Israeli Checkpoint

Staffed checkpoints differ from unattended physical obstacles: the former provide locations for inspection, while gates, earth mounds, concrete blocks, and trenches can close roads or direct traffic toward inspection points.[2] The system encompasses crossings between Israel and Palestinian areas, internal checkpoints between Palestinian localities, and crossings through the security barrier.[1][2] Consequently, a total for all movement obstacles is not a count of staffed checkpoints alone.[2]

The declared security objectives include preventing uncontrolled passage into Jerusalem and other Israeli population centers, stopping explosives smuggling and vehicle-borne attacks, and preventing entry without authorization.[4] Security checks also operate at exits from Palestinian cities, with the stated aim of distinguishing civilians from people involved in terrorism and adjusting restrictions according to security conditions.[5]

Checkpoint arrangements involve more than whether a road is physically open: permit eligibility, pedestrian or vehicle access, operating hours, identification procedures, and the frequency of searches all influence passage.[3] In 2010, for example, some checkpoints east of the barrier eased movement through longer operating hours, fewer searches and random document checks, and the removal of permit requirements.[3] The broader network nevertheless affected access to employment, schools, hospitals, agricultural land, places of worship, and humanitarian work.[3]

Movement restrictions known as closures were imposed to varying degrees from 1993, and Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza were required from March of that year to obtain permits to enter Israel and Jerusalem.[6] Restrictions could become tighter during periods of heightened tension.[6] The 1993–1995 Oslo agreements assigned Israel interim security responsibilities that included external security and border crossings.[7]

Oslo II, signed on September 28, 1995, provided for Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian cities and villages during October–December 1995 and the transfer of security and public responsibilities in those areas to the Palestinian Authority.[7] Its movement provisions stated that, without prejudice to Israel’s security powers and responsibilities, movement of people, vehicles, and goods between West Bank cities, towns, villages, and refugee camps would be “free and normal” and would not need to pass through checkpoints or roadblocks.[8] Movement between the West Bank and Israel was separately subject to applicable rules.[8] The agreement also provided for Palestinian Police checkpoints on connecting roads to identify Palestinian vehicles and passengers and prevent the illegal introduction of weapons.[8]

A 1995 government committee proposed controlled entry into Israel through official crossing points, requiring permits and police security checks.[4] Its recommendations included controlling vehicles and goods and preventing entry outside designated points as far as possible.[4] For Jerusalem, it proposed six crossing points for people, vehicles, and goods, with police and Border Police oversight.[4]

Restrictions expanded after violence began in September 2000, affecting travel between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza as well as movement between Palestinian localities.[6] In 2001, external closure was total on 210 days and partial on 155 days; internal closure in the West Bank was classified as severe on 278 days and limited on 87 days.[6] Severe internal restrictions included controls on primary roads and physical barricades on secondary roads, while limited closures involved checkpoints and roadblocks along some roads that remained open.[6] Approximately 130 Israeli-controlled checkpoints in the territories were used daily by hundreds of thousands of Palestinians traveling between towns and villages that year.[6]

Around Jerusalem, some checkpoints developed as operational responses to attacks and security concerns rather than through an orderly planning process.[4] Police, Border Police, and IDF field commanders established controls at locations including Ras Khamis and A-Tur, with more permanent checkpoints at Ras al-Amud, A-Ram, and Qalandiya.[4] The Ras al-Amud checkpoint subsequently moved to the Abu Dis intersection, while Qalandiya and A-Ram remained within the city.[4] The security fence began to be constructed in Jerusalem in 2002.[9]

Official crossing statistics from the mid-2000s used a narrower category than totals covering all road obstacles: one series counted 25 security crossings in January 2004, including temporary, permanent, encirclement, and seam-zone crossings.[5] Subsequent removals of 13 crossings and 87 additional roadblocks left 12 security crossings and 66 roadblocks in that series.[5] A separate estimate offered in a February 2005 discussion placed the number of checkpoints at around 100, alongside a journalist’s estimate of approximately 700 road barriers, including cement blocks, ditches, and dirt berms.[10]

Plans associated with a revised security-fence route in March 2005 envisaged five large crossing points operated by private contractors to reduce direct interaction between Israeli soldiers and Palestinians.[11] They also included 24–28 smaller passages, in addition to 31 agricultural gates already open and another 20–30 under development.[11] These were plans for barrier crossings and agricultural access, rather than a comprehensive checkpoint inventory.[11]

Different surveys continued to distinguish staffed controls from physical obstructions.[2][12] An April 2007 inventory listed 71 checkpoints, 13 partial checkpoints, 93 road gates, 60 roadblocks, 211 earth mounds, 16 earth walls, 12 trenches, and 73 road barriers.[2] Another 2007 survey counted 93 staffed checkpoints and 467 permanent blockages; its staffed controls comprised 35 on the Green Line, 43 elsewhere in the West Bank, and 15 in and around Hebron.[12] A separate annual estimate placed the average number of fixed checkpoints during 2007 at 102, including 66 internal checkpoints and 36 final inspection points before entry into Israel.[13]

Movement-easing measures in June 2008 included the removal of four central checkpoints: Rimonim, Asira Ash-Shamaliya, Bet-Ha’Arava, and Sheep Junction.[14] Approximately 70 temporary and permanent checkpoints were removed during May, the number of trucks carrying goods from Nablus to Efraim Gate doubled, and 150 agricultural vehicles received permission to travel from northern Samaria to the Jordan Valley.[14] A government statistical series subsequently recorded a decline from 41 checkpoints in July 2007 to 16 by 2010, together with the removal of 409 roadblocks since April 2008.[15] Most remaining checkpoints between key cities were described as “normally open,” meaning continuously open, seven days a week, alongside improved Israeli-Palestinian security coordination.[15]

A separate removal series recorded more than 200 roadblocks dismantled and a decline in manned checkpoints from 41 to 14 in 2009–2010.[16] Another passage concerning later measures recorded 30 checkpoint removals since 2009, leaving 11.[16] A historical map of checkpoints in 2002 likewise identified many mapped locations as subsequently dismantled to ease Palestinian travel.[17]

By June 2010, a broader obstacle inventory counted 505 obstacles inside the West Bank: 66 fully manned checkpoints, 20 occasionally manned checkpoints, 106 road gates, 167 earth mounds, 46 road barriers, 70 roadblocks, 20 earth walls, and 10 trenches.[3] Temporary checkpoints remained a feature of later restrictions, including prohibitions on travel between some towns and comprehensive closures during periods of potential unrest or some Israeli, Jewish, and Muslim holidays in 2019.[18]

In October 2022, Nablus experienced a three-week lockdown after a Palestinian killed an Israeli soldier near the city.[19] Military checkpoints and earth mounds blocked vehicle access points, and accounts of the closure described a 70 percent decline in commercial activity.[19] In 2023, military assessments opposed restoring the staffed checkpoints and earth barriers used during the Second Intifada, expressing concern that broad restrictions could increase support for violence and make fixed positions static targets.[20] Another contemporary description characterized internal Palestinian movement as generally permitted, while noting controls at entrances to Israel, fixed security positions at major junctions, and restrictions imposed for particular operations or holidays.[21]

Controls tightened after the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack amid concern about copycat attacks.[22] A March 2024 obstacle survey identified 86 new obstacles installed since October 2023 and tighter restrictions at roughly 100 existing locations, including newly closed gates and shorter checkpoint hours.[22] More than 120 additional gates were recorded during 2025.[22]

In January 2025, dozens of checkpoints were placed across shared West Bank roads to separate Israeli and Palestinian traffic and reduce the risk of drive-by shootings.[23] Accounts included waits of up to eight hours, while security officials warned that prolonged delays could fuel anger and unrest.[23] A Palestinian Authority committee estimate at that time put the combined number of military checkpoints and gates at 898.[23] A broader March 2026 count placed movement obstacles at 925, compared with an annual average of 647 over the preceding two decades, a reported increase of 43 percent.[22] That total included several kinds of physical obstacles rather than checkpoints alone.[22]

Inspection infrastructure has included biometric identification posts, luggage scanners, magnetic gates, computerized authorization systems, and metal detectors.[5] Crossing improvements also included covered lanes, restrooms, drinking stations, and humanitarian points for medical treatment.[5] Military policewomen were assigned to examine women, and Arabic-speaking Civil Administration officers were positioned at crossings.[5]

The associated permit system has regulated some Palestinian travel on restricted roads, through designated checkpoints, into the seam zone, and into Israel.[2] Before 2002, internal West Bank travel generally did not require permits apart from entry to East Jerusalem; a special permit for certain internal roads and checkpoints was introduced in January 2002.[2] Procedures described in 2007 included individual security screening and vehicle permits for some commercial trucks and buses.[2]

In 2010, approximately 34 checkpoints along the barrier were restricted to Israelis and Palestinians holding permits.[3] Palestinian worker-permit holders had to use one of 11 pedestrian crossings.[3] Vehicle-crossing provisions covered permit holders, people employed by international organizations, and biometric-card holders and their immediate families.[3] These historical arrangements illustrate distinctions between pedestrian access, vehicle passage, and categories of authorization.[3]

Qalandiya’s replacement pedestrian facility, inaugurated in late February 2019, introduced six metal-detector stations and 27 automatic gates capable of reading biometric permits.[24] People without biometric passes could present identification at windows.[24] The older facility had three narrow, cage-like walkways and five stations where permits were checked manually.[24] Approximately 4,000 people, mainly Palestinian workers, crossed each morning.[24] Workers interviewed after the opening described a more manageable journey, including one account of passage falling from approximately an hour to a few minutes.[24]

The scale of crossing activity extends beyond daily checkpoint queues.[25] In 2022, the Defense Ministry’s Land Crossings Authority operated Erez and Kerem Shalom and 14 crossings along the seam line.[25] Its figures recorded 21 million Palestinian pedestrian movements into Israel for employment, commerce, medical treatment, and humanitarian assistance—approximately 94,000 movements per day.[25] The annual total was 7.5 million above 2021, a reported increase of 55 percent, linked mainly to the closure of breaches along the seam line.[25]

Internal checkpoints can control connections between large parts of the West Bank rather than only entry into Israel.[18] Closing Container checkpoint near Bethlehem interrupted access between the southern West Bank, including Bethlehem and Hebron, and Ramallah and the north, affecting the one-third of the population living in the south.[18] Closing Za’tara disrupted traffic to and from northern areas including Nablus, Tulkarem, and Jenin.[18] Both checkpoints continued to cause major disruptions when closed for holidays or security incidents in 2022.[19]

The location and number of crossing points also reflect operational choices.[4] Planning around Jerusalem weighed fewer crossings with more intensive inspections against a larger number intended to reduce commuting burdens and friction with security forces.[4] In 2004, checkpoint infrastructure between Palestinian Authority areas and Jerusalem combined long waits and low service levels with security checks considered substandard, prompting efforts to make inspection arrangements more comfortable.[4]

Security-related assessments have described checkpoints and roadblocks as opportunities to intercept attacks, confiscate weapons, detain terrorism suspects, and provide time to stop an attack before it reaches civilians.[15] Official interception figures from the mid-2000s included more than 2,000 attempts involving wanted people, explosives, weapons, unauthorized workers, or false documents.[5] A separate figure recorded 389 Palestinians intercepted from the beginning of 2005 for attempted weapons smuggling or as wanted persons or people suspected of terrorist activity.[5] These figures describe official operational claims rather than a comprehensive measurement of checkpoint effectiveness.[5]

The barrier and checkpoint network has affected Jerusalem residents whose employment, schooling, hospitals, family connections, and other services lie on opposite sides of it.[4] Six Palestinian neighborhoods in the Kufr Aqab and Shuafat Refugee Camp areas remained inside Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries but were separated from the rest of the city by the fence.[9] Their residents retained Israeli resident status, while many had to cross checkpoints daily to enter the rest of Jerusalem.[9] A study estimated their combined population at 60,000–80,000 and described limited provision of physical and social services.[9]

The stated legal position accompanying Jerusalem’s barrier planning was that it constituted a security measure rather than a change in residents’ legal status, with special permits intended to facilitate movement subject to security arrangements.[4] In practice, the barrier and crossings made some cross-city connections more difficult, separated neighborhoods and families, and disrupted commuting and economic activity.[4]

Barrier-adjacent communities elsewhere also depended on checkpoints to reach the rest of the West Bank.[18][19] An estimate for 2019 placed approximately 27,000 Palestinians in communities west of the barrier in this position.[18] A 2022 estimate placed the population at more than 11,000, excluding East Jerusalem residents.[19] The figures describe differently dated estimates and should not be read as a single demographic series.[18][19]

Medical access has been a particularly consequential aspect of checkpoint operation.[3] For 2010, ambulance incident figures recorded 159 cases involving blocked access, impediments to transporting patients to specialized centers, or delays of 30 minutes to two hours.[3] Of these incidents, 142 occurred at checkpoints leading to Jerusalem and the remainder elsewhere in the West Bank.[3] Ambulances were sometimes delayed or refused entry to Jerusalem for security reasons.[3] By 2022, delays lasting hours remained an obstacle for patients and medical staff traveling to six East Jerusalem hospitals providing specialized care.[19]

An individual case in 2008 concerned Fawzia Abdel Fattah, who had heart disease and was traveling by taxi with her husband from Deir al-Ghoussoun to a hospital in Tulkarem.[26] Her husband’s account described soldiers turning the taxi back at a checkpoint, followed by her death in the village shortly afterward.[26] The military’s account linked the movement restrictions to a heightened security alert and stated that permission had been given for an ambulance to cross, but that traffic in Tulkarem prevented its arrival.[26] Earlier documentation from 2001 also included allegations of checkpoint abuse and medical delays, alongside instructions to soldiers not to harm ambulances.[6]

School access and ordinary intertown journeys could require substantial detours.[3][2] Students from Bir Nabala traveled seven to 10 additional miles through checkpoints to attend school in Jerusalem in 2010.[3] A 2012 assessment estimated that movement restrictions required approximately 200,000 Palestinians from 70 villages to use routes two to five times longer than the direct route to the nearest town.[27] That assessment described more than 500 checkpoints and military barriers disrupting access to work, schools, and hospitals.[27]

Employment and commerce are also sensitive to closures and unpredictable travel times.[18] Residents of villages affected by internal closures in 2019 described reduced employment prospects, lower wages, and fewer days worked.[18] Earlier descriptions of internal travel included changing taxis, queuing, inspections, and journeys increasing from 20 minutes to an hour and a half even before checkpoint waiting time.[12] A 2007 analysis described restrictions as dividing the territory into northern, central, and southern areas; the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea; barrier-created enclaves; and East Jerusalem.[13]

Individual accounts illustrate the difference between geographical proximity and practical accessibility.[10] In a 2005 discussion, an anecdote concerned a Ramallah resident who had not seen a brother living 12 miles away for two years because reaching him was so difficult.[10] Accounts from the period following October 2023 included a roughly 19-kilometer journey from Taybeh to Ramallah increasing from about 15 minutes to hours, and a journey from Beit Ummar to Hebron increasing from five to 40 minutes.[22] Another account described delays affecting access from Duma to a hospital approximately 28 kilometers away in Nablus.[22] These examples concern particular travelers rather than population-wide travel-time measurements.[22]

Religious access and seasonal commerce have also been affected.[28] During Ramadan in 2024, checkpoints around Jerusalem’s Old City and at entrances to the Temple Mount encumbered sales of food, clothing, and holiday gifts amid a tourism crisis.[28] Access from neighborhoods beyond the fence and from the West Bank was a central concern, alongside the stated policy of protecting freedom of worship while addressing security and safety needs.[28]

A spring 2026 survey of 1,038 Palestinian adults in the West Bank and East Jerusalem found that 92 percent regarded checkpoints as a major problem for themselves and their families.[29] The proportions were 93 percent in the West Bank and 85 percent in East Jerusalem.[29] Interviews were conducted in Arabic from March 30 to April 28; Gaza was excluded because of security concerns.[29] The results measure respondents’ experiences and perceptions, rather than the number of checkpoints or their security effectiveness.[29]

The principal dispute concerns whether the scope and location of restrictions are proportionate to their security benefits.[6][12] Criticism of internal checkpoints has questioned their necessity where travelers would face another inspection before entering Israel; the military response emphasized threats to Israeli civilians and soldiers within the West Bank itself.[12] Military assessments in 2023 also identified possible disadvantages of fixed checkpoints, including their vulnerability as static targets and the possibility that attackers would change tactics.[20]

In commentary, Pinhas Inbari contrasted the Israeli explanation that terrorist attacks created the need for inspections with European criticism emphasizing movement restrictions, while acknowledging the burden of internal checkpoints.[30] Biometric processing has generated a related dispute: faster passage at Qalandiya was welcomed by some workers, but objections concerned the checkpoint itself and Israeli possession of Palestinians’ biometric data.[24]

Numerical comparisons require particular caution because surveys count different categories, locations, and periods.[2][22] Historical checkpoint-removal series are not necessarily comparable with inventories covering all gates, roadblocks, and earth obstacles, and the March 2026 reporting noted the absence of publicly released comprehensive military figures.[16][22]