2025 Gaza City Offensive

On August 8, 2025, Israel’s political-security cabinet ordered the IDF to take control of Gaza City while providing humanitarian assistance to civilians outside combat zones.[6] The decision’s stated objectives included defeating Hamas, releasing all hostages, demilitarizing the Gaza Strip, and transferring civilian control to Arab forces affiliated with neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority.[6] The cabinet also endorsed continued Israeli security control as a condition for ending the war.[7]

The approved plan focused on Gaza City rather than Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s earlier stated goal of taking control of the entire Gaza Strip.[8] It envisaged taking the city by October 7, with approximately 800,000 residents given two months to move south before Israeli forces laid siege to the remaining Hamas fighters.[8] Netanyahu said the offensive could stop if Hamas accepted Israel’s demands, describing it as “not a war for war’s sake.”[8]

The military called the planned campaign Gideon’s Chariots II, also rendered Gideon’s Chariots B, following an earlier operation with a similar name.[3] Its August planning envisaged a phased operation extending into 2026, involving five regular divisions and, at its peak, an estimated 110,000–130,000 reservists.[3] The stages included civilian evacuation, airstrikes, encirclement, taking control of areas, and ground maneuvering, with provision to adapt the operation if a hostage agreement was reached.[3]

Defense Minister Israel Katz approved military plans on August 20 after their presentation by Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir and senior officers.[9] At that point, the IDF was issuing approximately 60,000 reservist call-up orders, and Katz approved humanitarian preparations for an estimated one million civilians expected to move from Gaza City to southern Gaza.[9] Most of the reservists in that call-up were expected to report on September 2; turnout was reported as lower than anticipated, although the army did not disclose how many were absent.[8]

Military assessments anticipated a lengthy campaign rather than a rapid seizure followed by immediate completion.[8][10] Before the ground offensive, the IDF reportedly told the cabinet that taking Gaza City alone could require four to five months, while the tunnel network and the presence of live hostages could extend the campaign to as long as a year.[8] Other senior assessments envisaged several months, possibly half a year, followed by a longer clearing process, and operations beyond the city, including in the central camps.[10]

Zamir reportedly opposed the cabinet’s plan, citing danger to hostages, the condition of Israeli forces, and humanitarian concerns, but was overruled.[8] National Security Council head Tzachi Hanegbi and Mossad director David Barnea also expressed reservations.[7] Zamir’s reported assessment was that taking Gaza City would not, by itself, defeat Hamas militarily or politically, and he opposed the IDF assuming civilian responsibility in captured areas.[10]

The initial civilian-movement plan centered on transferring roughly 800,000 people to Al-Mawasi in southern Gaza, where temporary accommodation was to be provided.[8] Hamas’s Interior Ministry urged residents to remain in their homes.[8] Former Israeli military intelligence official Michael Milshtein warned that an evacuation in which only five percent left would expose “a dramatic gap between our very nice plans and reality.”[8]

On September 15, Netanyahu described the targeted Gaza City towers as Hamas strongholds and said residents were being asked to leave before those positions were taken and destroyed.[11] He presented the mission as recovering all hostages and eliminating Hamas, alongside demilitarization, preventing weapons smuggling and production, continued Israeli security responsibility against renewed terrorism, and a transitional civilian government.[11] Katz additionally described the desired end state as including Hamas’s disarmament, exile of its senior leaders, and a security area protecting Israeli communities while preserving the IDF’s freedom of action.[3]

The United States framed its position around releasing all hostages and ending Hamas’s capacity to remain an armed threat.[12] On September 15, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said those aims should be achieved diplomatically if possible, but otherwise would have to be pursued through a military operation.[12]

Preparatory activity preceded the September ground maneuver: an offensive was reported as beginning on August 10, while opening maneuvers for a new campaign to remove Hamas from Gaza City were reported on August 19.[13][14] Tanks advanced into Sabra, and forces were also reported operating in Zeitoun.[14] By late August, operations focused on Zeitoun, Shuja’iyya, and Tuffah in eastern Gaza City, alongside Jabaliya and the city’s outskirts.[15]

Israeli authorities described preparations for southward civilian movement that included tents, aid-distribution areas, and water lines.[15] From August 29, Gaza City was designated a “dangerous combat zone,” and the local temporary tactical pause no longer applied there.[15] On September 4, an Israeli military spokesperson said forces controlled approximately 40 percent of the city.[13] Before the full ground push, Israeli forces were reported advancing in Zeitoun, Sheikh Radwan, and Shuja’iyya and recovering the bodies of ten hostages on the eastern outskirts.[8]

In early September, the IDF began striking high-rise buildings, saying they contained Hamas observation posts, intelligence-gathering equipment, or explosives.[16] It said it employed advance warnings, precision munitions, aerial surveillance, and intelligence to reduce civilian harm.[16] Other military descriptions identified surveillance cameras, anti-tank firing positions, and sniper positions on upper floors in central and western Gaza City as targets.[8] Encouraging civilians to leave the city was also described as a secondary objective of the high-rise strikes.[8]

On September 5, Israel warned residents to leave a high-rise shortly before destroying it, while Katz declared, “The gates of Hell are being unlocked in Gaza City,” and later posted, “We started.”[8] On September 8, he warned that a “powerful hurricane” would hit Gaza City and that “the roofs of the towers of terror will shake.”[16] By September 8, the IDF estimated that 100,000 people had left the city, while a separate UN estimate suggested approximately one million might still be in the area.[16]

Destruction affected parts of Zeitoun, Tuffah, Shuja’iyya, and Sheikh Radwan, and conflict-monitoring organization ACLED recorded more than 170 demolitions in the city from early August.[17] A resident of the 15-story Mushtaha tower described his family leaving after an evacuation warning and two missiles subsequently bringing the building down within seconds.[17] The IDF said Hamas maintained underground infrastructure beneath the tower that was used to attack troops.[17] Reporting shortly after the ground maneuver began put the number of destroyed high-rises at at least twenty.[17]

On September 9, the IDF issued a citywide evacuation warning through leaflets and digital announcements.[2] The warning directed residents south along the coastal road toward an Israeli-designated humanitarian zone and included a telephone number for reporting alleged Hamas roadblocks.[2][18] Some residents said they would remain because they believed nowhere else was safe, while a UN spokesperson described evacuation as impossible for many, citing transport costs exceeding $1,000, a barely passable coastal road, and overcrowded displacement sites.[18]

Hamas’s Government Information Office claimed that, by September 13, more than 1,600 buildings and high-rises had been completely destroyed and over 2,000 heavily damaged since activity against Gaza City began.[2] It also claimed that tents had been destroyed and more than 350,000 residents displaced from eastern neighborhoods toward the center and west of the city.[2] These were figures issued by the Hamas-run office, rather than a citywide damage count established by a common assessment process.[2]

The main ground maneuver began overnight before September 16, with public confirmation on September 16.[1][19] The 162nd and 98th divisions led the initial advance into the city’s west, while the 99th Division and Gaza Division surrounded the city and the 36th Division was expected to join gradually.[1] Israeli officials described a coordinated maneuver combining intelligence, air power, and ground forces, with expansion governed by the military’s assessment of conditions.[1][20]

The IDF said it had attacked more than 850 targets in the preceding week, including approximately fifty in Gaza City on the night before the assault.[1][8] It also said hundreds of operatives had been killed during the preceding week.[2] Its estimate at the beginning of the maneuver was that approximately 350,000 residents had evacuated and 600,000 remained.[2] On September 16, the Arabic-language military spokesperson urged residents to leave by Al-Rashid Street toward areas south of Wadi Gaza, by vehicle or on foot.[2]

Israeli officials characterized Gaza City as Hamas’s principal military and governing hub, with a strategic tunnel network.[20][21] The military estimated that 2,000–3,000 Hamas fighters were present and identified tunnels, weapons depots, high-rises, buildings used by armed groups, and other infrastructure as targets.[20][21] It described the immediate task as degrading Hamas’s command structure while separating civilians from combat zones.[22] Zamir identified dismantling Hamas’s control and freeing the 48 hostages then held in Gaza as priorities; approximately twenty hostages were believed alive.[21]

An additional inland evacuation route along Salah al-Din road supplemented the coastal corridor during the opening ground phase.[8] On September 17, the IDF estimated that approximately 400,000 residents had evacuated from a pre-offensive population of about one million.[23] It reported striking around 140 targets across the Strip over a 24-hour period, including tunnels and buildings used by armed groups.[23] Residents continued to describe transport costs, lack of shelter, and fear that no destination was safe as obstacles to leaving.[23]

Gaza health authorities reported at least thirty deaths across the Strip in Israeli strikes on September 17, including nineteen in Gaza City.[23] Those figures did not distinguish combatants from civilians.[23] On September 19, the IDF estimated that 480,000 Gaza City residents had fled since late August and closed the temporary Salah al-Din evacuation route as planned, leaving the Rashid coastal road available.[24]

Humanitarian supply problems accompanied the displacement.[24] UNICEF said four aid trucks had been commandeered outside its compound, depriving at least 2,700 severely or acutely malnourished children of ready-to-use therapeutic food.[24] COGAT and UNICEF both described the incident but assigned responsibility differently.[24] In mid-September, COGAT also reported moving a Gaza City warehouse’s historical artifacts, including mosaics and pottery, to a secure location in southern Gaza in coordination with an international organization.[2]

On September 23, military sources said the IDF had completed the encirclement of Gaza City.[25] Three divisions were reported to have taken key areas inside and around the city, including Sheikh Radwan, the coastline, Sabra, and Tel al-Hawa, while military estimates put departures above 600,000.[25] In a September 24 situation assessment, Zamir said operations were striking Gaza City to create conditions for hostage release and Hamas’s decisive defeat.[26] The 36th Division’s participating forces included the Givati, Nahal, and 7th Armored brigades, and Major Shahar Netanel Bozaglo was reported killed in northern Gaza.[26]

By September 27, the IDF said more than 750,000 people had left Gaza City for the Al-Mawasi area near Khan Yunis.[27] Hamas’s Government Information Office had claimed on September 24 that 335,000 had left and more than 900,000 remained.[27] Earlier reporting shortly after the ground phase began similarly contrasted Israeli estimates approaching 500,000 departures with Hamas’s acknowledgment of approximately 270,000 departures and 22,000 returns.[17]

The IDF described expanding the southern humanitarian area through field hospitals, water connections and desalination, food supplies, tents, and medical aid.[27] Palestinian accounts from central Gaza, particularly Deir al-Balah, described flimsy tents, heat, poor hygiene, and shortages of water, electricity, and services.[27] Al-Shifa Hospital’s director called conditions “tragic and dangerous,” said sick and wounded people had left out of fear of an IDF incursion, and warned that a suspension of hospital services could lead to tens of thousands of casualties.[27] Civil-defense teams also reported fuel and equipment shortages and difficulty accessing targeted areas.[27]

Between September 28 and October 2, Israeli forces advanced westward along the Netzarim Corridor toward the coast.[28] The IDF said the 99th Division extended control along the corridor, cutting Gaza City off from central Gaza and dividing the Strip into northern and southern sections.[28] It said residents could still leave southward, while Katz described the movement as “tightening the siege,” and the army called October 1 the “last chance” to move south.[28]

On October 4, following US President Donald Trump’s call for negotiations not to take place under fire, Israeli reporting described a halt to the offensive to take Gaza City.[29] Forces were instructed to shift to a defensive posture and fire only to remove an immediate threat, while remaining in position.[29] On October 5, the IDF estimated that 900,000 of the city’s pre-offensive population of approximately one million had evacuated.[30] A separate October 2 humanitarian estimate placed hundreds of thousands of people in Gaza City and North Gaza governorate.[30]

The halt followed Hamas’s conditional acceptance on October 3 of the first phase of Trump’s proposal.[8] Netanyahu said the suspension of offensive airstrikes was intended to prepare for immediate implementation of the plan’s first phase and the release of all hostages, while Israel continued operations it characterized as defensive.[8] Air and ground activity continued across Gaza through October 10, with Gaza City remaining the principal focus; the IDF reported two soldiers killed during October 1–10.[31]

On October 9, the parties and mediators agreed to and signed implementation steps for a proposal to end the Gaza war.[4] Commitments included a partial Israeli withdrawal from nearly half the Strip, suspension of military operations in those areas, humanitarian aid entry, and hostage and prisoner releases.[4] Implementation began on October 10, including a phased IDF withdrawal.[4]

The ceasefire took effect at noon on October 10 after the IDF withdrew to agreed deployment lines, starting a 72-hour period for the release of hostages.[32] Forces withdrew from broad areas, including Gaza City, and redeployed along the “yellow line.”[31] The pullback returned Israeli forces to positions held in August, before the latest Gaza City offensive, while leaving some heavily damaged Palestinian neighborhoods under Israeli control.[33]

Israel remained in control of approximately 53 percent of the Strip after the withdrawal, and residents were warned not to approach areas where Israeli troops remained deployed.[32] A broader estimate placed the territory remaining under Israeli control at 53–58 percent.[4] Hostilities affecting civilians decreased after the ceasefire, although more limited military operations and attacks continued.[4] By November, the wider war was described as under a ceasefire, with most hostages released and hostilities ceased.[34]

The offensive left extensive destruction and displacement in Gaza City.[4] Before the ceasefire, intensive airstrikes and demolitions, including controlled detonations of multistorey buildings, caused further large-scale destruction of civilian infrastructure.[4] Operations and evacuation orders produced another round of mass displacement, particularly from eastern and southwestern Gaza City.[4]

For September 20–December 2, Gaza Ministry of Health figures recorded at least 1,938 Palestinians killed and 4,888 injured across the Strip.[4] The ministry separately reported 356 killed and 909 injured after the October 10 ceasefire began.[4] Those totals cover the whole Gaza Strip and the specified reporting period, not Gaza City alone or a casualty total for this offensive.[4]

The campaign was debated as both a military effort against Hamas’s remaining urban defenses and a potential source of leverage for a hostage agreement.[3][35] An August 22 Mosaic commentary characterized the planned assault as “the largest and most complex battle of the war,” while describing renewed instructions to Israeli negotiators to pursue the hostages’ release.[35] A September 2 Jerusalem Center analysis framed the choice as taking military control of Gaza City or using the threat of a major offensive to press for a comprehensive hostage deal.[36]

Commentary also differed over the operation’s character and intended endpoint.[37] A September 18 Jerusalem Center commentary, originally published by JNS on September 17, portrayed the cautious initial entry as an effort to separate civilians from terrorists, pressure Hamas, and rescue captives, and argued that it was not intended as a conquest.[37] A September 8 Mosaic commentary emphasized fortifications and tunnels rather than fighters as the coming offensive’s targets.[38] The September 2 analysis also advocated relocating civilians to northern Sinai to facilitate operations, a recommendation rather than an implemented evacuation plan.[36]

The principal strategic dispute concerned whether expanded military pressure would help free hostages or expose them to greater danger.[10] Hostage families and protesters opposed the decision, arguing that military pressure had not worked, while far-right ministers favored continuing the offensive without negotiation.[8] The American Jewish Committee recognized Israel’s wartime challenges but warned that a full takeover could endanger remaining hostages and cause substantial Israeli military and Palestinian civilian casualties.[5]

International objections focused on humanitarian consequences and the war’s endgame.[39] Canada said the operation worsened the humanitarian crisis and jeopardized hostage release; France called it destructive and urged a halt; and the United Kingdom’s foreign secretary described it as reckless and appalling.[19] Hamas and the Palestinian Authority condemned the cabinet decision as a “war crime,” with Hamas alleging forced displacement and the Palestinian Authority warning of humanitarian disaster; these were political and legal accusations, not adjudicated findings.[6]

Accounts of civilian protection and targeting remained sharply divergent.[16] The IDF described military uses of targeted towers and precautions to limit harm, while reports based on media and social-media material described clinics, human-rights organizations, and law offices in the Al Ruya building.[16] Reporting could not independently verify some military assertions about humanitarian arrangements and civilian protection, or the September 17 casualty figures.[22][23] Aid organizations sought stronger action to stop the offensive, while Israel rejected genocide accusations and maintained that it was facilitating aid.[23]

Population figures likewise require attention to dates, geography, and counting methods.[27][30] The opposing late-September departure claims did not share an established counting methodology, while October estimates referred variously to Gaza City alone or Gaza City together with North Gaza governorate.[27][30] Other accounts gave approximately 350,000 evacuees at the September 16 launch, more than 500,000 by mid-September, and estimates of 100,000–300,000 civilians expected to remain; these figures cannot simply be combined into one consistent population series.[8]

The offensive also formed part of a broader dispute over the conduct of the Gaza war.[40] Wider assessments recorded extensive destruction, civilian casualties, and deteriorating humanitarian conditions, alongside accusations of disproportionate force, legal violations, and obstruction of aid; Israel maintained that its operations were necessary for defense and that it sought to avoid civilian casualties and permit assistance.[40] The October halt and subsequent ceasefire marked a diplomatic transition and partial withdrawal, rather than a reported military determination that all the offensive’s stated objectives had been achieved.[29][4]