Taba Summit

The unsuccessful Camp David summit of July 2000 preceded the negotiations at Taba, which followed further Israeli-Palestinian discussions, including meetings at Bolling Air Force Base in December 2000.[1] The December discussions culminated in proposals issued by President Bill Clinton, subsequently known as the Clinton parameters.[1] Clinton presented his proposal on December 23, and Arafat subsequently sought clarifications concerning Palestinian territorial contiguity, the division of East Jerusalem, and refugees’ right of return.[4] At Taba, the delegations considered Clinton’s ideas together with their respective qualifications and reservations, rather than treating the proposals as an already accepted settlement.[2]

The negotiating contacts after Camp David included a small forum involving Mohammed Dahlan, Saeb Erekat, Shlomo Ben-Ami, and Gilead Sher, with other officials participating at different times.[5] This process sought to take up the results of Camp David and provide a framework for possible negotiations after Israel’s forthcoming prime ministerial election.[5] The Taba meeting therefore followed several months of contacts rather than constituting an isolated attempt to settle the conflict.[1][5]

Direct contacts resumed at several levels from January 11, including meetings between Arafat and Amnon Shahak and between Israeli Foreign Minister Ben-Ami and Palestinian negotiator Erekat.[6] Before the summit, Arafat and Ben-Ami agreed that direct talks would begin on January 20.[6] The permanent-status negotiations themselves took place from January 21 to 27.[1]

Israel’s publicly stated Cabinet positions before the talks included rejection of a Palestinian refugee right of return into Israel and rejection of transferring sovereignty over the Temple Mount to the Palestinians.[6] The Cabinet also insisted that 80 percent of Jewish residents of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza remain in settlement blocs under Israeli sovereignty.[6] These positions formed part of the Israeli political setting before the negotiations, while the subsequent discussions explored proposals on the same subjects.[6][5]

The summit took place during the Second Intifada and shortly before Israel’s election.[7] It was the final round of Israeli-Palestinian talks under Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s administration.[3] Barak’s government had suffered parliamentary collapse before the meeting; the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs argues that this freed negotiators from coalition constraints, while also reporting criticism of their mandate to make new proposals.[8] The approaching election remained central to the timetable, and the delegations ultimately identified political and time constraints as reasons they could not complete an agreement.[2]

Israeli and Palestinian delegations met at Taba in Egypt beginning on January 21, 2001, and concluded their talks on January 27.[1] Their closing statement described the preceding six days as “serious, deep and practical talks” intended to produce a permanent and stable agreement ending the conflict and bringing peace to both peoples.[2][9] The negotiations were organized around four principal themes: refugees, security, borders, and Jerusalem.[2]

Palestinian participants included Abu Ala, Saeb Erekat, Hassan Asfour, Nabil Sha’ath, Yasser Abed Rabbo, and Mohammed Dahlan.[3] The Israeli participants included Shlomo Ben-Ami, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, Yossi Beilin, Yossi Sarid, Gilead Sher, Israel Hasson, Pini Meidan-Shani, and Gidi Grinstein.[3] The United States did not participate in the Taba meeting, although the ideas advanced by Clinton remained part of the negotiating framework.[3][2] Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak hosted and facilitated the talks, and the European Union supported them.[9]

The delegations reported substantial progress in understanding one another’s positions and movement toward each other on some issues, but they did not reach understandings on every question.[2] Their closing statement emphasized mutual willingness to address each side’s national, security, and existential needs.[2] The summit’s practical work nevertheless left unresolved questions across all four negotiating themes, including territorial proportions, sovereignty at holy sites, refugee implementation, and security arrangements.[10][11]

No comprehensive agreement emerged from the meeting.[2] On January 27, the delegations expressed the belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged if negotiations resumed after the Israeli election, and they voiced confidence that the process could restart at the earliest practical opportunity.[2] Their statement presented the end of the meeting as an interruption shaped by the political timetable, while also recording that agreement on all issues had not been achieved.[2]

The territorial discussions addressed the borders of a Palestinian state in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and Gaza, together with possible land exchanges.[10] The negotiating account prepared by European Union representative Miguel Moratinos identified the June 4, 1967 lines as the basis for borders under United Nations Security Council Resolution 242.[10] Both sides presented West Bank maps, accepted the principle of a land swap, and agreed that their respective sovereign areas should have territorial contiguity.[10] The proportions of the exchange remained unsettled.[10]

The official Israeli map allocated 92 percent to Palestinian territory and 8 percent to Israeli territory, while the Palestinian map allocated 97–98 percent to Palestinian territory and 2–3 percent to Israel.[12] Separate maps privately presented by some Israeli delegation members allocated 94 percent to Palestinian territory and 6 percent to Israel.[12] Those private maps were unauthorized and were distinct from the official Israeli map.[12] The territorial proposals thus included both formal delegation material and additional ideas explored by individual participants.[12]

Other descriptions of the negotiations give different territorial figures.[11][12] One account presents Israel’s offer as having improved from 87 percent to 97 percent of the West Bank, while the proposed land swap increased from 1 percent to 3 percent.[11] Another describes an Israeli proposal for withdrawal from 92 percent of the West Bank, supplemented by a 3 percent land swap, and a Palestinian demand for sovereignty over 98 percent to preserve territorial contiguity.[1] The Palestinian side also raised concerns about control of borders and airspace and the connection between the different parts of its proposed territory.[1]

Settlement blocs and the distribution of sovereignty were central elements of the territorial discussion.[8] The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs describes Israel as seeking annexation of settlement blocs with land swaps, while Palestinians disputed whether the Clinton parameters included those blocs.[8] In a separate retrospective characterization, Rabbi Jonathan Sacks described Barak’s proposal as a Palestinian state in all of Gaza and 97 percent of the West Bank, with land compensation for the remaining 3 percent.[13]

Neither delegation presented a map of Gaza during the talks.[10] The territorial discussion envisaged Palestinian sovereignty there and evacuation of the settlements, although details remained unresolved.[10] Alongside the debate over percentages in the West Bank, the negotiations therefore addressed the broader relationship between sovereignty, settlement evacuation, land exchanges, and the practical continuity of the proposed Palestinian state.[10]

The delegations accepted in principle that Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would come under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods under Israeli sovereignty.[3] Exceptions and unresolved cases included Har Homa and the Jewish settlement at Ras Al-Amud.[3] The discussions also envisaged Jerusalem as the capital of two states: Jerusalem for Israel and Al-Quds for Palestine, with the Palestinian side emphasizing East Jerusalem’s role as its capital.[10] One account describes Israel as agreeing to transfer almost all Arab quarters of East Jerusalem to the Palestinians for that purpose.[11]

Major sovereignty questions remained at the city’s holy places and in the Old City.[3] These included the Armenian Quarter, the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, and Jewish sites within the Holy Basin, particularly the Mount of Olives.[3] The negotiations also addressed the boundaries of the Western Wall and the administration of each side’s holy places.[3] The parties accepted the principle that each would administer its own holy sites, while sovereignty at some of the most sensitive locations remained unresolved.[3]

Israeli representatives proposed a special regime for the Holy Basin as an alternative to dividing sovereignty, with possibilities including internationalization or joint administration.[14] Yossi Sarid and Shlomo Ben-Ami also proposed a compromise covering four disputed Jerusalem issues: two would be resolved according to the Palestinian position and two according to Israel’s position.[14] That proposal was rejected.[14] The discussion of alternative regimes and linked compromises accompanied, rather than replaced, the negotiations over individual neighborhoods and holy places.[14]

The parties also examined how the two parts of Jerusalem would function alongside one another.[3] The Palestinians proposed an open city without an internal physical division, placing checkpoints outside the two capitals.[3] Israel proposed a geographically more limited open-city area, which the Palestinian side opposed.[3] The Palestinians indicated that, without their broader open-city arrangement, the alternative would be physical separation and travel between the two sides by visa.[3]

Municipal cooperation offered a more specific area of convergence.[3] The delegations agreed to coordinate matters such as infrastructure, electricity, and roads through a committee rather than through a single umbrella municipal institution.[3] This distinguished practical coordination between the proposed capitals from a unified municipal authority over both.[3] The open-city question, the extent of the areas involved, and sovereignty at the principal holy places nevertheless remained matters requiring further negotiation.[3]

Yossi Beilin and Nabil Sha’ath led the refugee negotiations, which addressed historical narratives, possible admission of refugees to Israel, destinations for refugees elsewhere, and international compensation arrangements.[15] The discussions included an international fund for personal compensation.[15] They also explored return or restitution involving Israel, territory exchanged between the parties, or a future Palestinian state, together with resettlement in third countries or in refugees’ existing countries of residence.[5]

The refugee discussions linked United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and General Assembly Resolution 194 to the search for a settlement.[10] Both sides proposed that a just resolution of the refugee issue under Resolution 242 should lead to implementation of Resolution 194.[10] They continued to disagree over the right of return and how it would be implemented.[15] Israeli willingness to receive some refugees was discussed alongside broader arrangements for compensation and alternative destinations.[15]

The parties also addressed the future of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, agreeing that UNRWA would be gradually dissolved.[5] Israel raised the issue of Jewish refugees from Arab states, while the Palestinian delegation maintained that this subject did not belong within an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.[5] The refugee agenda consequently extended beyond admission to Israel to include institutional arrangements and the scope of the claims to be covered.[5]

Numerical proposals varied across the discussions.[15] Beilin expressed willingness to receive 25,000 refugees during the first three years of a 15-year arrangement, without first consulting Barak.[15] A separate account gives a figure of 40,000 for Beilin’s proposal.[15] Palestinian figures for admission to Israel ranged in different accounts from 100,000 to 300,000, while one Israeli account cited 1.5 million over ten years.[15] Another description reports discussion of admitting 100,000–150,000 refugees to Israel from a refugee population of approximately 3.7 million.[1]

The discussions did not produce a final refugee settlement with agreed numbers, scale, and legal arrangements.[11] Beilin and Sha’ath described progress or an agreement on elements of the issue, including compensation and principles governing destinations, but Palestinian objections continued over Israeli responsibility for the refugee problem and recognition of a right of return.[15] Those unresolved questions remained central even as the negotiators explored practical mechanisms for an eventual settlement.[15]

Israel sought security arrangements involving Palestinian airspace, an Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley, and early-warning facilities.[5] The Palestinian delegation opposed Israeli forces remaining in parts of the West Bank but accepted the possibility of an international force.[5] The delegations also differed over the timetable for Israeli withdrawal, with Israel seeking a longer schedule and the Palestinians a shorter one.[5]

More detailed proposals included an Israeli preference for a non-militarized Palestinian state and Palestinian willingness to accept limits on arms.[10] Israel proposed three early-warning stations on Palestinian territory, whose continued operation the Palestinian side was prepared to accept under conditions.[10] Another account describes five early-warning systems, while a separate description reports an Israeli request for eight military positions in the Jordan Valley.[5][11] Israel also sought full control of the airspace over the West Bank and Gaza, a proposal rejected by the Palestinian delegation.[11]

The proposed withdrawal schedules differed substantially.[10] Israel proposed a 36-month withdrawal from the West Bank, followed by an additional 36 months for the Jordan Valley, accompanied by an international force.[10] The Palestinian proposal envisaged an 18-month withdrawal under international supervision, with a possible additional ten months for Israeli forces to leave the Jordan Valley.[10] Border monitoring and verification arrangements remained unresolved.[10]

These discussions connected the proposed Palestinian state’s security limitations to the duration and form of Israel’s continuing presence during a transition.[10] International supervision and forces appeared in the proposals, but the parties did not settle how such arrangements would replace or accompany Israeli deployments.[10][5] Security therefore remained an unfinished component of the permanent-status package rather than a completed agreement awaiting implementation.[11]

The January 27 joint statement attributed the absence of a comprehensive agreement to circumstances and time constraints, particularly the political timetable.[2] The delegations hoped to bridge the remaining gaps after Israel’s election, scheduled for February 6, and pledged to work toward normalcy and improved security in the spirit of the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum.[9] They closed with the words, “We leave Taba in a spirit of hope and mutual achievement.”[2]

After the meeting, EU envoy Miguel Moratinos consulted representatives of both sides and prepared an unofficial, non-binding document outlining areas of possible agreement and the differences that remained.[3] Its discussion of Jerusalem included the neighborhood-based sovereignty principle, administration of holy places, and continuing differences over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, Western Wall boundaries, and an open city.[3] The document provided a retrospective account of negotiating positions rather than a signed permanent-status settlement.[3]

Ariel Sharon’s victory in the February 2001 election was followed by the cessation of Israeli-Palestinian final-status negotiations, which did not resume during his premiership.[3] The incoming government expressed willingness to continue negotiations but indicated that it would not be bound by understandings reached by its predecessor.[16] Violence continued in the Palestinian territories.[16] The anticipated early resumption of the Taba process therefore did not occur during Sharon’s time as prime minister.[3]

The ideas associated with Taba nevertheless remained in subsequent political discussion.[17] In October 2001, Yoram Gabbai described the talks as producing “considerable rapprochement,” while arguing that changed political circumstances left the understandings under discussion with no chance of implementation.[17] A December 2001 commentary discussed returning to the “Taba understandings” as one possible future policy, alongside an interim accord and extensive withdrawals from Gaza and the West Bank.[18] These references treated Taba as a possible basis for future policy, not as an agreement already in force.[18]

The contrast between the delegations’ declaration that they had “never been closer” and the absence of a comprehensive agreement has shaped Taba’s legacy.[2][19] Saeb Erekat later expressed his belief that the two peoples could make peace, saying, “my heart aches because I know we were so close.”[19] Such recollections preserved the summit’s association with a negotiating opportunity that ended without an agreement.[19]

Retrospective assessments differ over which issues were nearest resolution.[17][20] Gabbai wrote that formulations concerning refugees and the right of return were “very nearly agreed upon,” supporting his view that refugees were not the pivotal difference between the parties.[17] In a 2010 interview, Alan Dershowitz offered a different emphasis, recounting that Clinton had described Jerusalem at Camp David and Taba as “resolved, essentially,” while identifying the right of return as the major unresolved issue.[20] This was Dershowitz’s secondhand recollection rather than a direct Clinton statement in that interview.[20]

The strongest documentary distinction is between the closing joint statement, which recorded progress and outstanding issues, and retrospective reconstructions of particular proposals.[2][3] No official note-taking took place at Taba, and subsequent accounts differ over the extent of progress.[1] Territorial percentages also depend on calculation boundaries, including whether East Jerusalem and parts of the Jordan Valley are counted.[1] Figures such as 92, 94, or 97 percent consequently do not establish a mutually agreed map.[12][1]

Critical interpretations emphasize the remaining gaps rather than the closing optimism.[21] The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs recounts Dahlan dismissing Ben-Ami’s claim of closeness as “kharta barta,” glossed as “baloney,” and cites Moratinos’s observation that “serious gaps remain.”[21] A separate commentary from the same center argues that the talks were not close to a comprehensive agreement.[22] The summit’s record thus preserves both substantive negotiating movement and an unfinished settlement, without a shared final document resolving their relationship.[2][3]