Great March of Return (2018)

The campaign’s idea is associated with Gaza journalist and activist Ahmed Abu Artema, who proposed it in 2011. A later Facebook post asked what would happen if “200,000 peaceful protesters broke through the barbed wire...raised the Palestinian flag and pitched tents a few kilometers into our own occupied territory”; community activists began planning after the post circulated.[1]

The immediate context included severe economic and humanitarian distress in Gaza and Palestinian opposition to President Donald Trump’s December 6, 2017, recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and proposed embassy move. An INSS analysis also described the campaign as a possible source of common ground between rival Palestinian factions, while warning that factional divisions and Israel’s response could limit participation.[7]

A pre-event JCFA analysis described the organizers’ strategic objective as securing a claimed right of return for Palestinian refugees from 1948 and their descendants. It identified opposition to U.S. policy and the proposed “deal of the century” as declared tactical objectives. The same account said a national committee led by Palestinian Islamic Jihad figure Khaled al-Batsh included Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, social groups, and 13 subcommittees.[8]

Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine endorsed the campaign and sought to use it for their own interests.[1] On the opening day, Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh appeared near the fence and presented the march as an affirmation of Palestine and the right of return.[2] Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar said the campaign would continue until Palestinians removed what he called the “transient border” between Gaza and Israel.[1]

Before the demonstrations began, organizers presented the campaign as a civilian, nonviolent initiative protesting the Gaza blockade and asserting the refugees’ claimed right of return. Abu Artema said organizers had not officially called for crossing the fence, while acknowledging that they could not guarantee nobody would attempt it. Plans included tent camps and a major demonstration on May 15, Nakba Day, which Palestinians associate with the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Arabs during Israel’s War of Independence.[3]

Hamas and other Palestinian groups transported participants to the border, where five tent encampments had been established approximately 500–700 meters from the fence.[1] Tens of thousands gathered, with camps extending along several parts of the Gaza border.[2]

At one camp east of Gaza City, families gathered around tents, football fields had been marked in the sand, scout bands played, and tents bore the names of Palestinian villages in what is now Israel. Among those present was 80-year-old Mansi Nassar, who walked toward the border with a cane and said he had been born in Beit Darras and would accept nothing less than returning there.[2]

Turnout estimates differed. Organizers had expected about 100,000 participants, while the IDF estimated approximately 30,000. The Supreme Court of Israel’s later chronology gave an estimate of approximately 41,000 for March 30.[2][9]

Most participants remained near the encampments, but groups approaching the fence threw stones, Molotov cocktails, burning tires, and other projectiles.[1] The IDF declared the area a closed military zone and said participants tried to damage the fence and conduct attacks under cover of the demonstrations.[2] Israel deployed thousands of troops, positioned snipers, enlarged earth berms, installed barbed wire, and used drones to monitor points of friction. The stated aim was to avoid live ammunition as much as possible while preparing for possible terrorist infiltration or attacks.[10]

In a separate incident in northern Gaza, two armed men approached the fence and fired toward Israeli soldiers. Israeli forces responded with gunfire, tank fire, and aircraft fire against the men and nearby Hamas positions; no Israeli soldiers were reported injured.[11] A separate predawn tank-fire incident in southern Gaza also resulted in a Palestinian death before the main demonstrations.[2]

Casualty totals varied by source and scope. Ynet reported at least 16 Palestinians killed, including 11 during clashes, a farmer in the separate predawn incident, and four people at a Hamas observation post. Palestinian health officials reported more than 1,400 people hurt, including 758 wounded by live fire.[2] The ADL reported 16 killed and 700–1,000 injured, primarily by tear gas and other riot-dispersal weapons, while the Jewish Virtual Library reported 19 deaths.[4][1]

The IDF said two of the dead were Hamas Nukhba members and characterized all of them as terrorist operatives. The ADL reported the IDF’s claim that at least 11 were active members of Hamas or other terrorist organizations, while noting that some affiliations were identified by the organizations themselves. Palestinian accounts included reports that a farmer and a 16-year-old were among those killed.[2][4]

Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman addressed Gaza residents in Arabic: “The Hamas leadership is gambling with your lives. Anyone who approaches the fence endangers his life.”[10] UN Secretary-General António Guterres subsequently called for an independent investigation after the Security Council convened at Kuwait’s request.[12]

The demonstrations continued primarily on Fridays. The Supreme Court’s chronology recorded approximately 29,000 participants on April 6, 15,000 on April 13, 13,000 on April 20, 13,800 on April 27, 11,000 on May 4, and 20,000 on May 11.[9]

On April 6, organizers promoted a “Friday of Tires.” Approximately 20,000 people took part, and participants burned large numbers of tires and attempted to damage or cross the fence.[1] Other preparations included catapults and mirrors intended to obstruct the vision of Israeli snipers.[11]

A tactical disagreement emerged between civil-society organizer Ahmed Abu Artima and Hamas. Abu Artima’s group wanted the camps to prepare for a larger march in May rather than an immediate breach, and it opposed stone-throwing, burning tires, and Molotov cocktails. His supporters proposed throwing flowers instead. Abu Artima argued that violence would provide Israel with justification to use greater force, while Hamas supported the “Friday of Tires” and assumed a larger role after the opening demonstration.[13]

By late April, organizers were holding themed events including a “Women’s March of Gaza,” a “Day of Rebellious Youth,” and a “Friday of the Palestinian Worker.”[14] Participants also launched incendiary kites and balloons toward Israel. The State Department, citing Israeli government figures, attributed nearly 2,000 fires and more than 5,600 acres of burned land in Israel to incendiary devices during the March 30–December 5 period.[6] Israeli civilians in southern Israel reported property damage, psychological distress related to the fires, and fear that demonstrators might reach their communities.[15]

May 14, 2018, the day the U.S. Embassy opened in Jerusalem, produced the campaign’s largest and deadliest single confrontation. Schools and workplaces in Gaza were closed, and people were bused to demonstration points.[4] Participants were spread across twelve sites along the fence.[5]

Attendance estimates ranged from approximately 45,000 to 50,000. More than 60 Palestinians were killed, and at least 1,000 were injured; other contemporary reporting placed the number of wounded in the thousands.[5][4]

Attempted infiltrations and the use of weapons against Israeli soldiers and outposts were reported. The IDF employed riot-dispersal measures and live fire in situations it characterized as imminent threats.[4] Israel also struck Hamas military sites in response to alleged attempts by Hamas terrorists to breach the fence.[16]

A Hamas leader later claimed that 50 of those killed were Hamas members, while Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed three additional members. The Israeli military and Shin Bet said they had verified 24 of the dead as terrorist operatives from various factions.[5] International criticism focused on whether Israel’s response was disproportionate, while a White House spokesperson placed responsibility for the deaths on Hamas. The CRS presented these as competing political assessments rather than settled findings.[16]

The campaign continued beyond its original six-week plan. Hamas initially announced that the protests would end on May 14 but continued calling for demonstrations. Participation declined after the major May confrontations, although smaller Friday gatherings and incendiary attacks continued. In August, campaign spokesman Ahmad Abu Rutema called for a “tactical withdrawal” and said, “We have lost the battle for public opinion.”[1] Weekly Friday demonstrations continued until late December 2019.[14]

During the March 30–December 5, 2018, period, Palestinian terrorist groups also launched more than 1,150 rockets and mortars toward Israel. The State Department separately attributed nearly 2,000 fires and more than 5,600 burned acres to incendiary devices attached to kites and balloons.[6]

Casualty totals differ because sources use different periods and methodologies. The CRS reported more than 100 Palestinians killed and thousands injured as of May 21, 2018.[16] For the full year, the State Department cited B’Tselem’s count of 190 Palestinians killed at the Gaza fence, including 41 minors, and a World Health Organization count of 6,239 Palestinians injured by live fire.[6] ITIC reported 187 deaths over 42 weeks and classified 150 as affiliated with Hamas or other terrorist organizations, while the Jewish Virtual Library cited a UN total of 279 Palestinian deaths from March 30, 2018, through April 30, 2019.[15][1]

For March 30–May 15, ITIC counted at least 112 Palestinians killed and identified 93 as terrorist operatives or people affiliated with terrorist organizations, including 63 associated with Hamas; it listed 19 affiliations as unknown.[15] B’Tselem used a different criterion, stating that 149 people killed during 2018 had not taken part in hostilities. The Israeli government responded that many victims were Hamas operatives or had been encouraged by Hamas to approach the fence.[17] Organizational affiliation and participation in hostilities are related but not identical classifications.

Before the first demonstration, the IDF doubled its presence along the border and said it would not permit a breach.[1] Preparations included enlarging earth berms, installing barbed wire, positioning snipers, deploying specialized units, and using drones to monitor the fence.[10]

The Israeli government maintained that live fire was a last resort for clear and imminent threats and that soldiers generally aimed below the knee to wound rather than kill. It also said lethal fire was used against terrorists attacking Israeli forces.[6] The IDF reported opening an internal inquiry into every Palestinian death at the fence, and the Military Advocate General had opened five criminal investigations by the end of 2018.[6]

The State Department described participants as including unarmed protesters, armed terrorists, and people launching incendiary devices, and said Hamas took control of the weekly demonstrations.[17] The CRS described Israeli live fire as intended to prevent breaches and violence involving incendiary kites, Molotov cocktails, and explosive devices.[16]

Human-rights organizations argued that most victims posed no imminent threat and that the force used was excessive or disproportionate. The State Department recorded both those critiques and the Israeli government’s position without independently resolving the individual cases.[6]

Human-rights organizations petitioned the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, to challenge the IDF’s rules of engagement. The Court’s background account described clashes, attempts to damage the barrier, and terrorist attacks during or under cover of the demonstrations, while also acknowledging the participation of Palestinian civilians who were not involved in terrorist activity.[9]

The Court denied the petitions on May 24, 2018.[6] Its judgment explained that an armed conflict can involve both conduct-of-hostilities and law-enforcement paradigms and that the applicable framework depends on the circumstances of a particular use of force. Under the law-enforcement paradigm, potentially lethal force requires an actual danger to life or bodily integrity and must be a last resort governed by necessity and proportionality.[9]

The Court nevertheless called for operational lessons and the development of alternative, nonlethal means in light of the casualty toll and the location of some injuries.[6] The classified rules of engagement and their explanations were not presented to the judges because the petitioners declined to consent to the proposed in-camera, ex-parte review. The Court warned that this refusal could result in a presumption of regularity regarding the state’s conduct.[9]

Incendiary kites and balloons launched from Gaza caused extensive damage to Israeli civilian property, agricultural land, crops, and natural areas. Israeli government figures cited by the State Department attributed nearly 2,000 fires and more than 5,600 burned acres to these devices during the March 30–December 5 period.[6]

The UN Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry characterized the demonstrations as “civilian in nature,” with political aims, and concluded that, despite significant violence, they did not constitute combat or a military campaign. It therefore treated law enforcement and policing as the applicable legal framework.[15]

The Commission also recorded damage to Israeli property and psychological distress among southern Israeli civilians. It assigned Gaza’s de facto police authorities responsibility for failing to take adequate measures to prevent incendiary kites and balloons from reaching Israel.[15]

Israeli officials and JCPA analysts rejected the Commission’s overall characterization, emphasizing attacks on the fence, attempted infiltrations, explosives, incendiary devices, and Hamas’s organizational role.[15] No lasting border breach occurred.[18] Hamas continued calling for demonstrations beyond its announced end date, but attendance declined, and Abu Rutema acknowledged in August that the campaign had lost the battle for public opinion.[1]

Institutional accounts differ over Hamas’s role. The ADL described Hamas as having launched the campaign, while INSS said Hamas led it but did not initiate it.[4][7] The State Department concluded that Hamas took control of the weekly demonstrations over time.[17] Abu Artima’s documented disagreement with Hamas over tire burning, stone-throwing, and Molotov cocktails supports accounts of tension between the campaign’s civil-society organizers and Hamas.[13]

Fatality classifications also remain contested. ITIC classified 93 of at least 112 people killed through May 15 as terrorist operatives or affiliated with terrorist organizations and later classified 150 of 187 deaths over 42 weeks in the same way.[15] B’Tselem stated that 149 people killed during 2018 did not participate in hostilities.[17] These figures should not be treated as direct opposites because organizational affiliation and conduct at the time of death are different criteria.

The legality and proportionality of Israel’s response produced similarly divergent assessments. Israel maintained that live fire was a last resort against clear and imminent threats, while human-rights organizations argued that most victims posed no such threat.[6] The Supreme Court denied the challenges to the rules but called for nonlethal alternatives and did not review the classified rules themselves after the petitioners rejected the proposed confidential procedure.[9]

The framing of the events—as protests, riots, or a combination of civilian demonstrations and terrorist activity—reflects these disputes. The UN commission emphasized the events’ civilian and political character, whereas JCPA emphasized Hamas’s role, violent attacks, and attempted breaches.[15] The CRS described possible grassroots beginnings followed by a larger leadership role for Hamas and other terrorist groups, while presenting competing interpretations of Hamas’s objectives and Israel’s response.[16]