Steve J. Rosen

Rosen worked for 23 years at AIPAC and served as its director of foreign-policy issues. He helped shape AIPAC’s decision to expand its lobbying of the executive branch; the related internal dispute contributed to the end of Douglas Bloomfield’s career as the group’s chief congressional lobbyist in 1988.[1] Daniel Pipes, writing in an opinion article, described Rosen as responsible for AIPAC’s relations with the State Department, National Security Council, and other executive-branch agencies, and credited him with helping pioneer executive-branch lobbying in the mid-1980s.[5]

Pipes also reported that Rosen headed Middle East issues for the RAND Corporation, taught at the University of Pittsburgh, Brandeis University, and Australian National University, and co-authored the textbook The Logic of International Relations.[5] The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs identifies him as having served as associate director of RAND’s National Security Strategies Program before joining AIPAC.[2]

After leaving AIPAC, Rosen worked with conservative organizations.[6] In 2008, the Middle East Forum began funding his work on efforts to stop Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons; after Barack Obama’s inauguration, the forum brought him on as a visiting fellow. In that role, he launched the forum’s Washington Project, the weblog Obama Mideast Monitor, and a publication series called The Policy Forum.[5] The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs identifies him as director of the Washington Project.[2]

Pipes credited Rosen with pursuing economic pressure on Iran before the issue became a broad public concern, including efforts to secure two presidential orders in 1995 and contributions to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.[5] In 2012, Rosen authored an article titled “Israeli Settlements, American Pressure, and Peace.”[2] In a 2021 interview, he described AIPAC’s approach as essentially bipartisan, saying the organization sought majorities for pro-Israel legislation and resolutions and worked to deter or defeat measures it considered problematic.[6]

In April 2005, AIPAC dismissed Rosen and fellow official Keith Weissman. Rosen was then described as the organization’s policy director and a prominent official; Weissman worked on Iran-related matters.[7] The case arose from disclosures by Lawrence Franklin, a U.S. Department of Defense analyst. The information involved subjects including al-Qaeda, U.S. policy toward Iran, and the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia.[8]

Rosen and Weissman were indicted on August 4, 2005, as participants in a conspiracy involving classified information.[8] The indictment alleged that they received national-defense information from government employees who were not authorized to disclose it and passed it to others, including Israeli officials, AIPAC personnel, and a Washington Post reporter.[3] The charges included conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 793(g) to violate sections 793(d) and (e); Rosen was also charged with a violation of section 793(d). Neither man was charged with espionage, and both denied wrongdoing.[3][9]

The prosecution was notable because it was the first known criminal case to charge recipients of leaked classified information in this context.[3] Rosen and Weissman were also the first nongovernment employees indicted under the 1917 Espionage Act for receiving classified information orally.[8] Their defense argued that they were exercising First Amendment-protected speech and that the law was intended to punish government officials who disclosed secrets.[8]

In August 2007, the trial judge said that First Amendment rights could yield to national-security needs, while requiring the government to show that national security was genuinely at risk and that those disclosing information knew disclosure could harm the country.[8] The judge also ordered Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and other officials to testify about conversations with the defendants. The defense sought to portray the meetings as examples of AIPAC serving as a diplomatic back channel for the U.S. government; this was the defense’s argument, not a finding about the purpose of the meetings.[8]

In June 2008, an appeals court left in place a ruling requiring the prosecution to prove that the defendants knew the information was classified national-defense information and unlawful to disclose, and had a bad-faith reason to believe disclosure could harm the United States or aid a foreign nation. The appeals court also rejected the prosecution’s appeal of a ruling that proceedings remain open to the public.[8] In February 2009, an appeals-court ruling allowed the defense to use classified material, including an Israeli government document indicating that U.S. officials had routinely shared information almost identical to information the defendants received with Israeli counterparts.[4]

On May 1, 2009, the government moved to dismiss the charges, citing the risk that a trial would reveal classified information and doubts about its ability to prevail. Prosecutors dropped the case, which ended without a trial or jury verdict against Rosen.[3][4] Rosen later told the Jerusalem Post that the case had cost him his livelihood, professional relationships, and reputation; he also filed a civil suit against AIPAC, alleging that the organization had wronged him by firing him during the proceedings.[10]

Rosen’s documented institutional influence includes helping move AIPAC toward sustained lobbying of the executive branch. The internal dispute over that shift contributed to the end of Douglas Bloomfield’s tenure as chief congressional lobbyist in 1988.[1]

The criminal case against Rosen and Weissman also became a reference point in legal debate over the Espionage Act’s application to recipients of leaked information. The Congressional Research Service described it as the first known prosecution of that kind and noted that later courts distinguished the district judge’s interpretation of the intent required for conviction.[3]

The allegations prompted conflicting public statements. AIPAC had initially said that nothing illegal had been done, while a subsequent statement suggested that Rosen and Weissman had overstepped its rules. Their lawyer, Abe Lowell, said, “They have not violated any US law or AIPAC policy”; AIPAC’s spokesman responded that the lawyer’s statement represented only the defendants’ view of the facts.[7] The indictment and prosecution concerned allegations, not findings of guilt, and the charges were dismissed before a trial verdict.[3][4]

The case raised questions about how the Espionage Act applies to people who receive and pass along leaked information, and about what intent the government must establish. The prosecution prompted debate over whether such applications of the law could criminalize ordinary information-gathering. Later courts distinguished the trial judge’s interpretation of the intent requirement in Rosen, explaining that a “reason to believe” standard does not necessarily require an intent to cause harm.[3]

A 2006 Congressional Research Service report recorded an allegation that the FBI authorized Franklin to provide classified information to the AIPAC officials as a sting, expecting the information to be passed to the Israeli Embassy. The report presented this as an allegation, not an established finding.[9] Rosen was not charged with spying for Israel, and prosecutors later stated that AIPAC employees had not spied for a foreign country.[11]