Yitzhak Hofi

Yitzhak Hofi was born in Tel Aviv in 1927, during the British Mandate, and became known by the nickname “Haka.”[4][3] He left high school as a teenager to join the Palmach, enlisting in 1944, before the establishment of the State of Israel.[1][3] During the 1948 War of Independence, he served as a company commander in the first battalion of the Palmach’s Yiftach Brigade.[4]

After the war, Hofi continued in military service, holding operational and command positions in the Israel Defense Forces.[4] His early IDF career included service in a paratrooper unit and participation in the Reprisal Operations, known in Hebrew as Peulot HaTagmul, and in the Sinai Campaign.[1] His military education included study at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.[5]

Hofi’s rise through the IDF included service as an operations officer in Central Command, deputy commander and then commander of the Paratroopers Brigade, and commander at officer school.[1][4][3] He also headed the operations department in the Operations Division under Ezer Weizman and commanded the training department.[1] During the 1967 Six-Day War, he headed the General Staff Operations Department, and in 1968 he was among the first officers to receive the newly introduced rank of brigadier general.[3] He subsequently served as deputy head of the IDF Operations Directorate until 1972.[4]

His promotion formed part of a later discussion about advancement within the army’s senior command.[6] At a government meeting on January 27, 1974, former chief of staff Haim Bar-Lev cited his promotion of paratroopers Motta Gur and Hofi from colonel to general when rebutting allegations that armored-corps officers had been favored over paratroopers.[6] The account does not establish when Hofi received that promotion.[6]

Hofi commanded Northern Command from 1972 to 1974 and held the rank of major general during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.[3] In the days before the war, Northern Command intelligence officer Hagai Mann warned him that indicators pointed toward an imminent attack.[7] Mann’s independent assessments and efforts to persuade Hofi to reinforce the Golan front later received praise from the Agranat Commission.[7]

On October 2, Hofi received word from his chief intelligence officer that the Syrian army was planning an attack.[8] He checked the information with military-intelligence authorities and was told that it was baseless.[8] In his subsequent commission testimony, Hofi said he had not known the information’s origin and had assumed that it originated in military intelligence but had been leaked without its commander’s knowledge.[8] He nevertheless warned of the danger of a surprise attack and persuaded Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to reinforce Israeli forces on the Golan Heights.[8][9]

During the war, Hofi commanded the Israeli armored forces fighting the defensive battles on the Golan Heights against Syria.[3] A later Ynet farewell account credited Northern Command with stopping the Syrian offensive and subsequently capturing an enclave inside Syrian territory toward the outskirts of Damascus.[9] Hofi received recognition for his management of the battles against the Syrian military.[1] A later study of five Israeli leaders’ performance under pressure on the war’s second day characterized his performance as adequate and related differences among the leaders to individual accountability and available social support.[10]

After the war, Hofi became head of the General Staff Branch, also described in his biography as head of the Operations Division.[1][3] Following Chief of General Staff David Elazar’s resignation, he served as acting chief of staff.[1] He retired from the IDF with the rank of major general and, after leaving the army in July 1974, became director of the Mossad at the age of 47.[1][5]

Hofi was the Mossad’s fifth director, succeeding Zvi Zamir and serving under prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Menachem Begin.[1] Biographical and encyclopedia entries date his term to 1974–1982, after which Nahum Admoni became director.[1][11] A separate Jewish Virtual Library directors table instead lists 1973–1982.[12]

One of Hofi’s institutional changes was the establishment of the Mossad’s Analysis Division in response to the Agranat Commission’s recommendation for greater pluralism in intelligence assessment.[1] The new division provided an alternative to reliance on a single assessment body, military intelligence.[1]

Within the organization, Hofi emphasized selective recruitment, professional training for both new and existing employees, and a better understanding among personnel of how the organization worked.[1] He sought to foster mutual responsibility across ranks and expected leaders to provide a personal example.[1] These priorities extended beyond individual operations to the selection, preparation, and conduct of the people carrying them out.[1]

His description of the Mossad’s mission centered on current and future threats.[13] In a reported 1977 briefing to Begin, Hofi identified the agency’s principal priorities as monitoring conventional and unconventional weapons development in Arab states, the condition of Arab armies, and Palestinian terrorist organizations.[13] When Begin pressed him about pursuing Nazi war criminals, Hofi reportedly answered that the agency had other tasks involving the Jewish people’s security “today and tomorrow,” and that he gave today and tomorrow priority over yesterday.[13]

Begin nevertheless instructed Hofi in 1977 to renew the pursuit of escaped Nazi war criminals.[13] Hofi established a dedicated unit within the Mossad’s special operations division to pursue them.[13] The unit, described as “Messer,” was headed by Yosef Porat and compiled a list that included Josef Mengele, Walter Rauff, Klaus Barbie and other wanted Nazis.[13] The same account identified Alois Brunner in Syria as another fugitive about whom the unit initially had limited intelligence.[13]

The Mossad continued operations against Palestinian terrorism abroad during Hofi’s directorship, including efforts to foil planned attacks.[1] Operations associated with his tenure included the killing of several Black September leaders and the assassination of Ali Salameh in Beirut.[4][9] His leadership also encompassed the agency’s intelligence contribution to the 1976 Entebbe hostage-rescue operation in Uganda.[1][4]

The Entebbe crisis followed the hijacking of an Air France aircraft to Uganda by Palestinian terrorists, with assistance from Ugandan president Idi Amin.[1] The hijackers released the non-Jewish passengers.[1] Information obtained through Mossad personnel and contacts in Africa and Europe helped enable the IDF rescue operation.[1] Hofi was involved in preparing the rescue, during which Yonatan Netanyahu was killed.[4] The operation was one of the major events of his directorship linking the Mossad’s overseas intelligence work with an IDF mission.[1][4]

Another major area of activity was the development of covert political contacts between Israel and Egypt. The Jewish Virtual Library credits Hofi and the Mossad personally with helping set in motion the initial covert foreign-political negotiations between the two countries, which eventually led to their first peace accord.[1] A later Maariv commentary similarly credited Hofi with identifying promising signs in Egypt and managing the effort that opened the way for Israeli talks with Egypt in Morocco; this remains an attributed retrospective assessment rather than an independently established operational account.[14]

Hofi’s tenure also encompassed the beginning of Operation Moses, the covert transport of Ethiopian Jews to Israel.[1] Alongside its intelligence and counterterrorism responsibilities, the Mossad thus participated in preparations and operations involving the security and movement of Jewish communities abroad.[1] These activities occurred during the same eight-year directorship as the Entebbe rescue, the Egyptian diplomatic contacts, and preparations connected with Iraq’s nuclear reactor.[1]

The Iraqi nuclear program brought Hofi into a sustained disagreement with the political leadership over the use of force.[2] In early 1978, Begin convened discussions about Iraq’s rapidly advancing program.[2] Hofi opposed military action, as did Deputy Prime Minister Yigael Yadin, Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, and Military Intelligence chief Shlomo Gazit.[2] His opposition continued after the Israeli cabinet authorized a strike on October 28, 1980.[2]

The Mossad supplied information and made preparations over the years for an Israeli Air Force attack on the reactor at Tuwaitha in Iraq.[1] Israeli F-16s destroyed the reactor on June 7, 1981.[2] Hofi and Military Intelligence chief Yehoshua Saguy did not change their opposition to the strike, but carried out the order after the political decision had been made.[2] His leadership of the Mossad during the operation therefore did not mean that he personally supported launching it.[2]

Lebanon was another sustained concern during Hofi’s years at the Mossad.[1] The Lebanese civil war began during his directorship, and the agency developed covert ties with Lebanese groups, principally Christians.[1] Hofi opposed Israeli operational involvement with Lebanese Christian factions from the outset.[15] In 1976, rather than personally attend a meeting between Rabin and Christian leader Pierre Gemayel aboard an Israeli missile boat, he sent Efraim Halevy.[15] He believed that deeper Israeli involvement in Lebanon would create problems rather than resolve them.[15]

In an early-May 1982 strategic assessment, the Mossad under Hofi favored pursuing a political agreement in the Middle East and identified meaningful potential for an agreement with the Lebanese government.[15] The agency argued for giving priority to peace contacts and initiating them proactively instead of going to war.[15] This preference preceded a more specific dispute over the scope of proposed Israeli military action in Lebanon.[15]

At a meeting on June 3, 1982, Hofi and Saguy strongly opposed implementing the “Big Pines” plan presented by Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan.[15] The plan envisaged advancing into and encircling Beirut, joining forces with Bashir Gemayel’s Phalangists, installing Gemayel as Lebanon’s leader, and driving Syrian forces out of the Beqaa Valley.[15] Begin initially approved a narrower operation intended to push the PLO forty kilometers away from Israel’s northern border.[15]

After that meeting, Hofi reportedly told government secretary Dan Meridor and Sharon adviser Uri Porat: “At this moment I am satisfied, but knowing the people involved, they may exceed the decisions that were made.”[15] At Begin’s request, he later traveled to Lebanon to meet Bashir Gemayel and his father, Pierre, in an effort to restore cooperation.[15] The account describes this as his first and last trip to Lebanon.[15]

In 1982, after eight years at the Mossad, Hofi asked Begin to release him from the post and recommended his deputy, Nahum Admoni, as his successor.[1] Admoni was subsequently appointed director.[1][11] Hofi then became general manager of the Israel Electric Corporation.[1][3] His later positions also included chairman of Tadiran’s board and membership on Bank Leumi’s board.[1] He participated in public organizations including the Council for a Beautiful Israel and the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center.[1]

Hofi died on September 15, 2014, aged 87.[3] His career extended from the Palmach and the War of Independence through senior IDF command, leadership of the Mossad, and management of the Israel Electric Corporation.[1][3] His public service included command during the fighting against Syria in the Yom Kippur War, intelligence work supporting the Entebbe rescue, and covert diplomatic contacts that helped establish a channel between Israel and Egypt.[1]

The Analysis Division established during his directorship was a specific organizational response to the Agranat Commission’s recommendation that intelligence assessments should not depend on a single body.[1] His management priorities similarly emphasized the internal functioning of the agency: professional preparation, carefully selected personnel, mutual responsibility, and leadership through personal example.[1] These institutional measures accompanied an operational record that included counterterrorism, hostage-rescue support, work concerning Ethiopian Jews, and preparations connected with Iraq’s nuclear reactor.[1]

Hofi’s position on the reactor strike illustrated the distinction between advising the government and implementing its decisions.[2] He continued to oppose the operation without withholding his participation once the government had ordered it.[2] A retrospective account of his approach to Lebanon similarly portrays him as repeatedly expressing his objections while continuing to accept the authority of the political echelon.[15]

In personal exchanges recounted after his death, Hofi resisted encouragement to publicize his experiences.[9] When asked to write books, he replied, “Everyone writes books; I don’t,” and when asked about making a television program, he responded, “Everyone makes TV shows; I don’t.”[9] Pressed to share stories from his senior posts, he said: “If I contributed anything to the state, I don’t deserve thanks for it.”[9]

Public tributes after his death emphasized his contribution to national security and his temperament as a commander.[4][3] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described him as having worked throughout his life on behalf of Israel’s security.[4][3] Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon called him a “brave and level-headed commander.”[4][3]

The Kahan Commission examined Hofi’s responsibility as Mossad head in connection with the Sabra and Shatila massacre.[16] Following the assassination of Lebanese president-elect Bashir Gemayel, the IDF entered West Beirut; Christian Phalangist forces entered the Sabra and Shatila camps on the evening of September 16, 1982, and began killing residents.[16] The commission concluded that Hofi should have anticipated the possibility of revenge attacks after Gemayel’s assassination, while judging that “his direct responsibility is minimal.”[16][17] Its investigation lasted about four months, included testimony from 58 people and additional collected testimonies, and produced a report made public on February 8, 1983, with a classified addendum.[17]

A separate reported episode concerns a 1979 request by former Iranian prime minister Shapour Bakhtiar to former senior Mossad official Eliezer Tzafrir to kill Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.[18] Hofi reportedly opened a meeting of Mossad officials by stating that he would not support the request on moral grounds, while inviting the views of others present.[18] Another retrospective account quotes him saying, “We’re not in,” and describes objections involving the assassination of foreign political leaders, uncertainty about Khomeini, and possible damage to relations with France and other countries.[19] The episode rests on retrospective testimony and published accounts rather than an independently established finding in the material documenting it.[18][19]

Other details of covert activity and Lebanon policy also depend on retrospective reporting, documentary testimony, and book excerpts.[13][15] Those limitations are relevant to precise operational attributions and reconstructed dialogue, without changing the documented distinction between Hofi’s leadership responsibilities and the positions he expressed on particular government decisions.[2][15]