2004 in Israel

The defining political event of 2004 was Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's effort to secure approval for a unilateral disengagement plan that would remove Israeli settlements and forces from the Gaza Strip and four settlements in northern Samaria. The plan emerged in the winter of 2003–2004 against what Israeli government publications described as a Palestinian negotiating vacuum: the logic, as summarized in a Jerusalem Institute study, was that Israel lacked a Palestinian partner and that the political stalemate was dangerous, requiring action that did not depend on Palestinian cooperation.[9]

Sharon reaffirmed his commitment to the plan before the Likud Central Committee on January 5, 2004, stating that he intended to proceed even if the committee rejected it.[10] On March 15, the Knesset narrowly backed his official announcement by 46–45.[1] The plan's first major setback came on May 2, when 59.5 percent of participating Likud members voted against it. The party had approximately 193,000 members, and turnout exceeded 50 percent.[1][11] A revised plan, presented on May 28, laid out a four-stage settlement evacuation to be completed by the end of 2005.[1]

Despite the referendum result, Sharon pressed forward. On June 6, the Israeli Cabinet approved the amended disengagement plan by 14 votes to 7, calling for the removal of all 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and four settlements in northern Samaria.[1][2] Securing that approval required Sharon to dismiss two National Union ministers and accept the resignation of a National Religious Party minister.[12] By September, Sharon governed with a minority coalition and faced recurring no-confidence votes while seeking support from Labor, Shas, and United Torah Judaism.[12] The Knesset approved the disengagement plan on October 26 by 67–45, with 7 abstentions, and the government had approved a settlers' compensation proposal on October 24 by 13–6.[1]

The plan drew strong international backing. President George W. Bush endorsed the initiative in an exchange of letters on April 14, 2004, describing it as an opportunity to advance a two-state vision, and the Quartet endorsed it in May.[12][2] Bush's April 14 statement went further on final-status questions, stating that Israel "must have secure and recognized borders" and that, in light of "new realities on the ground," including existing major Israeli population centers, a complete return to the pre-1967 lines was unrealistic. It also stated that Palestinian refugees should be settled in a Palestinian state rather than in Israel.[13]

In a July 8 address at the Caesarea Conference, Sharon linked the plan to national economic priorities, arguing that Israel could not simultaneously seek foreign investment while presenting itself internationally as a rejecter of peace. He also emphasized that the initiative had been coordinated with the Bush administration.[14] The Institute for National Security Studies described disengagement as a watershed in Israel's policy toward territories captured in the 1967 Six-Day War, generating a deep public and political struggle concerning Israel's borders, national ethos, religious beliefs, social cohesion, civil-military relations, and democratic legitimacy.[1]

Palestinian terrorist groups conducted suicide bombings, shootings, and mortar and rocket attacks throughout Israel, Judea and Samaria, and Gaza during 2004. An Israeli government terrorism report recorded 117 people killed in terrorist attacks during the year — a 45 percent decline from 214 deaths in 2003 — and 589 wounded, down 41 percent from 1,004 in 2003. There were 15 suicide attacks in 2004, causing 55 deaths, compared with 26 suicide attacks and 144 deaths in 2003.[3] A Jerusalem Institute study put cumulative figures since the beginning of the broader Israeli-Palestinian confrontation in 2000 at 989 Israelis killed and 6,709 wounded in 22,406 attacks, attempted attacks, and violent incidents as of September 19, 2004.[15]

Major attacks in January and February struck Jerusalem's bus network. On January 29, a suicide bomber attacked Egged bus number 19 in central Jerusalem, killing 11 people and injuring 44.[16] On February 22, a second bomber struck bus number 14 in Jerusalem, killing eight people and injuring 60.[16]

A double suicide bombing at the Port of Ashdod on March 14 killed 10 people and wounded at least 15.[17] The deadliest attack of the year came on August 31, when two Hamas bombers struck buses near Beersheba's central station, killing 16 Israeli civilians and wounding more than 100 people.[18] A November 1 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine suicide bombing at the Carmel Market in Tel Aviv killed three people and wounded 30.[17] The U.S. State Department's terrorism report identified Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and the PFLP as responsible for the majority of attacks during the year.[17]

Israeli security forces achieved significant interdiction results. Government terrorism data reported that security forces foiled 367 suicide attacks in Judea and Samaria during 2004 and an additional 159 terrorist attacks described as being on the verge of execution.[3] Large-scale attacks originating from Samaria-based terrorist networks in 2004 resulted in 14 deaths and 106 wounded, compared with 12 such attacks, 74 deaths, and 374 wounded in 2003, which the report attributed to the security barrier and other counterterrorism measures.[3]

Rocket fire from the Gaza Strip intensified sharply in 2004 and became a distinct and growing threat to Israeli communities in the western Negev. The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center recorded 281 identified rocket hits during the year, compared with 155 in 2003, 35 in 2002, and only 4 in 2001.[4] Most rockets landed near Israeli towns and villages in the western Negev, and the report identified 2004 as the record year for rocket-fire casualties up to that point, with 4 civilians killed and 148 injured.[4]

A Hamas Qassam rocket attack on Sderot on June 28 was described as the first fatal attack against Israelis using Qassam rockets and killed two Israelis.[17] Another Qassam attack in September killed two Israeli children.[17] In response to the continuing rocket campaign, the Israel Defense Forces launched a three-week operation beginning September 28. Press reports cited by the U.S. State Department indicated that 130 Palestinians — including 68 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorists — and five Israelis were killed during that operation.[17]

The rise in rocket fire coincided with the most intense stage of the disengagement debate. Likud opponents portrayed the plan as a reward for terrorism, while Sharon presented unilateral action as the best available security option if no Palestinian negotiating partner emerged.[11][10]

Israel carried out a consequential series of targeted killings against Hamas's senior leadership during 2004. On March 22, Israeli helicopter missiles killed Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin; the strike also killed two bodyguards, one son-in-law, and eight worshippers, and wounded 15 bystanders.[5][19] Abd al-Aziz Rantisi was chosen as Yassin's successor on March 24 and was himself killed by Israeli security forces on April 17, along with his bodyguards; 18 other people were wounded in that strike.[5][19] Mahmoud Zahar subsequently became Hamas's leader, though Hamas did not publicly announce the succession at the time out of concern that Israel would target him as well.[19]

The sequence left Hamas without two of its founding leaders within less than a month and led the organization to conceal its succession arrangements. The targeted-killing campaign was conducted alongside other counterterrorism measures, including a February 2004 Israeli raid on Judea and Samaria offices of the Arab Bank and Cairo-Amman Bank that seized almost $9 million in cash from 310 accounts, disrupting financial networks Israel said were used to fund terrorist operations.[17]

On January 29, 2004, Israel completed a major prisoner exchange with Hezbollah following nearly four years of German-mediated negotiations. Israel exchanged 435 Arab prisoners for kidnapped Israeli businessman Elhanan Tannenbaum and the remains of three Israeli soldiers — Benny Avraham, Adi Avitan, and Omar Sawayid — who had been abducted in October 2000.[6][20] The released group included Mustafa Dirani, Sheikh Obeid, approximately 25 other Lebanese prisoners, 400 Palestinian prisoners, and nine other foreign prisoners.[5]

The Israeli Cabinet approved the exchange by a narrow 12–11 vote.[20] Critics within Israel argued that the swap rewarded Hezbollah, strengthened Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah's standing, and would encourage further hostage-taking; the deal also involved the release of Lebanese prisoners convicted of killing Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon.[20] On July 20, a Hezbollah sniper attack on an IDF post in the western sector of the Israel-Lebanon border killed two IDF soldiers, underscoring the continuing threat along the northern frontier even after the exchange.[19]

Israel continued constructing the separation barrier in Judea and Samaria throughout 2004, and the structure generated major legal controversies at both the domestic and international levels. On June 30, the Israeli High Court upheld Israel's right to build the security fence while ordering one section rerouted, finding that the harm caused by that segment was disproportionate to the security benefits.[21]

On July 9, the International Court of Justice issued a non-binding advisory opinion, by a series of 14–1 votes, declaring that construction of the barrier in the West Bank and East Jerusalem was contrary to international law, violated obligations concerning Palestinian self-determination, and required the dismantling of affected sections and payment of reparations.[22][21] The United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/ES-10/15 on July 20, 2004, by a vote of 150 in favor, 6 against, and 10 abstentions, acknowledging the opinion and demanding compliance with the legal obligations it identified.[23]

Israel stated that it would follow the Israeli Supreme Court's position rather than the ICJ advisory opinion.[21] Construction of the security fence accelerated during the year even as the international legal dispute continued.[7]

The Palestinian political landscape underwent two major transitions with direct implications for Israel's security environment. Yasser Arafat, longtime chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority, died on November 11, 2004, at a French military hospital near Paris, aged 75, after becoming ill at his headquarters in Ramallah. Contemporary medical accounts identified a stroke and a blood-clotting disorder but did not establish the underlying cause.[24] His death ended an era in Palestinian leadership and created substantial uncertainty about the future of negotiations and the behavior of Palestinian terrorist factions. Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei and PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas subsequently attempted to persuade terrorist groups to accept a cease-fire, though talks remained inconclusive by year's end.[17]

On December 23, 2004, the first phase of Palestinian Authority municipal elections took place. Hamas secured nearly half of the seats in that first round, signaling the organization's growing political strength alongside its continued terrorist campaign.[6] Mahmoud Abbas became PLO chairman and was subsequently elected president of the Palestinian Authority.[17][19]

Beyond the disengagement debate, 2004 saw several significant developments in Israeli domestic politics and governance. In June, the attorney general cleared Prime Minister Sharon over allegations that he had accepted bribes while serving as foreign minister in 1999, though review of his connections to the Cyril Kern financial affair continued.[5] In July, Sharon dismissed Infrastructure Minister Yosef Paritzky after a recording allegedly showed him plotting to defame a political rival.[5] In September, Public Security Minister Tzachi Hanegbi was suspended pending an investigation into alleged improper political appointments.[5]

Mordechai Vanunu, who had served 18 years in prison after revealing details of Israel's nuclear program to the British press, was released in April 2004. He remained subject to restrictions on travel and proximity to airports, land crossings, and foreign diplomatic offices. In November, police briefly rearrested him for meeting foreign media in violation of his release conditions.[5]

After years of economic contraction associated with the al-Aqsa Intifada — which had severely affected high technology, construction, and tourism and contributed to GDP declines in 2001 and 2002 — Israel's economy recorded renewed growth in 2004.[25][8] The Ministry of Finance reported that real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 4.4 percent in 2004, compared with 1.7 percent in 2003, while per-capita GDP grew by 2.5 percent. Inflation during the year was 1.2 percent, and the annual average inflation rate was negative 0.4 percent.[8]

The government deficit stood at NIS 20.4 billion, approximately 3.89 percent of GDP, near the government's 4 percent target. Government revenues totaled NIS 183.5 billion against expenditures of NIS 201.3 billion. The government-debt-to-GDP ratio declined from 104 percent at the end of 2003 to 102 percent at the end of 2004, which the Ministry of Finance described as a reversal of the negative trend after three consecutive years of sharp increases.[8]

Foreign tourism recovered substantially. Approximately 1.506 million visitors arrived from abroad in 2004 — 42 percent more than in 2003, though still 38 percent below the 2000 peak. Incoming-tourism revenue reached approximately $1.499 billion, a 40 percent increase over 2003, and tourist person-nights reached approximately 5.028 million, roughly 45 percent above 2003 levels.[7] Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics described the year as one of "hesitant optimism" following years of deteriorating security, economic recession, and crisis in foreign tourism.[7] The recovery occurred alongside continuing security incidents, including terrorist attacks on Jerusalem and Beersheba buses and the attack at Ashdod Harbour, factors the Central Bureau acknowledged in its tourism report.[7]

Amid the turbulence of 2004, Israel achieved a historic sporting milestone. On August 25, Israeli windsurfer Gal Fridman won Israel's first Olympic gold medal at the Athens Summer Games.[6][19] The achievement provided a widely celebrated moment of national pride while the country was grappling with major security and political debates.

Several major events of 2004 remain subjects of contested interpretation. The disengagement plan generated the most extensive internal controversy: Likud members rejected it in the May referendum by approximately 60 percent to 40 percent, with polling conducted in late April finding that 53 percent of likely Likud voters disagreed that the plan would improve Israel's security and 54 percent characterized it as "a reward for terrorism."[11] The rationale that Israel lacked a Palestinian negotiating partner and therefore needed to act unilaterally reflected the framing of Israeli government and policy publications.

The Hezbollah prisoner exchange was approved by only a single vote in the cabinet, and critics within Israel argued that it would encourage further kidnappings.[20] The ICJ advisory opinion on the security barrier conflicted with Israeli domestic jurisprudence: Israel's Supreme Court upheld the state's right to build the barrier while requiring route modifications in specific segments, whereas the ICJ called for dismantlement across affected areas. Israel declined to accept the ICJ opinion as binding, citing its advisory character.[21] Casualty figures for 2004 varied across U.S. State Department terrorism and human-rights reports and Israeli government data, reflecting different reporting categories, geographic scopes, and methodologies.[17][5] The circumstances surrounding Yasser Arafat's death — specifically whether he had been poisoned — also remained a subject of unresolved dispute, with French investigators closing their inquiry without a definitive conclusion.[24]