Yossi Melman

Melman was born in Zabrze, Poland, on December 27, 1950, and immigrated to Israel with his family in 1957.[1][2] His parents had survived the Second World War under very different circumstances: his father, a senior figure in the Polish Communist Party, escaped to Soviet territory, while his mother survived by hiding in Christian homes and forests in Poland.[1]

As a teenager, Melman left school, joined the Hashomer Hatzair youth movement, and moved at age 15 to Kibbutz Beit Alfa. He served in the Israel Defense Forces from 1969 to 1972, including as a volunteer in the Sayeret Shaked reconnaissance unit. After military service, he attended a short course at Army Radio, an experience that led him toward journalism.[1][2]

Melman earned a bachelor’s degree from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1976 and attended Harvard University in 1989–90 as a Nieman Fellow in journalism.[2]

Melman recalled entering journalism in 1973.[1] A 2012 appointment notice said he had worked in Israeli media since 1974, while a biographical reference dates his Kol Yisrael economic-correspondent role to 1975.[3][2] His early assignments included economic reporting for Kol Yisrael radio, followed by work as a European correspondent for Haaretz in London from 1980 to 1984. He later served as chief diplomatic correspondent for Davar and worked for publications including Jane’s Defence Weekly and the Glasgow Herald.[2]

His movement into intelligence reporting began while he was Haaretz’s London correspondent. After the June 1982 attempted assassination of Israeli ambassador Shlomo Argov, Melman covered the trial of the arrested attackers and encountered British counterterrorism personnel, Mossad officials, and Israeli embassy staff. Research for a book about Abu Nidal’s organization brought him into contact with additional intelligence figures and drew him further into the subject.[1]

Melman said he had no prior intelligence background before taking up the beat. He became the first Israeli journalist to cover intelligence as an exclusive beat and later worked as a Haaretz special correspondent, reporting on intelligence, terrorism, and nuclear issues and producing international investigations. He also reported from London and the United States during his Haaretz career.[1][3] Reporting on intelligence involved particular obstacles, including military censorship and security personnel’s reluctance to disclose secrets; Melman recalled that the intelligence community initially regarded him with suspicion.[1]

His work and commentary covered Israeli society, Arab-Israeli conflicts, the Palestinian uprising, defense, intelligence, Israeli-American relations, and Europe.[2] His articles also appeared in international publications including The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Sunday Times, and The Guardian.[2][3] A 2012 notice identified him as the only Israeli journalist then belonging to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.[3] He has been described as an Israeli journalist and writer specializing in security and intelligence affairs, and a 2025 profile noted his earlier work as a Haaretz military commentator.[4][5]

Melman’s books range across intelligence, terrorism, Israeli society, and foreign relations. Among his solo works are The CIA Report on Israel’s Intelligence Community (1982), The Master Terrorist: The True Story of Abu Nidal (1986), and The New Israelis: An Intimate View of a Changing People (1992).[2] His account of Abu Nidal also drew on the recollection of Colin Simpson, the bodyguard who chased and shot Argov’s attacker as he fled.[6]

With American journalist Dan Raviv, Melman coauthored The Imperfect Spies: The History of Israeli Intelligence, published in 1989.[7] They also wrote Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance, published around 1994.[8] Other titles in his bibliography include Behind the Uprising: Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians (1989), Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel’s Intelligence Community—the U.S. edition of The Imperfect Spies, published in 1990—and The Nuclear Sphinx of Tehran: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the State of Iran (2007), written with Meir Javedanfar.[2]

Melman and Raviv’s Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars examines the intelligence agencies and their personnel, emphasizing the plurality of Israel’s services rather than treating them as a single organization. Its coverage ranges from the late 1940s to more recent operations, including Mossad human intelligence, the destruction of Syria’s nuclear reactor in 2007, the reported killing of Hamas weapons smuggler Mahmoud Abdel Rauf al-Mabhouh in Dubai in 2010, and Stuxnet’s infection of Iranian nuclear computer technology.[9]

The book also covers the Lavon affair and the capture of Adolf Eichmann in Argentina. Its account describes a joint Mossad–Shin Bet operation involving 67 agents who apprehended Eichmann and took him to Jerusalem for trial, while also discussing the Shin Bet’s part in the operation.[9] Shadow Wars: The Mossad and the Intelligence Community is a 2012 Hebrew-language book covering intelligence organizations, their successes and failures, operations concerning Iran and Syria, recruitment, and the protection and immigration of Jews abroad.[10]

With Eitan Haber, Melman wrote The Spies: Israel’s Counter-Espionage Wars, which is cited in an account of the Ulrich Schnaft affair. Schnaft, described in that account as a former SS member who posed as a Jewish refugee, served in the IDF under a false identity and later provided information to Egyptian intelligence.[11]

Melman has written about Israeli arms policy and the country’s defense industry. In a 2009 article, he traced the industry’s development from early difficulty obtaining military supplies through cooperation with France and the 1967 French arms embargo, after which Israel developed domestic production to meet its own needs. He wrote that the industry later expanded overseas sales as research and development costs increased.[12]

The same article interpreted two events in September 2009 as part of Israeli arms policy: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Moscow, which Melman said included an effort to discourage a Russian sale of S-300 air-defense missiles to Iran, and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s visit to five African countries. Melman argued that although Lieberman’s tour was presented publicly as addressing humanitarian issues, it also laid groundwork for future weapons deals. These are his interpretations of the government’s actions, not independently established conclusions in the available accounts.[12]

Melman also reported and commented on Iran’s nuclear program. In a mid-2005 article, he relayed an assessment by military experts in Israel and elsewhere that the Israel Air Force lacked the capacity to destroy Iran’s nuclear sites in a preemptive strike. He wrote that awareness of this assessment was “trickling down to the military-political establishment”; Meir Javedanfar, his coauthor on a forthcoming book about Iran’s nuclear program, agreed with the assessment.[13]

In coverage of Spies Against Armageddon, Melman and Raviv’s book was reported as claiming that Israeli operatives killed at least four Iranian nuclear scientists as part of a campaign against Iran’s nuclear program. Melman said Israel believed the campaign had disrupted the program by killing scientists and discouraging other scholars from joining it. The account presents these as claims by the authors and as Melman’s description of Israel’s view, rather than independent confirmation of the covert actions.[14]

Melman also characterized the cyber campaign against Iran as an Israeli innovation originating with military intelligence and Unit 8200, and said it had White House backing following an Israeli suggestion. He described Israeli cyber specialists working with the NSA on malware, including Flame, which he said gathered information about Iran’s centrifuges, and Stuxnet, which he said was developed after specialists obtained that information. These claims are attributed to Melman in the interview.[14]

Melman has worked in documentary production as well as print journalism. He co-created the four-part documentary The Mossad: Imperfect Spies with director Duki Dror and filmmaker Chen Shelach. The series aired on HOT’s Channel 8 in 2017, and Netflix acquired rights for a release in January 2019. Melman described its subject as the Mossad’s history, operations, psychology, and dilemmas; the series included interviews with dozens of former operatives, among them Rafi Eitan and Ram Ben-Barak.[15]

Melman was also the screenwriter and one of the creators of the HOT8 documentary series The Mossad: A Cover Story. He co-created Rabin’s Assassination: Looking Away with Nadav Benzur. Broadcast on HOT8 in connection with the 30th anniversary of Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination, the film examined the preceding incitement, the response and failures afterward, and the accusations that followed, using interviews with people from across Israel’s political spectrum.[5]

His career also received formal recognition. Melman received an Overseas Press Club of America award in 1987 and the Sokolov Prize for Journalism in 2009. He was a Nieman Fellow at Harvard in 1989–90, and The Master Terrorist was selected by The New York Times as a notable paperback of 1987.[2][3]

Some of Melman’s work concerns covert operations and politically sensitive events for which the cited material records allegations or interpretations rather than independently established findings. This includes the reported killings of Iranian nuclear scientists and the accounts of Israeli involvement in cyber operations against Iran; the claims should be understood as attributed to Melman, Raviv, or their book.[9][14]

The Argov attack also appears in accounts of the events that preceded the 1982 Lebanon War. In discussing competing explanations and motives, Melman called an Iraqi scenario “extremely credible,” reasoning that Iraq might have used an Israeli invasion of Lebanon to call for a cease-fire or appeal for Arab and Muslim solidarity. This was Melman’s assessment, not an independently established account of Iraq’s role.[6]

A later interview recounts Melman’s recollection of a telephone call he said he received from Benjamin Netanyahu on November 5, 1995, less than a day after Rabin’s assassination. Melman said Netanyahu asked where Yigal Amir had worked and remarked that money “always has significance.” Melman interpreted the comments as a reason to investigate possible ties between Amir and Israel’s intelligence community; the report presents the exchange as his recollection and interpretation, not as independent confirmation of the implication.[5]