. Bush criminally liable, and that Meese had advised that the National Security Act of 1947 could be invoked to supersede the Arms Export Control Act.[17]

The joint congressional report, as summarized by the Jewish Virtual Library, praised the Israeli government for providing detailed chronologies based on documents and interviews with participants. It also reiterated the Tower Commission’s conclusion that U.S. decision-makers made their own decisions and bore responsibility for their consequences.[15]

Concern about Iran’s Jewish community appears in accounts of Israel’s motives, but the sources do not establish that arms transfers produced improved treatment or increased emigration. The Jewish Virtual Library says Israel hoped that support for Iran might help protect the large Jewish population still in the country, while covert and overt efforts were also made to get Iranian Jews out.[6] A Washington Institute account lists receiving Jewish refugees from Iran among Israeli concerns as the war and covert U.S.–Iran engagement unfolded.[1]

A 1994 account reports speculation that Israeli arms sales were intended in part to persuade Tehran to reduce harassment of Iran’s Jewish community and ease travel restrictions. It also says a senior Israeli official denied that increased Jewish emigration was tied to the arms deal, and notes that harassment of the community increased during the same period.[3] The proposed link should therefore be understood as speculation reported in the account, not as an established result of the sales.

The same account reports that Manouchehr Kalimi Nikrouz, the sole Jewish representative in Iran’s parliament, was arrested on charges of alleged sexual misconduct. Former Iranian president Abolhassan Bani-Sadr claimed the arrest was intended to show Tehran’s anger over Israeli leaders’ disclosure of secret U.S. arms shipments. Nikrouz was eventually exonerated, released, and restored to his parliamentary seat.[3] The account presents Bani-Sadr’s explanation as an attributed claim; it does not establish that the alleged motive was the reason for the arrest.

After a cease-fire ended hostilities with Iraq in 1988, Iran began easing its travel restrictions, according to the 1994 account.[3] A later Ynet article says secret security ties between Israel and Iran continued during the war despite hostile public rhetoric, approximately until 1988, but does not identify particular transactions, operations, weapons, or officials to substantiate that broad claim.[18] These accounts indicate that the period’s relationship cannot be reduced solely to the best-documented Iran-Contra shipments, while leaving the details of later or continuing contacts unspecified.

Israeli support for Iran during the war exposed the gap between public enmity and strategic calculation. Israel supplied or arranged weapons for a revolutionary government that publicly rejected Israel, in part because Israeli decision-makers viewed Iraq as the more immediate strategic danger and wished to preserve a channel to Tehran.[8][6] For the United States, Israel initially provided a route to Iranian interlocutors and arms transfers, but the arrangement intersected with disputes over hostages, embargo policy, presidential authorization, and congressional oversight.[1][2]

The affair’s public disclosure in November 1986 led to congressional hearings and wider investigation of the covert operation.[4] Its legacy remains tied to divergent accounts of the purpose and authorization of particular shipments and to the contradictory TOW totals in official records.[2][5] The constitutional and political significance of the Contra diversion also remained contested.[13] The evidence supports the conclusion that Israeli assistance formed an important part of covert wartime dealings with Iran, while not permitting a definitive total or a single account of every transfer and its consequences.

The records distinguish confirmed or specifically documented shipments from additional arms sales reported without verification. The Library of Congress country study says Iran made selective purchases from Israel and other countries during the war, but labels specific claims about Israeli sales of Sidewinder missiles, radar equipment, ammunition, field telephones, M-60 tank engines, artillery shells, and C-130 spare parts as “unverified reports.” It does not confirm that Iran received those items.[7] Those claims should not be treated as established deliveries or used to inflate the confirmed shipment totals.

Other summaries confirm Israeli transfers but do not supply a detailed chronology. Encyclopedia.com says Israel shipped arms to Iran during the war but gives no dates, types, quantities, or motives for those transfers outside the later Iran-Contra transactions.[19] The Times of Israel reports an overall figure of about 1,500 missiles supplied by Israel during 1980–1988, without breaking the estimate down by missile type or explaining its method.[20] That figure is separate from the detailed shipment accounts and the reported valuations for arms sales; the available sources do not provide a common basis for reconciling them.

The Jerusalem Post’s account also notes that by 1983 Israel had moved a covert operation facilitating arms transactions from New York to London. It describes the later network as involving private arms dealers and shell companies, after concerns arose about sales of sophisticated U.S. military equipment without explicit U.S. consent.[4] The article’s account of evolving arrangements adds context to the covert nature of the supply route, but it does not settle the overall total of Israeli wartime assistance.

Taken together, the sources support a clear distinction between the existence of Israeli arms support and the uncertain scale of the entire wartime program. The August–September 1985 TOW quantities conflict between two government records, and some hostage-release conditions remain disputed.[2][5] Estimates of early sales cover different periods, while certain lists of equipment remain explicitly unverified.[7][4] The most detailed evidence concerns the Iran-Contra channel, while the extent and character of Israeli assistance across the full 1980–1988 war remain incompletely specified.