Yuval Diskin

Diskin served in the Israel Defense Forces’ Shaked Reconnaissance Unit from 1974 to 1978, then joined the ISA in May 1978 as a field agent in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[3] His subsequent assignments included work in Jenin and Tulkarm, counterterrorism, Arab affairs, and leadership of the agency’s Jerusalem, Judea, and Samaria Region.[3] Before becoming director, he also headed the Arab division and managed the department responsible for coordinating and planning counterterrorism operations.[7]

In a later account of his career, Diskin recalled completing his term as director of the Jerusalem district in June 2000 and receiving an invitation to farewell meetings with the Palestinian Preventive Security Service in Nablus.[8] He described walking through the city’s casbah with former colleagues and being recognized and warmly greeted by people whom they had previously investigated.[8] He remembered “an almost euphoric feeling of reconciliation in the air,” followed four months later by the outbreak of the Second Intifada.[8]

Diskin became deputy ISA director under Avi Dichter in 2000 and served until August 31, 2003, encompassing the opening years of the Second Intifada.[3] He then took a two-year leave of absence to study in the National Security Program at the University of Haifa, earning an M.A. degree cum laude.[3] His progression through field, staff, regional, and deputy-director positions preceded his selection to lead the agency in 2005.[3][7]

As deputy director, Diskin pioneered a “joint prevention conception” intended to maximize intelligence and operational capabilities for targeted killings.[4] This approach reduced compartmentalization among the Shin Bet’s geographic units and strengthened coordination with Unit 8200, IDF operational units in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Israeli Air Force.[4] His work during the early Second Intifada also included developing the agency’s targeted-killing approach and strengthening cooperation with the IDF.[7]

In February 2005, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon selected Diskin to succeed Avi Dichter as Shin Bet director, choosing him over another serving deputy.[7] Diskin formally assumed office on May 15, 2005, at a ceremony at President Moshe Katsav’s residence.[9] His service as director lasted until 2011, when Yoram Cohen succeeded him.[1]

At the assumption-of-office ceremony, Diskin said the Shin Bet would be prepared for a renewed outbreak of terrorism while operating within the law and democratic principles.[9] He also identified a domestic challenge: helping ensure that conflicts within Israeli society did not become “Armageddon.”[9] Describing the balance he hoped to maintain, he spoke of finding the “correct balance between humility and strength, between caution and provocation, between idealism and reality.”[9]

Diskin also participated in work on Israel’s national security doctrine, with his involvement in the committee extending until spring 2005.[10] The committee’s broader process included 52 formal meetings and dozens of additional meetings with security-establishment personnel and outside experts.[10]

At a November 18, 2005, meeting with U.S. official Robert Danin, Diskin described management of the Rafah crossing as a test case whose success could positively influence the opening of other passages.[11] He also raised Israeli concerns about movement between the West Bank and Gaza.[11] In the same discussion, he assessed that Mahmoud Abbas’s inattention to Fatah’s affairs and conflict between its old and new guards were weakening the movement.[11] He described Marwan Barghouti as influential and popular, considered him a possible future party leader, and characterized him as one of Fatah’s most extremist members.[11]

Discussing the approaching Palestinian election, Diskin said he believed the best result would be more than 40 percent of the vote for Fatah and less than 30 percent for Hamas.[11] He cited polling suggesting that a strong Fatah list could receive 42 percent against Hamas’s 20 percent.[11] His assessment of security cooperation at that point was sharply negative: he called cooperation with Palestinian counterparts on counterterrorism “useless” and said there had been no coordination on such activities.[11]

In an October 6, 2006, meeting with U.S. Security Coordinator Keith Dayton, Diskin supported strengthening Abbas and the Palestinian Presidential Guard but argued that strengthening Fatah as a movement mattered more than bolstering Abbas personally.[12] He linked weakness in Fatah to weakness in the Palestinian security apparatus.[12] He did not object to the proposed deployment of the Jordan-based Badr Brigade to northern Gaza, but doubted its effectiveness unless it became part of the Presidential Guard.[12]

Diskin also assessed that clashes between Hamas and Fatah did not mean a Palestinian civil war was imminent, reasoning that neither side wanted one and both feared the political consequences.[12] He nevertheless warned that events involving Ismail Haniyeh, Mohammed Dahlan, or Rashid Abu Shabak could worsen the situation, as could actions by Abbas that Hamas perceived as threatening its control of government.[12]

By December 2007, Diskin described himself as having been closely involved in Palestinian affairs since 1993 and said the Shin Bet had maintained contacts with Palestinian security services even during the worst periods.[13] He judged the Palestinian security establishment to be “broken, not professional, reactive rather than proactive,” pointing to the absence of a complete chain connecting intelligence collection, investigation, arrest, interrogation, and trial.[13]

His later public assessment of cooperation was markedly more favorable.[14] In a 2014 opinion article, Diskin wrote that coordination between security forces had contributed significantly to relative quiet in the West Bank and described cooperation as better than ever despite the impasse in peace negotiations since 2007.[14] He argued that the Palestinian Authority understood Israel’s security to be central to its own survival in its struggle with Hamas in the West Bank.[14]

Diskin’s discussions of Gaza repeatedly addressed the relationship between crossing arrangements, weapons smuggling, and the capabilities of armed organizations.[12][13] In September 2006, he warned that Palestinians might have smuggled anti-tank weapons across the Egypt–Gaza border.[15] In a follow-up remark, he said Egyptian officials knew the smugglers’ identities, had received Israeli intelligence, and had failed to act on it.[15]

During his October 2006 meeting with Keith Dayton, Diskin attributed Israeli concerns about normalizing Rafah operations to failures to fulfill commitments under the November 15, 2005, Agreement on Movement and Access.[12] He praised the work of the European Union border mission and the Palestinian Presidential Guard, while emphasizing that the political and security terms underlying the crossing agreement mattered more to Israel than its procedures.[12] He also said Israel possessed intelligence that some Palestinians were using the crossing to travel to Iran and Lebanon to enhance Hamas’s capabilities.[12]

Diskin expressed concern that al-Qaeda-linked groups in Sinai could infiltrate across the Gaza border.[16] During this period, the Shin Bet was investigating the Jihad Brigade, described as a suspected al-Qaeda affiliate in Gaza.[16] Separately, the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs reports that Diskin told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in February 2006 that the IDF and ISA had uncovered a Bethlehem terror gang one day before it intended to fire mortars at Gilo or Har Homa.[17] The chapter attributes to contemporary media reports the detail that the gang possessed six mortars and a .3 machine gun.[17]

At a December 18, 2007, briefing for U.S. Special Envoy James L. Jones, Diskin described weapons-smuggling routes extending beyond the Philadelphi corridor through Sudan, Egypt, Sinai, and the Red Sea.[13] He also raised the smuggling of people across Sinai from Eritrea, Somalia, and Darfur.[13] In May 2009, his assessment of Egyptian border enforcement was more positive: he told a Knesset committee that Egypt was making significant efforts to stop smuggling and that improvements in the results were becoming discernible.[18]

In the December 2007 briefing, Diskin characterized the West Bank as Israel’s principal security threat and emphasized the importance of security measures and movement controls, especially in its northern areas.[13] He said 1,100 Israelis had been killed since 2000, compared with ten Israeli civilians and soldiers killed by Palestinians in Israel or the territories during 2007.[13] He attributed the decline in Israeli victims after a 2002 peak to construction of the separation barrier and Operation Defensive Shield.[13]

In November 2008, shortly before the thirteenth anniversary of Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination, Diskin warned the cabinet that members of the extreme right were willing to use firearms to halt diplomatic processes and harm political leaders.[2] The warning came amid an increase in settler violence in the West Bank, and the statement from the closed cabinet meeting was released by a participant.[2]

Diskin told ministers that radical settlers regarded the “price tag” strategy as successful and threatened to extend violence beyond the West Bank.[19] The strategy involved retaliation for government efforts against settlements and outposts, and he assessed that fringe elements were “preparing for war.”[19] The historical intelligence figures cited alongside the warning included 300 strands of intelligence concerning extremist threats during the July 2000 Camp David talks, 100 in the following year, and 150 in 2005 as the Gaza withdrawal approached.[19]

His views on another sensitive security issue were later invoked during an October 2015 U.S. congressional hearing.[20] A witness attributed to Diskin opposition to allowing visits to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and quoted his description of the site as “the most fuel-saturated flammable area in the Middle East.”[20] The same hearing included testimony presenting cooperation with Palestinian security counterparts as important to Israeli counterterrorism in the West Bank, with Diskin named among the former security leaders relevant to that discussion.[20]

After leaving the Shin Bet, Diskin publicly challenged Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak over their judgment on Iran and the prospect of an Israeli military strike.[5] In 2012, he called them “messianists from Caesarea and Akirov,” accused them of misrepresenting the Iran issue, and argued that decisions were being driven by “messianic feelings.”[21] He maintained that an Israeli strike would not prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear bomb and could instead accelerate its nuclear arms race.[21]

Diskin also said that he and colleagues lacked confidence in the leaders’ ability to manage an undertaking against Iran and feared decisions made for extraneous reasons.[5] He described one closed meeting as leaving him with the feeling that “they were trying to steal something under the radar.”[5] In subsequent interviews, he questioned the leadership’s capacity to manage a confrontation, argued that a strike could accelerate the nuclear program, and said internal national conflict would, in his view, be worse for Israel than an Iranian bomb.[22][23] He separately accused Netanyahu and Barak of placing personal or opportunistic interests above national interests and described a leadership crisis.[23]

His intervention became part of a wider public discussion involving former security chiefs.[24] Labor Party leader Shelly Yachimovich named Diskin alongside former IDF chief of staff Gabi Ashkenazi and former Mossad director Meir Dagan as figures publicly expressing concerns about the decision-making process surrounding a possible strike on Iran.[24] A separate 2012 account of a Hebrew-language video summarized Diskin’s allegation that Netanyahu had no interest in negotiations with the Palestinians and his argument that Iran could recover from an Israeli strike and develop nuclear weapons within one or two years.[25]

Diskin also participated in domestic civic debate.[26] At a 2012 Tel Aviv rally calling for universal military conscription and a more equal distribution of the burden, he said he had enlisted at 18 and completed his service the previous year at 55.[26] He told the crowd that he had served willingly for 37 years without feeling like a “sucker,” urged public officials not to evade action, and described the moment as an opportunity to address an injustice.[26]

On Palestinian policy, Diskin advocated a long-term arrangement based on two states while cautioning against expecting a definitive end to the conflict.[22] His proposed gradual approach combined security calm, negotiations, and limits on settlement construction outside the major blocs.[22] In a 2013 interview, he accused the government of strengthening Hamas and humiliating Mahmoud Abbas.[27] In a December speech that year, he argued that the unresolved Israeli–Palestinian conflict posed a more existential danger to Israel than Iran’s nuclear program and called for an immediate freeze on Jewish construction outside the settlement blocs.[27]

In 2015, Diskin argued that managing the status quo was not a durable solution and advocated a regional approach involving Arab states and the international community.[8] His proposals included freezing construction outside the large settlement blocs, improving Palestinian infrastructure and the economy, and strengthening Jordan.[8] He warned that failure to separate the populations could produce a de facto binational state and threaten the Zionist vision of a democratic and Jewish state in the Land of Israel.[8][28]

That year, Diskin said he was considering entering politics but had not made a decision.[8] He explained that he had avoided contact with Palestinians for three years after leaving the Shin Bet to avoid appearing to interfere with negotiations, then resumed contacts mainly to remain informed.[8] He also described visits to Hebron and the outskirts of Nablus.[8]

Diskin described himself after leaving the Shin Bet as taking his first steps in high technology, and by 2015 said he owned a Herzliya-based high-tech company.[22][8] He founded Diskin Advanced Technologies; Opora Technologies was one of two startups spun out of the company.[6][29] In 2019, he was identified as Opora’s founder and chairman, with the company developing software intended to detect potential cyberattacks before they occurred.[6]

By 2020, Diskin served as Opora’s president alongside fellow founders Noam Jolles and Tsafrir Kats, both former senior ISA figures, and U.S.-based chief executive Chris Bell.[29] The company raised a $7 million seed round led by Jerusalem Venture Partners.[29] Its software gathered intelligence about potential attackers and their behavior during the early stages of attack preparation.[29]

In 2023, Opora laid off most of its staff, considered offers for its technology, and said it was on the verge of closing.[30] The company said it had run customer pilots but that its technology had not matured into a commercial product.[30] It had raised approximately $10 million in total funding, and the report described Diskin as having served as its president.[30]

Diskin also became chairman and a co-founder of automotive cybersecurity company Cymotive.[31] In May 2026, Indian software company KPIT Technologies signed an agreement to acquire a controlling stake in Cymotive through a phased transaction.[31] The total consideration could range from $60 million to $120 million depending on revenue and profitability, with completion expected in stages by mid-2029.[31]

Diskin’s operational legacy includes the reduction of internal intelligence compartmentalization and closer integration between the Shin Bet, military intelligence, operational IDF units, and the air force.[4] His leadership also saw increased cooperation with the IDF and Mossad and tighter coordination with Palestinian security services.[32]

At his departure in 2011, the Shin Bet was characterized as an orderly, professional agency with strong operational capabilities.[32] Its campaign against Palestinian terrorism combined intensive work by West Bank handlers, expansion of the professional workforce, and new intelligence tactics that helped thwart attacks and secure relative calm within the Green Line.[32]

A prominent shortcoming at the end of his term was the absence of operational intelligence that could secure the release of abducted IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.[32] Nearly five years after Shalit’s abduction to Gaza, the Shin Bet had not gathered information that could help secure his release.[32] Diskin’s subsequent public role extended beyond operational intelligence into arguments about democratic leadership, the distribution of military service, and Israel’s long-term future as a Jewish and democratic state.[5][26][28]

Diskin’s 2012 allegations against Netanyahu and Barak generated a direct political dispute: both rejected his statements as false and attributed them to personal frustration.[5] Iran had not been within his essential remit as Shin Bet director, a limitation relevant to the authority of his intervention in that debate.[21]

A separate controversy concerned the ISA’s interpretation of “subversion.”[33] In April 2007, Diskin sent the attorney general a letter clarifying the term, but the clarification was not incorporated into the ISA Law, whose definition remained vague; the change became public only after a High Court petition.[33] A March 2007 press report had attributed to him a warning of a “strategic danger to the existence of the state” in response to four documents by prominent Israeli Arab organizations advocating enhanced civil rights and rejecting Israel’s definition as a Jewish state.[34] On May 20, the attorney general declined to open an investigation, stating that the ISA’s position was lawful and had been coordinated with him.[34]

Diskin’s warnings about Egyptian handling of smuggling also arose amid differing Israeli and Egyptian perceptions of the threat.[15] His allegations about Egyptian inaction therefore represented his security assessment rather than an uncontested finding about Egypt’s conduct.[15]