United Nations Emergency Force II

Full-scale hostilities erupted on 6 October 1973 when Egyptian forces attacked Israeli positions along the Suez Canal and Syrian forces struck Israeli positions on the Golan Heights.[1] The fighting opened what became known as the Yom Kippur War, which the Israeli Ministry of Defense records as lasting from 6 October to 22 October 1973, ending with a Security Council ceasefire.[2] On 22 October, the Security Council adopted Resolution 338, calling for an immediate cessation of military activity and the opening of negotiations toward a just and durable peace; as fighting continued, Resolution 339 followed the next day.[1][3]

The ceasefire did not hold. With fighting continuing and the situation at a critical stage, the Council acted again on 25 October 1973.[3] Resolution 340, adopted by 14 votes to none, demanded an immediate and complete ceasefire and called for the parties to return to the positions they had held at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973.[4] It also called for an increase in UN military observers on both sides and decided to establish a United Nations Emergency Force under the Council's authority, composed of personnel from UN member states other than the permanent members of the Security Council.[4] The force's deployment effectively brought the acute crisis to an end.[5]

Two days after Resolution 340, on 27 October 1973, the Security Council adopted Resolution 341, approving the Secretary-General's report and establishing UNEF II for an initial six-month period subject to extension.[3] The force's terms of reference went beyond simple ceasefire observation. UNEF II was tasked with supervising the ceasefire and the return to 22 October positions, using its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting, working in coordination with United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) military observers, and cooperating with the International Committee of the Red Cross in humanitarian activities in the area.[3] Its initial planned strength was approximately 7,000 personnel.[3]

UNEF II was distinct from the original United Nations Emergency Force created in 1956 and operated from 1973 to 1979 in the Suez Canal sector and the Sinai Peninsula.[6] Its area of operations was initially centered on the Suez Canal, with headquarters first established in Cairo using UNTSO's liaison office before moving to Ismailia in August 1974.[3]

UNEF II began assembling with remarkable speed. Advance elements arrived on 26 October 1973, the day after Resolution 340's adoption, and deployed along the front immediately.[3] The initial contingents consisted of Austrian, Finnish, and Swedish troops transferred from the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus, with an Irish company joining several days later.[3] Major-General Ensio P. H. Siilasvuo of Finland served as interim commander from the outset and was formally appointed commander on 12 November 1973; he was later succeeded by Bengt Liljestrand of Sweden and then Rais Abin of Indonesia.[3] The 1974 Europa Year Book also records Siilasvuo as the force's commander and notes that the force was to supervise a full ceasefire and ensure a return to the positions held at 1650 GMT on 22 October 1973.[7]

By 20 February 1974, UNEF II had reached its peak recorded strength of 6,973 personnel drawn from 12 countries: Austria, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland, Senegal, and Sweden.[3] The composition shifted over time as contingents were withdrawn or transferred. In 1974, the Austrian and Peruvian contingents and elements of the Canadian and Polish logistics contingents were transferred to UNDOF, the new UN force established on the Golan Heights.[3] Following a reinforcement connected with the September 1975 Egypt-Israel agreement, the Senegalese contingent was subsequently withdrawn in 1976.[3] At the mission's end in July 1979, UNEF II comprised 4,031 personnel from Australia, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Poland, and Sweden, assisted by 120 UNTSO military observers.[3]

Egyptian and Israeli officers were attached to the force and helped carry out its monitoring activities.[8] A notable operational constraint arose from Israel's objection to contingents from Ghana, Indonesia, Poland, and Senegal on the grounds that those states had no diplomatic relations with Israel; Israel refused to extend freedom of movement in Israeli-controlled areas to their personnel.[3] The Secretary-General protested on practical and principled grounds, arguing that UNEF II needed to function as an integrated military unit without distinctions between contingents based on their UN member status. The restrictions nonetheless remained in place, and the affected contingents were deployed in UN buffer zones or Egyptian-controlled areas.[3] Movement restrictions were similarly applied to Soviet observers attached to UNEF II.[3]

In its opening phase, UNEF II troops interposed themselves between opposing forward positions wherever possible, established observation posts and checkpoints, and conducted patrols alongside UNTSO observers.[3] One of the force's most immediate humanitarian challenges was the situation of Egypt's Third Army, which had become trapped on the east bank of the Suez Canal during the final stages of the war.[3]

On 27 October 1973, Egyptian and Israeli military representatives met in the presence of UNEF representatives at kilometre-marker 109 on the Cairo-Suez road to discuss ceasefire observance and humanitarian arrangements.[3] UNEF II and the ICRC then organized lorry convoys carrying non-military supplies through Israeli-held territory to the city of Suez and across the Canal to the encircled Third Army.[3] This humanitarian work showed how UNEF II operated beyond observation alone while Egyptian and Israeli military representatives were beginning direct contacts under UN auspices.

A peace conference convened in Geneva in December 1973 under UN auspices and U.S.-Soviet co-chairmanship, with Egypt, Israel, and Jordan attending.[5] The UNEF II commander took on an additional political role, chairing the Military Working Group that conducted Egyptian-Israeli military disengagement negotiations.[3] This dual function—operational commander and diplomatic facilitator—gave UNEF II an unusual position in the postwar diplomatic process.

The negotiations, assisted by Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, culminated in the Agreement on Disengagement of Forces signed on 18 January 1974 at kilometre 101 on the Cairo-Suez road.[3] Israeli Chief of Staff David Elazar and Egyptian Chief of Staff Muhammad Abd al-Ghani al-Gamasy signed the agreement, with UNEF II commander General Siilasvuo serving as witness.[9] Under its terms, Egyptian forces east of the Canal were deployed west of a designated line roughly 10 kilometres east of the waterway, Israeli forces were deployed east of a separate line, and a UNEF II-manned disengagement zone was established between them, with limited-force areas on either side.[3] The agreement text provided that UNEF would continue to consist of units from countries that were not permanent members of the Security Council and that Egyptian and Israeli liaison officers attached to UNEF would continue their role.[10]

Implementation began on 25 January: UNEF II took over designated areas as Israeli forces withdrew and then transferred them to Egyptian forces, completing the operation by 4 March 1974.[3] Thereafter, UNEF II manned the disengagement zone with checkpoints and observation posts, conducted patrols, and inspected force and armament limits with UNTSO assistance.[3] An Israeli government account similarly states that Israeli forces withdrew to 20 kilometres east of the Suez Canal while Egypt withdrew most of its forces west of the canal.[11]

In April 1974, the Security Council affirmed that the force was still required and commended its contribution to efforts toward a just and durable peace. Resolution 346 extended the mandate for six months, until 24 October 1974, citing the Secretary-General's view that the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement was only a first step and that continued UNEF operations were essential to maintaining quiet in the Egypt-Israel sector and could assist further peace efforts.[12] The resolution also noted the Secretary-General's intention to keep the force's required strength under review, with reductions and economies when circumstances allowed.[12] In October 1974, Resolution 362 extended the mandate again for six months, until 24 April 1975, citing the Secretary-General's assessment that the Egypt-Israel sector was quiet but that the overall Middle East situation remained fundamentally unstable while underlying problems went unresolved.[13]

A further U.S.-brokered disengagement agreement, signed on 4 September 1975, substantially expanded UNEF II's area of operations and responsibilities.[3] The agreement provided for additional Israeli and Egyptian force withdrawals and an enlarged UN buffer zone.[14] Its provisions specified detailed maximums for limited-force areas: no more than 8,000 military personnel, 75 tanks, and 72 artillery pieces, including heavy mortars, on either side.[3] A protocol signed on 22 September 1975 set out implementation procedures.[3]

The 1975 agreement described the force as "essential" and provided that it should continue its functions with its mandate extended annually.[14] It also established a joint commission under the aegis of the Chief Coordinator of UN Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East to consider problems arising under the agreement and assist UNEF in carrying out its mandate.[14] UNEF II helped monitor the resulting redeployments from November 1975 through February 1976 and thereafter patrolled and controlled buffer zones, escorted personnel connected with early-warning stations, and conducted bi-weekly inspections of force and armament limits.[3] The agreement made UNEF II an ongoing element of the Egypt-Israel security arrangements rather than solely an immediate postwar stabilization force.

UNEF II's Sinai-Suez role had a direct counterpart in the north. Security Council Resolution 350, adopted on 31 May 1974, established the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) for similar service in the Golan Heights under the Israel-Syria disengagement arrangement.[15] Both UNEF II and UNDOF operated on six-month mandates subject to Security Council renewal, and their approaching renewal dates generated what one contemporary account described as periodic "signs of nervousness."[15] In 1974, several UNEF II contingents—including the Austrian and Peruvian contingents and elements of the Canadian and Polish logistics units—were transferred to UNDOF as the new force assembled.[3]

Scholarly characterizations of the two forces' relationship have varied. Shabtai Rosenne, writing in the American Jewish Year Book, argued that the difference between UNEF II and UNDOF was "essentially one of name" and attributed it to Syrian sensitivities—an interpretive view rather than a technical description of their separate mandates and deployment areas.[15]

The Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, signed on 26 March 1979 and entering into force on 25 April 1979, transformed the strategic context in which UNEF II operated.[16] Egypt and Israel favored extending the force's mandate to carry out security-monitoring functions associated with the treaty.[16] However, the Soviet Union opposed the peace treaty and made clear that it would veto an extension, and the Security Council allowed the mandate to lapse.[1]

The Security Council's final extension had been Resolution 438, adopted on 23 October 1978, which extended the mandate for nine months through 24 July 1979.[17] The mandate lapsed at midnight on that date without renewal.[16] After expiry, contingents were rapidly repatriated; a Swedish guard unit and limited Canadian and Polish logistics groups remained temporarily to assist in winding up the force.[16] The UN estimated gross costs of $10.32 million for repatriation and liquidation, against estimated income of $4.531 million. That income included proceeds from disposing of surplus property, with nearly $3.7 million of the projected $4 million in property-disposal income expected to come from transfers to other peacekeeping operations.[17]

As UNEF II wound down, a dispute arose over what would replace it as the Sinai withdrawal proceeded. Israel argued that the United States had committed to organize a multinational military force of several thousand soldiers, while the Carter administration backed a plan to expand UNTSO—then described as roughly 300 unarmed observers—possibly to 500 in the Sinai. Israel objected to relying on an expanded observer mission and to treating the UN as the treaty's ultimate guarantor, while U.S. officials described the plan as a viable alternative.[18] The issue was ultimately resolved outside the UN framework: Israel and Egypt formulated a special protocol, signed in 1981, establishing the Multinational Force and Observers with U.S. support to perform the required peacekeeping functions.[19]

The UN's official facts page records a total of 51 fatalities during UNEF II's six-year deployment: 49 military personnel and 2 international civilian staff.[20] Total expenditures over the mission's lifetime reached $446.5 million, financed through assessments to a special UN account.[20] Contributing countries across the mission's duration included Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland, Senegal, and Sweden.[20]

UNEF II stands as one of the more consequential UN peacekeeping deployments of the Cold War era. Its rapid establishment after Resolution 340's passage—with advance elements on the ground by 26 October 1973—helped stabilize a ceasefire that had repeatedly broken down and bring the immediate crisis to an end.[5][3] Its organization of supply convoys to the encircled Egyptian Third Army also demonstrated that peacekeeping could address urgent humanitarian needs alongside military stabilization.[3]

The force's role in the disengagement negotiations was particularly unusual. By chairing the Military Working Group that produced the January 1974 agreement, the UNEF II commander served not merely as an implementer of decisions made elsewhere but as a facilitator of the arrangements the force would then supervise.[3] The participation of Egyptian and Israeli liaison officers within the force's monitoring structure further distinguished UNEF II's approach by giving both parties a role in the inspection process.[10]

The force's termination illustrated UN peacekeeping's dependence on Security Council consensus. Egypt and Israel sought to use UNEF II as part of the security mechanism for implementing their 1979 peace treaty, but Soviet opposition to the treaty foreclosed renewal of the mandate.[1] Egypt and Israel subsequently established the Multinational Force and Observers outside the UN framework, making it UNEF II's institutional successor in function, though not in form.[19]

Israel's restrictions on freedom of movement for contingents from Ghana, Indonesia, Poland, and Senegal—justified by Israel on the basis that those states lacked diplomatic relations with it—are recorded in the UN's history of the mission.[3] The Secretary-General's objections on practical and principled grounds did not result in the restrictions being lifted. The episode reflected tension between the operational requirements of an integrated peacekeeping force and Israel's concerns about the composition of forces operating in Israeli-controlled territory.

The non-renewal of the mandate in 1979 occurred without a formal recorded vote. The Soviet Union had made clear that it would veto an extension, while the Security Council's consultations resulted in the mandate being allowed to lapse at midnight on 24 July.[1][16] The judgment that UNEF II was successful in carrying out its mandate, and that its presence may have helped create a calmer environment for Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, is an analytical conclusion in peacekeeping literature rather than a directly measurable outcome.[21]