Gaza War Timeline (28 October–23 November 2023)

The period began as Israeli ground forces moved from raids and incursions to a larger campaign in northern Gaza. One chronology dates the beginning of the ground invasion to 27 October, the day before this timeline starts.[7] Britannica describes the advance as gradual, with the number of armored vehicles and personnel increasing at the end of October.[8] The IDF called its activity on 28 October “expanded ground activity,” while U.S. officials described it as appearing to be the start of a ground offensive.[9] These descriptions reflect differences in terminology and in what each account counted as the beginning of an invasion.

On 28 October, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the war had entered a “new stage” and would be “long and difficult.” He described Israel’s objectives as destroying Hamas’s military and governmental capabilities and bringing the hostages home.[2] Halevi likewise said that the war’s objectives required ground operations. Israeli officials described intensified shelling and ground activity as part of an effort to penetrate Hamas’s tunnel and bunker network and support forces entering the Strip.[1]

The expansion of fighting coincided with a communications blackout in Gaza. Reports on 28 October said phone and internet services had collapsed amid bombardment, obstructing aid organizations’ contact with their teams. The World Health Organization’s director-general said the loss of communications made it “impossible for ambulances to reach the injured” and raised concerns about health facilities and staff.[9] Britannica also describes the initial loss of communications as limiting Hamas terrorists’ coordination while hindering emergency responders.[8]

Hostages remained central to the military and diplomatic context. On 28 October, the IDF said it had notified families that relatives were being held in Gaza, giving a figure of 230 while another entry in the same contemporaneous report cited 229 confirmed hostages. Hostage families called for an “all for all” exchange, and Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar publicly offered to exchange all hostages for all Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails.[9] An IDF spokesperson characterized the offer as “psychological terror.” These reports document figures and proposals as stated at the time, rather than a settled count or agreement.[10]

On 28 October, Israeli forces expanded their ground activity in northern Gaza after operating there from the previous evening. The IDF said infantry, engineering forces, and tanks were operating in the area and that the Air Force struck about 150 underground Hamas sites, including tunnels and underground combat areas.[9] The FDD account described the shelling as intensified and said Israeli officials viewed it as supporting ground-force entry and operations against Hamas’s underground network.[1]

On 30 October, Israeli forces rescued Pvt. Ori Megidish, a soldier abducted from the Nahal Oz base during the 7 October terrorist attack. The IDF and Shin Bet said she was in good condition and had been reunited with her family.[11]

The IDF reported on 1 November that its forces had broken through Hamas’s first line of defense in northern Gaza and were approaching Gaza City. Brigadier General Itzik Cohen, commander of the 162nd Division, described the troops as being “at the gates of Gaza City.” The IDF also announced that 16 soldiers had been killed in and near Gaza that week.[12] The same day, the Rafah crossing began admitting wounded Palestinians and foreign passport holders into Egypt. Hundreds crossed, and 61 trucks carrying food, water, and medical supplies entered Gaza through Rafah, according to the reported figures.[13][14]

On 2 November, the IDF announced that its forces had completed the encirclement of Gaza City, which it described as a center of Hamas activity. Chief of Staff Halevi said troops were operating inside the city and surrounding it from several directions, with close-quarters fighting supported from the air and sea.[15] A separate account says Israeli forces were targeting command nodes and the tunnel network.[16] Israeli engineers were reported to be using robots and explosives against tunnel entrances and booby traps; reports also attributed to Israeli sources a figure of about 100 tunnels destroyed by that point.[17]

By 5 November, Israeli forces said they had reached the Mediterranean coast, fully encircled Gaza City, and divided the Strip into northern and southern areas. The IDF reported reaching the coastal Rashid Road and central Salah al-Din Road, creating a separation between the north and south.[18] The military also reported striking more than 1,600 targets and killing more than 300 terrorists during the operation; those figures are military claims, not independently established totals.[19]

The ground advance was accompanied by movement of civilians southward. The IDF said a one-way route remained open and identified Salah al-Din Road as a humanitarian corridor.[18] UN figures reported that about 2,000 people moved south on 5 November, 5,000 on 6 November, and about 15,000 on 7 November. On 8 November, the IDF said the corridor would be open for specified hours and later extended the opening; its spokesperson said about 50,000 people had moved south that day.[20]

Other reported developments included Israeli forces taking positions in western parts of Gaza City by 6–7 November, including along the coastal road. Israeli forces from the 7th Armored Brigade, supported by aircraft, were reported to have captured a Hamas stronghold after striking a terrorist cell. Reports also described tanks escorting residents south and tents being set up near Rafah for people displaced from the north.[21] On 8 November, the IDF said it had destroyed 130 tunnel shafts. On 9 November, the IDF said it had surrounded terrorists near Indonesian Hospital and a school in Beit Hanoun; allegations that terrorists had fired from a hospital and that explosives had been placed near civilian facilities were attributed to Israeli military statements.[17]

The campaign’s advance was described as slow and methodical. The Jewish Virtual Library attributed that approach to expectations of a long war, concern about a possible second front with Hezbollah, and a desire to prepare the public for continued military activity. Reports described Israeli forces finding weapons and rockets in a mosque and a building used by the Palestinian Scout Association, and tunnel openings near an amusement park and a university. These accounts also described heavy fighting near Shifa Hospital, where Israel said Hamas had a tunnel network connected to its headquarters.[17]

A first-person diary published during the period offers a limited view of one soldier’s experience rather than a comprehensive military chronology. Yoni Heilman wrote on 31 October about his unit’s work recovering people killed in the 7 October attack, including searches of towns and surrounding areas and efforts to locate missing people. He described night searches and checking bodies for improvised explosive devices, and wrote that the recovery work continued without a cease-fire.[22]

In a 2 November entry, Heilman recounted reports of soldiers injured by rocket-propelled grenades, a commander calling for mortar fire on his own position after reporting enemy forces among his unit, and hearing of soldiers’ deaths before their names became public. He did not identify the battle or provide a complete casualty tally. On 5 November, he wrote that the war had reached one month and that he did not know how long it would last; he recalled recovering a photo album from the ruins of Kibbutz Be’eri and expecting to return it to the surviving sons of its owner.[22]

Heilman’s 6 November entry reproduced a message he had written for his children about fear and uncertainty during the war and his view that soldiers were trying to avoid harming civilians. On 7 November, he described a visit to Kibbutz Be’eri that residents turned away because it had not received advance approval; he interpreted their decision as asserting that the kibbutz was their home rather than a military base or tourist attraction. In an 8 November entry, he recounted a ceremony marking the end of the 30-day mourning period for those killed on 7 October, including prayers, a memorial candle, the national anthem, and a story of a wounded soldier warning a medic not to approach because the medic could also be killed.[22]

The opening of Rafah on 1 November enabled foreign passport holders and wounded Palestinians to leave Gaza for Egypt. Reports described the arrangement as mediated by Qatar and coordinated among Israel, Egypt, Hamas, and the United States.[23] At least 320 foreign passport holders crossed that day, according to a report citing Egyptian security sources and a Hamas official.[14] The crossing was presented as temporary, and Israel and Egypt consulted on the identities of those crossing. In addition to the 61 aid trucks reported to have entered that day, Egypt had consented on 31 October to receive 81 wounded people from Gaza for treatment.[13][24]

On 4 November, Israel agreed to open a corridor for three hours to enable civilians to travel from northern Gaza southward. Reports said the IDF suspended operations for several hours on following days to facilitate movement. The same account alleged that Hamas fired mortars toward the route; the details concerning conduct around the corridor are reported claims and not uniformly independently verified.[24] On 5 November, the IDF said Salah al-Din Road had been opened as a humanitarian corridor and that civilians could move south.[18]

The humanitarian situation was also affected by the condition of health-care facilities and fuel supplies. On 11 November, the Gaza Health Ministry said Shifa Hospital had stopped functioning after losing electricity and water, while hospital officials described a fire and patients and displaced people remaining inside. Ynet attributed these statements to Gaza health authorities and separately recorded Israeli claims that the IDF was operating near the hospital and that Hamas had placed military capabilities in and around hospitals. Accounts of the facility’s condition, its surroundings, and responsibility for events differed.[25]

On 12 November, regional directors of the World Health Organization and two other UN agencies called for urgent international action to end attacks on health-care facilities, describing conditions for pediatric care and other services in hospitals including Al Shifa as “perilous.” On 13 November, U.S. President Joe Biden said he expected Israel to take “less intrusive action relative to hospitals.”[26]

Israel permitted limited fuel supplies to enter on 15 November for specified humanitarian purposes, after having blocked fuel from entering since the war began, according to the U.S. State Department’s 2023 human-rights report. The report said Israel cited the risk that Hamas and other terrorist groups could use fuel for military purposes.[27] A State Department spokesperson said the fuel was intended to help humanitarian organizations operate trucks carrying aid from warehouses, while more fuel was needed for hospitals, desalination, and other humanitarian uses.[28] Reports also said Israel consented to the transfer of 23,000 liters of fuel for UNRWA and agreed to allow fuel trucks into Gaza daily for UN use.[24]

The Palestinian Red Crescent said that on 19 November, in coordination with the World Health Organization and OCHA, it evacuated 31 premature babies from Shifa Hospital by ambulance to the UAE Hospital in Rafah.[29] A later report said the babies had been transferred onward to Egypt, with 28 eventually making that transfer. The difference in reported details is tied to the dates and accounts in the sources; the central event was the evacuation of premature infants from Shifa to facilities in the south and then Egypt.[30]

By 20 November, UNRWA reported that approximately 1.7 million people in Gaza had been displaced.[24] In a diary entry dated 13 November, Heilman described his unit operating in central Gaza and arranging a 48-hour leave after more than a month, while he felt reluctant to leave the battle area.[31] On 19 November, he wrote about routine operational shifts, reports of casualties, and a 12-hour duty period that included an attack on neighboring forces requiring his team’s attention. These accounts convey individual experience but do not constitute a comprehensive description of displacement or military operations.[32]

Shifa Hospital became a major focus of military operations and diplomatic concern in November. Before Israeli forces entered the hospital compound, accounts differed over its operational status and the circumstances around it. The Gaza Health Ministry said services had stopped after a loss of electricity and water, while the IDF said it was operating nearby and maintained that Hamas used military infrastructure in and around hospitals. A report also described an Israeli official’s suggestion that hostages might be held beneath Shifa as a possibility rather than a confirmed finding.[25]

On the night of 14–15 November, Israeli forces began what the IDF described as a focused, intelligence-based operation in a designated area of the hospital. The IDF said hospital management had been informed, that it had opened a route for evacuations, and that troops encountered explosives and Hamas terrorists before entering.[33] It also said it delivered medical equipment, incubators, and baby food, with medical personnel and Arabic-speaking soldiers present to assist. Hamas and Palestinian officials disputed Israel’s account of Hamas’s military use of the hospital and challenged the justification for the operation.[17][34]

The IDF said troops found weapons and military equipment, including in the MRI department. Reports also described weapons, ammunition, protective vests, and military uniforms found in the hospital or nearby storage areas.[17][34] On 16 November, the IDF said it had found a tunnel entrance inside the complex and a Hamas pickup truck containing weapons nearby, as well as communications equipment and electronic devices under investigation.[35] These findings and claims about military use were attributed to the IDF and were disputed. U.S. officials said they had intelligence assessments that Hamas operated tunnels under hospitals and a command node at Shifa, while cautioning that they could not assess the exact situation on the ground during the operation.[28]

The State Department spokesperson said on 16 November that it was too early to draw definitive conclusions about the operation and that the United States was continuing to monitor the facts. He said the United States had not assessed that Israel violated international humanitarian law, while emphasizing that patients should receive humane treatment and access to food, water, and medical care. The U.S. position distinguished its intelligence assessments about Hamas activity from a definitive assessment of what had occurred inside the hospital during the ongoing operation.[28]

The IDF said on 18 November that, at the hospital manager’s request, it had provided a secure route for people sheltering at Shifa who wished to leave. It said patients and medical staff who could not or did not wish to evacuate could remain, and reported delivering more than 6,000 liters of water and more than 2,300 kilograms of food rations. A doctor quoted in the report said it was impossible at that time to evacuate patients. Hamas representatives disputed Israel’s account and described the operation as an attack on the hospital.[36]

On 19 November, the evacuation of 31 premature babies from Shifa was reported by the Palestinian Red Crescent as coordinated with WHO and OCHA.[29] On 22 November, the Red Crescent said evacuation of remaining patients had begun and that 14 ambulances had arrived. A report citing a Hamas-run Health Ministry spokesperson said more than 250 patients and about 400 displaced people remained at the facility.[30] Separately, the IDF showed reporters additional portions of a tunnel beneath the complex, describing a passage beneath the hospital’s Qatari building with a room, hideout, toilets, and a kitchen; it said an entrance found the prior week reached a blast door after about 55 meters. These descriptions were attributed to the Israeli military.[30]

The operation and the claims about the hospital remained contested throughout the period. On 12 November, international health officials had called conditions in hospitals perilous; on 13 November, Biden urged less intrusive action around hospitals.[26] On 16 November, the U.S. spokesperson said the facts on the ground were not yet clear. The available accounts therefore distinguish among statements by the IDF, Hamas and Palestinian officials, hospital personnel, international organizations, and U.S. officials rather than resolving all disputed claims as established fact.[28]

The IDF said on 10 November that its forces entered what it called Hamas’s “security quarter” near Shifa Hospital after clearing the area. The military reported that about 50 terrorists were killed and said forces found intelligence documents and destroyed ammunition, tunnels, weapons-production sites, and anti-tank launchers. These figures and descriptions were military claims as reported by the source.[37]

On 16 November, the IDF announced that it had taken control of Gaza harbor, which it described as a Hamas naval-commando training facility. According to the IDF account, combat engineers identified and destroyed 10 tunnels, Israeli forces killed 10 Hamas terrorists, and four harbor buildings were destroyed. The reported figures and the characterization of the facility are attributed to the IDF.[38]

The IDF also announced expanded operations in Zeitoun and Jabaliya on 18 November. It said that forces had provided a secure route for residents seeking to leave Shifa, while Hamas representatives described the hospital operation as an attack.[29] Reports on 17 November said Israeli forces had expanded operations in Gaza City, including ground operations in Zeitoun, where the IDF said it captured Hamas strongholds. The same report attributed to the IDF claims that weapons had been found at sites including a school and kindergarten and that an Islamic Jihad weapons-production site had been destroyed after weapons and military materials were removed.[39]

On 21 November, the IDF said it had completed the encirclement of Jabaliya and that fighting had intensified in Zeitoun. It also reported continued operations around Shifa and said forces had breached an iron door leading to a tunnel used by Hamas terrorists.[40] On 19 November, the IDF had reported locating 35 tunnel shafts in northern Gaza. Tunnel discoveries and operational descriptions in these accounts are military statements, not independent tallies.[29]

Heilman’s diary provides additional, explicitly personal accounts of fighting and military routines. On 9 November, he alleged that Hamas blocked some civilians from using humanitarian escape corridors and described a night when, after his forces came under fire, Palestinian women, children, and babies emerged from an unseen tunnel before his soldiers returned fire. The cited diary page does not independently verify these serious claims. On 15 November, he alleged that Hamas used a humanitarian pause to move truckloads of terrorists and launch rockets at Israeli population centers; this, too, is the diarist’s account rather than an independently corroborated report.[31]

In an entry dated 17 November, Heilman wrote that more than 30 soldiers had been killed in Gaza since ground forces crossed the border and that many others had been injured. He described a nearby incident in which a terrorist emerged from a tunnel and fired a rocket-propelled grenade through the cab of a military bulldozer, injuring its driver. The casualty figure and incident are presented in his personal account, not as an independently verified total or complete military report.[31]

Other reported fighting included a 1 November airstrike in Jabalia. A report said the IDF had identified Hamas terrorists gathering in a multistory building near a school, medical center, and government offices and called in an airstrike; it also said the Air Force struck a vehicle carrying antitank missiles moving toward Israeli forces. Palestinians reported many civilian casualties, while Palestinian UN observer Riyad Mansour condemned the strike and called for International Criminal Court action. These casualty and legal characterizations were reported as claims by the parties and officials cited.[23]

Discussions about Gaza’s postwar governance ran alongside the military campaign. On 31 October, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken told Congress that if Gaza could not be transferred to the Palestinian Authority in one step, temporary arrangements might involve regional countries and/or international agencies. This was a discussion of possible arrangements, not an agreed plan. On 5 November, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas told Blinken that the PA was willing to “fully assume our responsibilities” within a comprehensive political solution covering Gaza and the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — including East Jerusalem.[2]

On 15 November, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2712. As summarized in the Congressional Research Service report, it called for “urgent and extended humanitarian pauses,” the immediate and unconditional release of hostages held by Hamas and other groups, and protection of basic services and humanitarian assistance indispensable to Gaza civilians’ survival.[2] The vote was 12 in favor, none against, and three abstentions: the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia. The UN Digital Library’s voting record confirms those totals.[41]

U.S. representative Linda Thomas-Greenfield said the United States could not vote yes because the text did not condemn Hamas or reaffirm states’ rights to protect their citizens from terrorist attacks. The vote thus combined a call for humanitarian pauses and hostage release with an expressed U.S. objection to the resolution’s treatment of Hamas and state security.[2]

On 19 November, President Biden wrote that “a cease-fire is not peace” while Hamas retained its ideology and control of Gaza. He outlined principles for a postwar arrangement that included no forcible displacement, reoccupation, siege or blockade, or reduction in Gaza’s territory; governance of Gaza and Judea and Samaria ultimately under a revitalized Palestinian Authority; and international support for immediate needs, interim security, and reconstruction. These were stated principles, not an agreement among the parties.[2]

On 22 November, Biden spoke with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, thanking Egypt for efforts to reach an agreement for hostage release together with a humanitarian pause. The leaders discussed coordinating an increase in humanitarian assistance and agreed to remain in close contact as implementation proceeded. The readout described preparations for implementation rather than a deal that had already been fully carried out.[42]

Negotiations over hostages and a pause in fighting developed through several stages, and contemporaneous reports do not always use the same date for cabinet approval and agreement. On 17 November, Israel told Qatari mediators it rejected a proposal to release 50 hostages without categories or criteria and demanded that children and mothers be released without separating families. Israel was reported as willing to be flexible about the number of pause days and prepared for an agreement involving at least 70 hostages. Separately, the War Cabinet approved two diesel tankers per day through Rafah for UN needs connected to water and sewage infrastructure, with officials saying this was intended to help prevent disease outbreaks and did not change overall strategy.[39]

The Israeli cabinet approved a hostage arrangement overnight on 21–22 November. Reports described a first stage in which about 50 Israeli hostages, mainly women and children, would be exchanged for about 150 Palestinian security prisoners, mainly women and youths, during a four-day pause.[4] The arrangement provided for at least 10 hostages in each phase and an additional 24-hour pause for every additional 10 hostages released. One report described a possible second stage involving up to 50 further hostages and up to 150 further prisoners.[3] National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and ministers from his Otzma Yehudit party were reported to have voted against the deal.[4]

The reported terms included increased humanitarian aid and fuel deliveries. FDD described the agreement as Qatar- and Egypt-mediated and reported that the pause could be extended by additional days linked to further releases.[3] The Jewish Virtual Library reported terms that included a halt to Israeli ground operations, suspension of aerial surveillance while Hamas complied, and Red Cross visits to hostages with medicine. Differences in the reported lists of hostage categories and other provisions reflect the sources’ accounts of the evolving arrangement.[11]

On 22 November, Hamas said that the four-day ceasefire would begin on 23 November at 10 a.m. and announced a halt to military operations, aid and fuel deliveries, and an exchange of 50 women and children held in Gaza for 150 Palestinian women and children imprisoned in Israel. At that point, the releases were prospective.[40] Israel’s cabinet approval and the reported terms were presented in other accounts as occurring on 21–22 November, while the Jewish Virtual Library dates cabinet approval late on 20 November. The reports may describe different stages or record differing dates and do not support treating every date as a single, uncontested event.[11][4]

The expected 23 November start did not occur within the period covered here. On 23 November, Israel’s National Security Council head Tzachi Hanegbi said the first release would not begin before Friday, rather than Thursday as initially expected. Reports cited differing explanations for the delay: a U.S. official referred to incomplete information about some hostages, while a Qatari official attributed it to last-minute disagreements.[5] Qatar later announced that the pause would begin at 7 a.m. on Friday, 24 November, with the first 13 hostages scheduled for release at 4 p.m. That announcement placed the start of the pause and releases after the timeline’s cutoff.[6]

A 22 November diary entry by Heilman reflected the uncertainty before implementation. He wrote that his unit was preparing for a possible exchange involving Israeli women and children and Palestinian prisoners, and described an operation against terrorists he said were building a rocket launcher ahead of the anticipated pause. He wrote that, if plans proceeded, the pause would begin the next day; his entry does not establish what happened on 23 November or independently specify the agreement’s terms.[32]

The announced pause took effect on 24 November, one day after this timeline ends. Later CRS reporting confirms that the multi-day pause began on that date, while the Jewish Virtual Library records that the first 13 Israeli hostages were released that afternoon and Israel released 39 Palestinian prisoners.[26][11]

The start of implementation therefore belongs to the immediate aftermath rather than to the events covered through 23 November. The distinction is important because the agreement, cabinet approval, announced start time, delayed implementation, and actual beginning of the pause occurred at separate stages.[11]

Several central events in this period are documented through statements by parties to the conflict rather than independently verified operational findings. Military claims about targets struck, terrorists killed, tunnel discoveries, and control of territory are attributed to the IDF in the cited reports. The reported figures—such as targets struck, people killed, or tunnel shafts found—should therefore be read as claims made at the time, not as independently confirmed totals.[19][37]

The most sustained dispute concerned Shifa Hospital. Israeli officials and the IDF said Hamas used military facilities in or near the hospital and reported finding weapons, equipment, and tunnels. Hamas and Palestinian officials disputed the claims and the justification for the operation.[33] Hospital personnel and international organizations emphasized the safety and needs of patients, staff, and civilians. U.S. officials said they had intelligence assessments of Hamas activity beneath hospitals and a command node at Shifa, but said on 16 November that the operation was ongoing and that they could not assess the exact situation on the ground.[28]

Humanitarian access and evacuation reports likewise include claims attributed to different actors. Reports described corridors for civilians moving south, changes in corridor hours, fuel and aid deliveries, and disputes over movement and safety. UN and IDF figures for civilian movement were reported separately, and the cited material does not establish that every figure or allegation concerning the routes was independently verified.[20] The same caution applies to the circumstances of hospital evacuations and accounts of civilian conditions.[36]

The date and implementation of the hostage arrangement require similar care. Reports place cabinet approval or agreement at different points between 20 and 22 November, while Hamas announced a 23 November start and Qatar subsequently scheduled implementation for 24 November.[3][6] The pause and hostage releases were therefore not events that had begun by the end of 23 November.

Finally, first-person diary passages provide a perspective on the experience of one Israeli soldier and his unit, not a comprehensive or independently corroborated chronology. Heilman’s accounts of events at evacuation corridors and alleged Hamas activity during a humanitarian pause are appropriately presented as his own descriptions.[22][31] His later entries concerning battlefield routines and preparations for the hostage arrangement have the same limited, personal scope.[32]