War of Attrition

Egypt’s loss of the Sinai Peninsula to Israel in the Six-Day War created the territorial setting for the War of Attrition.[7] Nasser declared his intention to recover the territory, but the Egyptian armed forces initially lacked the capacity to cross the Suez Canal and retake Sinai.[7] Their losses in weapons and personnel, together with damaged fighting spirit, made an immediate large-scale offensive impractical.[7] A limited campaign offered a way to rebuild military strength and confidence while imposing casualties on the Israel Defense Forces without undertaking an immediate canal crossing.[7]

Soviet weapons and technical assistance supported Egypt’s rearmament after 1967.[7] Egyptian planning developed through successive stages: a period of “firm stance” from June 1967 to August 1968, “active defense” from September 1968 to February 1969, and an intensive war of attrition from March 1969 to August 1970.[8] The limited fighting was intended both to strengthen Egyptian confidence and to wear down Israel before a later effort to recover territory.[7]

The strategy targeted the relationship between Israel’s military commitments, its economy, and public morale.[9] Because Israel depended heavily on reserve soldiers, an extended deployment could impose economic costs while continuing casualties weakened willingness to remain on the canal.[9] On February 16, 1969, Nasser told his ministers that an escalated campaign could strain Israeli military capability and force Israel to maintain reserves in Sinai for prolonged periods.[10] He also hoped to influence American policy, encourage pressure for negotiations favorable to Egypt, and restore Egyptian morale after the defeat of 1967.[10]

The confrontation developed alongside an unsuccessful diplomatic effort to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 242.[9] Israel favored direct negotiations leading to peace and agreed borders, while Egypt and Jordan demanded Israeli withdrawal before negotiations.[9] Israel submitted proposals to U.N. mediator Gunnar Jarring in December 1967 and again communicated its willingness to negotiate in February 1968, but exchanges among the parties failed to produce agreement, and Jarring’s mission was suspended after further unsuccessful exchanges in 1969.[9]

Military violence resumed well before the conventional March 1969 opening of the war.[9] Egyptian forces shelled Israeli positions near the canal as early as July 1, 1967, and Egypt sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat in October of that year.[9] In 1968, Egyptian artillery fire, strafing, and sniping sought in part to disrupt Israeli entrenchment on the canal’s eastern bank.[9] Large Egyptian bombardments in September and October 1968 killed 25 Israeli soldiers.[8]

Israel responded to those bombardments by striking targets deep inside Egypt, including two bridges over the Nile in Upper Egypt and an electrical transformer installation serving the Aswan–Cairo power network.[8] The physical damage was limited, but the attacks surprised the Egyptian government and prompted a five-month halt in military operations while Egypt prepared defenses in its interior.[8] During this pause, Israel constructed approximately 30 fortified positions along 160 kilometers of the canal.[8] At a September 1968 General Staff meeting, Chief of Staff Haim Bar-Lev expressed Israel’s intended response: “we will stop the enemy’s attack and we will shift the war to its land.”[8]

On March 8, 1969, Egyptian artillery opened fire along roughly 120 kilometers of the Suez Canal front, attacking Israeli positions on the Bar-Lev Line.[11] Nasser repudiated the existing ceasefire, marking the beginning of the intensive phase conventionally identified as the War of Attrition.[9][5] Israeli forces returned fire and struck refineries near Suez; Egypt’s chief of staff, General Abdel Moneim Riad, was killed during the fighting of March 8–9.[1][11] Fighting intensified through March and April, accompanied by Israeli raids penetrating deeper into Egypt.[10]

The Bar-Lev Line was named for IDF Chief of Staff Haim Bar-Lev and consisted of fortified positions along the eastern bank of the canal.[10] The strongholds served both to maintain a visible Israeli presence and to help defend the western edge of Sinai in the event of a wider war.[8] Some stood approximately ten kilometers apart, with armored and mobile forces positioned between them to reinforce threatened strongholds or reach other points along the canal.[8] A planned rear line of fortified camps was never constructed.[8]

Egypt possessed superior artillery strength at the canal and combined bombardments with small-unit incursions, commando attacks, and the mining of access roads.[8] Egyptian troops crossed the canal in small groups, sometimes penetrating well into Israeli-held territory, while air and naval raids extended the pressure beyond the strongholds themselves.[8] The Israeli positions came under severe strain, although none was abandoned during the fighting.[8] Their ability to harass Egyptian forces or independently resist a major crossing was limited.[8]

For soldiers inside the positions, attrition meant repeated bombardment followed by repair work rather than a continuous sequence of maneuver battles.[12] Veterans recalled shelling that could continue from afternoon until sunset and resume during the night, with the following day spent rebuilding damaged defenses and filling sandbags.[12] Leaving a bunker even for basic needs could be dangerous, a condition one veteran recalled through the soldiers’ slogan, “Better to hold it in than get hit.”[12] Prolonged fighting and mounting losses contributed to a widespread sense of exhaustion among Israeli troops.[5]

Israel’s objectives during the intensive phase were to prevent Egyptian territorial gains and compel a ceasefire while avoiding an uncontrolled expansion in the use of heavy weapons.[8] By June and July 1969, Israeli commanders concluded that the strongholds could not hold without air support because Israeli artillery could not match Egyptian firepower.[8] Israel intensified its response in July after mounting casualties.[5] On July 21, the Israeli Air Force attacked Egyptian artillery, antiaircraft missile batteries, and forces near the canal.[8] Israel demonstrated clear superiority in aerial engagements, but the air campaign did not stop Egyptian attacks.[8]

Commando operations accompanied this escalation.[11] On July 10, Egyptian commandos attacked the Israeli position at Mezach, killing seven Israelis and wounding five.[13] On July 20, Shayetet 13 and Sayeret Matkal assaulted the fortified Egyptian position on Green Island at the southern entrance to the canal.[11] Israeli troops occupied about two-thirds of the island before withdrawing under Egyptian artillery fire; six Israelis were killed and 14 wounded.[13] The raid formed part of Israel’s effort to disrupt Egyptian fire and regain the initiative.[11]

Israeli operations also targeted infrastructure and military installations beyond the immediate front.[5] Aircraft attacked Egyptian frontline and rear positions, while ground forces struck deeper targets, including power lines, refineries, and bridges.[5] By late 1969, Israeli commanders concluded that operations near the canal had not compelled a ceasefire and decided to begin deep-penetration air attacks inside Egypt.[8] The widening campaign sought to break the stalemate, deter a canal crossing, and bring the pressure of war closer to the Egyptian public.[14]

One notable intelligence operation occurred in December 1969, when Israeli forces captured a Soviet-made P-12 radar installation at Ras-Arab.[15] Israeli intelligence had identified the installation as a new air-defense threat, and the raiding force dismantled the radar and associated equipment for removal by helicopter.[15] Two CH-53 helicopters carried the equipment across the Red Sea, with one load placing severe strain on its helicopter’s hydraulic system.[15] The radar nevertheless reached Israeli intelligence specialists, who studied it to develop countermeasures before it was later transferred to the United States.[15]

Deep air attacks began on January 7, 1970, when Israeli Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft struck military camps near Cairo and elsewhere.[14] Targets included missile stores, a training base, and a commando headquarters.[14] The deep-penetration campaign continued until April 13, expanding the conflict far beyond artillery exchanges across the canal.[8] Israeli forces also captured Shadwan Island in the Gulf of Suez for two days beginning January 22.[16]

The air campaign caused civilian casualties as well as damage to military targets.[14] On February 12, an Israeli Phantom crew attempting to attack a military camp at al-Khanqa mistakenly bombed a civilian factory at Abu Zaabal, killing 70 workers and wounding dozens.[14] The navigation error was probably associated with a failure in the aircraft’s navigation computer.[14] Israel expressed regret and passed Egypt instructions for disarming another delayed-action bomb at the site, but the attack had already attracted international attention.[14]

The expansion of Israeli attacks prompted Egypt to seek more direct Soviet assistance.[8] Nasser appealed to Moscow for protection against the deep-penetration raids and threatened to resign if effective assistance was not provided.[16] Soviet support went beyond supplying equipment to include personnel operating air-defense systems and fighter aircraft.[8]

Soviet-manned SA-3 missile batteries began arriving in March 1970, and Soviet pilots were flying operational missions from Egyptian bases by April.[4] At that stage, their activity had not extended to the ceasefire line or included air combat there.[4] The Soviet deployment of aircraft and air defenses led Israel to end its deep-penetration campaign and shifted the main fighting back toward the canal zone.[8][4] The scale of the intervention included approximately 20,000 Soviet personnel and two fighter squadrons.[5]

The intervention linked the canal war more directly to the global confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.[16] Soviet military involvement served wider strategic interests, including a planned presence capable of countering the U.S. Sixth Fleet, and its timing and scale surprised Israeli and American intelligence.[16] By the end of Israel’s deep air campaign, Soviet aircraft and missiles were defending Egypt’s interior.[8] The danger that the conflict could produce a direct U.S.–Soviet confrontation became an important consideration in diplomatic efforts to stop the fighting.[17]

On July 30, 1970, Israel conducted Operation Rimon 20, an aerial ambush against Soviet-piloted MiG fighters over Egypt.[16] The Israeli force employed eight Mirage and four Phantom aircraft and shot down five Soviet aircraft.[16] The operation was intended to confront the Soviet aerial presence and deter further escalation.[16] Despite Israel’s success in the engagement, concern about a wider superpower confrontation remained part of the strategic setting of the ceasefire effort.[17]

The war’s principal theater was the Suez Canal, but its wider course included fighting and attacks involving Jordanian, Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian forces on less extensive fronts.[3][11] Palestinian raids supported by Jordan reached Israel and the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[3] Attacks and rocket fire also affected communities and military positions along the borders with Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, alongside attacks within Israel and against Israeli air transport.[11] The fighting on these fronts occurred alongside terrorist attacks.[11]

American diplomacy developed while combat continued.[17] A U.S. proposal transmitted on June 19, 1970, envisaged negotiations under Gunnar Jarring and strict observance of ceasefire resolutions from July 1 through at least October 1.[17] It called for an end to ground and air firing and cross-line incursions, together with restrictions on changes to military deployments.[17] Egypt and the Soviet Union were to refrain from placing surface-to-air missiles or other installations in the restricted area west of the canal ceasefire line, while Israel would observe a corresponding standstill to the east.[17] These provisions belonged to the American proposal rather than, by themselves, constituting the final agreement.[17]

The more limited 1970 initiative centered on a three-month halt in fighting and negotiations under Jarring, within the broader diplomatic effort to exchange territory for peace.[6] Israel accepted on August 4 despite opposition within its government.[18] Menachem Begin and 26 fellow Knesset members left the governing coalition about a week later.[18] Egypt also accepted, and the two countries stopped fighting on August 7, 1970.[6]

The ceasefire ended the fighting along the Suez Canal without requiring Israel to withdraw from its canal positions.[19] It also required both sides to freeze their military deployments.[8] Egypt nevertheless advanced surface-to-air missile batteries toward the canal, violating the standstill arrangement, and the batteries remained in their new positions without an Israeli military response.[8][19] Egyptian and Soviet efforts to move antiaircraft missiles closer to the canal continued after the ceasefire.[6]

Israel protested diplomatically rather than resuming military operations.[20] The anticipated negotiations did not produce the settlement envisaged in the American peace effort.[10] After the ceasefire and its renewal, the IDF continued investing in the canal strongholds to prepare for a possible resumption of fighting.[8] The military confrontation had stopped, but the canal remained a central defensive concern for Israel and a focus of Egypt’s effort to recover Sinai.[7][8]

Nasser died of a heart attack on September 28, 1970, less than two months after the ceasefire.[3][21] Egyptian military planning entered a preparation-for-war phase lasting from August 1970 until October 1973.[7] The unresolved conflict contributed to renewed hostilities in 1973, while the status of Sinai and a permanent peace were ultimately addressed in the 1979 Egypt–Israel peace treaty.[6]

The human cost extended beyond frontline combat losses to wounded personnel, civilian deaths, equipment damage, and the cumulative strain of prolonged service.[19][12] One accounting for the 17-month war gives 594 Israeli soldiers and 127 civilians killed, a total of 721 deaths.[11] Another count covering June 15, 1967, through August 8, 1970, gives 1,424 Israeli soldiers killed in action.[9] The same broader-period account records more than 100 civilian deaths, approximately 2,000 wounded soldiers, 700 wounded civilians, and the loss of 15 Israeli combat aircraft, most to antiaircraft guns and missiles.[9]

Surviving soldiers later emphasized the burdens of a war dominated by exposed positions, repeated shelling, and the difficulty of maintaining ordinary routines under fire.[12] Their recollections included not only moments of combat but the repetitive labor of repairing defenses after bombardment and enduring another night of attacks.[12] Veterans also described the war as poorly represented in Israeli public memory.[12] A public campaign eventually secured government recognition through a campaign ribbon in the early 2000s.[11][12]

The war joined sustained Egyptian artillery pressure to an Israeli response based increasingly on air power, raids, and attacks against targets beyond the immediate front.[8] Israeli air superiority did not by itself compel Egypt to stop fighting, while Egypt’s pressure did not force an Israeli withdrawal from the canal line.[8][19] The introduction of Soviet-operated aircraft and air defenses added a direct external military presence to the confrontation.[4] The ceasefire therefore left both the territorial question and the military relationship between the two countries unresolved.[6]

The defensive strongholds became a lasting element of Israeli preparations on the canal.[8] Built to demonstrate presence and support the defense of western Sinai, they depended on mobile forces and air support under the pressures of the attrition campaign.[8] Continued investment after the ceasefire carried this defensive system into preparations for a possible renewed war.[8] Egypt, meanwhile, moved from the attrition phase into preparations that culminated in the fighting of October 1973.[7]

The conflict’s chronology and outcome remain matters of differing historical definition and assessment.[8][20] The conventional chronology begins with Egypt’s March 8, 1969, repudiation of the ceasefire and ends with the August 1970 truce; broader definitions include clashes beginning shortly after the Six-Day War.[20][2] Other accounts identify September–October 1968 as the beginning of the sustained campaign.[8] These definitions encompass different phases rather than a single uniformly delimited period.[8] The ceasefire is also dated August 7 or August 8 in different accounts.[5][20]

Casualty totals differ substantially across those chronologies and theaters.[8][9] Alongside the 721-death accounting and the broader figure of 1,424 soldiers killed, Tamari reports 968 fatalities and 3,730 wounded across the conflict’s theaters.[8][9] His passage adds that 260 were combatants in the Suez Canal arena without clearly identifying which of the two preceding totals that figure qualifies.[8] These figures should not be treated as interchangeable totals for an identically defined campaign.[8][9]

Assessments of strategic success range from an inconclusive outcome with no obvious victor to emphasis on particular Israeli or Egyptian gains.[1] Israel retained its canal positions and demonstrated military advantages, especially in aerial combat; Egypt obtained expanded Soviet assistance and advanced its missile defenses toward the canal.[1][19] The war also exposed limits to Israeli deterrence and resilience and inflicted substantial personnel and equipment losses.[19] Egyptian leaders themselves differed over whether the campaign’s costs were justified by its contribution to determination and preparation for the next war.[7]

The purposes and civilian consequences of Israel’s deep air campaign generated a separate public debate.[22][23] Benny Morris argues that attacks destroying an Egyptian factory and a school resulted from mistaken targeting rather than a general campaign against Egyptian cities.[22] A response in the same journal argues instead that the government sought to destabilize Nasser by demonstrating his inability to protect Egypt’s population, and disputes Morris’s account of civilian losses.[23] The two accounts also disagree about Soviet-inflicted Israeli aircraft losses and the sequence that ended the deep air campaign.[22][23]