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IHRA Definition of Antisemitism

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01In brief

The IHRA definition of antisemitism is a non-legally binding working definition adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance on 26 May 2016 as a practical guide to identifying and combating antisemitism. It defines antisemitism as “a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews,” and accompanies that formulation with eleven illustrative examples to be assessed in their overall context. The examples address violence, conspiracy theories, Holocaust denial, collective blame, and manifestations involving Israel, while expressly excluding criticism of Israel comparable to criticism of other countries. Governments, educational institutions, public authorities, and civil-society organizations have used the definition for recognition, education, monitoring, and related policy work. Its application, particularly in educational settings and to political expression about Israel, has generated debate over discrimination and freedom of speech.

02Overview

The working definition addresses both perceptions of Jews and the rhetorical or physical manifestations of those perceptions.[1] Its central formulation reads: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.”[1] The scope therefore includes attacks on people and property, as well as manifestations directed at communal institutions and places of religious life.[1]

The definition is accompanied by explanatory material and eleven contemporary examples, rather than being presented solely as a short abstract statement.[1] These examples concern manifestations in public life, the media, schools, workplaces, and religious settings.[1] They are illustrations that may apply “taking into account the overall context,” not an exhaustive list of everything that can constitute antisemitism.[1] The accompanying explanation also identifies speech, writing, visual forms, and action as possible modes of expression.[1]

A central theme is the relationship between familiar anti-Jewish accusations and their contemporary manifestations.[1] The explanatory text describes allegations that Jews conspire to harm humanity or are responsible for why things go wrong, while the examples address dehumanizing stereotypes, supposed Jewish control, collective blame, and Holocaust denial.[1] Other examples address circumstances in which Israel is targeted as a Jewish collectivity or Jews are blamed for Israeli state actions.[1] The text expressly states that criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.[1]

The instrument is intended chiefly for practical use in recognizing and combating antisemitism, rather than to settle the academic theory of the subject.[6] Its non-legally binding status is part of the terms under which it was adopted, and its illustrations guide assessment rather than establish a self-contained criminal code.[2][1] Practical applications include education, institutional training, monitoring incidents, and gathering and analyzing data.[2][3] Whether an antisemitic incident also constitutes a crime depends on the applicable law; not every antisemitic incident is criminal.[2]

03Origins and History

The core text developed in 2004–2005 before its adoption by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.[4] Its early development followed an escalation of antisemitism and anti-Zionism associated with the period after the 2001 United Nations World Conference against Racism in Durban.[4] The working definition existed in an earlier form associated with the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, commonly abbreviated EUMC.[6] That earlier text provided the basis for the definition subsequently adopted by IHRA.[6]

Lawyer and scholar Kenneth Stern drafted text in 2004 in response to a perceived need for consistent documentation and comparison of antisemitic incidents across European countries.[7] One episode in that development concerned the burning of a Jewish school in Canada following Israel’s killing of Hamas leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi.[7] Stern challenged an approach under which an attack might not be classified as antisemitic if it arose in response to Israeli actions, asking the European monitoring body whether the school attack should count.[7] The resulting text was used in the EUMC’s data-collection work.[7]

The early institutional history includes adoption by the European monitoring body in late 2004 and use by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in 2005.[4] A European Union agency published the definition in 2005.[3] The United States Department of State had used its own definition since 2010; the later IHRA definition built on and was consistent with that formulation.[1] These earlier uses preceded the formal IHRA decision in 2016.[1]

Within IHRA, the initiative was connected to the Stockholm Declaration’s call for international responsibility to combat antisemitism and xenophobia.[1] The Committee on Antisemitism and Holocaust Denial brought the issue before the organization’s plenary in Budapest in 2015.[1] The plenary adopted the working definition in Bucharest on 26 May 2016, with all 31 member states supporting it.[4][1] Both the United States and the United Kingdom were among those member countries.[3][8]

Adoption expanded beyond the IHRA plenary during the following year.[2] The United Kingdom adopted the definition in December 2016, and the Government of Israel adopted it on 22 January 2017.[9][10] The European Commission began using it in January 2017.[2] On 1 June 2017, the European Parliament adopted it in a resolution on combating antisemitism.[2] A December 2018 Council of the European Union declaration called on member states to endorse the definition as a useful guidance tool for education, training, and law enforcement.[2]

In the United States, Executive Order 13899, issued on 11 December 2019, directed relevant executive agencies to consider the definition and its examples in specified civil-rights enforcement work.[11] In Israel, the Knesset plenary approved the definition on 22 June 2022 by 33 votes to five, following the government’s earlier endorsement.[9][12] By the end of 2022, 1,116 bodies worldwide, including 39 countries, had adopted it.[10] A later count, dated 9 November 2026, listed 40 countries, 38 U.S. states, and the District of Columbia as having adopted the working definition.[9]

04Practice and Application

The eleven examples are introduced as possible contemporary manifestations of antisemitism whose assessment requires attention to overall context.[1] They are applicable across public and institutional settings, including schools, workplaces, religious life, and the media.[1] Their stated function is illustrative: the text does not claim that the list exhausts the possible forms of antisemitism.[1] The accompanying explanation likewise encompasses several forms of conduct and communication, ranging from words and images to physical action.[1]

The first example concerns calling for, aiding, or justifying harm to Jews.[1] Another addresses dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews or Jewish power, including claims of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy or Jewish control of institutions.[1] These examples correspond to the explanatory text’s emphasis on conspiratorial accusations that Jews seek to harm humanity or are to blame for wider misfortunes.[1] The framework thus addresses both explicit hostility and accusations framed as explanations of political or social events.[1]

Collective responsibility is addressed in more than one setting.[1] One example concerns blaming Jews as a people for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by an individual Jewish person or group, or even by non-Jews.[1] Another concerns holding Jews collectively responsible for the actions of the State of Israel.[1] In each case, the example concerns the attribution of responsibility to Jews collectively rather than only to the particular people or institutions involved in an action.[1]

Two examples address the Holocaust.[1] One concerns denial of its fact, scope, mechanisms, or intentionality.[1] The other concerns accusations that Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, invented or exaggerated the Holocaust.[1] These examples sit alongside those addressing contemporary violence and conspiracy theories, extending the framework to manifestations involving the destruction of European Jewry and accusations about its remembrance.[1]

An additional example concerns allegations that Jewish citizens are more loyal to Israel, or to alleged worldwide Jewish priorities, than to the interests of their own nations.[1] The example addresses accusations directed at Jewish citizens on the basis of an assumed external allegiance.[1] It appears alongside examples concerning Jewish self-determination and the treatment of Israel, but its immediate subject is the loyalty imputed to Jews within the countries where they live.[1]

The examples concerning Israel include denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, illustrated by the claim that Israel’s existence is a racist endeavor.[1] They also include applying a double standard by requiring behavior from Israel that is not expected or demanded of another democratic country.[1] The text further identifies the use of symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism to characterize Israel or Israelis, comparisons between contemporary Israeli policy and Nazi policy, and collective blame of Jews for Israeli actions.[1] These are contextual illustrations within the working definition, not a statement that criticism of Israeli policy as such is antisemitic.[1]

The accompanying explanation explicitly addresses the relationship between antisemitism and criticism of Israel.[1] It allows that manifestations of antisemitism may target Israel when Israel is conceived as a Jewish collectivity, while stating: “However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.”[1] That qualification forms part of the same explanatory framework as the Israel-related examples.[1] Assessment under the text therefore includes both its substantive illustrations and its instruction to consider overall context.[1]

Institutional uses include identifying antisemitism and gathering and analyzing information about it.[3] The definition has also been used as a resource for education and for efforts to recognize and counter antisemitism.[2] The European Union’s practical-use handbook treats education, training, and law enforcement as relevant fields of application.[2] Although the definition is itself non-binding, Romania based legislation on it, illustrating that a jurisdiction can separately choose to incorporate it into a legal initiative.[2]

The distinction between antisemitism and criminality remains explicit in the accompanying material.[1] Antisemitic acts are criminal when the applicable law defines them as such.[1] A criminal act can be antisemitic because a person or property was selected for being Jewish, being perceived as Jewish, or being associated with Jews.[1] Separately, antisemitic discrimination includes denying Jews opportunities or services available to others, conduct that is illegal in many countries.[1] The threshold for criminal liability consequently depends on the legislation of the country concerned, rather than on the working definition alone.[2]

Executive Order 13899 established a particular U.S. federal application in the enforcement of Title VI.[11] It directed executive agencies enforcing that provision to consider the IHRA definition when identifying evidence of discrimination based on race, color, or national origin.[11] The contemporary examples were to be considered only to the extent that they could be useful as evidence of discriminatory intent.[11] The order did not treat their inclusion as a substitute for examining the circumstances of a complaint; it specified that each Title VI complaint requires detailed analysis.[11]

The same order instructed agencies not to diminish or infringe rights protected by federal law or the First Amendment.[11] Its direction to consider the definition was therefore accompanied by express protections for legally protected expression and other rights.[11] The Department of Education has used the definition since at least 2019, while the Department of State identifies the United States as an IHRA member that uses the working definition.[3][1] These administrative applications form part of its broader use as a recognition and assessment tool.[3]

05Significance

The definition has attained international reach beyond the 31 states represented at its adoption in 2016.[13][1] More than 40 United Nations member states use it, and hundreds of subnational public authorities, universities, sports bodies, nongovernmental organizations, and corporations rely on it.[13] These categories encompass both governmental users and institutions outside government.[13] The separate November 2026 adoption tally of 40 countries, 38 U.S. states, and the District of Columbia records formal endorsements across national and subnational levels.[9]

Its European uptake includes use by the European Commission, endorsement by the European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union’s call for member states to adopt it as guidance.[2] In the United Kingdom, institutional adopters have included universities and the Football Association.[5] In Israel, government endorsement in 2017 was followed by a separate Knesset vote in 2022.[10][12] This institutional spread reflects applications in education, public administration, communal protection, and organized sport rather than a single uniform enforcement system.[13][2][5]

The framework connects contemporary manifestations of antisemitism with longstanding forms of anti-Jewish hostility.[1] Conspiracy accusations, stereotypes about Jewish power, Holocaust denial, and collective responsibility appear in the same set of illustrations as antisemitic imagery applied to Israel and accusations against Jewish citizens’ loyalty.[1] The text gives explicit attention to Jewish self-determination and to the possibility that hostility toward Jews can be expressed by treating Israel as a Jewish collectivity.[1] At the same time, its express protection for comparable criticism of Israel establishes a distinction within the framework between criticism of a state and manifestations of anti-Jewish hostility.[1]

Its practical significance also lies in the possibility of recognizing and comparing incidents across settings.[3][7] The early drafting responded to a need for a consistent way to document antisemitic incidents across European countries, and subsequent institutional uses have included collecting and analyzing relevant data.[3][7] This monitoring function accompanies, rather than replaces, its educational and training applications.[2][3] The short central definition and its accompanying examples provide both a general formulation and illustrations of conduct that may require assessment in context.[1]

Supporters regard the Israel-related examples as useful for recognizing anti-Jewish hostility expressed through rhetoric about Israel while preserving room for ordinary criticism of Israeli policy.[3][4] Many Jewish community members regard the definition as an important safeguard.[5] Its early reception among British Jewish leadership included an assessment by Jonathan Arkush, then president of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, that the predecessor EUMC text was helpful, comprehensive, and fit for purpose; he described the IHRA adoption as involving a “tiny change in wording.”[8] Supporters have also described the framework as providing a common language for police, education ministries, and governments.[14]

The definition’s significance does not depend on its being a comprehensive scientific theory of antisemitism.[6] It was developed and adopted principally as a practical political instrument for combating the phenomenon.[6] The accompanying examples encompass attitudes and their expression in thought, speech, or action.[6] Its institutional role is consequently broader than criminal enforcement but distinct from a claim to settle every scholarly question about how antisemitism should be defined.[6][2]

06Controversies

The principal dispute concerns how institutions interpret and apply the Israel-related examples, particularly in universities and other settings involving political speech.[4][5] Critics argue that broad application can conflate legitimate criticism of Israel with antisemitism and chill freedom of expression or academic freedom; supporters argue that the examples help recognize contemporary anti-Jewish discrimination.[3][4] Kenneth Stern, the lead drafter, has opposed using the definition as a campus hate-speech code.[15]

Stern told Congress that the definition was intended primarily to help data collectors measure antisemitism over time and across borders.[15] He opposed its broad adoption as a hate-speech code, arguing that it had been used to chill some pro-Palestinian political speech, particularly on campuses, while distinguishing opinions from harassment, intimidation, and bullying.[15] In a later interview, he similarly objected to its use as a political weapon and distinguished classic anti-Jewish stereotypes from opposition to Zionism arising from Palestinian political and historical experiences.[7]

British parliamentary discussion focused partly on the double-standards example.[8] Friends of Palestine representatives warned that particular attention to Israel could be treated as antisemitic, while other witnesses argued that disproportionate scrutiny could indicate antisemitism.[8] Sir Mick Davis compared nine Commons Early Day Motions on North Korea since 2010 with 97 critical of Israel.[8] The committee broadly accepted the definition but proposed clarifying that criticism of Israel’s government, equal treatment with other liberal democracies, or particular interest in its actions was not antisemitic without additional evidence of antisemitic intent.[8]

The wider dispute includes disagreement about whether anti-Zionism inherently constitutes antisemitism.[16] Supporters of a linkage argue that opposition to Israel’s existence can deny Jewish self-determination, while critics point to political, historical, or theological forms of anti-Zionism that they do not regard as inherently anti-Jewish.[7][16] An alternative, the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, was issued by an international group of academics in March 2021 and defined antisemitism as “prejudice, discrimination, hostility or violence against Jews as Jews.”[5] It attracted 350 scholarly endorsements in the report’s account, alongside rejection by mainstream Jewish organizations favoring IHRA.[5]

The working definition remains expressly non-legally binding, includes a contextual requirement, and excludes criticism of Israel comparable to that directed at other countries.[1] The U.S. executive order also preserves First Amendment protections and requires individual analysis of complaints.[11] These provisions are central to the distinction between adopting guidance for identifying antisemitism and imposing a legal prohibition on political expression.[1][11]

Sources

  1. 1U.S. Department of State, Defining Antisemitism, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  2. 2Jewish Virtual Library, Handbook for the Practical Use of the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  3. 3Anti-Defamation League, About the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  4. 4Institute for National Security Studies, The IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism: Criticism, Implementation, and Importance, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  5. 5Institute for Jewish Policy Research, Facing Antisemitism: The Struggle for Safety and Solidarity, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  6. 6Institute for Jewish Policy Research, Antisemitism as a Form of Exclusion and the Controversy Surrounding Competing Definitions, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  7. 7Calcalist, “When people try to suppress opinions, it never ends well for Jews”, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  8. 8Institute for Jewish Policy Research, Antisemitism in the UK, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  9. 9Jewish Virtual Library, International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Definition of Anti-Semitism, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  10. 10The Knesset, Knesset Research and Information Center, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  11. 11Federal Register, Executive Order 13899, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  12. 12Maariv, By a large majority: The Knesset approved the IHRA organization’s definition of antisemitism, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  13. 13U.S. Department of State, Global Guidelines for Countering Antisemitism, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  14. 14Ynet, In this place, the joke goes that there are three guards at the synagogue for five worshippers, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  15. 15Congress.gov, Written Testimony of Kenneth S. Stern, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  16. 16My Jewish Learning, Israel and Anti-Semitism, accessed on November 19, 2026.

IsraelPedia Question & Answers

  • What is the IHRA definition of antisemitism?

    The IHRA definition of antisemitism is a non-legally binding working definition adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance on 26 May 2016 as a practical guide to identifying and combating antisemitism. It defines antisemitism as “a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews,” and is accompanied by eleven illustrative examples to be assessed in context.

  • What do the IHRA definition’s examples cover?

    The IHRA definition’s eleven examples address possible contemporary manifestations of antisemitism, including calls for harm to Jews, conspiracy theories, Holocaust denial, collective blame, and allegations about Jewish citizens’ loyalty. Several examples concern Israel, including denying Jewish self-determination and applying certain antisemitic symbols or comparisons to Israel. The examples are illustrative rather than exhaustive, and the definition says that criticism of Israel comparable to criticism of any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.

  • Why was the IHRA definition developed?

    The definition’s core text developed in 2004–2005 in response to a perceived need for a consistent way to document and compare antisemitic incidents across European countries. Lawyer and scholar Kenneth Stern drafted text in 2004, and the resulting text was used in the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia’s data-collection work. The earlier text provided the basis for the definition later adopted by IHRA.

  • How did the IHRA definition become widely adopted?

    After its adoption by IHRA in Bucharest on 26 May 2016, with all 31 member states supporting it, the definition received further institutional endorsements and uses. The United Kingdom adopted it in December 2016, and the Government of Israel adopted it on 22 January 2017; the European Commission began using it in January 2017. By the end of 2022, 1,116 bodies worldwide, including 39 countries, had adopted it.

  • How is the IHRA definition used in practice?

    Institutions use the IHRA definition to recognize antisemitism, support education and training, monitor incidents, and gather and analyze data. It is a practical guidance tool, not a self-contained criminal code, and whether an antisemitic incident is also a crime depends on applicable law. The United States’ Executive Order 13899 directed relevant agencies to consider the definition and examples in specified civil-rights enforcement work, while requiring detailed analysis of each complaint and protecting rights under federal law and the First Amendment.

  • Why is the IHRA definition controversial?

    Disagreement centers on how institutions apply the Israel-related examples, particularly in universities and other settings involving political speech. Critics argue that broad application can conflate legitimate criticism of Israel with antisemitism and chill freedom of expression or academic freedom; supporters say the examples help identify contemporary anti-Jewish discrimination. Kenneth Stern, the lead drafter, opposed using the definition as a campus hate-speech code.