2014 Gaza War

Three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped and murdered on June 12, 2014, in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and their bodies were found on June 30.[3][4] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Hamas of abducting them, and Israel launched a security operation involving searches and arrests of suspected Hamas members and other terrorists.[4] Operation Brother’s Keeper sought to find the teenagers and reduce Hamas’s ability to conduct similar terrorist attacks; the search coincided with increasing rocket fire from Gaza.[1]

The escalation unfolded against a longer background of unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, repeated fighting, and fragile infrastructure in Gaza.[3] The Israeli blockade of Gaza had been fully implemented since 2007, while Israel faced increasing rocket attacks and the discovery of tunnels leading into its territory.[5] Fatah and Hamas reached an agreement in April 2014, followed by the formation of a Palestinian national-consensus government in June; that government had not assumed its full responsibilities in Gaza when the war began.[5] The confrontation was the fifth major clash between Israel and Hamas since Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005.[6]

The search for the teenagers included arrests of Hamas leaders and the dismantling of Hamas institutions in the West Bank.[2] After the teenagers’ bodies were found, Palestinian teenager Muhammad Abu Khdeir was abducted and murdered in Jerusalem on July 2 in an apparent revenge killing.[3][4] Rocket attacks from Gaza subsequently resumed a daily frequency.[4] Sustained Israeli military engagement in Gaza began with airstrikes on the night of June 30–July 1, before the launch of the broader operation the following week.[7]

Rocket and mortar attacks had already increased during the preceding months: the Israeli government’s accounting listed 41 projectiles in 2013, more than 80 in March 2014, and approximately 300 between June 12 and July 7.[1] On July 5, an Israeli airstrike targeted a cross-border assault tunnel near Kerem Shalom that Israel said was intended for an attack inside Israel.[1] Six Hamas terrorists in the tunnel were reported killed; Hamas’s military wing warned that the Israeli attacks had “crossed the red line.”[8] On July 7, after more than 60 rockets and mortars were fired from Gaza in a single day, Israel began a broader aerial operation against Hamas and other terrorist organizations.[1]

Israel’s declared objective was to restore security for civilians exposed to rocket fire.[2] Stopping attacks and damaging Hamas’s capacity to conduct operations against Israel were central to the initial campaign; neutralizing the cross-border tunnel network became an additional major military objective.[2][3] The tunnels presented a different operational challenge from rockets because they enabled terrorist groups to cross beneath the border and emerge inside Israeli territory.[3]

Operation Protective Edge opened with an aerial campaign in early July, followed by a ground operation on July 17 and a final period of airstrikes and intermittent ceasefires in August.[3] The first phase, extending through July 17, included air and naval attacks on targets identified as military infrastructure.[1] During the opening days, rockets reached central Israel, a Hamas maritime infiltration attempt was reported near Kibbutz Zikim, and 40,000 Israeli reservists were called up; the reserve call-up doubled by the end of the operation.[9]

On July 10, heavy rocket fire targeted southern and central Israel: 60 rockets had been fired by the time of a contemporaneous report, and Iron Dome had intercepted 15.[10] Israeli attacks from the air, sea, and land included rocket launchers, weapons, government buildings, and homes of senior Hamas officials.[10] Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon said the fighting would continue until Hamas understood that escalation was not worthwhile.[10] Six days into the operation, Hamas claimed to have dispatched unmanned aircraft into Israel, one of which was intercepted near Ashdod.[9]

Israel’s Security Cabinet accepted an Egyptian ceasefire proposal on July 15.[11] The proposal envisaged restoring the understandings reached after the 2012 Pillar of Defense operation, with subsequent negotiations in Egypt to work out details.[11] It was intended to take effect at 9 a.m., but Hamas had not accepted it and rocket fire continued.[11] The fighting therefore proceeded beyond the initial aerial phase.[9]

On July 17, an attempted infiltration by 13 Hamas terrorists through a tunnel near Kibbutz Sufa preceded the Israeli ground offensive.[9] The ground operation’s stated purposes were to destroy tunnels extending into Israel, restore long-term calm for Israeli residents, and substantially damage the infrastructure of Hamas and other terrorist organizations.[12] Troops operated in northern, central, and southern Gaza and began locating tunnel entrances.[9] Five brigade task forces participated in the ground phase, which focused particularly on the tunnel system.[2]

The fighting brought substantial Israeli military losses, including 13 Golani Brigade soldiers killed in a single day.[9] A later tunnel infiltration near Nir Am and Erez killed seven soldiers.[9] Forces were reinforced near the border and nearby communities as concern grew about further infiltrations.[13] By July 20, a contemporaneous operational account listed approximately 2,500 targets attacked and 360 Palestinians killed.[13]

The tunnel network included 32 tunnels located by Israeli forces, 14 extending beyond the Green Line into Israel.[3] A combat analysis also identified two tunnels whose exits were within 500 meters of the border and described six tunnel-based infiltration operations, four involving engagements with Israeli forces.[14] Eleven Israeli soldiers were killed in those clashes.[14] The attack on a security post at Nahal Oz, in which five Israeli soldiers died, was described as an apparent attempt to take hostages.[14]

Israeli soldiers adapted their tunnel-search methods by using smoke grenades and industrial fans to force occupants out and reveal shafts through columns of smoke.[2] An operational accounting distinguished 13 tunnels destroyed completely, 13 neutralized, and six disrupted, rather than treating every tunnel encountered as destroyed in the same manner.[2] Other portions of the network included shafts and unfinished passages; the Israeli government’s report listed 81 tunnels under construction approaching the border.[1]

Rocket and mortar attacks continued throughout the ground campaign and after Israeli troops withdrew.[1] Approximately 4,600 rockets and mortar shells were fired at Israel in one operational analysis, with about 3,600 falling in unpopulated areas.[2] Iron Dome intercepted 735 rockets assessed as threats, using nine deployed systems.[2] The estimated 90 percent interception rate reduced the danger from rockets threatening populated areas, but the bombardment nevertheless disrupted daily life and economic activity, especially in southern Israel.[2] Rocket fire placed approximately 70 percent of Israel’s population within the threatened area.[2]

The effects extended to international transportation when a rocket struck a civilian house in Yehud near Ben Gurion International Airport.[9] The strike prompted the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration to prohibit American commercial flights to the airport; other airlines also canceled services before flights were gradually restored.[9] Communities close to Gaza experienced particularly severe disruption: an Israeli government estimate put civilian displacement at approximately 10,000, while a separate humanitarian estimate indicated that as many as 70 percent of residents in nearby communities left their homes.[5]

Several short humanitarian pauses and international efforts to secure a ceasefire punctuated the fighting.[9] A 72-hour humanitarian ceasefire was announced for August 1 by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, with Israeli forces remaining in Gaza to complete tunnel demolition.[9] Fighting resumed after an attack on Israeli troops in Rafah during the pause, killing two soldiers and raising concern that officer Hadar Goldin had been captured.[9]

Israeli ground forces withdrew in early August following the tunnel-focused campaign, and the phase beginning August 5 consisted of alternating ceasefires and continuing airstrikes.[1][3] Indirect negotiations proceeded in Cairo under Egyptian mediation, with temporary extensions intended to sustain the talks.[15] On August 19, a 24-hour extension was reported at Egypt’s request; unresolved issues included demilitarization and proposals for a seaport and airport.[15] A strike on a building where Hamas military-wing leader Mohammed Deif was believed to be staying left his fate unclear in contemporaneous reporting.[16]

The final days remained deadly for Israeli civilians.[3] Four-year-old Daniel Tragerman was killed by mortar shrapnel at his home in Kibbutz Nahal Oz on August 22, and a Grad rocket struck a synagogue in Ashdod that day, injuring three civilians.[17] Two Israeli men repairing power lines at Kibbutz Nirim were killed by mortar shrapnel hours before the final ceasefire took effect.[3]

An Egyptian-mediated ceasefire took effect at 7 p.m. on August 26 and was accepted by Israel, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.[2][9] On that final day, 182 rockets and mortars were fired between midnight and 7 p.m.; 143 fell in open areas, five in built-up areas, and 27 were intercepted.[18] The arrangement provided for opening crossings, admitting humanitarian and reconstruction supplies under Israeli supervision, and restoring a six-nautical-mile fishing zone.[18][19]

Further discussions were intended to begin within a month on issues including demilitarization and a possible airport and seaport.[18] Netanyahu accepted the arrangement without a cabinet vote.[18] The fighting ended, but the anticipated follow-up negotiations had not begun by April 2015.[1]

At the height of the fighting, approximately 500,000 people, or 28 percent of Gaza’s population, were internally displaced.[3] Forty-four percent of Gaza was either a no-go area or subject to evacuation warnings.[3] Eighteen thousand housing units were destroyed in whole or in part, water and sanitation infrastructure was extensively incapacitated, and 73 medical facilities and many ambulances were damaged.[3] The reported Palestinian injury total reached 11,231, including 3,540 women and 3,436 children; almost 10 percent of those injured suffered permanent disability.[3][5]

Displacement placed enormous pressure on schools used as shelters.[20] By August 3, 90 UNRWA schools were sheltering 259,321 people, with inadequate sanitation and, at times, access to only three liters of drinking water per person per day.[20] At that stage, roughly 26 percent of Gaza’s population had been displaced, water and electricity facilities had collapsed, and the health system was close to collapse.[20] The shelters were described as capable of accommodating people for only a few days.[20]

A humanitarian estimate placed displacement at approximately 520,000 by August 5.[21] By late August, more than 293,000 people were accommodated in 85 UNRWA schools and another 45,000 in government schools.[21] A technical assessment counted 96,000 damaged or destroyed Palestinian refugee dwellings.[21] These emergency accommodation arrangements continued well beyond the end of the main ground operations.[22]

Electricity outages reached as much as 22 hours per day during the hostilities, limiting hospital capacity, water pumping, and sewage treatment.[5] Sixty-three water facilities were damaged, including 23 completely destroyed, and damage was reported at 209 schools.[5] On August 6, eight of the ten high-voltage lines supplying electricity from Israel were out of service, alongside damage to Gaza’s power station.[23] Three of five wastewater treatment facilities were not functioning, damaged pipes caused flooding, and purchased water prices rose from NIS 25 to NIS 60 per cubic meter.[23]

Early financial estimates conveyed the scale of destruction but were not final audited assessments.[23][24] An August report relayed a $5 billion estimate for damage to homes and infrastructure, based on submitted figures of approximately 10,000 homes completely demolished and 30,000 severely damaged.[23] A reconstruction plan subsequently estimated total costs of $7.8 billion, including approximately $450 million for humanitarian relief and $3.02 billion for development projects such as a port and a desalination plant.[24]

By September, more than 100,000 people—approximately 20,000 families—remained without homes.[22] On September 11, 65,774 people were still living in 20 UNRWA schools.[22] Twenty-two schools had been destroyed and 120 partially damaged in that update’s accounting.[22] Gaza’s school year began on September 14, three weeks late, with approximately 80 percent of schools operating double shifts.[22]

The housing crisis persisted into the following years.[25] A later breakdown counted 11,000 homes totally destroyed, 6,800 severely damaged, 5,700 with major damage, and 147,500 with minor damage.[25] Approximately 18 months after the war, about 75,000 people remained internally displaced.[25]

The conflict also left Israeli communities dealing with bereavement, injuries, displacement, and the effects of prolonged bombardment.[3][5] One major postwar accounting recorded six civilians and 67 Israeli soldiers killed, with as many as 1,600 people injured in Israel.[3] Tunnel discoveries and their use in cross-border attacks generated anxiety among Israelis concerned about attacks on civilians.[3] Southern communities experienced sustained disruption to ordinary life and economic activity even with the protection provided by Iron Dome.[2]

The combination of rocket defense and cross-border tunnel warfare became central to assessments of the campaign.[2] Israel damaged Hamas’s tunnel network and other infrastructure, while Hamas sustained rocket fire capable of disrupting Israeli life throughout the operation.[2] A late-2014 strategic analysis characterized the result as a fragile deadlock rather than a decisive outcome and left open which side had been more successful.[2]

Ethical commentary emphasized that successful interception did not eliminate Israel’s security problem.[26] Ethicist Asa Kasher argued that rockets not intercepted by Iron Dome still posed a danger, identifying rocket factories, storage magazines, and launch batteries as campaign targets.[26] He described the principal military missions as eliminating the offensive-tunnel threat and reducing or eliminating the rocket threat.[26] Kasher also recalled seeing a division commander’s note at a General Staff base in early August that qualified the operation’s objectives with the phrase “without escalation,” a formulation he had not encountered in media coverage.[26]

The war affected Jewish communities outside Israel as well as diplomatic relationships.[7] Demonstrations against Israel’s conduct took place internationally, including in the United Kingdom, and some demonstrations included reported antisemitic content.[7] More than 130 antisemitic incidents were recorded in Britain in July 2014, the highest monthly total since January 2009.[7] Academic analysis of the U.S.-Israel relationship examined the combination of the Obama administration’s qualified public support for Israel’s right to self-defense and its public criticism of civilian deaths in Gaza, including the effects on Israeli leaders’ perceptions of the relationship.[27]

Postwar accountability processes included Israeli military assessments and an international commission of inquiry.[22][3] By September 2014, more than 40 incidents had been referred to Israel’s General Staff Fact-Finding Assessments Mechanism, including allegations involving civilian deaths and damage to medical or UN facilities.[22] Twelve assessments had been completed; seven cases were closed and investigations ordered in two, including the July 16 deaths of four children on Gaza’s shoreline and a July 24 school attack in which 15 civilians were reported killed.[22]

The international inquiry conducted more than 280 interviews and received more than 500 written submissions and other documents.[3] Denied access to Israel and the Palestinian territories, it interviewed Gaza witnesses remotely and witnesses from Israel and the West Bank elsewhere.[3] It applied a reasonable-grounds standard lower than that required in criminal trials and did not determine the criminal responsibility of specific individuals.[3] The inquiry called for accountability and cooperation with the International Criminal Court’s work concerning the Palestinian territories.[28]

Published chronologies date the operation’s beginning to either July 7 or July 8, producing descriptions of 51 or 50 days respectively; the end date is August 26.[1][7] Operational counts differ by reporting period and category: Calcalist reported 4,564 rockets and mortars fired toward Israel, while the UN commission listed 4,881 rockets and 1,753 mortars.[18][3]

Palestinian fatality estimates and civilian classifications remain substantially different.[3][1] The UN inquiry’s accounting was 2,251 dead, including 1,462 civilians—299 women and 551 children—whereas the Israeli government’s April 2015 assessment counted approximately 2,125 dead: 936 terrorist operatives, 761 civilians, and 428 unclassified.[3][1] Other early Israeli-source estimates used different totals and classifications. The ADL reported an initial Israeli estimate of 2,127 deaths, including 616 members of Hamas or other terrorist groups, 706 civilians, and 805 cases still under investigation.[19]

Legal assessments addressed conduct by both sides without constituting criminal verdicts.[3] Indiscriminate rocket attacks and targeted mortar attacks against civilians were assessed as violations of international humanitarian law that could amount to war crimes; the execution of 21 alleged collaborators between August 5 and 22 was assessed as a war crime.[3] Examination of 15 Israeli residential-building strikes, killing 216 people including 115 children and 50 women, raised concerns about proportionality and precautions, while the use of wide-area explosive weapons in built-up neighborhoods raised concerns about indiscriminate attacks.[3]

Allegations of Palestinian terrorist groups using civilian buildings were not independently verified by the inquiry, although weapons were discovered in three empty UN schools.[3] Such conduct, if established, could violate humanitarian law without removing Israel’s own obligations.[3] Netanyahu rejected the inquiry’s report as biased; its access limitations and evidentiary standard remained important qualifications to findings that did not establish individual criminal responsibility.[28][3]