Tal Russo

Russo was born in 1959 and grew up on Kibbutz Hulata in northern Israel. He earned a bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of Haifa and an MBA from Tel Aviv University.[4]

He enlisted in the IDF in 1978 and volunteered for the newly formed Shaldag special-operations unit. Russo declined officer training and left the army in 1981, but returned during the 1982 Lebanon War, commanding a Shaldag team and later a company. After the war, he returned to regular service and received the rank of captain despite not having attended officer school; Ynet likewise reported that he received his officer insignia outside the officers’ training course.[4][5]

Russo’s career included commands in Shaldag and Sayeret Matkal, followed by roles in the Givati Brigade and the Maglan commando unit. He became deputy commander of Sayeret Matkal in 1985, left the army again in 1987, and returned in 1989. In 1991 he commanded the Rotem Battalion in Givati, and around 1992 he took command of Maglan. His subsequent commands included the Nahal Brigade from 1998 and the Steel Formation from 2003 to 2005.[4] A later profile also lists his command of the 551st reservist Paratroopers Brigade, the 98th Paratroopers Division, and the 162nd Armor Division.[1]

As commander of the 162nd Armor Division, Russo’s forces took part in evacuating four settlements in northern Samaria during the 2005 disengagement. In an interview that year, he said he would accept new companies of hesder students—yeshiva students combining religious study with military service—arguing that their integration into the IDF was important. The discussion took place amid tension over soldiers refusing evacuation orders and broader questions about integrating the national religious camp into Israeli institutions.[6]

In October 2006, Russo was appointed head of the IDF Operations Directorate, succeeding Gadi Eisenkot. He was promoted to major general. Before the appointment, he had commanded the Steel Formation and served as an adviser on special operations and as a project officer working with the religious-Zionist community after the disengagement.[5]

During the 2006 Second Lebanon War, Russo was initially a brigadier general without a defined role. He was tasked with organizing the army’s special operations, and an improvised headquarters was established under his leadership. A study describes the formation of a special team in the Operations Directorate on the war’s ninth day, followed by planning to find targets intended to have a cognitive effect. It reports that 24 special operations took place north of the Litani River, most covert; another profile describes more than 30 operations in Lebanon by units including Sayeret Matkal, Shaldag, and Shayetet 13.[7][1]

One operation took place in Baalbek, deep inside Lebanon, with forces from Sayeret Matkal and Shaldag. Russo described its intended effect as showing Hezbollah’s military leadership that the Lebanese home front was not beyond the reach of Israeli ground forces. He compared the shock to “our soldiers fighting in the north and hearing that [someone] had raided Tel Aviv.” The account says Hezbollah responded by reinforcing units defending the Bekaa Valley.[3]

After the war, Russo pushed for a permanent command to coordinate long-range operations and activity deep in enemy territory. The IDF announced the establishment of the Depth Command in December 2011, and Russo later commanded the Depth Corps.[1][8] His other senior positions included head of the Operations Directorate and commander of Southern Command.[9]

Russo was designated in 2010 to replace Yoav Galant as head of Southern Command. In that role he managed the command’s operational activity and was responsible for implementing its training program, drawing on experience with regular and reserve divisions.[9] He held the Southern Command post from 2010 until 2013 and oversaw Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012.[1]

During the operation, the opening phase focused on airstrikes following the targeted killing of Hamas military chief Ahmad Jabari. Russo coordinated forces in the southern sector, prepared for a possible ground phase, maintained security activity along the Gaza border, and coordinated units and intelligence for attacking forces. He shared management of the fighting with the Air Force commander and was responsible for civilian protection in the area through Home Front Command units.[1][10] After the operation, he was quoted assessing that deterrence was in place and that both Israel and Hamas knew Hamas had been hit hard.[11]

In August 2011, an attack on Highway 12 prompted Russo to acknowledge that he had misjudged the threat. He later said he had expected an attack at night and anticipated that soldiers, rather than civilians, would be targeted; civilians were killed. He summarized his error by saying, “I was wrong in my assessment of the situation.”[12]

Accounts describe different milestones in Russo’s departure from military service. A 2013 report said he would leave the army after 35 years, while later reporting gives January 2014 as the date recorded for his release from regular service.[12][13] He subsequently returned to reserve service at Eisenkot’s request and left that service in May 2017 after commanding the Depth Corps.[12][14] A Mako profile published as he prepared to leave active service described him as having come close to the chief-of-staff position.[4]

On February 20, 2019, Labor chairman Avi Gabbay presented Russo as the second candidate on the party’s slate for the April election. Russo referred to his 35 years of military service and advocated security based on creative thinking and cooperation, separation from the Palestinians, and greater social unity.[15] Labor received 190,870 votes, or 4.43 percent, and won six seats; Russo was elected from its list.[16][15]

Russo described himself as a centrist and supported separation from the Palestinians, ultimately envisioning two states for two peoples. He also argued that Israel’s security required separation and said the country must not be led to a single state with an Arab majority.[15][17]

His candidacy prompted a legal dispute over the three-year cooling-off rule for senior security officials. The question was whether his later reserve service, performed under conditions resembling permanent service, counted as career military service for the rule and would have delayed his eligibility until May 2020. Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit concluded that the arrangement remained voluntary reserve service and that Russo’s regular service had ended more than three years earlier, leaving no legal bar to his candidacy. Russo subsequently ran and was elected.[16][14]

Russo entered the 21st Knesset on April 30, 2019.[18] After the Knesset dispersed and another election was called, he gave up his reserved second place on Labor’s slate and said he might consider running for party chair. In June, he announced that he would not seek the leadership and removed himself from the list for the next election, saying the short timetable made it impossible to accomplish what he had hoped and that he did not want to take part in succession battles.[19]

His parliamentary term lasted about five and a half months. Russo later described the experience as “an amazing education,” but said he believed the Knesset and opposition had little ability to influence policy and that the party’s human composition did not fit his way of thinking. He left Labor politics, explaining that he had entered public life to change and influence rather than to hold a political appointment.[1][19]

In July 2019, Russo donated 154,000 shekels—equivalent to three and a half months of Knesset salary—to help rehabilitate an IDF soldier who had been wounded and was facing a serious illness. The report said he had returned his Knesset car and begun reducing his staff after deciding not to seek another term.[18]

In September 2025, Russo returned to organized party politics as a founding member of Yashar! with Eisenkot, a centrist party established by former IDF chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot.[2]

Russo’s career linked field command in elite and conventional formations with senior General Staff roles. He served in Shaldag, Sayeret Matkal, Maglan, paratrooper and armored formations before heading the Operations Directorate, Southern Command, and the Depth Corps.[4][1]

His post-2006 advocacy for a permanent command coordinating deep, long-range operations preceded the IDF’s December 2011 announcement of the Depth Command, which he later led.[1][8]

Russo defended the 2005 Gaza disengagement in a 2019 interview, calling it a “genius move.” He argued that withdrawal had avoided larger terrorist attacks and additional Israeli casualties. The remarks drew criticism, including over a reported comment about arson attacks from Gaza; Russo said he valued residents of Gaza-border communities, had been with them during difficult periods, and regretted that his remark had been taken out of context.[20]

In a 2021 interview, Russo recalled that the first week of the Second Lebanon War showed commanders had not yet made the “mental switch to being at war,” and said they needed to make that transition quickly. The same profile described his visits to unrecognized Bedouin communities in the Negev. In a discussion of illegal firearms and crime, he recalled a child saying he wanted to earn money to buy an M-16 rifle, an exchange Russo cited in discussing the spread of illegal weapons.[1]

In an October 2026 interview, Russo said he continued to struggle to understand the October 7, 2023 attack, describing the day as a collapse of both the military and the state. He credited civilians, police officers, soldiers, and volunteers with helping stop the attack and called for a state commission of inquiry to establish responsibility and prevent similar failures.[21]

In the same interview, Russo said that Hamas had been treated as an enemy during his command but later as a partner, and that the organization had grown and received money from Israel. He also said he had seen earlier signs of erosion and arrogance among commanders and politicians. These were his retrospective assessments of Israeli policy and leadership, rather than independent findings about the policy history.[21]