Colombia–Israel Relations

Colombia–Israel relations encompass formal diplomacy as well as cooperation in defense, intelligence, agriculture, technology, trade, and humanitarian projects. The relationship has moved through markedly different phases: early diplomatic uncertainty, sustained engagement and commercial ties, a rupture during the Gaza war, and a rapid restoration under a new Colombian government in 2026.[1][2]

The partnership has had practical dimensions beyond government visits and trade agreements. Colombian forces have used Israeli-made military equipment, while Israeli and Colombian institutions have cooperated on mine-clearing, water management, agriculture, intelligence, and cybersecurity.[3][4] At the same time, policy decisions concerning the Gaza war, Palestinian statehood, coal exports, and the location of Colombia’s embassy have made the relationship politically contentious.[5][6]

In October 2026, Colombia inaugurated an embassy in Jerusalem and the governments restored their free-trade agreement, following the restoration of diplomatic ties after President Abelardo de la Espriella took office.[2] The embassy move and Colombia’s recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights marked a pronounced shift from the policies of Petro’s government.[7]

Colombia abstained from the United Nations General Assembly vote on the 1947 Palestine partition plan. A reproduced voting record lists Colombia among six Latin American abstentions and says none of those six voted against the plan.[8] Colombia is also listed as an abstainer in a World Jewish Congress account.[1]

Sources disagree over Colombia’s recognition of Israel. The World Jewish Congress says Colombia did not recognize Israel when it was declared in 1948, while the American Jewish Committee describes Colombia as among the first Latin American states to recognize Israel that year.[1][9] The Jewish Virtual Library also says Colombia did not recognize Israel in 1948, while a 2026 report gives 1949 as the recognition year.[5][2] The available accounts therefore do not establish a single uncontested date.

The sources more consistently place the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1957.[9][2] The two countries opened embassies in the 1960s, and major trade agreements were signed in 1988, although the source does not identify those agreements.[5] A 1985 account of Latin American Jewry described Israeli trade with the region as growing even as Israel was losing political ground there. It reported that a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute list for 1982 included 12 Israeli Kfir C-2 fighter planes sold to Colombia, using the spelling “Columbia.”[10]

Colombia’s relations with Israel developed alongside its later policy toward Palestinian statehood. In August 2018, President Juan Manuel Santos recognized Palestine as a free, independent, and sovereign state in a letter dated August 3 and addressed to Palestinian foreign minister Riyad al-Maliki.[5][11] The decision became public after Iván Duque took office. His government said it would examine the decision and act in accordance with international law; the Israeli embassy in Bogotá said it was surprised and disappointed that Israel had not been informed beforehand.[11] Santos’s letter said direct negotiations between Israel and Palestine were the best way to resolve the conflict, and Colombia’s foreign minister said Israel had the right to live in peace alongside its neighbors.[11]

President Juan Manuel Santos made a state visit to Israel in June 2013, accompanied by ministers and business leaders seeking investment and closer cooperation. During the visit, the two governments signed a free-trade agreement, an innovation agreement, and an aviation agreement. Israeli President Shimon Peres identified security, science, technology, and agriculture as areas for cooperation.[12]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Colombia in September 2017, the first visit to the region by a sitting Israeli prime minister.[1] That month, Santos publicly thanked Israel for assistance related to mine-clearing and peace-building. Israel’s National Mine Action Authority had hosted eight Colombians for a week-long mine-clearing workshop in September 2016, and the governments discussed cooperation in agriculture, water management, tourism, and cybersecurity.[13]

Colombia’s diplomatic policy also included a 2021 trade and innovation presence in Jerusalem. President Iván Duque opened an office of iNNpulsa, Colombia’s entrepreneurship and innovation agency; it was the country’s first innovation center abroad. Duque said the location would connect Colombian entrepreneurs with Israel’s innovation system, but did not say the office represented formal recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.[14]

The relationship deteriorated during the Petro presidency. Israel halted security exports amid the deterioration, and in April 2024 Colombia filed a declaration of intervention in South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice under Article 63 of the Court’s Statute.[9][15] This was an intervention, not Colombia joining South Africa as a co-plaintiff.[15]

At a rally on May 1, 2024, Petro announced that diplomatic relations would be severed the following day, citing Israel’s conduct during the Gaza war.[9][4] Petro accused the Israeli government of supporting genocide and called Israel’s president “genocidal”; Israel rejected the genocide accusation.[4] Colombia’s foreign ministry called for a ceasefire, the immediate release of hostages, and humanitarian aid for Gaza. It also expressed support for a two-state solution while criticizing Israel’s conduct and calling for compliance with international humanitarian law and United Nations decisions.[6]

The rupture did not immediately eliminate every form of official contact. Colombia said consular services would continue for its citizens in Israel and the Palestinian territories, and contemporary reporting described consular representation continuing on both sides.[4][6] Colombia later closed its embassy in Tel Aviv; its ambassador’s posting ended in June 2024, while Israel recalled its ambassador to Bogotá that month. Petro also ordered the Foreign Ministry to open an embassy in Ramallah.[16]

The change of government in 2026 reversed this course. After de la Espriella became president in August, Colombia restored full diplomatic relations with Israel, renewed diplomatic representation, and appointed ambassadors. Reciprocal visa requirements ended on September 1.[2] In July, before the inauguration, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar and Colombia’s designated foreign minister Omar Bula Escobar had agreed in Washington on a roadmap toward restoring diplomatic and economic relations. The proposed steps included appointing ambassadors, removing mutual visa requirements, and opening a Colombian embassy in Jerusalem.[16]

Colombia announced recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights on August 10, 2026. Its government cited regional instability and the territory’s strategic importance to Israel’s security.[7] On September 18, Colombia notified the ICJ that it was withdrawing its intervention in South Africa’s case; the Court confirmed the withdrawal on September 22. Colombia’s Foreign Ministry said the decision did not change the country’s status as a party to the Genocide Convention or its obligations under that convention, and the withdrawal did not end South Africa’s case.[2][17]

At the October 14, 2026, inauguration of Colombia’s Jerusalem embassy, Foreign Minister Omar Bula Escobar said that the countries had maintained relations for nearly seven decades and built cooperation in trade, security, and technology. He described Israel as a strategic partner and said the countries aimed to strengthen trade and innovation links, including ties among universities, research centers, and companies.[18] Tania Gilinski’s appointment as Colombia’s new ambassador followed more than two years without a Colombian ambassador in Israel.[16][18]

Defense and security cooperation was a substantial feature of ties before the 2024 rupture. Colombia operated Israeli-made Kfir fighter jets and Galil rifles designed in Israel, and the Kfir fleet required maintenance by Israeli firms. The countries also cooperated in cybersecurity, intelligence, and military equipment for border protection.[4]

Colombia was a longstanding customer of Israeli defense firms. It bought roughly 20 Israeli-made Kfir fighters for its air force in the late 1980s, later purchased 13 more, and upgraded older aircraft with aerial-refueling capability and renewed avionics and radar. Israel Aerospace Industries also sold Colombia a Boeing 767-based aerial-refueling aircraft for about US$60 million.[19] A 1985 article reported that about 50 Arava short take-off and landing aircraft had been sold collectively to Guatemala, El Salvador, Ecuador, and Colombia, but did not specify Colombia’s share or the timing of any sale.[10]

More recent procurements included an Israel Aerospace Industries contract for the Barak MX air-defense system. The system won a Colombian tender worth US$131.2 million in 2022, with the Colombian Air Force integrating the first battery and delivery of all batteries scheduled by 2026; full operational deployment was scheduled for 2032.[5] A separate report described the deal as approximately US$130 million.[19] Elbit Systems also had a deal worth approximately US$100 million for about 20 ATMOS 155-mm self-propelled artillery guns, expected for delivery by the end of the decade, while Rafael sold Colombia Spike anti-tank missiles and remotely operated weapon stations.[19]

Colombia contributed the Colombia 3 battalion to the Multinational Observer Force in Sinai, established in 1982 following the Egypt–Israel peace agreement.[3] Military and intelligence cooperation between Israel and Colombia, alongside the United States, also extended to counterterrorism, organized crime, and cybercrime.[3]

Israel’s halt to security exports affected a relationship in which Colombian forces still depended on Israeli equipment and services. The available accounts document both the political suspension of some arms ties and the continuing presence, procurement, and integration of Israeli-origin systems; they do not establish that every form of security cooperation ended during the rupture.[5][19]

Trade agreements and commercial exchange became central to the relationship. The free-trade agreement signed in 2013 entered into force on August 11, 2020.[20] At the time, it was described as Colombia’s first free-trade agreement with a Middle Eastern country, and reporting said it would allow 97 percent of Colombian goods to enter Israel without tariffs.[20] Israel’s economic mission to Colombia said customs duties were immediately eliminated on most products on both sides, including almost all industrial goods and many food and agricultural products, encouraging more Israeli companies to pursue business in Colombia.[21]

The agreement included tariff-free products, investment facilities, and joint ventures, and Colombia benefited from Israeli foreign direct investment.[3] In 2023, the Colombian-Israeli Chamber of Commerce was cited as reporting that Colombian exports to Israel had exceeded US$1 billion in the preceding year, almost three times the previous year’s amount. The account attributed the increase to the free-trade agreement and identified agricultural and energy products among the exports.[22]

A narrower set of trade figures reported Israeli exports to Colombia of about US$140 million in 2022 and US$110 million in 2023, chiefly fintech, cybersecurity, electrical machinery, chemicals, medical equipment, and rubber. Israeli imports from Colombia were placed at about US$15 million in 2023 and described as largely food and agricultural products, while civilian trade was characterized as modest compared with defense transactions.[19] These figures appear not to be directly comparable with the broader Colombian export total, which explicitly included energy products and concerned the preceding year.[19][22]

The relationship also included innovation and business exchange. Santos’s 2013 visit produced an innovation agreement as well as the trade and aviation agreements.[12] In 2021, Duque’s iNNpulsa office in Jerusalem was intended to connect Colombian entrepreneurs to Israel’s innovation system.[14] At the 2026 embassy opening, Colombia’s foreign minister emphasized prospective links among universities, research centers, and companies as part of renewed trade and innovation cooperation.[18]

Agriculture, water, and community development formed another strand. An Israeli embassy project in La Guajira inaugurated two small drinking-water plants for communities lacking reliable water: one used desalination and the other purification technology.[3] The countries also discussed agricultural development and innovation, while earlier cooperation included agriculture and technology and trade in pharmaceuticals, electronics, and agro-technology.[9]

At the time of the 2024 rupture, contemporary reporting expected existing trade arrangements to remain in place for the time being, although their longer-term future was uncertain.[4] Later accounts say the Petro government attempted to terminate the pact but had not completed the domestic procedure for withdrawing from the international agreement. Colombia and Israel exchanged diplomatic notes on October 13, 2026, reactivating the existing agreement rather than negotiating a replacement.[2]

The restoration under de la Espriella included several concrete steps in addition to renewed diplomatic relations. Colombia and Israel appointed ambassadors, ended reciprocal visa requirements on September 1, 2026, and restored the free-trade agreement through an exchange of notes on October 13.[2] Colombia inaugurated its embassy in Jerusalem the next day, becoming the tenth country with an embassy in the city according to contemporary reporting.[2]

The embassy opening reversed the Petro administration’s policy, which had included severing diplomatic relations and closing Colombia’s embassy in Tel Aviv.[2][5] The governments’ foreign ministers planned talks on security, defense, trade, and investment.[5] Bula Escobar described Israel as a strategic partner and said the relationship should be strengthened through trade and innovation.[18]

Other policy reversals accompanied the restoration. Colombia resumed thermal-coal exports to Israel toward the end of August 2026, reversing the 2024 restriction.[5][23] It withdrew its intervention in the ICJ case in September, while clarifying that this did not alter its treaty status or obligations under the Genocide Convention.[17] On October 14, Colombia also announced a request to withdraw from the Hague Group, though the available account does not say that withdrawal had been completed.[2]

The restored relationship followed years of cooperation in which security, trade, technology, and practical development projects had coexisted with differences over Palestinian statehood and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.[3][11] In 2026, Colombian officials emphasized renewed strategic, economic, and innovation links, while the embassy’s location and Colombia’s changed positions on the Golan Heights and the ICJ intervention remained diplomatically sensitive.[7][18]

Petro’s government adopted a position on the Israel–Hamas conflict that differed from both the Biden and Trump administrations, and the decision to break ties over Gaza strained U.S.–Colombia relations during the Biden administration.[24] The decision drew criticism from several Members of Congress, some of whom characterized Petro’s social-media rhetoric as antisemitic; that characterization was attributed criticism rather than an undisputed description.[24]

Colombia’s policies toward the conflict extended beyond diplomatic relations. In April 2024 it intervened in South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel, and in 2026 it withdrew that intervention.[15][17] The intervention allowed Colombia to present its interpretation of provisions of a convention at issue; it did not make Colombia a co-plaintiff, and the later withdrawal did not terminate South Africa’s case.[15][17] At the October 2026 embassy opening, Bula Escobar announced that Colombia had formally requested withdrawal from the Hague Group, a coalition established to coordinate diplomatic and legal measures against Israel over the Gaza war; the report described this as a request, not a completed withdrawal.[2]

Trade in coal also became a point of pressure. Petro halted Colombian coal exports to Israel in 2024 during the Gaza war. Israel had previously been a major destination for Colombian coal, with annual purchases worth hundreds of millions of dollars.[25] De la Espriella’s government reversed the restriction and ordered thermal-coal shipments to resume in August 2026. He described the earlier embargo as ideologically motivated and argued that it had harmed employment, state revenue, legal certainty, and investor confidence.[23][25]

Another sensitive issue was Jerusalem. Colombia’s 2021 iNNpulsa office was a trade and innovation office, and Duque did not characterize its location as recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.[14] Colombia’s October 2026 embassy opening was a distinct diplomatic step. Palestinian officials criticized the move; Palestinians seek East Jerusalem as the capital of a future state, while most countries maintain their embassies in Tel Aviv or nearby and argue that the city’s final status should be determined through negotiations.[2] Colombia’s embassy move therefore carried diplomatic significance beyond the practical functions of a trade office.

The relationship’s political disputes also included competing claims about the Gaza conflict and the status of the Golan Heights. Petro’s genocide accusation was rejected by Israel, while Colombia’s 2026 recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights represented a major policy change.[7][4] These positions, together with Colombia’s intervention and withdrawal at the ICJ, were diplomatic acts and claims; the sources do not present them as legal findings by the Court.[15][17]