Timeline of the Red Sea Crisis

The October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks on Israel and the ensuing Israeli military operations in Gaza preceded the Houthi campaign against Israeli territory and shipping passing through Bab al-Mandab.[2] The Houthis presented their actions as support for Palestinians and subsequently linked their shipping threats to Israeli operations and humanitarian access in Gaza.[2] Their initial announced maritime targets were Israeli ships, followed by vessels sailing to Israeli ports regardless of nationality.[2]

The threatened corridor carried substantial international commerce: a U.S. government background estimate placed the Red Sea’s share at 15 percent of international commerce and 30 percent of global container traffic.[10] Ships avoiding the corridor could travel around the Cape of Good Hope, but this added sailing time and increased fuel, crew-time, and shipping costs.[10] The geographic scope of the subsequent naval protection effort included the southern Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Bab al-Mandab Strait.[11]

On November 14, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi publicly threatened maritime attacks: “We will monitor and locate Israeli ships in the Red Sea and we will not hesitate to target them.”[1] The seizure of Galaxy Leader five days later turned that warning into a prolonged ship-and-crew detention and marked an early major episode in the commercial-shipping campaign.[12][4]

On October 19, 2023, the USS Carney intercepted weapons launched from Yemen over the Red Sea, an engagement occurring on the date used for the beginning of Houthi attacks on Israel.[1][13] The initial account described three land-attack cruise missiles and several drones traveling north; their targets were potentially in Israel but had not been confirmed.[13]

Israeli defenses intercepted further attacks later that month.[14] On October 31, interceptions over the Red Sea included ground-to-ground missiles, a cruise missile, and a drone launched toward Israel; one interception used the Arrow long-range defense system.[14] A Houthi spokesperson said that day that the group had conducted three attacks and would continue missile and drone strikes until what it called “the Israeli aggression” stopped.[15] Across nine identified waves between October 19 and December 26, the campaign employed medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones; none of the 46 identified weapons reached Israel, although that tally may have understated the number launched.[1]

On November 19, Houthi forces seized Galaxy Leader in a helicopter-borne raid.[4] The Bahamas-flagged ship was Japanese-operated and owned by a British company partially owned by Israeli businessman Abraham Ungar.[4] It was sailing from Turkey toward India when captured, and its 25 crew members included no Israelis.[12][15] The Houthis said they targeted it because of its connection to Israel.[4]

Other incidents followed in late November.[16] An Iranian-made drone attacked CMA CGM Symi, owned by Idan Ofer’s Eastern Pacific Shipping, while Central Park, owned by Eyal Ofer’s Zodiac Shipping, was hijacked off Somalia.[16] U.S. Navy personnel responded to Central Park’s distress call and captured five armed individuals fleeing in a small boat; Pentagon officials identified the hijackers as Somalis.[16][15] After the rescue, two ballistic missiles launched from Houthi-controlled territory fell into the sea near the USS Mason and Central Park off Aden.[16]

On December 3, attacks originating in Houthi-controlled territory targeted three commercial vessels in the southern Red Sea.[17] The incidents involved missiles and drones and also drew a response from the USS Carney.[16] One targeted vessel was Unity Explorer, owned by UK-based Unity Maritime, which had an Israeli ownership connection.[16] The Houthis described attacked vessels as Israeli, while the Israel Defense Forces denied that connection; two vessels discussed in the contemporary account were not traveling to or from Israel that day.[12]

On December 9, the Houthis broadened their declared policy to encompass all ships heading to Israel, regardless of nationality, and warned international shipping companies against dealing with Israeli ports.[18] Their spokesperson declared ships sailing to Israeli ports banned from the Red Sea and Arabian Sea.[18] Later December attacks included the Norwegian-owned Swan Atlantic and MSC Clara; Swan Atlantic’s owner said it had no Israeli connection and was carrying biofuel feedstock from France to Réunion Island.[11]

By December 17, major container-shipping companies were suspending or diverting sailings.[19] Maersk paused vessels approaching Bab al-Mandab after a near miss involving Maersk Gibraltar and another attack, MSC diverted ships after attacks involving MSC Platinum and MSC Alanya, and Hapag-Lloyd suspended Red Sea sailings after an incident involving Al Jasrah.[19] Diversions around the Cape of Good Hope could add approximately 18 days to some journeys.[19]

On December 18, the United States announced Operation Prosperity Guardian, a multinational maritime security initiative coordinated by Combined Task Force 153.[11] The announced partners were the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles, and Spain, with contributions envisaged as joint patrols or intelligence support.[11] Its stated purpose was to address attacks and protect navigation in the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[11]

A December 19 joint international statement condemned Galaxy Leader’s seizure and reported that its crew remained detained.[17] The statement identified connections between the ship and 14 nations and warned that attacks threatened the movement of food, fuel, humanitarian assistance, and other commodities.[17]

On December 26, U.S. forces intercepted additional Houthi missiles and drones.[1] On December 31, Houthi small boats attacked Maersk Hangzhou and fired on U.S. Navy helicopters answering its distress call; the helicopters destroyed three of the four boats.[20] The ship had also been struck by a ballistic missile, and Maersk halted its tentative return to Red Sea voyages after the successive attacks.[21]

On January 9, 2024, U.S. and British forces intercepted 21 drones and missiles launched in a major Houthi barrage toward international shipping lanes.[22] The following day, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2722, demanding an end to attacks on merchant and commercial vessels and calling for Galaxy Leader and its crew to be released.[2]

On January 11–12, the United States and United Kingdom began strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, distinct from Operation Prosperity Guardian’s defensive maritime patrols.[22][15] Targets included weapons-storage areas, radars, and missile and drone launch sites, with more than 150 missiles and bombs used in the opening action.[15] A subsequent account identified the strike campaign as Operation Poseidon Archer.[22] By this stage, more than 2,000 ships had changed course to avoid the Red Sea.[15]

The Houthis responded by threatening U.S.- and UK-owned vessels.[2] American naval forces continued intercepting missiles and uncrewed aircraft and intervening against attempted ship seizures, while attacks, patrols, and strikes continued through January and subsequent months.[2] The European Union decided in January to establish its own naval operation and launched EUNAVFOR Aspides in February, with a defensive remit to protect commercial vessels and intercept attacks rather than strike targets ashore.[5][23]

Civilian supply ships serving Yemen were also attacked.[24] Sea Champion, carrying corn and other food to Aden and Hudaydah, came under attack on February 18 and 19.[24] Another civilian ship attacked on February 16 was disabled, creating a risk of fertilizer and fuel spilling into the sea.[24]

On February 18, an anti-ship ballistic missile struck the Belize-flagged bulk carrier Rubymar, forcing its crew to abandon ship.[1][15] The vessel, carrying fertilizer, sank on March 2, becoming the first ship lost in the campaign.[15] Its leaking engine oil and fertilizer added an environmental dimension to the maritime emergency.[15]

On March 6, a missile struck True Confidence in the Gulf of Aden, killing three seafarers in the campaign’s first civilian fatalities.[1] The vessel was Barbados-flagged and Liberian-owned.[15] Despite the prominent sinking and fatal attack, the number of Houthi attacks did not intensify during March and April.[1]

In May 2024, the Houthis expanded their stated target category beyond ships directly visiting Israel to include vessels whose owners or operators had other ships visiting Israeli ports.[25] This followed earlier expansions from Israeli-linked vessels in November, to Israel-bound vessels in December, and to U.S.- and UK-linked vessels in January.[25]

On June 12, an uncrewed surface vessel struck the bulk carrier Tutor, causing severe flooding and engine-room damage; a civilian mariner was reported missing and the crew abandoned ship.[26] Missiles struck Verbena on June 13, starting a fire, and its crew subsequently abandoned the vessel and was rescued by another ship.[26] Both vessels were attacked twice.[26] By June 20, Tutor had sunk, while Verbena remained abandoned and adrift as a navigational hazard.[27] An end-of-June tally recorded more than 190 drone and missile strikes and four sailors killed during the campaign.[15]

On July 19, a Houthi drone struck Tel Aviv, killing one person and injuring others.[28] Israel responded on July 20 with its first publicly acknowledged airstrike against Houthi targets in Yemen, striking around Hudaydah port.[28] The IDF identified infrastructure used by the Houthis as its target, and Houthi officials threatened retaliation.[28] Another expansion of the group’s maritime targeting policy followed the Tel Aviv drone attack.[25]

On August 21, Houthi forces attacked the Greek-flagged tanker Sounion, whose crew abandoned ship and was rescued by a French warship.[23] The tanker remained anchored between Yemen and Eritrea and caught fire.[23] Its cargo represented approximately one million barrels of oil, creating the potential for a spill four times the volume of the Exxon Valdez disaster.[29] By August 26, the EU naval mission reported no obvious spill but identified the vessel as an imminent environmental hazard.[23]

On September 2, Houthi forces attacked two more oil tankers, including the Saudi-flagged Amjad, which carried approximately two million barrels of oil.[30] Fires continued aboard Sounion during this period.[30] On September 5, Maersk reported a 66 percent reduction in Suez Canal traffic since shipping companies began diverting vessels to avoid attacks.[30]

By October, an assessment estimated that Houthi attacks since October 19, 2023, had involved approximately 300 drones, 150 cruise missiles, 120 ballistic missiles, and 50 explosive unmanned vessels.[3] Its shipping-damage tally included five severely damaged ships, two of which sank, four hijacked vessels, and roughly 30 ships with minor damage.[3]

Commercial-vessel incidents declined from fourteen in June to three in November, but Bab al-Mandab transit remained more than 50 percent below its year-earlier level.[25] On December 1, U.S. destroyers intercepted seven missiles and drones fired at the warships and three American merchant vessels under escort in the Gulf of Aden, without damage or injuries.[15] Attacks on Israeli territory continued: a ballistic missile landed in a Jaffa park in December and injured 16 people.[31]

When the Israel-Hamas ceasefire took effect on January 19, 2025, Houthi representatives announced that attacks on Israel and international shipping would stop or be limited.[32] Their coordination center informed shipping companies that attacks would halt except against vessels owned by Israeli entities or flying Israel’s flag.[32] The 25 Galaxy Leader crew members were released that month after Omani mediation; the Houthis linked the release to the Gaza ceasefire and said Hamas had separately requested it.[4]

After Israel paused aid deliveries to Gaza on March 3, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi issued a four-day deadline on March 7 for aid to resume.[32] On March 11, spokesman Yahya Sarea announced resumed naval operations and claimed a blockade of Israeli shipping in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and Gulf of Aden.[32]

The United States launched Operation Rough Rider on March 15 with the stated aims of restoring freedom of navigation and ending attacks on commercial shipping.[33] Over 52 days, the campaign involved more than 1,100 strikes against command facilities, weapons stores, air defenses, factories, ports, and other targets.[33] U.S. military statements also described the deaths of hundreds of Houthi fighters and numerous leaders.[6] The Houthis claimed retaliation against the USS Harry S. Truman, while American officials said no projectiles came within 100 miles of the carrier.[15]

Attacks on Israeli aviation infrastructure became another focus of Houthi announcements.[32] Later in March, the group claimed missile attacks on Ben Gurion Airport and asserted that airport traffic had been suspended, an assertion denied by Israel’s Airports Authority.[32] A Mosaic account reported that a missile struck near the airport on May 4, interrupting flights, and that approximately 20 Israeli fighter jets struck Hudaydah port, a cement factory, and other infrastructure the next day.[34]

On May 6, President Donald Trump announced that the United States would halt its bombing campaign.[6] Oman announced an agreement under which neither the United States nor the Houthis would target the other, including American vessels in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab.[6] Houthi representatives said their attacks against Israel would continue.[6]

On May 19, Sarea announced a purported maritime blockade of Haifa port, warning shipping companies that vessels present in or heading toward the port had entered the group’s target list.[32] He declared: “All companies with ships present in or heading to this port are hereby notified that, as of the time of this announcement, the aforementioned port has been included in the list of targets.”[32]

In June 2025, Bab al-Mandab merchant traffic reached approximately 36–37 ships daily, compared with a low of 20–23 in August 2024 and a pre-crisis average of 72–75.[35] The commander of Aspides linked the improvement to reduced missile and drone attacks and the U.S.-Houthi ceasefire, although shipping companies remained reluctant to return.[35]

On July 6, Houthi forces attacked Magic Seas, setting the bulk carrier on fire and forcing its crew to abandon ship.[36] A passing commercial vessel rescued the crew, but Magic Seas later sank.[36] Eternity C was attacked the next day, and its sinking was confirmed on July 9.[36] The attacks caused casualties among mariners, and surviving crew members from Eternity C were reportedly taken hostage.[36]

The campaign extended farther north in the Red Sea.[37] The Houthis announced an attack on Scarlet Ray near Yanbu at the end of August; the Liberian-flagged vessel belonged to Eastern Pacific Shipping.[37][38] Its crew heard a loud explosion but remained unharmed, and the vessel continued its voyage without reported damage.[37][38]

On September 29, Minervagracht, a Netherlands-flagged cargo ship, was struck in the Gulf of Aden.[39][38] One crew member was killed and another wounded.[39] By October, a campaign-wide tally recorded at least nine mariners killed and four ships sunk.[39]

An Israel-Hamas ceasefire was agreed in October, after which Houthi attacks on Israel paused.[32][40] As of November 12, no further Houthi ship attack had been recorded since the late-September attack on Minervagracht.[38] The reduction in attacks did not restore shipping patterns immediately: major companies continued avoiding the Red Sea–Suez route because of security concerns and high insurance costs.[37]

The Houthis conducted a limited number of attacks on Israel in late March and early April 2026 during the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict.[40] As of May, they had not resumed vessel strikes, and maritime traffic had not returned to pre-crisis levels even before the wider conflict involving Iran began in February.[40]

On June 8, after renewed fighting between Israel and Iran, the Houthis announced a ban on Israeli-linked ships entering the Red Sea and fired two missiles toward Israel.[41] The IDF said one missile was intercepted and the other did not reach the country.[41] Several shipping lines that had begun returning to the route instructed vessels to delay approaching the Red Sea and await further instructions.[42]

The announced target set widened again on July 20, when the Houthis declared a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia, presenting it as retaliation for Saudi restrictions on Yemen’s air and sea access.[8] Riyadh denied the allegation and conducted strikes on Houthi facilities in Hudaydah linked to threats against commercial shipping.[8] Earlier that month, a Houthi delegation’s flight from Tehran to Sanaa reportedly carried Iranian Revolutionary Guard advisers and weapons, and Saudi aircraft struck Sanaa airport to prevent another Iranian plane from landing.[43]

Saudi Arabia confirmed that an attack caused a fire aboard Encelia on July 23 and that NCC Masa sustained damage on July 24 but continued its voyage.[44] On August 5, the Houthis claimed attacks on Wafa near Yanbu and Daisy in the Gulf of Aden.[44] A separate maritime alert described an uncrewed-surface-vessel attack north of Bab al-Mandab, followed by the crew’s rescue and the vessel’s reported sinking.[44]

In August, a Yemeni government official reported that Houthi missiles struck ships unloading at Mokha, setting two vessels ablaze and killing eight people, including two security personnel.[8] Houthi-affiliated media separately claimed a drone attack on a Saudi Aramco refinery.[8]

In September, Houthi forces advanced along Yemen’s coast, capturing Mokha and reaching the Bab al-Mandab area, with reported gains including Mayun, Zuqar, and other islands.[45] Yemen’s internationally recognized government launched the Saudi-backed Operation Dawn of Yemen on October 5 and retook some coastal territory.[9] A coalition spokesperson described Saudi support involving approximately 100 jets striking more than 300 targets.[9]

On October 10, Houthi forces attacked Riyadh’s international airport, killing 13 people, including an American, and injuring more than 300.[46] Saudi strikes hit oil-storage facilities in Sanaa on October 13, followed by a Houthi strike on Saudi Aramco’s headquarters in Dhahran.[46] On October 16, the UN Security Council condemned continued Houthi attacks and threats against commercial shipping and attacks on Saudi Arabia.[47]

Diversion around Africa became a persistent consequence of the crisis rather than a brief interruption.[2][37] One estimate placed the additional voyage time at about ten days, with increased fuel consumption, crew-time costs, and freight charges; particular routes faced longer delays.[10][19] By February 2024, more than ten shipping firms had halted Red Sea and Gulf of Aden transits, while approximately thirty commercial vessels had been targeted since Galaxy Leader’s seizure.[48]

Suez Canal traffic and Egyptian revenue fell sharply.[3] An October 2024 estimate placed the decline in canal traffic by April at approximately 70 percent and monthly revenue losses at roughly $600 million.[3] Canal transits fell from approximately 2,068 in November 2023 to about 877 in October 2024.[25] The continued depression in traffic despite fewer attacks demonstrated the persistence of shipping companies’ avoidance of the corridor.[25][37]

Eilat Port experienced a prolonged disruption to vehicle imports.[49] No vehicles arrived there in 2024 or 2025, followed by a partial recovery involving 5,900 vehicles in March 2026, another 11,000 between April and June, and 4,400 in July, partly through routes involving Aqaba in Jordan.[49] January–July 2026 imports totaled approximately 21,000 vehicles, compared with roughly 111,000 in the corresponding months of 2023.[49]

The losses also affected humanitarian access and marine safety.[24][27] Attacks struck vessels carrying food to Yemen, while abandoned ships, leaking cargo, and burning tankers created navigational and environmental hazards.[24][27] Rubymar’s sinking threatened Red Sea ecosystems, and the Sounion emergency exposed fishing communities and regional ecosystems to the possibility of a major oil spill.[27][29]

The chronology combines several related campaigns: attacks on Israel, assaults on commercial shipping, maritime interception and escort operations, and strikes against Houthi targets ashore.[2][22] Operation Prosperity Guardian and Aspides were protective maritime missions, whereas the U.S.-UK strike campaign and Operation Rough Rider targeted Houthi capabilities in Yemen.[22][5][33]

The May 2025 agreement illustrated the distinction between stopping U.S.-Houthi hostilities and ending attacks against Israel.[6] Its terms addressed mutual targeting and American vessels, while Houthi representatives explicitly maintained their separate campaign against Israel.[6] Subsequent shipping attacks and renewed threats showed that the agreement was not a comprehensive settlement of the crisis.[36][7]

The changing announced target categories are another defining feature of the campaign.[25] Restrictions expanded from Israeli-linked ships to Israel-bound ships, American- and British-linked ships, and vessels associated with companies trading with Israeli ports.[25] The widening criteria helped sustain commercial avoidance even when reported attack numbers declined.[25]

Houthi declarations of blockades and vessel affiliations did not establish that the announced restrictions were successfully enforced or that every attacked ship had the claimed connection.[2][32] Many commercial attacks did not appear discriminate or connected to the group’s stated demands; Minervagracht had no known Israeli affiliation.[2][38]

Operation Rough Rider caused civilian deaths and damage in some strikes, and an assessment concluded that it did not eliminate Houthi capabilities or resolve the broader shipping threat.[33]

Reporting on 2026 developments diverges substantially: an October 27 congressional research update did not identify resumed vessel strikes, whereas other accounts described Saudi-confirmed incidents and additional Houthi claims.[7][44] Saudi Arabia had not confirmed the claimed August 5 attacks when they were published, and the extent and durability of territorial control near Bab al-Mandab remained uncertain after the October counteroffensive.[44][9] These reporting limits preclude a definitive end date or comprehensive operational status for the crisis.[40][7]