Shas

Shas brought a distinct Sephardi religious constituency into Israeli national politics, separating its representation from the Ashkenazi-dominated Agudat Israel framework.[4][5] Its followers have roots in Jewish communities of the Middle East and North Africa and have included both ultra-Orthodox Jews and people whose religious practice is described as traditional.[2] The movement has therefore extended beyond a narrowly Haredi electorate, appealing to voters seeking recognition for Sephardi religious traditions and greater social and political representation.[4]

The party’s institutional identity combines rabbinic authority with electoral politics: a Council of Torah Sages provides its religious leadership, while its representatives pursue government funding, religious legislation, and participation in coalition governments.[6][7] Education and social services have been central to that work, particularly support for religious institutions and opposition to measures ending ultra-Orthodox military-service exemptions.[1] Shas has joined governments led by both the left and the right, although it has more often supported right-wing governments.[8]

The name Shas is associated with the Sephardi Shomrei Torah Association and the Hebrew ballot letters Shin and Samekh; those letters also evoke the six orders of the Talmud.[4] Another expansion of the name is Shomrei S’farad, meaning “Sephardi Guardians.”[1] Its communal message has been expressed through the aspiration to “return the crown to the former glory,” linking religious renewal with efforts to address what the party regards as continuing economic and social discrimination against Sephardi Jews.[6]

Shas’s municipal roots preceded its emergence as a national party in 1984: a Jerusalem movement organized in 1982 by Yaakov Cohen, Nissim Ze’ev, and Shlomo Dayan sought an independent political vehicle for Sephardi Jews.[4] The organizers believed that Sephardim were disregarded within Ashkenazi-led Agudat Yisrael and wanted to appeal both to ultra-Orthodox Sephardim and to Mizrahim who were not fully observant.[4] In Jerusalem’s 1983 municipal election, Shas won three of the council’s 21 seats.[5]

The national party emerged from grievances about the representation of ultra-Orthodox Sephardim in Agudat Israel’s Council of Torah Sages, party organization, and educational and welfare institutions.[4][5] Former Sephardi chief rabbi Ovadia Yosef became its spiritual leader and established a seven-member Council of Torah Sages, while Rabbi Yitzhak Haim Peretz initially served as political leader.[9] Rabbi Eliezer Menachem Shach supported its establishment as a separate Sephardi faction.[9] Yosef had served as Sephardi chief rabbi from 1972 to 1983 before turning toward party politics.[10]

The party won four seats in its first Knesset election in 1984, compared with Agudat Israel’s two, drawing support from Haredi and traditional voters alike.[9] Its success contrasted with the decline of Tami, a more religiously moderate party appealing to a similar Sephardi-religious constituency.[11] Shas joined the national unity government formed after the election, and Peretz became interior minister.[9] During that government, promoting religious legislation placed it in competition with the National Religious Party and Agudat Israel.[11]

Shas’s early coalition behavior combined alignment with the right-wing bloc with tactical pressure on Likud, including a brief resignation from government and contacts with Labor.[11] Peretz resigned as interior minister in January 1987 after the High Court of Justice ruled that Susan, or Shoshana, Miller should be registered as Jewish on her identity card following conversion through a Reform rabbi.[9] The ministry was subsequently run by its director general, Aryeh Deri, and Peretz later returned to government as a minister without portfolio.[9]

After winning six seats in 1988, Shas again entered a national unity government, with Deri becoming interior minister and the party’s political leader.[9] In March 1990, five Shas lawmakers were absent from a no-confidence vote, helping Shimon Peres bring down the government.[9] When Peres failed to assemble a replacement, Shas joined Yitzhak Shamir’s right-wing religious government.[9] These events demonstrated the parliamentary leverage available to a religious party able to negotiate across competing coalition possibilities.[9]

Shas retained six seats in 1992 and joined Yitzhak Rabin’s government as its only religious party.[9] That decision prompted a split with Shach, after which Yosef remained the party’s undisputed spiritual leader.[10] Shas sought Shulamit Aloni’s removal from the Education and Culture Ministry and left the government in August 1993 amid external pressure, criminal charges against Deri, and the attorney general’s calls for his resignation.[9] Its departure occurred approximately a month before the Declaration of Principles with the Palestine Liberation Organization was signed in Washington.[9]

In 1996, Shas increased its representation to 10 seats and joined Benjamin Netanyahu’s government.[9] Three years later, it won a record 17 seats, becoming the third-largest party after One Israel and Likud.[3] Its 1999 support varied considerably by locality: it received 17 percent in Jerusalem, where it was the largest party, and 44 percent in Netivot.[3] The election used separate ballots for prime minister and Knesset party, allowing voters to distinguish their preferred national leader from their parliamentary choice.[12]

The 1999 campaign unfolded alongside Deri’s conviction and a political campaign presenting him as unfairly targeted by the establishment.[3] A 90-minute videotape, “J’accuse,” directed by Uri Zohar, featured Deri defending himself and attacking the establishment.[3] The campaign’s defense of Deri became intertwined with appeals to Sephardi communal solidarity and grievances about unequal treatment.[3] Eli Yishai was the party’s political leader when it entered Ehud Barak’s government following the election.[9]

Barak’s coalition included Shas alongside One Israel, Meretz, the Center Party, Mafdal, Yahadut Hatorah, and Yisrael B’aliyah.[13] Shas agreed that Deri would hold no formal or decision-making party position and that it would not control the Interior Ministry.[3] Deri resigned as party head, and six Shas members joined the government in July 1999.[14] Barak also postponed most proposed changes to yeshiva students’ military exemptions pending a commission’s review.[3]

Financial and diplomatic disagreements strained that partnership.[9][15] In December 1999, the Council of Torah Sages instructed Shas’s cabinet and Knesset representatives to leave the coalition after the government rejected demands covering a deficit in the Ma’ayan education network and increased welfare, health, and religious-affairs budgets.[15] The party’s subsequent departure was also associated with opposition to Barak’s willingness to make far-reaching concessions to the Palestinian Authority.[9]

Shas won 11 seats in 2003 and 12 in 2006, entering the Kadima-led government after the latter election.[7] It opposed Netanyahu’s economic policies in the early 2000s, particularly reductions in social transfers and child-support benefits, and opposed Ariel Sharon’s disengagement policy.[9] Its 2006 participation brought four cabinet posts, including Yishai’s appointment as minister of industry, trade and labor.[9] In 2009, the party won 11 seats.[6]

Coalition negotiations in 2008 highlighted two major priorities: restoring a child-allowance formula benefiting large ultra-Orthodox families and ending negotiations with the Palestinians concerning Jerusalem.[16] By the 2013 election, its political agenda remained concentrated on sectoral education, public funding, and social welfare, while Yosef’s positions had moved rightward.[17] Deri returned to the party in 2013 and resumed its political leadership.[6]

In the November 2022 election, Shas won 11 seats, increasing from nine in each of the three preceding elections.[18] Its campaign emphasized the cost of living, Jewish identity, and social assistance, while invoking Yosef’s image and memory as symbols of communal belonging.[18] Shas belonged to the group of parties supporting Netanyahu, which collectively won 64 seats and enabled him to form a religious and right-wing coalition.[19] Together, Shas and United Torah Judaism increased their representation from 16 to 18 seats and their combined vote share from 12.8 percent in 2021 to 14.2 percent in 2022.[20]

On July 16, 2025, Shas announced its withdrawal from the government following a Council of Torah Sages decision concerning what it called unacceptable harm to the status of Torah scholars.[6] Its ministers formally resigned the next day, but the party remained within Netanyahu’s parliamentary coalition and said it was not seeking early elections.[6] The dispute concerned Haredi conscription, making the distinction between leaving ministerial office and leaving the governing coalition politically important.[6]

Shas won six seats in the October 27, 2026 election, with its final profile listing 299,506 votes, or 5.26 percent.[1] The party said it would join a Netanyahu-led government.[1] After the result, Deri withdrew from the new Knesset while retaining the chairmanship at the Council of Torah Sages’ instruction, saying he would make room for younger representatives and continue directing the parliamentary faction.[21] Shas’s six representatives entered the 26th Knesset when it was sworn in on November 10, 2026.[1][21]

Shas established the Ma’ayan Torah Education Network in 1984 to provide schooling for Mizrahi children whose families had experienced discrimination in Haredi institutions operated under United Torah Judaism auspices.[22] The network helped develop an independent Mizrahi Haredi community that relied less on Ashkenazi institutions and could give greater expression to its own religious traditions.[22] Associated institutions also included El Hamaayan, a social, religious, and youth movement.[4]

A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs study argues that Shach’s early-1980s campaign against excluding Sephardi pupils from Haredi schools contributed to Shas’s establishment and the formation of a separate educational stream.[23] The study describes Maayan Hahinukh Hatorani, or “Torah Education Spring,” as formally recognized at the end of 1991 with status equal to the Ashkenazi Independent educational stream.[23] It presents Maayan’s acceptance of children from non-Haredi and sometimes secular homes as an expansionist alternative to restrictive admissions practices elsewhere in Haredi education.[23]

The same study gives Maayan enrollment as 18,332 in 2005–06, 20,718 in 2006–07, and 21,334 in 2007–08.[23] Its corresponding figures for the Independent educational stream are 68,836, 70,729, and 71,051 pupils.[23] Government-funded education associated with Shas became popular in poor Sephardi towns and helped broaden the party’s support.[6] Encouraging a return to religious observance was an explicit component of its educational activity.[9]

The party’s wider social network has offered day-care centers, preschool education, inexpensive summer camps, and food and clothing for people in need.[24] Schools, clinics, and youth groups formed part of its reputation for practical assistance during the 1999 campaign.[25] These services addressed daily needs among lower-income communities, including supporters who felt neglected by government.[24] A Druze leader considering work on the party’s behalf summarized that reputation by saying Shas “delivers.”[25]

Its electoral organization has also depended on local branches, municipal influence, volunteers, and activists.[18] In 2022, gains included support in Tiberias, Beersheba, Afula, and Netanya, along with approximately 3,000 additional voters in Ashdod.[18] A large campaign gathering in Ramla accompanied a reported 30 percent increase in the party’s vote there compared with the previous election.[18]

Outreach has not been confined to Jewish voters.[26] At a 2013 campaign event in Abu Sanan attended by Muslims, Christians, Bedouins, and Druze, Deri called for a joint Jewish-Arab struggle for equality and said he felt at home.[26] An organizer estimated that Shas had received votes from 8,000 Druze, Christians, and Bedouins in the preceding election.[26] Earlier, its use of the Interior Ministry had helped attract Arab and Druze support.[3]

In parliamentary practice, Shas has sought public financial support for its constituents while promoting Orthodox Judaism.[8] Its priorities include additional funding for religious education and communities, protecting Haredim from military service, and expanding the influence of Jewish law in society.[1] Seeking resources for its educational and social institutions has repeatedly shaped coalition negotiations and threats to bring down governments.[24] Its demands for higher child allowances have connected support for large religious families with a broader appeal to economically vulnerable households.[4]

On religion-and-state questions, Shas has opposed civil marriage and resisted further secularization.[27] Its public positions have included opposition to public expressions of homosexuality, particularly Pride parades in Jerusalem.[6] Its 2026 election presentation opposed LGBTQ rights and non-Orthodox Judaism while describing the party as a guardian of traditional Jewish values and an ally of poor and working-class voters.[28] The party had not published a platform for that election.[28]

Territorial policy has changed over time rather than following a single unchanging formula.[9][7] Its early relative moderation followed Yosef’s declaration that lives mattered more than territory, though the party was less dovish by 1996.[9] During the 1999 campaign, it supported territorial compromise with the Palestinians and withdrawal from the Golan Heights.[25] A later account of its religious reasoning described territorial compromise as permissible when lives were at stake and something was received in return.[7]

Shas supported Palestinian autonomy while opposing a Palestinian state and took an equivocal approach to the peace accords of the 1990s.[27] After later moving right, it opposed a freeze in settlement activity in the West Bank—the territory known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[6] By 2026, opposition to compromise over control of Jerusalem remained among its stated political positions.[29] Domestic religious and social priorities have generally occupied more of its attention than foreign policy or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[1]

Shas created an organized political and institutional home for Sephardi Haredi Jews outside Ashkenazi-dominated religious frameworks.[4][5] Its significance extended beyond legislative representation to the preservation of communal customs and recognition of Sephardi religious culture.[4] Some Sephardi students in Ashkenazi yeshivas felt expected to adopt Yiddish and Ashkenazi prayer practices while continuing to experience inferior treatment, and supporters understood Shas as a means of maintaining traditions learned at home.[4]

The party’s attraction among non-Haredi voters was particularly visible in the 1990s, when even some nonobservant Sephardim supported it as an expression of grievances concerning education, employment, and housing.[8] Its electorate thus linked ultra-Orthodox leadership with a wider traditional public rather than corresponding simply to one level of religious observance.[2] This breadth helped make cultural identity, social recognition, and religious institutions interconnected elements of its political appeal.[4]

Many supporters worked, served in the military, and identified strongly with Israel, including people who described themselves as traditional or secular.[30] For these voters, restoring respect for Sephardi heritage could matter alongside material assistance.[30] Yosef’s motto about restoring the crown expressed a program of religious and cultural renewal in which poverty and educational failure were connected to diminished communal confidence.[30] His work to elevate Sephardi religious life predated the party, including the establishment in 1953 of a yeshiva devoted to Sephardi law and tradition.[12]

Shas’s educational and welfare institutions gave organizational form to that identity and enabled engagement with families beyond its strictly Haredi core.[22][24] Its rise to 17 seats in 1999 demonstrated the scale of an appeal combining religious commitment, Sephardi identification, and practical services.[3][24] Its ability to negotiate with different political camps made it an important coalition power broker rather than merely a protest vehicle.[3][8]

The movement also encompassed varied communities and centers of authority.[2] At a 2014 seminar, scholar Nissim Leon characterized it as a “haredi-Sephardi political federation of communities,” with differing styles, initiatives, interests, and power centers.[2] Yosef’s leadership connected its Israeli and ultra-Orthodox identities, giving the movement a unifying figure across those constituencies.[2] His image and memory continued to feature prominently in the 2022 campaign.[18]

Longer-term parliamentary figures also show the durability of organized Haredi representation: Shas and United Torah Judaism together held between 16 and 18 seats from 2003 through the period assessed after the 2022 election.[20] Those totals concern both parties, not Shas alone.[20] Shas’s distinctive contribution within that wider sector has been its combination of Sephardi religious authority, communal institutions, and support reaching into traditional Mizrahi society.[2]

Deri’s criminal convictions have repeatedly affected Shas’s leadership and public standing.[14][31] He was convicted in 1999 of bribery, fraud, and breach of trust connected to his service as interior minister. His initial four-year prison sentence was reduced to three years, and he served 22 months.[14][31] The party’s 1999 campaign portrayed him as a victim of unfair establishment treatment, while opponents maintained that legal standards applied equally to everyone.[3] His 2022 tax conviction brought a 12-month suspended sentence and a NIS 180,000 fine, and in January 2023 the High Court of Justice blocked his ministerial appointment as “unreasonable in the extreme” in light of his convictions.[31]

Military conscription has generated a significant dispute between Shas’s Haredi leadership and parts of its wider traditional constituency, including military-serving families.[32] In 2025, party representatives and rabbis opposed enlistment targets for Haredi men, while differing accounts circulated about whether the founding-era party accepted service for people not engaged in Torah study.[32] Shas clarified that one legislator’s remarks about prison and Torah study concerned full-time students rather than opposition to every form of enlistment.[32]

Following the 2026 electoral decline, some party officials criticized its hardline conscription position and called for organizational change.[33] In Netivot, its vote share fell from 42.5 percent in 2022 to 28.9 percent in 2026, with declines also recorded in Ofakim and Kiryat Malachi.[34] Explanations advanced for these losses included political and rabbinic rifts, opposition to enlistment, and perceived distance between leaders and peripheral communities; these remain interpretations of the result rather than a single established cause.[34] The Council of Torah Sages rejected Deri’s request to resign as chairman after the six-seat result.[6][21]

The movement’s educational independence has also raised questions about cultural representation.[22] A review of its textbooks found continuing prominence for Ashkenazi culture and little representation of Yosef in the materials examined, despite the network’s role in asserting Mizrahi tradition.[22] Critics have characterized some demands for public funding as “political blackmail,” while a former party secretary questioned how far its social policies had reduced disparities between Israel’s center and periphery.[4][18]

Descriptions of its desired relationship between religion and the state have differed: one presents advocacy of government according to Halakha, while another emphasizes preservation of Jewish identity within state law under the phrase “a state with a Jewish soul.”[6][7] Interpretations of its future have likewise remained provisional: a 2014 forecast suggested that after Yosef’s death Shas might lose traditional voters and become more narrowly Sephardi Haredi, but that was a contemporary prediction rather than a demonstrated electoral outcome.[2]