2026 in Israel

The October 27 election was Israel’s first national vote since the Hamas-led terrorist attack of October 7, 2023, and the ensuing wars in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran.[4] Responsibility for October 7, the conduct of subsequent military campaigns, and the fate of the hostages remained central political questions during the campaign.[4] Relations with the United States, military conscription, the judicial system, economic pressures, the burden on reservists, settlement policy, and relations between secular and religious communities also figured among the election issues.[4]

The economy entered 2026 after several years of wartime disruption: GDP growth had slowed to 1% in 2024 before recovering to 2.9% in 2025.[5] High technology remained a principal growth engine, accounting for approximately 12% of employment, 20% of GDP, and 56% of exports, and demonstrated resilience during the war.[5] These structural strengths coexisted with pressures on public finances, labor availability, tourism, and businesses exposed to interruptions in travel and normal economic activity.[5][6]

The institutional framework for the election combined proportional representation with coalition government: citizens voted for party lists, which needed at least 3.25% of valid votes to enter the 120-member Knesset.[7] Seat allocation used the total valid vote divided by 120, with surplus votes distributed through agreements between lists or the statutory allocation method.[7] A government required the support of at least 61 lawmakers, while the outgoing government continued in office until a new government was formed.[7][8]

The second phase of the U.S.-backed Gaza ceasefire plan began on January 14, with President Donald Trump announcing it the following day.[9] The phase envisaged a transitional technocratic Palestinian administration, a National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, and the beginning of disarmament of unauthorized personnel.[9] On January 16, the White House announced the committee and a Board of Peace intended to oversee its work.[9]

The broader 20-point plan connected the transitional administration with full demilitarization and reconstruction.[10] Its implementation nevertheless faced disputes over Israeli territorial control, Hamas disarmament, governance, and the sequencing of the proposed arrangements, while fighting continued in bouts after the earlier ceasefire.[10] The January announcements therefore established a proposed governing and security framework without ending the disputes surrounding its application.[10]

On January 26, Israeli forces recovered the remains of Ran Gvili, the last hostage held in Gaza.[2] Gvili was a police officer killed while defending Kibbutz Alumim during the Hamas-led terrorist attack of October 7, 2023, and his remains were returned after being held for 843 days.[2] His recovery meant that, for the first time since 2014, no hostages remained in Hamas captivity in Gaza.[2]

The search took place in a cemetery in Gaza City’s al-Shuja’iyya neighborhood and lasted two days, following intelligence obtained from a captured Palestinian Islamic Jihad operative.[11] Israeli forces examined approximately 250 corpses during the large-scale recovery operation before finding Gvili’s remains.[2] His return closed the remaining hostage-recovery case described in the January reporting, even as questions concerning Gaza’s security and administration continued.[9][2]

The United States and Israel launched coordinated attacks on Iran on February 28, targeting Iranian security infrastructure, military capabilities, and industrial capacity.[10] The campaign’s stated objectives included degrading Iran’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programs and reducing its capacity to launch missiles toward Israel.[12][1] Opening targets included ballistic-missile arrays, air-defense sites, senior command centers, and other strategic infrastructure.[1]

An estimated 200 Israeli Air Force aircraft participated in the opening operation, described as the largest such operation in Israel’s history.[13] Nearly 900 strikes were launched during the first 12 hours of the joint campaign, targeting missiles, air defenses, military infrastructure, and Iranian leadership.[14] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and dozens of other Iranian officials were killed in the first wave.[14] On the first day, Iran fired an estimated 170 missiles at Israel, and residents of central Israel spent much of the day in shelters.[13]

The opening attacks also caused major civilian casualties in Iran: approximately 170 people were killed when a missile struck a girls’ school near a naval base in Minab.[14] A preliminary U.S. military investigation believed that U.S. forces carried out the strike while targeting adjacent buildings belonging to an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps naval base.[14] Iranian retaliation included missile and drone attacks across the region, while the conflict disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.[14]

Israel entered a special emergency status, closing its airspace, schools, and universities and moving hospital patients into underground facilities.[15] Home Front Command prohibited gatherings and suspended most educational and economic activity apart from essential businesses.[12] Workplace restrictions were eased after approximately a week, although schools remained closed.[12] By March 6, Iranian ballistic-missile attacks had killed 12 civilians and destroyed a few hundred civilian buildings; those figures represented an early reporting date rather than a final campaign total.[15]

A military summary released after the initial ceasefire reported more than 10,800 Israeli airstrikes, over 18,000 munitions dropped in Iran, and attacks on more than 4,000 targets.[16] Its operational breakdown included more than 1,000 strike sorties, over 8,500 operational sorties to Iran, and strikes on more than 6,700 components.[16] Listed targets included air-defense systems, missile launchers, weapons-production sites, nuclear facilities, headquarters, and senior commanders and leaders.[12] Iran launched approximately 650 ballistic missiles at Israel during the campaign, with at least 16 conventional-warhead missiles striking populated areas and causing extensive damage and loss of life.[12]

The United States and Iran agreed to an initial two-week ceasefire on April 7, which took effect on April 8 after approximately 40 days of sustained combat.[10][1] Israel reportedly did not participate directly in the negotiations, and the ceasefire was subsequently extended indefinitely despite intermittent fighting.[10] The pause opened a diplomatic phase but did not produce a lasting settlement of the confrontation.[10]

Hezbollah fired missiles and drones into Israel on March 2, shortly after the Iran campaign began, and Israeli airstrikes subsequently expanded into southern Beirut.[14] The renewed exchanges prompted large-scale Israeli operations in Lebanon and efforts to establish a larger buffer zone in the south.[10] Israeli evacuation orders across southern Lebanon had displaced more than 1.1 million people by late March.[14]

A limited Israeli ground invasion began on March 17.[14] On March 24, Israel’s defense minister announced plans for the Israel Defense Forces to occupy southern Lebanon up to the Litani River.[14] Military operations and Hezbollah attacks continued to create security challenges despite repeated attempts to arrange ceasefires.[10][14]

Direct Israel-Lebanon talks brokered by the United States took place on April 14, followed by an announced cessation of hostilities beginning April 16 at 17:00 EST.[17] The arrangement initially covered ten days, with an extension possible by mutual agreement.[17] It preserved Israel’s stated right to take necessary self-defense measures while committing Israel not to conduct offensive military operations against targets in Lebanon during the cessation.[17] Lebanon, in turn, was to take steps to prevent Hezbollah and other armed groups from attacking Israeli targets.[17]

In early June, the United States, Israel, and Lebanon jointly announced another ceasefire arrangement, contingent on Hezbollah ending its fire and its operatives leaving the South Litani area.[10] On June 26, the three countries agreed to a framework for working toward peace through the gradual extension of Lebanese Armed Forces control into areas where Hezbollah had been disarmed and its infrastructure dismantled.[10] Two initial pilot zones were designated, with additional zones to be agreed mutually.[10]

Iran resumed direct ballistic-missile attacks on Israel on June 7, launching approximately 30 missiles toward northern Israel, the Tel Aviv area, and parts of the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[18] Iran described the barrage as retaliation for an Israeli strike on Hezbollah command facilities in Beirut after Hezbollah had launched rockets at northern Israeli communities.[18] Israel responded by striking Iranian air-defense systems and a petrochemical facility.[18]

Millions of civilians entered shelters, schools closed, hospitals reopened underground emergency wards, and reserve forces were mobilized.[18] The exchange subsided within approximately 24 hours, although Iran warned that additional Israeli action against Hezbollah could prompt renewed missile attacks.[18] Further exchanges on June 8 underscored the fragility of the April ceasefire.[10]

A U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding reached in mid-June called for military operations to end on all fronts and for a 60-day negotiating period.[10] Israel was not a party to the memorandum and continued to assert freedom of action against threats.[10] The June 14 framework addressed hostilities in Lebanon, passage through the Strait of Hormuz, U.S. military assets, sanctions, and Iranian reconstruction.[14] It became virtually defunct in July after Iran struck three commercial vessels using a route it had not preapproved.[14]

Reporting available by November 1 continued to describe an unsettled confrontation: Netanyahu was pressing Trump to resume the war, while Trump had not decided whether to do so.[19] Qatari and Iranian negotiating teams were also traveling to Doha for talks toward a possible agreement with Washington.[19] The material available at that date therefore did not establish a definitive end to the Israel-Iran confrontation.[19]

Disputes over military-service exemptions for ultra-Orthodox men threatened Netanyahu’s coalition before the scheduled election.[4] In May, after Haredi parties accused Netanyahu of failing to preserve exemptions for yeshiva students, the coalition introduced dissolution legislation; preliminary and first-reading votes passed 110–0 and 106–0 respectively.[4] Netanyahu subsequently reached an agreement with the ultra-Orthodox parties that enabled the government to remain until the regular election date.[4]

The 25th Knesset formally dispersed on July 17 after approving a dissolution measure by 62 votes to zero, but the election remained scheduled for October 27.[4] The vote elected the 26th Knesset and was the first national election since 1988 to occur on its originally scheduled legal date.[4][7] Netanyahu’s government remained in office pending the formation of a new coalition.[4]

In its final days, the coalition advanced legislation concerning Torah study and enlistment, the attorney general’s powers, oversight of broadcast media, and an investigation into the October 7 failures.[4] Supporters presented these measures as fulfilling commitments and correcting institutional imbalances, while opponents argued that they weakened oversight and protected draft evaders.[4] The campaign also reflected criticism of Netanyahu over October 7, the wars, his corruption cases, reliance on far-right parties, and the 2023 effort to increase legislative oversight of the judiciary.[20] Supporters emphasized his experience, national-security priorities, and commitment to Israel’s Jewish character.[20]

The completed count reported on October 29 gave Likud 27 seats, Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar 21, Naftali Bennett’s B’Yachad 12, and the Joint List 11.[3] The Democrats and Ra’am each won eight seats; Yisrael Beytenu, United Torah Judaism, and Otzma Yehudit each won seven; and Shas and Religious Zionism each won six.[3] The Netanyahu-aligned bloc consequently held 53 seats, the opposition bloc 48, and the Arab-led parties 19, leaving both principal blocs below the 61-seat majority threshold.[3] The count remained subject to further checks before the official announcement.[3]

Election-day reporting put turnout at 77.7%, the highest since 1999.[21] The completed count listed 5,589,836 ballots cast, of which 5,564,764 were valid and 25,072 invalid.[3] The Joint List and Ra’am together achieved a record 19 seats, compared with ten in the outgoing Knesset.[22][3] Arab turnout was reported at 76.5%, close to the national rate.[21] Tens of thousands of Israelis living abroad returned to vote, while special double-envelope ballots enabled participation by soldiers, diplomats, and others in qualifying circumstances.[21]

Preliminary counting identified more than 304,000 votes for 27 lists that failed to cross the electoral threshold, leaving 11 lists represented in the incoming Knesset.[22] Possible coalition arrangements included a unity government or a minority government supported by, but excluding, one or both Arab lists.[22] President Isaac Herzog sought to avoid another election in early 2027.[22] As of November 1, coalition formation remained unresolved, and official confirmation of the results was expected on November 4.[8][22]

Between February 28 and May 1, missiles and other strikes from Iran and Hezbollah killed 28 civilians in Israel and the West Bank and caused an estimated $820 million in property damage.[5] The 2025 and 2026 wars with Iran together killed more than four dozen civilians in Israel and caused billions of dollars in damage.[5] These figures covered different periods from the early March casualty count and did not constitute a completed calendar-year toll.[5][15]

Education resumed unevenly after the initial closures.[23] In March, gradual reopening was permitted in designated areas subject to local authorities’ decisions, while remote learning was recommended elsewhere.[23] Of 364,298 pupils in the designated authorities, 172,720—slightly more than 47%—returned to schools and kindergartens.[23] Attendance reached 37% in secondary schools, 53% in elementary schools, 51% in kindergartens, and 4% in day-care centers.[23]

The accumulated human cost of the wars remained prominent on the third anniversary of October 7.[24] An anniversary account published on October 7, 2026, put the number of Israeli service members killed since the attack at 1,318 and the number of officially recognized wounded people at approximately 30,000.[24] More than 70% of wounded service members had returned to service.[24] These were cumulative figures published in the anniversary account, rather than losses confined to 2026.[24]

The Finance Ministry’s initial estimate placed the Iran campaign’s budgetary expenses at approximately NIS 35 billion, equivalent to $11.5 billion.[12] That estimate comprised NIS 22 billion in defense and military spending, NIS 12 billion for compensation and relief, and NIS 1 billion in civilian costs, including hospital operations, emergency response, and treatment of victims.[12] The military component included equipment and expanded reserve mobilization and had already been incorporated into the Defense Ministry’s 2026 budget.[12] Lost output and some additional spending remained to be assessed.[12]

A separate April assessment estimated military costs at NIS 50–60 billion, with an average day of fighting costing approximately NIS 1 billion and the opening days reaching NIS 2–3 billion daily.[25] Defense officials warned that further rounds could cost tens of billions more and that it was too early to regard the confrontation as finished.[25] The estimates represented different assessments rather than a single settled measure of the war’s total economic cost.[12][25]

In March, the cabinet planned to raise the defense allocation from approximately NIS 111 billion in the original budget to NIS 140 billion, with another NIS 7 billion reserved for security needs.[26] The plan increased the fiscal deficit target to 5.1% of GDP.[26] At the same time, the Finance Ministry’s chief economist lowered the 2026 growth forecast from 5.2% to 4.7%, citing disruption from the Iran war.[26]

On May 8, S&P Global Ratings affirmed Israel’s long- and short-term sovereign ratings at A/A-1 with a stable outlook.[27] Its assessment identified pressures on the economy, labor market, and public finances from the Iran, Gaza, and Lebanon conflicts.[27] The stable outlook assumed no large-scale military re-escalation and broadly continuing ceasefires; renewed escalation could weaken economic, external, or fiscal performance.[27]

S&P’s May assessment estimated an almost 10% annualized contraction in first-quarter output and anticipated recovery from the second quarter, stronger growth in the second half, and 5.9% growth in 2027.[27] It also expected lasting conflict effects and labor-supply constraints to keep economic activity below its prewar trend.[27] These were contemporary estimates and projections rather than final annual outcomes.[27]

Later national-account revisions substantially changed the picture.[28] By October, second-quarter growth was estimated at 15.4% annualized, while the first-quarter contraction had been revised to 1.5% annualized.[28] Growth in the first half relative to the second half of 2025 was put at 3.7%, or 1.3% when production abroad by Israeli companies was excluded.[28] Government spending was revised upward, with defense-related consumption estimated to have risen 20.4%.[28]

In October, the Bank of Israel held its policy rate at 3.25% after three successive cuts and reported annual inflation of 1.6% in September.[29] Its Research Department forecast headline growth of 5.6% in 2026 and 7.5% in 2027, compared with domestic-activity growth of 3.4% and 5.1% respectively when overseas production was excluded.[29] The bank warned that additional defense spending without corresponding budget adjustments could enlarge the deficit and reignite inflation.[29]

Tourism remained severely depressed amid war and flight disruptions.[6] Foreign tourist hotel nights totaled 1.29 million in January–June, down approximately 5% from the first half of 2025 and 75% from the comparable period in 2023.[6] National hotel occupancy was 44%, against 50% in the first half of 2025 and 63% in 2023.[6] Domestic hotel nights fell approximately 9% year over year to 7.2 million.[6]

For Israel’s 78th Independence Day, the population was provisionally estimated at 10.244 million, current to April 22.[30] The total comprised 7.790 million Jews and others, or 76%; 2.157 million Arabs, or 21.1%; and 296,000 foreigners, or 2.9%.[30] Estimated growth since the preceding Independence Day was 146,000 people, or 1.4%, including approximately 177,000 births, 21,000 immigrant arrivals, 48,000 deaths, a negative balance of 45,000 Israelis staying abroad, and 5,000 family-reunification arrivals.[30] Changes in methodology meant that the reported annual increase could not be obtained simply by subtracting the two published population totals.[30]

Around Rosh Hashanah, another provisional estimate put the population at approximately 10.305 million: 7.828 million Jewish and other residents, 2.173 million Arab residents, and 304,000 foreign residents.[31] Growth over the period measured was approximately 124,000, or 1.2%, with revised methods for counting Israelis abroad and foreign residents.[31] An April demographic analysis connected Israel’s continuing growth principally to high fertility across almost all sectors, alongside low mortality and migration, and projected approximately 17 million residents by 2055.[32]

The July Peace Index found that 29% of Jewish respondents supported negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, compared with 81% of Arab respondents.[33] Only 12% of Jewish respondents expected negotiations to produce peace in the coming years, compared with 48% of Arab respondents.[33] Jewish support for negotiations had risen from 26% in March but remained within the low range recorded since October 7, 2023.[33]

Support for Trump’s Gaza plan stood at 48% overall, including 47% among Jewish respondents and 54% among Arab respondents.[33] Among Jewish respondents, support had fallen from 55% in March.[33] A proposed sequence that transferred authority to a temporary Palestinian government of experts and introduced an international stabilization force before disarming Hamas received 27% support and 57% opposition among Jewish respondents, while 58% of Arab respondents supported it.[33]

On Lebanon, 57% of the full sample supported transferring full security responsibility to the Lebanese army in pilot areas after Hezbollah infrastructure was dismantled.[33] Another 55% supported full Israeli withdrawal following dismantlement and peace between the states, while 52% of Jewish respondents supported a permanent Israeli security zone even if it prevented an agreement.[33] These findings measured preferences among competing arrangements rather than implementation of an agreement.[33]

The survey was conducted online in Hebrew and Arabic by iPanel on July 26–30 among 608 adults, including 504 Jewish and 104 Arab respondents.[33] Its nationally representative sample carried a reported maximum sampling error of ±4.2 percentage points at a 95% confidence level for the full sample.[33]

The return of the last hostage, direct warfare with Iran, renewed fighting in Lebanon, and an inconclusive parliamentary election formed the principal milestones documented through November 1.[2][1][3] The record at that point established major military and political developments but not a completed diplomatic settlement, a new governing coalition, or final annual economic results.[8][19][29]

Technology also featured in arguments about Israel’s longer-term strategic position.[34] In a February essay, the authors of “The Silicon Dome” argued that Israel should make itself an indispensable international partner through coordinated technological development.[34] They cited research-and-development investment of approximately 5.6% of GDP and advocated greater state coordination and investment in materials science, artificial intelligence, robotics, quantum computing, synthetic biology, and space.[34] Their proposal was a policy argument, not an announced government program.[34]

Contemporary commentary likewise treated the election as the start of an unresolved political process rather than a clear transfer of power.[35] An October 29 Tikvah Podcast discussion considered the unsettled government-formation question alongside perceived polling inadequacies, Netanyahu’s position, and the political identity of Israeli Arabs.[35] Such discussions reflected the uncertainty surrounding the election’s eventual governing consequences.[35]

After the election, Likud alleged that Arab parties had benefited from fraud and other misconduct and demanded an investigation.[36] Israel Police said it had no investigative or intelligence evidence supporting the allegations.[36] The Central Elections Committee’s completed count remained subject to further checks before the official results were announced.[3]

Contemporary election accounts differed over preliminary party totals, turnout, ballot counts, and the stage at which results should be considered final.[8][3] The latest completed count available by November 1 is used here rather than earlier projections, while recognizing that the official announcement was still pending.[22][3] Wartime reporting likewise used different periods and definitions for casualty totals, campaign duration, and costs, while economic estimates changed as revised data became available.[5][28]