Settlement Movement in Israel

The settlement movement encompasses organizations, activists, political networks, and state-supported initiatives that promoted Jewish communities beyond the pre-1967 Green Line, especially in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria. Religious-nationalist activists became especially prominent after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, but settlement policy also reflected government security planning and other state priorities.[4][9]

The movement should not be equated with everyone who has lived in a settlement. Settler communities have included religious and secular residents, new immigrants, ultra-Orthodox Jews, ideological activists, and people drawn primarily by housing costs, convenience, or living standards.[6][4]

Settlement development likewise cannot be reduced to a single cause. Government planning, strategic arguments, religious and national commitments, metropolitan growth, economic incentives, and organized political pressure all contributed, with their relative importance changing over time.[2][3]

The movement’s religious-nationalist roots are commonly traced to the aftermath of the June 1967 Six-Day War, when Israel took control of East Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria, Gaza, Sinai, and the Golan Heights. Some religious Zionists interpreted Israel’s victory as divine intervention and settlement across the biblical Land of Israel as part of a process of religious redemption. This outlook drew on the thought of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook and the later influence of his son, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook.[1]

Settlement activity did not begin as a single unified movement. Early government initiatives and private religious-nationalist efforts overlapped. Some of the first communities were reestablished in locations where Jews had lived before 1948, including Hebron and Kfar Etzion in the Jerusalem–Bethlehem corridor.[6]

An early landmark came during Passover in 1968, when a small group of religious Zionist activists established themselves in Hebron’s Park Hotel. The episode led to the establishment of Kiryat Arba and then a renewed Jewish settlement in Hebron. The initiative became a model for activists who sought to create a durable presence and then press the government to accommodate it.[4]

Gush Emunim, meaning “Bloc of the Faithful,” later gave organizational form to a program that treated settlement as a means of realizing Zionism and advancing the redemption of the Land of Israel. Its founders and early supporters came from religious-Zionist settlements, yeshiva and youth networks, the National Religious Party, and other religious and nationalist constituencies.[10] Sources differ over its precise formal founding date: the Center for Israel Education gives February 7, 1974, while the Library of Congress account places its formation in March 1974. The organization is therefore best understood as a collective formation in early 1974 rather than the creation of one individual.[11][5]

During the first decade after 1967, Labor governments pursued settlement while also considering negotiations over the territories. On June 26, 1967, Yigal Allon submitted a proposal titled “The Future of the Territories and Ways to Handle the Refugees” to Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. It envisaged retaining security-critical areas, especially the Jordan Valley and the mountain ridge above it, while leaving densely Arab-populated areas for Arab rule or another agreed arrangement.[2]

The plan was never formally adopted as a government program, but its principles influenced construction. From 1968 through 1977, 76 settlements were established according to its outline, although that figure covers territories beyond the West Bank as well.[2] A Library of Congress account records that more than 30 settlements had been established in the West Bank by 1976.[11]

The Allon approach envisioned agricultural settlements in a sparsely populated strip along the Jordan River and the western shores of the Dead Sea, as well as communities around Jerusalem and near the Green Line. One account describes the Jordan Valley strip as approximately 12 to 15 kilometers wide. The rest of the West Bank was eventually to become an autonomous area under Jordanian administration.[11][12]

The rationales extended beyond military security. They included defensible borders, strategic maneuverability, settling the Land of Israel, creating territorially contiguous Jewish settlement, agricultural production, employment, and support for local livelihoods. Settlements in this period were mostly agricultural, while the government avoided a definitive decision on long-term borders and the population to be included within them.[2]

The plan’s exact role remains a matter of interpretation. It was not formal government policy, but its geographic and security principles served as a practical reference for some settlement development. Gush Emunim subsequently challenged this limited approach by advocating settlement throughout Judea and Samaria, particularly in its central highlands.[2][9]

Gush Emunim took shape after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, drawing on activists who opposed territorial compromise and advocated Jewish settlement throughout the Land of Israel. Its early core included students and graduates of Jerusalem’s Merkaz Harav yeshiva, activists from Igud Hamoshavim, Hapoel Mizrahi, and Hakibbutz Hadati, and supporters in the National Religious Party’s “young guard.”[4]

The movement interpreted the establishment of Israel as the “Beginning of the Redemption” and regarded settlement throughout the land west of the Jordan as a means toward complete redemption.[10] It initially operated within the National Religious Party before moving away from party politics. Although it never became a political party, its activists gained influence through political parties, regional councils, and settlement organizations.[10][9]

Its Samaria campaign involved repeated attempts in 1974 and 1975 to establish a civilian presence near Sebastia. The army removed participants from unauthorized sites, but during Hanukkah 1975 thousands of supporters gathered at the old railway station. A compromise eventually permitted the group to settle at the nearby military camp of Kaddum, from which Kedumim developed.[10][13]

Haim Gouri, who was reporting on the confrontation, became an intermediary between the settlers and the Rabin government. He brokered an arrangement allowing 30 people to remain legally, which was later interpreted as permitting 30 families.[13] A separate agreement provided for the settlement nucleus to live in an IDF camp, with Defense Ministry housing and employment for 30 families and a later government discussion of settlement plans.[14]

The Sebastia episode became a turning point because it demonstrated the movement’s ability to obtain concessions through confrontation and negotiation. The movement sought not only to establish facts on the ground but also to create the municipal organizations and political networks needed to sustain communities over time.[4][8]

Likud’s 1977 victory changed the political environment for settlement. Labor’s earlier policy had been driven primarily by security considerations, while Prime Minister Menachem Begin expressed an ideological and biblical attachment to the territories and regarded Jewish settlement there as the fulfillment of prophecy.[11]

The new policy did not depend solely on religious settlers. The government offered low-interest mortgages and other economic benefits, including to secular Israelis who were not members of Gush Emunim, and developed military bases and road, electricity, and water networks.[11] Settlement strategy also expanded to locations near densely populated Palestinian cities and to suburban communities near Israeli cities along the Green Line, helping attract middle-class residents.[1]

Government departments, the army, and the World Zionist Organization supported Gush Emunim’s settlement activities. The WZO recognized the organization as an official settlement movement and allocated funding, while Amana became its operational settlement arm.[11]

The Yesha Council—whose name refers to Judea, Samaria, and Gaza—developed as a representative body for local authorities and settlement communities. Founded in the late 1970s as a successor to Gush Emunim, it sought to strengthen Jewish presence in the territories. Gush Emunim itself ceased to operate as a movement in the 1980s, while organizations such as Amana and the Yesha Council continued much of its practical and political work.[8][15]

The scale of settlement increased substantially. One account gives about 13,000 settlers in the territories in 1977 and nearly a quarter million by 2005.[1] By the end of 1986, the Library of Congress recorded 51,200 Jews in the West Bank and 2,100 in the Gaza Strip, distributed across 122 localities. It also recorded 7,094 new residents in 1985 and about 5,160 in 1986, citing religious and national commitments, housing costs, and economic incentives among their motives.[11]

The settlement movement and the population living in settlements are not interchangeable. Residents have included religious and nonreligious people, while communities have ranged from those rooted chiefly in ideology to those associated primarily with affordable housing or living standards. In 2005, ideological settlers were described as a minority of the overall population in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, although religious-ideological settlers had a dominant voice in the Yesha Council.[4]

The settler population has also included secular Israelis, new immigrants, ultra-Orthodox Jews, and people attracted by affordability or convenience. Many supporters describe the communities as a “first line of defense” for Israel.[6]

Housing and metropolitan growth became increasingly important from the 1980s onward. Planning restrictions were eased to facilitate suburban communities, while improved roads and transport links made West Bank communities more attractive to residents motivated by economic as well as ideological considerations. Communities within commuting distance of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem offered detached homes on comparatively inexpensive plots.[12]

A peer-reviewed study treats settlement as a state-planning and urban-development process as well as a result of ideological activism. Focusing on large, state-sponsored suburban settlements and the Ministry of Housing’s role from the mid-1970s through the early 1990s, it argues that metropolitan growth and a shift toward market-oriented policy were major factors in settlement proliferation.[3]

The communities also depended on public infrastructure and municipal organization. Roads, electricity, water, local councils, schools, and public services connected settlements to Israel’s political and economic systems. These institutions enabled a movement that began through small activist groups to sustain larger and more socially diverse communities.[11][10]

Gush Emunim increasingly worked through organizations capable of building communities, coordinating residents, and engaging with government. Amanah, established in 1980, became its operational settlement arm. In the period covered by the Encyclopaedia Judaica account, it included more than 50 settlements, nearly all in the West Bank and a minority in Gush Katif. Its communities ranged from about 15–20 families to more than 500, and government recognition enabled it to receive public aid and funding.[10]

The Yesha Council represented settlements and local authorities, coordinating practical matters and political advocacy. Its work included land and water use, relations with Israeli military authorities, and pressure on the government. Gush Emunim figures were substantially represented in the council and related organizations.[11][15]

Settlement development extended beyond residential construction. Municipal and regional councils provided schools, clinics, welfare services, and other public functions, while roads and transportation links connected the communities to Israeli metropolitan centers.[12] Congressional Research Service reporting also describes settlements as increasingly integrated into Israeli political and economic life through infrastructure, local councils, transport, communications, and services.[16]

During the Al-Aqsa intifada, bypass and controlled-access roads were built to allow settlers to reach their homes without driving through Palestinian towns and villages. These roads were intended to improve settler security but also disrupted Palestinian movement, contributing to the wider dispute over territorial contiguity and access.[12]

Settlement activity has covered several territories and has changed through withdrawals as well as expansion. Communities were established after 1967 in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and Sinai Peninsula. Motives included recovery of property lost in 1948, strategic and defense considerations, and efforts to increase Jewish presence in biblical lands. Most, but not all, were authorized and supported by Israeli governments.[17]

Israel dismantled its Sinai settlements in 1982. In 2005, the government carried out disengagement from Gaza and parts of northern Samaria. Ariel Sharon’s plan covered 25 settlements in the two territories and about 8,000 residents scheduled for evacuation.[1] The government had approved the plan on June 6, 2004, describing it as an effort to improve Israel’s security, diplomatic, economic, and demographic conditions and establishing that Israel would no longer settle the Gaza Strip.[18]

The disengagement provoked intense opposition. Demonstrations drew nearly 100,000 people, and some opponents viewed the uprooting of communities as an obstacle to religious redemption. Rabbis disagreed over whether soldiers should participate in evacuation, while settlement leaders rejected fighting the Israel Defense Forces as religiously impermissible and anticipated civil disobedience.[1] All Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip were removed in 2005.[6]

The withdrawal was a defeat for efforts to retain the Gaza communities, but it did not end settlement activity in the West Bank. Public support for further settlement dismantlement declined after the withdrawal, while the movement’s West Bank presence remained a major issue in peace discussions.[5][17]

The 1993 Oslo Accords left settlements’ final status to later negotiations, but construction continued, especially in the West Bank. Settlement populations exceeded 280,000 in 1993, or approximately 130,000 when East Jerusalem was excluded. The difference illustrates how geographic definitions affect reported totals.[17]

In 2010, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to a 10-month moratorium on West Bank settlement construction. Palestinians have described settlement building as the main obstacle to peace, while Israel has treated settlements as one of several final-status issues. Growth outside the principal blocs has also prompted concern about the borders and territorial contiguity of a future Palestinian state.[6]

Population estimates vary according to date and the communities included. The ADL estimates around 400,000 Israelis living in the West Bank in 131 settlements and 97 outposts, with approximately 80 percent in the main blocs near Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and the remainder in more remote communities. The estimate excludes East Jerusalem and should not be conflated with broader totals.[6]

A Congressional Research Service report estimates approximately 660,000 Israelis in residential neighborhoods or settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Its table lists about 432,000 in the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem and 227,100 in East Jerusalem, alongside approximately 132 official residential communities and 141 additional outposts unauthorized under Israeli law.[16]

Britannica reports that the settler population exceeded 737,000 in early 2025, or 503,000 excluding East Jerusalem. By late 2025, it counted about 150 state-authorized settlements excluding East Jerusalem and approximately 220 small unauthorized settlements whose combined populations numbered in the tens of thousands.[17]

These figures are not directly interchangeable. Estimates differ over the inclusion of East Jerusalem, the distinction between an authorized settlement and an outpost, and the date of measurement. They should therefore be read as source-specific snapshots rather than a single universally accepted count.[16][17]

Israel distinguishes authorized settlements from outposts established without the required permission. Some unauthorized sites have been dismantled, while others have remained or later received approval. International legal bodies generally do not accept Israel’s domestic distinction as determining whether settlement activity is lawful under international law.[12][17]

The movement’s lasting influence derives partly from its ability to turn ideological claims into institutions, communities, infrastructure, and political constituencies. Although Gush Emunim ceased to exist as a movement in the 1980s, it gave rise to organizations that continued to advance its Greater Land of Israel outlook and settlement policy. The Yesha Council and Amana carried on important practical and political functions, while settlement supporters became participants in Israel’s governmental and institutional frameworks.[8][15]

Benny Katzover, one of the movement’s early leaders, characterized the settlement campaign as the first time in Zionist history that the religious public “led and was not led.” He credited the campaign with giving religious-Zionist activists confidence that they could influence government, the army, education, and public affairs. This was Katzover’s assessment rather than an independent measurement of the movement’s effects.[19]

The movement’s significance also lies in the interaction of religious and national ideology, state planning, strategic claims, economic incentives, and organized political pressure. No single factor explains the development of every community or the motivations of every resident. Its legacy remains visible in the settlement network, in the political influence of its institutions, and in continuing debates about the boundaries of a two-state agreement.[9][3]

The international-law status of settlements is a major dispute. Most countries and many international jurists hold that transferring an occupying power’s civilian population into occupied territory violates Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Israel describes the West Bank as disputed rather than occupied territory and argues that settlements do not violate international law.[7][16]

Israel disputes both the Convention’s applicability to the West Bank and the interpretation of Article 49, and it argues that the Green Line is not an agreed international border. The majority position described by INSS is reflected in the International Court of Justice’s 2004 advisory opinion and UN Security Council Resolution 2334. Israel rejects that characterization and argues that the territory’s final status should be resolved through negotiations.[7]

The United States’ position has also changed over time. In 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the establishment of Israeli civilian settlements in the West Bank was “not, per se, inconsistent with international law.” That position differed from the majority international view described by INSS and from the approach reflected in Resolution 2334.[7]

Israeli courts have also addressed settlement land and authorization. In the 1979 Elon Moreh case, Arab landowners appealed against a Gush Emunim settlement on a hill above Nablus. On October 22, 1979, the Supreme Court ordered it dismantled after finding insufficient evidence that the site had been selected for security reasons. The settlers were given 30 days to evacuate, and the military government was ordered to cover the landowners’ trial costs.[20]

In 2020, the Supreme Court struck down the 2017 Regulation Law by an 8–1 vote. The law had provided rights of use and possession for settlements built “in good faith” or with state consent. The court held that it disproportionately violated Palestinian residents’ property, dignity, and equality rights by prioritizing Israeli residents and retroactively legitimizing unlawful construction.[21]

Land use, movement, and territorial effects remain disputed. Settlement construction has involved contested classifications of public and private land, while bypass and controlled-access roads built for settler security have disrupted Palestinian movement.[12] Congressional Research Service reporting says the settlement footprint constrains Palestinian claims, movement, and access; some observers characterize the resulting integration and building restrictions as “creeping annexation” or “de facto annexation.”[16]

Settlement tactics and goals have also faced domestic opposition. In a 1976 interview, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin described Gush Emunim as one of the most acute dangers facing Israel, likened it to a cancer in democratic society, and warned about the consequences of incorporating the West Bank’s Arab population without withdrawal.[22] Peace Now opposed settlement construction as an obstacle to an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, while the discovery of a Jewish underground in 1984 produced an internal crisis after 20 Jewish settlers were imprisoned, three with life sentences. Supporters disagreed over whether the underground’s actions were legitimate.[10]