Brazil–Israel Relations

Political ties have varied across Brazilian administrations, with periods of warmer engagement and periods of strain over Brazil’s approach to Israel, the Palestinians, and the wider Middle East. Brazil hosted a 2005 meeting in Brasília bringing Arab and South American countries together to improve commercial relations between the regions. The meeting’s final document included anti-Israel rhetoric, and Brazil’s foreign minister subsequently visited Israel in an effort to strengthen political and commercial relations.[7]

During Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s first presidency, from 2003 to 2010, Brazil sought a larger role for emerging powers in international diplomacy. It argued that the United Nations should oversee negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, hosted the presidents of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and suggested Brazil might mediate the conflict.[8] In 2010, Brazil recognized Palestine as an independent state within the 1967 borders. The Congressional Research Service says the decision set off a wave of similar recognitions in South America.[8] Another account describes the 2010 action as recognition of the Palestinian Authority as an independent state within the 1967 borders, including the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem.[3] Sources therefore use differing formulations for the recognition; the terminology and its relationship to negotiated borders have been politically contested.[9]

The recognition also formed part of a wider debate about Brazil’s earlier support for negotiated borders. A critical commentary argued that the recognition decision conflicted with Brazil’s previous position favoring borders negotiated by the parties.[9] That source’s assessment is an argument, rather than an uncontested description of the decision. Brazil’s government, in turn, presented its diplomatic posture as supporting a UN role and broader participation by emerging powers.[8]

Lula made an official visit to Israel in 2010, the first official visit to Israel by a Brazilian head of state, according to the World Jewish Congress.[1] During the visit, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cited the Mercosur free trade agreement as an expression of bilateral cooperation and put annual trade at $1.5 billion, while expressing an expectation that discussions would identify ways to increase it.[10] The visit also became a point of public debate because Lula did not visit Theodor Herzl’s grave in Jerusalem, but days later laid a wreath at Yasser Arafat’s grave in Ramallah.[11]

Relations were described in 2018 as politically cool despite stable economic and cultural ties.[12] The election of Jair Bolsonaro appeared to signal a potential foreign-policy shift. During his 2018 campaign, he promised to move Brazil’s embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and said he would remove the PLO mission offices from Brazil, arguing that “Palestine is not a state.”[12] A Congressional Research Service account says Bolsonaro later backed away from some campaign positions amid domestic and international criticism, though it does not identify whether the embassy proposal was among them.[13]

Bolsonaro’s stated interest in closer relations also intersected with domestic political constituencies. A 2020 commentary argued that his cultivation of friendly ties with Netanyahu marked a break from what its author described as Brazil’s longstanding coolness toward Israel, and suggested that growing evangelical political influence contributed to the outreach.[14] The same commentary estimated that Brazil had about 40 million evangelical Christians, roughly one-fifth of the population, and said Bolsonaro owed his election substantially to their support. It described him as embracing Christian Zionism and reported that he had made moving the embassy to Jerusalem a high priority, although the embassy remained in Tel Aviv as of December 2020.[14]

The political significance of these alliances was not uniform within Brazil’s Jewish community. A 2019 academic study examined relationships among Brazilian Jews, evangelical Christians, and Israel during Bolsonaro’s presidency. Its abstract identifies a Jewish protest against Bolsonaro’s visit to a Jewish cultural center, criticism within the Jewish community of previous governments’ Israel policies, and the rise of fringe right-wing militant Zionist groups. The study presents these episodes as reflecting divisions within Brazilian Jewish life and changing alliances between Jewish actors and evangelical supporters of Israel.[15]

After Lula returned to the presidency in 2023, reports described a shift in Brazil’s approach. One account said Brazil dismissed its ambassador to Israel, who had been appointed by Bolsonaro, and quoted the new foreign minister as saying Brazil would cooperate with Arab countries, “especially Palestine.” It also contrasted the Bolsonaro government’s voting pattern in international organizations, which it described as having shifted toward support for Israel, with what it called the foreign ministry’s traditional position.[16] The broader pattern illustrates how ties have responded to changes in government and differing policy priorities.

Brazil’s role in the United Nations deliberations over Palestine in 1947 became an enduring point of reference in its relationship with Israel. Brazilian diplomat Oswaldo Aranha was appointed president of the UN special session on Palestine that opened on April 28, 1947. The session considered representation for the Jewish Agency, Arab demands for independence in Palestine, and the creation of a commission to investigate the question.[17] On November 29, the General Assembly voted on Resolution 181, recommending partition of the territory west of the Jordan River into independent Arab and Jewish states with an economic union.[18]

Brazil is recorded among the 33 states voting in favor of Resolution 181; 13 voted against and 10 abstained.[2][18] Aranha chaired the Assembly session. Accounts describe him as supporting partition and working to build a majority, with one reporting that he delayed the vote so supporters could secure additional votes.[1][19] His role in the session approving partition is remembered in Israel, and the vote remains associated with Brazil’s early diplomatic connection to the creation of the Jewish state.[1]

Brazil formally recognized Israel in February 1949 and maintained an embassy in Tel Aviv from 1952.[7] Israel’s embassy was first located in Rio de Janeiro and later transferred to Brasília; the Israeli Embassy records that the move to Brasília took place in 1964.[20] Its Brasília plot was designated for the future embassy by the Israeli ambassador, Yossef Nahmias. The cornerstone was laid on August 9, 1973, in the presence of Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban and Federal District Governor Hélio Prates da Silveira; construction of the embassy and ambassador’s residence began in 1974 and concluded in 1977.[20] Israel’s consulate general in São Paulo closed in 2004.[7]

The early relationship included cooperation in international forums as well as disagreements over the status of Jerusalem and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Brazil supported internationalizing Jerusalem in a December 1949 vote. Following the 1956 Sinai Campaign, it supported establishing the UN Emergency Force and contributed soldiers.[7] In June 1967, Brazil voted against Jerusalem’s reunification by Israel. As a member of the Security Council that year, it participated in postwar negotiations and debates and sponsored a Latin American resolution that a source says blocked the acceptance of anti-Israel proposals.[7]

Brazil’s position during the 1970s reflected a combination of continuing recognition of Israel and growing attention to economic and diplomatic ties with Arab states. President Ernesto Geisel’s government faced economic needs and dependence on imported oil; a Library of Congress country study says imported oil met 80 percent of Brazil’s needs and describes a shift from a pro-Israeli stance toward closer relations with oil-rich Saudi Arabia and Iraq.[21] A 1978 diplomatic memorandum records Geisel as recognizing Israel and supporting UN Security Council Resolution 242. He said Israel should receive assurances of its survival within secure boundaries, while also arguing for the return of territories occupied during wars and for the Palestinian people’s right to an independent nation, territory, and national existence.[22]

In November 1975, Brazil voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 3379, which declared that “Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.”[23] A contemporary account characterized the vote as part of a foreign policy oriented toward the Third World and Arab oil-exporting countries. Another historical account connected the policy shift to rising oil prices and economic pressures, and said that limited Arab investment and exports to the Middle East contributed to Brazilian disenchantment.[7][24] The vote drew considerable criticism.[7]

Brazil later disavowed that vote. In January 1990, President-elect Fernando Collor de Mello told World Jewish Congress president Edgar Bronfman that the 1975 vote had been “a mistake” and that Brazil would not vote that way again.[23] The General Assembly revoked Resolution 3379 on December 16, 1991, by 111 votes to 25, with 13 abstentions.[23] Collor’s statement marked an explicit repudiation of Brazil’s earlier position, although the episode continued to be cited in discussions of the country’s Middle East policy.

Trade, commercial diplomacy, and technical collaboration have provided continuing channels for Brazil–Israel engagement, even when political relations have cooled. In 1959, the countries signed the first of several agreements for cooperation in culture, commerce, agriculture, science, and industry.[4] A later account identified agriculture and water resources as areas with particular room for technical cooperation, given Brazil’s semi-arid regions and needs in agricultural development and water management.[7]

Trade was limited relative to the overall commerce of both countries in 2003. A country profile reported Israeli exports to Brazil of $364 million and Brazilian exports to Israel of $128 million that year, each representing a small share of the exporting country’s total trade.[7] The same source identified Brazil’s economic and commercial interests in Arab countries, and some governments’ Third World policies, as obstacles to closer relations with Israel.[7]

A major institutional framework for trade was the Israel–Mercosur free trade agreement. Israel and the Mercosur states—Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay—signed the agreement in Montevideo on December 18, 2007.[25][26] It entered into force on June 1, 2010.[27] The agreement established a free trade area and covered trade in goods, rules of origin, and technical and technological cooperation. Its stated aims included reducing tariff barriers, facilitating the movement of goods, encouraging economic cooperation, expanding investment opportunities, and providing a framework for dialogue and more predictable trading conditions.[27][26]

A 2008 Library of Congress account described projected tariff-free trade targets of 70 percent of goods after four years, 85 percent after eight years, and 99 percent after ten years, and anticipated a significant overall increase in trade.[25] Brazil completed its final approval of the agreement in March 2010 after ratification by both chambers of Congress; Paraguay had approved it on February 24. A contemporary report said the agreement would take effect after 30 days and described Brazil as Israel’s largest trade partner in Latin America.[28] Netanyahu’s later figure of $1.5 billion in annual bilateral trade during Lula’s 2010 visit offered a measure of the relationship’s commercial scale at that time.[10]

Security, technology, and industrial collaboration have also featured in bilateral relations. In 2009, Israel Aerospace Industries agreed to supply unmanned aerial vehicles to Brazil in a deal valued at $350 million, subject at the time to Brazilian government approval. The plan called for three aircraft to be delivered by the following April and 14 in total over the next several years. Fifteen Brazilian Federal Police agents were already training in Israel to operate them; proposed uses included border patrol, combating crime and arms smuggling, and security for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games.[29]

In 2018, Bolsonaro and Netanyahu presented strategic ties with Israel’s high-tech sector as a potential contribution to Brazil’s economic modernization. Netanyahu attended Bolsonaro’s inauguration in Brazil, and the two held a joint press conference on December 29. The visit was described as the first by an Israeli prime minister to Brazil since Israel’s establishment.[3] Bolsonaro raised the possibility of moving Brazil’s embassy to Jerusalem, while placing emphasis on potential cooperation with Israeli technology.[3]

During Bolsonaro’s official visit to Israel on March 31, 2019, the leaders said Brazil’s embassy would not move to Jerusalem in the near term and announced instead that Brazil would open a trade office there.[3][30] Their agenda included technology and innovation, including cybersecurity and agrotech.[3] Reports on the four-day visit say ministers signed six agreements covering defense, security and cybersecurity, health, aviation, and science and technology.[30] Other reporting described agreements on security and aviation, internal security, science and technology, and cybersecurity. The internal-security agreement provided for cooperation against organized crime, human trafficking, money laundering, arms and drug trafficking, cybercrime, emergency management, security technology, and infrastructure protection; it also set out a joint working group to monitor implementation and develop work programs, and contemplated sending an Israeli internal-security attaché to Brazil for the first time.[31]

The Jerusalem office opened in December 2019 under the Brazilian Agency for the Promotion of Exports and Investments, Apex-Brasil, and the auspices of Brazil’s foreign ministry.[32] It promoted trade and investment rather than serving as a diplomatic mission: it had no diplomatic status, was located in Jerusalem’s Har Hotzvim technology park, and had three employees, one Brazilian and two locally hired staff.[32] Brazilian officials described it as a commercial office, while Israeli officials presented it as a possible step toward a future embassy move.[32] Brazil did not then officially recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and its embassy remained in Tel Aviv.[30]

The embassy proposal had been framed differently at different moments. Bolsonaro had previously told Netanyahu that moving the embassy was a matter of “when, not if,” but later retreated from the pledge. One account linked the change to concern about alienating Arab countries that were major purchasers of Brazilian halal food.[4] A contemporaneous report likewise attributed the decision not to move the embassy to pressure from Arab countries and concern about Brazilian exports.[31] The Jerusalem office thus represented a concrete expansion of commercial presence without the diplomatic status or capital recognition implied by a full embassy transfer.

By 2020, one commentary reported that Brazil and Israel had signed five bilateral agreements covering national defense, cybersecurity, science, technology, and other fields, despite the embassy remaining in Tel Aviv.[14] Commercial ties also continued amid later political disputes. In February 2024, the president of the Israel–Brazil Chamber of Commerce and Industry said trade had tripled in recent years and that the chamber was seeking to maintain commercial relations while avoiding politics. He added that the Brazilian government’s position on the conflict inhibited commercial relations.[33]

Reports in 2024 documented Brazilian procurement and cooperation with Israeli defense firms during the political dispute. Minas Gerais state police selected IWI to supply 1,310 Arad 7 rifles in a tender worth about $3.1 million. The Brazilian Air Force had agreed in 2019 for Israel Aerospace Industries to refurbish and support Heron unmanned aerial vehicles and train Brazilian personnel. Elbit’s Brazilian subsidiary, ARES, developed a remote-controlled weapon station for the Guarani armored vehicle in a deal reported at about $100 million, while Rafael’s Brazilian activity included Spike missiles purchased by Brazil in 2021.[34] These examples indicate that business and defense links could persist even as diplomatic ties deteriorated.

Cultural exchange has continued even during periods of cool official relations. A 1978 account of Brazil recorded visits by several Israeli public figures in 1976, including Leah Rabin, former Israeli ambassador Itzhak Harkavi, Israeli Federation of Industries president Avraham Shavitt, and Jerusalem mayor Teddy Kollek. Israeli performers toured several Brazilian cities, while painter Arie Sartani exhibited in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.[24]

People-to-people programs also connected Brazilian youth with Israel. In January 1977, 1,500 teenagers took part in a Zionist Organization program that sent them to Israeli kibbutzim for three months to help harvest oranges.[24] These activities took place against a backdrop of relatively cool official relations in the mid-1970s, illustrating that cultural and community exchanges did not simply track diplomatic temperature.[24]

The relationship also has a visible parliamentary and communal dimension. The expansion of Brazil’s Israel Allies Caucus to a bicameral group in 2024 and the lawmakers’ solidarity mission to Israel demonstrated continued political support for Israel among some Brazilian representatives during a period of diplomatic strain.[35] At the same time, academic work on Brazilian Jewish life during Bolsonaro’s presidency describes internal divisions, protest, and changing political alliances, rather than a single uniform communal position.[15]

Brazil–Israel relations combine durable institutional and commercial links with substantial variation in political alignment. The countries have maintained diplomatic relations since 1949 and developed cooperation in fields including agriculture, science, technology, security, and defense.[1][4] The Mercosur agreement and continuing commercial activity have offered frameworks that remain relevant even when governments disagree over the Israel–Palestinian conflict.[27][34]

At the same time, Brazil’s policy has shifted with administrations and economic or diplomatic priorities. The 1975 vote on Zionism and its later repudiation marked one major reversal.[23] The 2010 recognition of Palestinian statehood and ambassador recalls during the 2014 Gaza conflict further illustrated shifts in policy.[8][3] The unfulfilled proposal to move Brazil’s embassy to Jerusalem and the 2024–2025 diplomatic rupture likewise show that political ties have not followed a single uninterrupted course.[4][5] The 1947 partition vote and Aranha’s role remain a prominent historical reference, but they coexist with later disagreements over borders, Palestinian statehood, Jerusalem, and Israel’s military actions.[1][9]

The relationship’s future therefore depends not only on high-level diplomacy but also on whether economic, technological, cultural, and parliamentary ties can continue alongside policy disagreements. Reports through 2026 describe relations being conducted at a lower diplomatic level after ambassadorial appointments failed to advance.[5][36] They also document continuing defense procurement and political engagement by some Brazilian lawmakers.[34][35]

Disputes over Israeli policy and Palestinian statehood have repeatedly affected diplomatic representation. In 2014, during Operation Protective Edge, Brazil recalled its ambassador to Israel for consultations. The operation ran from July 8 to August 26, and Brazil was among five Latin American countries, together with Ecuador, Chile, El Salvador, and Peru, that recalled their ambassadors.[3] Brazil’s Foreign Ministry described the escalation as unacceptable and condemned what it called Israel’s disproportionate use of force; Brazil also said an earlier note had condemned Hamas rocket fire and Israeli military action and supported an immediate ceasefire.[37][38]

Israel’s Foreign Ministry spokesman criticized the recall. An Israeli statement said it did not reflect the level of relations between the countries and ignored Israel’s right to defend itself; another Israeli response characterized Brazil’s position as applying a “double standard.”[37][16] The recalls took place within a wider deterioration in Israel’s relations with some Latin American governments.[3]

Another diplomatic strain arose over Israel’s proposed ambassador Dani Dayan. Brazil did not accept his appointment in 2015 or 2016, leaving the Israeli ambassador’s post vacant for a period. Reports link the refusal mainly to Dayan’s former chairmanship of the Yesha Council and his residence in a settlement; he was later appointed Israel’s consul general in New York.[12][16] Sources place the timing differently: one describes tensions developing from late 2015, while another dates the non-approval to 2016.[12][16]

The most severe recent rupture followed Lula’s February 2024 remarks about the war in Gaza. After Israel’s military response to the Hamas terrorist attacks of October 7, 2023, Lula called events in Gaza “a genocide” and compared them to Hitler’s killing of Jews.[39] Israel’s Foreign Minister Israel Katz summoned Brazilian Ambassador Frederico Meyer, reprimanded him at Yad Vashem in Jerusalem, and declared Lula persona non grata in Israel until he withdrew the statements.[40][41] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu condemned the comparison as a trivialization of the Holocaust.[40]

Brazil’s Jewish umbrella organization, CONIB, condemned Lula’s comparison as unfounded and criticized what it called the government’s extreme and unbalanced posture toward the conflict.[39] Brazil’s Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira said the relationship would survive and described Israeli Foreign Ministry statements as unacceptable.[41] These responses reflected sharply opposed judgments about Lula’s language and the Israeli military campaign; the reported statements should be understood as the positions of the named speakers and organizations.

Brazil recalled Meyer, and in May 2024 announced that he would not return to Israel. It assigned him as a special representative to the United Nations and other international organizations in Geneva, while Brazil’s mission in Israel was to be led by a chargé d’affaires until a new ambassador was announced.[42] Reports said Meyer had been in Brazil for consultations for about three months; Israel said it had not received formal notice of his departure. At that time, Israel’s ambassador in Brazil remained at work.[43] A government gazette announced the recall on May 29, and Brazil later reassigned Meyer to Geneva without appointing a replacement in Israel.[42][44]

In July 2025, Brazil announced that it was finalizing a legal submission to join South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice, which alleges violations of the Genocide Convention through Israel’s military actions in Gaza.[4] The report said Brazil’s government cited alleged breaches of international law and civilian harm, while Israel denied targeting civilians and criticized Brazil’s position.[4] The reported development was a planned or pending submission; the account does not establish that Brazil had completed the filing.

A further diplomatic downgrade followed in August 2025. Israel announced that it was withdrawing ambassador-designate Gali Dagan’s request for agrément after Brazil did not respond. Israel’s Foreign Ministry said Brazil had “unusually, refrained from replying” and that relations would consequently be conducted at a “lower diplomatic level.”[5][6] Israel also cited the absence of a Brazilian replacement for Meyer and the strained political relationship.[5] The request’s withdrawal and the lower-level designation were reported developments; the explanations and characterizations made by Israeli officials remain their stated position.

In December 2024, amid the diplomatic rift, Brazil’s Israel Allies Caucus expanded to include the Senate and became a bicameral group of 78 parliamentarians under Senator Carlos Viana. The report also noted that Brazilian lawmakers had undertaken a solidarity mission to Israel following the October 7 terrorist attacks.[35] A June 2026 report said Brazil had also not approved Vivian Eisen, Israel’s nominee for consul general in São Paulo. It projected that, when the serving consul general returned to Israel at the end of his term, Israel would have neither an ambassador in Brasília nor a consul general in São Paulo, leaving relations to more junior diplomats. That account presented the latter situation as a forecast at the time of publication, not as confirmation of what subsequently occurred.[36]