Incidents in the Gaza War (2008–2009)

A six-month ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, mediated indirectly by Egypt, expired on December 19, 2008.[1] For its first five months, the truce held relatively well, though some rockets were fired, mostly attributed to groups other than Hamas.[1] The two sides disagreed fundamentally over the ceasefire's terms: Hamas sought an end to Israel's blockade of Gaza, while Israel demanded a halt to all rocket fire and progress toward the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.[1]

On November 4, 2008, Israel carried out a raid it said was intended to prevent the use of tunnels to abduct soldiers; rocket fire subsequently resumed with greater intensity.[1] By the final days before the operation, the Congressional Research Service records approximately 88 rockets fired on December 24 and a further 44 on December 25.[1] Israel launched Operation Cast Lead on December 27, 2008, citing the sustained rocket campaign against its civilian population as justification for military action.

During the conflict and in the period immediately preceding it, Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups fired rockets and mortar shells into populated areas of southern Israel. The UN Fact-Finding Mission reported that Israeli authorities cited approximately 570 rockets and 205 mortars fired between December 27, 2008, and January 18, 2009, while the al-Qassam Brigades and Islamic Jihad claimed more than 800 rockets during the same period.[3] The Mission concluded that unguided rockets and mortars fired into civilian areas constituted indiscriminate attacks and, where no military target was intended, deliberate attacks on civilians—characterizations it also applied as potential war crimes and possible crimes against humanity.[3] More than 8,000 rockets had been fired at Sderot and surrounding communities since 2001.[4]

Israeli air strikes began at approximately 11:30 a.m. on December 27, 2008, with the first wave hitting 50 targets. A second wave struck another 60 targets roughly 30 minutes later, and more than 170 targets were hit during the day. Palestinians reported more than 200 people killed and approximately 800 wounded.[2]

Among the opening-day strikes was an attack on a Hamas officer training course at the Gaza police headquarters. A Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs article, citing Palestinian Centre for Human Rights figures, reports 89 deaths at that site, identifying 60 as Hamas members, two as members of Fatah military wings, one as a member of the Popular Resistance Committees, and 18 as trainees in infantry units intended for fighting Israel. The article classifies 81 of the 89 as "terror activists and fighters," though that classification represents the article's assessment rather than an uncontested finding.[5]

The initial air campaign continued for about one week before the ground offensive began on January 3, 2009.[1] Israel's official account states that the initial move into northern Gaza was partly intended to disable rocket-launch sites near southern Israel.[1] Israeli troop withdrawal was completed on January 21, after Israel declared a unilateral ceasefire on January 18 and Hamas followed with its own ceasefire after firing additional rockets.[1]

On January 5, 2009, a serious friendly-fire incident occurred when an Israeli tank fired on a building north of Sajaiya that was occupied by Golani Brigade soldiers. Three soldiers were killed and 23 wounded, including brigade commander Colonel Avi Peled; an inquiry identified a chain of coordination and identification errors, including mismatched maps and control systems and a failure to confirm that the target lay within the tank's assigned sector.[6] Overall, friendly-fire incidents during the operation killed four Israeli soldiers and wounded more than 30.[6]

Several senior Hamas figures were killed during the operation. On January 1, 2009, an Israeli airstrike on the home of Hamas figure Nizar Rayyan in northern Gaza killed Rayyan and nine other people, including his wife and three children, and wounded 25.[7] Israeli security sources described the house as also serving as a weapons-storage facility, communications center, and concealed tunnel opening; Hamas confirmed Rayyan's death.[7]

Said Siam, Hamas's Internal Affairs and National Security Minister, was killed in an Israeli airstrike on his brother's home in Gaza City on the afternoon of January 15, 2009.[8] Also killed in that strike was Salah Adin Fuad Sha'aban Abu Sharah, identified as a close associate of Siam and commander in chief of Hamas's internal security forces.[8]

Among the most extensively documented incidents of the conflict were attacks on the extended al-Samouni family in the Zeitoun neighborhood south of Gaza City. The UN Fact-Finding Mission described a sequence of events beginning on January 4, 2009, when Israeli soldiers entered the home of Ateya al-Samouni. According to the Mission's account, based on interviews, site visits, and other materials, soldiers shot Ateya al-Samouni after he approached with his arms raised and identity documents; his four-year-old son Ahmad was badly wounded and later died after an ambulance was prevented from reaching him.[3]

Soldiers subsequently ordered approximately 100 members of the extended family—mostly women and children—to gather in the home of Wa'el al-Samouni.[3] On January 5, projectiles struck near five men who had gone outside to collect firewood, followed by further strikes directly on the house. Saleh al-Samouni told the Mission that 21 family members were killed and 19 injured in the attack on Wa'el's house; the Mission's summary places the total killed at 23.[3] Survivors later reported that soldiers ordered them back toward the house after the shelling, saying, according to witness accounts, "go back to death."[3]

The Mission reported repeated denials of medical access: Palestinian Red Crescent ambulances were stopped on January 4, and later requests by the Red Crescent and the ICRC to reach the area were denied.[3] During a temporary ceasefire on January 7, rescue teams were allowed in but could not evacuate all the wounded within the available time.[3] The Mission concluded that Israeli forces had arbitrarily prevented evacuation of the wounded, causing at least one additional death and worsening other injuries.[3]

Wail and Salah al-Samouni gave testimony to the Goldstone Commission placing events at about 5:30 a.m. on January 5: Wail said he left with other men to gather firewood, a helicopter fired a missile at them, and further missiles then struck the house.[9] Their account placed no armed Palestinian activity in the vicinity. A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs article contrasts this testimony with Palestinian Islamic Jihad statements describing attacks on Israeli forces in Zeitoun on January 4–5 and identifying some al-Samouni relatives as fighters; these remain conflicting accounts that the sources do not fully resolve.[9] Israel's later investigation update acknowledged that allegations concerning the al-Samouni family were under a special command investigation and that related allegations had been referred for criminal investigation.[10]

On January 6, 2009, Israeli forces fired mortar shells near the al-Fakhura junction in Jabaliya, close to a UNRWA school that was sheltering 1,368 people. The UN Fact-Finding Mission reported that one shell landed in a family courtyard and three others on the adjacent street; 11 members of the al-Deeb family died in the courtyard, and at least 24 further people were killed along the street, with up to 40 injured.[3] No shell struck the school itself, though the building was damaged and up to nine people inside were injured.[3] The Mission concluded that the use of mortars in those crowded circumstances was indiscriminate and violated international humanitarian law.

Israel's official account gave a substantially different version of events: it said Hamas mortar fire came from a location approximately 80 metres west of the school, that IDF forces waited about 50 minutes before responding, and that their fire landed outside the school grounds—killing five Hamas operatives and seven civilians.[11] The Israeli investigation rejected Hamas's claimed figure of 42 deaths inside the school and described the response as directed at a verified firing position.[11]

Separate testimony from Mohammed Fouad Abu Askar described his house being struck approximately 20 minutes after a telephone warning, with bombs then hitting the area around al-Fakhura school and the Diyab family house, where 11 people were reportedly killed.[9] A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs account notes that Palestinian organizational sources identified some of those killed in the area—including Khaled and Raafat Abu Askar—as members of armed groups, though the article does not produce a complete incident toll.[9]

A Ynet report on the IDF inquiry said the military assessed that 12 to 17 people were killed, including five people it identified as members of a mortar-firing cell, and maintained that the school building itself was not hit.[12] That estimate differed from both the later official account of five Hamas operatives and seven civilians and the UN Mission's finding of at least 35 deaths in the surrounding area. The casualty count, the origin and duration of Palestinian fire, and the sequence of the Israeli response therefore remain disputed.

On January 6, 2009, an Israeli aircraft struck the al-Daya family home on al-Rai'i Street in Zeitoun, southeast of Gaza City. The UN Fact-Finding Mission reported that 22 family members were killed, including 12 children under the age of ten.[3] Israel acknowledged the strike but described it as an operational error: the intended target was a weapons-storage facility in an adjacent building, and the al-Daya home was struck by mistake.[11]

Israel's investigation stated that warning measures had been employed, but that the warning telephone call was directed to the building containing the intended target rather than to the al-Daya residence.[11] The IDF described the incident as having severe consequences, said the error was being examined to strengthen targeting safeguards, and maintained that no intentional attack on civilians had occurred.[11]

The Mission said it could not determine whether the home had been deliberately targeted or whether the incident constituted a direct violation of international or criminal law.[3] Nevertheless, it found Israel responsible for the consequences of deliberately firing at the house and cited a substantial failure of due diligence in the targeting process, as well as deficiencies in the transparency and credibility of Israel's subsequent investigation.[3] Ynet separately reported that the IDF attributed the error to incorrect intelligence coordinates provided to the air force, and said the matter would be referred to the Military Advocate General.[12]

On January 15, 2009, Israeli fire struck the UNRWA field-office compound in Gaza City while 600 to 700 civilians were sheltering there. The UN Fact-Finding Mission reported that at least three high-explosive shells and seven white-phosphorus container shells or substantial components struck inside the compound, which contained a fuel depot and warehouses holding food and other relief supplies.[3] Fires broke out, at least one UNRWA staff member was lightly injured, and UN personnel repeatedly notified Israeli authorities during the hours of shelling—including alerting them to white phosphorus and a burning warehouse.[3]

The Mission concluded that commanders continued using the same means of attack after being informed of the danger and found a failure to take feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilian life and property.[3] Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak described the incident as a "grave error" and apologized. Israel's military investigation offered a different account: it said white-phosphorus smoke projectiles had been used to screen Israeli tank forces from anti-tank fire, that fragments or wedges had entered the compound unintentionally, and that firing in the area was stopped after UN complaints.[11] The official Israeli account reported one UNRWA employee and two other people injured and maintained that the forces had not intended to strike the UN facility.[11]

The Palestinian Red Crescent's al-Quds hospital and a nearby ambulance depot in the Tal el-Hawa district of Gaza City came under Israeli bombardment on January 15, 2009, following a barrage that had begun the previous night. The UN Fact-Finding Mission reported that white-phosphorus shells and at least one high-explosive shell damaged the facilities; more than 50 patients and several hundred civilians were inside the complex at the time.[3] Patients had to be evacuated twice under dangerous conditions; one ambulance was directly struck and two others were crushed by tanks.[3]

An eight-year-old girl wounded by an Israeli sniper during this period later died after being transported from al-Quds to al-Shifa hospital; the Mission found Israeli forces responsible for her death.[3] The Mission concluded that al-Quds was not a military objective and found no evidence it was being used for military purposes.[3] It additionally found that Israeli forces blocked or delayed rescue efforts in the al-Samouni area, concluding that denial of access caused at least one additional death and worsened other injuries among that family.[3]

On the evening of January 3, 2009, a strike near or on the al-Maqadmah mosque in the Jabaliya area killed a number of people who had gathered for prayers. Between 200 and 300 men were on the first floor and women were in the basement when a missile struck near the entrance; the UN Mission reported that at least 15 people were killed and approximately 40 injured.[3] Physical evidence was consistent with a fragmentation sleeve on an air-to-ground missile, and the Mission concluded that the mosque had been intentionally targeted.[3]

Israel offered a sharply different account, denying that the mosque itself was attacked and asserting that those described as civilian casualties were actually Hamas operatives killed while fighting Israeli forces elsewhere.[3] Ynet's coverage reported that Goldstone cited 21 deaths and that seven of the 15 identified dead were described in Palestinian sources as armed-group operatives.[13] The casualty figures, the victims' status, and precisely what was struck remain disputed across the sources consulted.

The use of white phosphorus emerged as one of the most contested legal and humanitarian issues of the conflict. The UN Fact-Finding Mission identified its use in multiple incidents, including the January 15 strikes on the UNRWA compound and al-Quds hospital, and the January 4 strike involving the Abu Halima family home in al-Atatra, where a white-phosphorus shell entered the house and killed five family members—including four children—and burned five survivors.[3] One family member, Ghada Abu Halima, later died in Egypt.[3] Two teenage relatives who attempted to transport wounded family members were shot and killed; the Mission reported that ambulances had been denied access to the area.[3]

Israel's official account acknowledged the use of munitions containing white phosphorus during the operation, distinguishing between exploding munitions used in open areas for marking or signaling and smoke projectiles whose felt wedges were dipped in white phosphorus.[11] The investigation concluded that the investigated uses did not violate international law. Ynet reported that the IDF decided to stop using phosphorus shells on January 7, while maintaining that the uses examined before and immediately after that decision complied with applicable restrictions.[14] The UN Mission, by contrast, criticized the use of white phosphorus in built-up areas and found that the January 15 attack on the UNRWA compound failed to satisfy the requirement to take feasible precautions to protect civilians.[3]

On January 5, 2009, flechette missiles struck a family's condolence gathering in Izbat Beit Hanoun. An earlier strike on January 4 had fatally injured first-aid volunteer Arafa Abd al-Dayem. Two missiles hit near the women's mourning tent as participants were leaving, killing five people and injuring 17; the Mission also described an earlier strike on the family home during the gathering.[3] The Mission found no indication that the house or tents were military objectives and concluded the attacks were unjustified. Israel's investigation said flechettes were used only to a limited extent and that specific complaints about their use remained under investigation.[3]

On December 29, 2008, Israeli forces struck a truck near a Hamas rocket-manufacturing site after surveillance personnel mistook objects on the vehicle for Grad rockets; it actually carried oxygen tanks.[11] Israel's investigation reported that four Hamas operatives and four civilians were killed, and said the tanks resembled rockets and were likely intended for rocket manufacture; the strike and secondary explosions were attributed to the vehicle's proximity to the Hamas facility.[11]

On January 6, a 122mm Grad rocket fired from Gaza struck near a residential dwelling in Gadera, approximately 40 kilometers from the border, slightly wounding a three-month-old girl and causing several others to suffer shock.[15] On December 27, a rocket directly struck the home of Bebert Vaknin, 58, in Netivot, killing him; four other civilians were wounded.[15]

On January 16, 2009, two Israeli tank shells struck the home of Gaza physician Izz al-Din Abu al-Aish in Jabalia, killing three of his daughters and his niece.[16] Israel's account said suspicious figures had been identified at the house and that concealed ammunition had exploded after the shells struck. Abu al-Aish disputed that explanation in subsequent legal proceedings, arguing that an IDF targeting error rather than concealed Hamas ammunition caused his daughters' deaths.[16]

Allegations that Israeli soldiers shot civilians carrying white flags were documented by multiple sources. The US State Department's 2009 human-rights report recorded Human Rights Watch documentation of seven alleged cases involving 11 Palestinian civilian deaths, including five women and four children.[17] In one incident on January 7, family witnesses described Israeli soldiers firing on two women and three girls who had left Khalid Abd Rabbo's house holding makeshift white flags; two were reportedly killed and two seriously wounded, and Israeli military police were investigating the case at year's end.[17] A separate incident on January 13 in Khuza'a involved Rawiya al-Najjar and other family members reportedly shot while attempting to leave with white flags after following soldiers' instructions.[17] The UN Fact-Finding Mission separately described seven incidents in which civilians were shot while fleeing their homes, sometimes after following Israeli instructions and while waving white flags.[4]

Casualty figures for the operation vary substantially depending on the source and the methodology used to classify combatants and civilians. Israeli government figures put Palestinian deaths at 1,166, including 295 people classified as non-combatants.[18] The UN Fact-Finding Mission recorded totals of 1,417 from the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, 1,387 from B'Tselem, and 1,166 from the Israeli armed forces, but said it had not cross-checked the Palestinian casualty lists or made an overall finding on either the total killed or the civilian proportion.[19] The State Department separately summarized a B'Tselem estimate of 1,385 deaths, including 773 civilians.[18]

A central point of contention was the status of 248 Hamas police officers killed during the operation; the US State Department noted that much of the disagreement over civilian deaths concerned whether these officers should be counted as civilians or combatants.[18]

Israeli casualty figures also vary by source and scope. Israel's official report states that rocket and mortar fire killed four civilians and injured 182 people in southern Israel.[20] The State Department report's overview gives a total of 13 Israelis killed, including three civilians, while another passage reports four civilians and ten soldiers killed in combat or by rocket and mortar fire.[18] The UN Mission counted three civilians and one member of the military killed specifically by rockets and mortars during the operation.[3] These figures should therefore be read as differently scoped accounts rather than a single consistent total.

Two days after hostilities ended, on January 20, 2009, IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi ordered five special command investigations covering incidents harming multiple civilians, damage to UN and international facilities, firing on medical facilities, destruction of private property and infrastructure, and use of phosphorus-containing weaponry.[18] The State Department report said approximately 140 cases had been referred for criminal investigation by year's end.[18] Israel's January 2010 investigation update, using different categories, stated that 150 separate incidents had been investigated and that 36 had been referred for criminal investigation.[10]

Human-rights organizations criticized the pace and scope of the proceedings, noting delays in opening investigations and a limited number of Arabic-speaking personnel available to take witness statements from Palestinian civilians.[18] The State Department reported that the investigations covered approximately 100 complaints and remained largely ongoing through the end of 2009.[18]

In 2011, Richard Goldstone stated that, knowing what he then knew about events in Gaza in 2008–2009, he would have produced a different report.[21] He maintained that the report had identified evidence of possible war crimes by both Israel and Hamas, noted that Israel had investigated more than 400 suspected cases of misconduct, and criticized Hamas for not investigating rocket attacks on Israel.[21] He also acknowledged that Israel's refusal to cooperate with the commission had hindered its ability to reach further conclusions.[21] Critics of the Goldstone Report—including analysts writing for the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs—characterized the commission's selection and treatment of incidents as one-sided and argued that it gave insufficient weight to the context of Palestinian armed groups operating in dense civilian areas.[22]

The UN Human Rights Council's Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, chaired by South African jurist Richard Goldstone, published a 575-page report on September 15, 2009.[22] The Mission's mandate covered military operations from December 27, 2008, through January 18, 2009, and it investigated 36 specific incidents as illustrative of the main patterns of conduct.[19] The Mission sought Israel's cooperation but did not receive it; it noted that this had limited the conclusions it could reach.[19] It emphasized that its findings did not identify individual perpetrators or meet the proof standard used in criminal proceedings.[19]

Among the Mission's principal findings on Israeli conduct were that certain attacks constituted deliberate targeting of civilians, that white phosphorus had been used recklessly in populated areas and near protected facilities, that medical access had been unlawfully obstructed, and that destruction of civilian infrastructure was unjustified.[18] On Palestinian conduct, the Mission found that rocket and mortar attacks on Israeli civilian areas constituted indiscriminate attacks and, in some cases, deliberate attacks on civilians—characterizations it described as war crimes and potential crimes against humanity.[3] It noted evidence that one primary purpose of the rocket attacks was to spread terror among Israel's civilian population, while it found no direct evidence that rockets were launched from urban areas specifically to shield launchers from Israeli counter-fire.[23]

Israel rejected the allegation that it had maintained a policy of deliberately targeting civilians and criticized the Mission's methodology, factual analysis, and legal conclusions as flawed, arguing that insufficient attention had been paid to the challenge of Hamas operating in dense urban areas.[18] While Israel declined to cooperate with the Fact-Finding Mission, it did cooperate with a separate UN Board of Inquiry established to examine incidents affecting UN personnel and facilities.[18]

The incidents of Operation Cast Lead generated a body of sharply competing accounts that remain unresolved in the sources examined. On the al-Fakhura school incident, casualty totals range from 12–17 in the IDF inquiry reported by Ynet to more than 40 in initial Palestinian claims, while the UN Mission found at least 35 deaths in the surrounding area.[3][12] The sequence and origin of Palestinian mortar fire, and whether it prompted or justified the Israeli response, are also disputed. The al-Daya family home strike is described by Israel as an operational error and by the UN Mission as a failure of due diligence for which Israel bears responsibility, though the Mission itself could not determine whether it involved deliberate targeting.[3][11]

Allegations of deliberate attacks on civilians—including people carrying white flags—remained under military police investigation at year's end with no final findings reported in the sources.[17] The combatant-versus-civilian classification of those killed, particularly the 248 Hamas police officers, represents a genuine disagreement over applicable legal standards rather than a purely factual dispute.[18]

The overall death toll for Palestinians, ranging from 1,166 in Israeli government figures to as many as 1,444 in Gaza-authority figures, reflects differences in who counted, what records were available, and how combatants were defined.[19] These are not trivial methodological variations; they produce substantially different conclusions about the proportion of civilian deaths in the operation. The UN Mission did not establish a single authoritative total.

Israel's official accounts and the UN Fact-Finding Mission's conclusions remain irreconcilable on several key points: the legal status of white-phosphorus use in built-up areas, the obligations triggered once Israeli forces knew civilians had been concentrated in specific locations, and the adequacy of precautions taken before and during strikes on populated areas. These disputes concern both the underlying facts and the application of international humanitarian law to contested circumstances.