Sammy Smooha

Smooha was born in Baghdad in 1941, shortly after anti-Jewish riots in Iraq in which his father was attacked and injured.[1] The Farhud pogrom took place near the end of his mother's pregnancy; rioters attempted to enter the family home, and his mother and siblings survived by hiding in the basement.[4] His family of nine immigrated to Israel in 1951, arriving at the Kiryat Ono transit camp, where they initially lived in a tent and later in a shack; the family subsequently moved between small communities connected to his father's work as a railway-station manager.[1][4] Israel recognized him as a Holocaust survivor approximately seventy years after his immigration.[4]

Smooha earned a bachelor's degree with honors in psychology and sociology from Bar-Ilan University in 1965, and a doctorate in sociology from the University of California, Los Angeles, in 1973.[1] His doctoral research compared the ethnic, religious-secular, and Jewish-Arab divisions in Israeli society, establishing a focus on internal social divisions that remained central to his scholarly career.[1]

After completing his doctorate, Smooha returned to Israel in 1974 and joined the University of Haifa as a lecturer in sociology, becoming a full professor there in 1990.[1] He served as Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences beginning in 2006 and as President of the Israel Sociological Association in 2008.[1] He has also held visiting positions at universities and research centers outside Israel and is a member of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities.[1][4] He belonged to a generation of University of Haifa scholars who challenged structural-functionalism; his research on disadvantaged Asian-African immigrants and Israeli Arabs emphasized the lack of unity and consensus in Israeli society.[5]

Smooha's scholarly output spans internal divisions in Israeli society, Israeli society in comparative perspective, and Arab-Jewish relations. His 1978 book Israel: Pluralism and Conflict was published in London by Routledge and Kegan Paul.[6] The Israel Prize committee identified it as a turning point in the study of Israeli society and an important contribution to critical sociology in Israel.[1] The 462-page book challenged accounts centered on Jewish social solidarity and cultural integration, instead analyzing social divisions, inequality, and institutional mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion.[6][1] Its subject matter included cultural pluralism, Mizrahi communities, Judaism, and Jewish-Arab relations.[6] A 1985 American Jewish Committee monograph also cited the book for its data on Oriental leadership roles in political fields, the army, police, and public organizations.[7]

Smooha has conducted research on Jewish-Arab relations continuously since 1976.[8] Since 2003, that work has included the regularly conducted Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel, a longitudinal survey monitoring attitudes within and between Israel's Jewish and Arab communities.[3] Published works associated with the index include Still Playing by the Rules: Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2012 (2013), and earlier editions concerning 2004 and 2006.[3][9] His other notable publications include The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel (1984), Arabs and Jews in Israel (two volumes, Westview Press, 1992), "Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the Arab Minority in Israel" (Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1990), and "Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype" (Israel Studies, 1997).[10][11]

The concept for which Smooha is most internationally recognized is "ethnic democracy," his analytical model for describing states that combine democratic institutions with institutionalized dominance by an ethnic majority.[1] In his formulation, the "ethnic nation, not the citizenry, shapes the symbols, laws and policies of the state for the benefit of the majority," while minorities retain individual rights, some collective rights, and the ability to engage in lawful political struggle.[2][1] Smooha described the model as "a realistic compromise between ethnic national state and democratic regime."[2] He distinguished ethnic democracy from "herrenvolk democracy," which he characterized as granting dominated groups no democratic rights at all.[2]

Smooha developed the model from the Israeli case, and it was subsequently applied in research concerning countries in Europe and Asia.[4] Comparative applications recorded in his Israel Prize biography included Northern Ireland, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and India.[1] He was also invited to apply the model in research across seven Eastern European countries.[4]

Smooha's application of the model to Israel focuses on the country within its pre-1967 borders, examining the structural relationship between the Jewish majority and Arab citizens.[2] In that framework, the Jewish group preserves group-related interests while non-Jewish Palestinian citizens hold individual rights within a structural group hierarchy.[2] The model generated direct scholarly responses: As'ad Ghanem, Nadim Rouhana, and Oren Yiftachel published "Questioning 'Ethnic Democracy': A Response to Sammy Smooha" in Israel Studies in 1998, and Alan Dowty's "Is Israel Democratic? Substance and Semantics in the 'Ethnic Democracy' Debate" appeared in the same journal in 1999.[11] Critics have argued that the model is not fully implemented in Israel, citing concerns about equal and inclusive citizenship, minority rights, and consent.[12]

A second major strand of Smooha's scholarship concerns the dynamics of coexistence and identity among Arab citizens of Israel. He is identified as a leading proponent of the "Israelization" approach—a term his Israel Prize biography credits him with coining—and in 1980 he was the first to observe that Arab society in Israel had become embedded in the broader Israeli social milieu.[13][1] In his account, Israeli society had become the Arab minority's primary arena for political activity, encompassing not only its formal legal structures but also its rules, logic, and aspects of its culture. Israelization did not mean abandonment of Arab ethnic or cultural identity: greater involvement in Israeli-Jewish society could coincide with a more pronounced national identity.[13]

Smooha described the process by writing that "the Arabs underwent Israelization (without assimilation), by which they have become closely bound to the state and its Jewish population in many fields of life." He added that they had become bilingual and bicultural, partially modernized their ways of life and thinking, and grown accustomed to Israeli standards.[14]

His research also developed a "politicization thesis," which holds that positive and negative forces affect Jews and Arabs in Israel simultaneously and that confrontation between majority and minority groups does not inevitably produce crisis or violence.[3] Among the factors he identified as shaping this dynamic were the demographic balance between the groups, the Jewish majority's determination to maintain a Jewish and democratic state, the benefits Arab citizens derive from life in a modern democratic state, and what he termed a "balance of threat."[3]

Smooha's assessment of coexistence rests on three agreed foundations: acceptance of Israel within the Green Line as the parties' country, acceptance of democracy as the mechanism for regulating relations, and acceptance of equal rights and allegiance to the state.[3] He argued that this basic framework moderates the deep ideological divide between the communities, even though Arab acceptance of Israel's legitimacy as a political entity is distinct from acceptance of its Jewish-Zionist character.[3]

His mid-1990s research, conducted while the Rabin government was taking steps toward equality for the Arab population, found growing integration into Israeli society and politics alongside a growing distance from Palestinian identity and politics.[15] His 1985 analysis of Ashkenazi-Sephardi relations proposed a "dynamic paternalism-cooptation" model as an alternative to absorption-modernization accounts, describing the incorporation of Mizrahi Jews into an Ashkenazi-dominated system while noting restrictions on advancement to higher levels.[7]

Smooha's annual index has produced a sustained empirical record of shifting attitudes within Israeli society. In 2012, 67.8 percent of Arab respondents identified as exclusively or mainly "Palestinian-Arab," while 11.3 percent identified as exclusively or mainly "Israeli" and 19.6 percent as equally Palestinian-Arab and Israeli.[3] Tracking longer-term shifts, the share of Arab respondents identifying as "Israeli, Israeli-Arab, Arab in Israel" fell from 53.6 percent in 1995 to 53.0 percent in 2003 and then to 32.6 percent in 2012, while the "Palestinian in Israel, Palestinian-Arab in Israel" category rose from 36.1 percent in 1995 to 45.0 percent in 2012.[3] A 2012 opinion article in TheMarker summarizing Smooha's survey findings reported that 55–58 percent of Arab citizens accepted Israel as a democratic Jewish state with a Jewish majority, compared with 66 percent who had accepted Israel's existence as Jewish and democratic in 2003, and that the share identifying exclusively as Palestinian had risen from 5.5 percent in 2003 to 20 percent in the later survey.[16]

The 2017 index, based on interviews with 700 Arab and 700 Jewish respondents conducted between May and August of that year, showed further movement.[8] Among Arab respondents, 58.7 percent recognized Israel's right to exist, down from 65.8 percent in 2015, and 49.1 percent recognized it as both Jewish and democratic, down from 53.6 percent.[8] The share agreeing that Israel should maintain a Jewish majority fell from 60.3 percent in 2015 to 44.6 percent, and agreement with the Law of Return as practiced fell from 39 percent to 25.2 percent.[8] At the same time, 77.4 percent of Arab respondents said they would not move to a Palestinian state if one were established, and 63.1 percent agreed that Arab and Jewish citizens should always live together in Israel.[8]

Among Jewish respondents in 2017, 61.1 percent viewed Arab citizens as full members of Israeli society, down from 69.5 percent in 2015, while the share unwilling to have an Arab friend rose from 24.3 percent to 28.9 percent, and 63.7 percent reported avoiding Arab communities, compared with 59.3 percent in 2015.[8] Smooha characterized the overall results as evidence of worsening attitudes but not a breakdown in relations, and said that surveys conducted since 1976 indicated a durable basis for coexistence.[8]

Smooha described the period following the October 2000 events—when Arab demonstrators rioted and police fatally shot demonstrators—as a "lost decade" in Jewish-Arab relations.[14] He associated worsening alienation and more radical Arab positions in that period with, among other developments, the suppression of the Second Intifada, the absence of legal accountability for police who shot demonstrators, the Second Lebanon War, Israeli operations in Gaza, anti-Arab legislation, and economic hardship.[14] His retrospective analysis back to 1976, however, showed relative stability in Arab public views and, in his interpretation, a foundation for coexistence.[14]

A 2006 study comparing Arab political leaders with their electorate found that 18.2 percent of leaders, versus 60.2 percent of Arab voters for Arab parties, agreed that Arab citizens should accept Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. It also found that 85.7 percent of leaders, versus 32 percent of those voters, described themselves as anti-Zionist.[17] Smooha said leaders were more radical than their supporters on many issues and suggested their distance from government encouraged them to maintain uncompromising positions.[17]

A survey Smooha conducted shortly after the July–August 2006 Lebanon War found that 48.3 percent of Israel's Arab population justified Hezbollah's rocket fire into Israel.[9]

The Israel Prize committee, awarding Smooha the 2008 Israel Prize for Sociology, described him as a scholar whose work advanced a pluralist approach to comparative research on divided societies and encouraged critical discussion of democracy in societies with deep ethnic and national divisions.[1] His 1978 book Israel: Pluralism and Conflict was singled out as a turning point in the study of Israeli society, and his broader body of research was credited with challenging accounts centered on Jewish social solidarity and integration in favor of a sustained analysis of social divisions and institutional mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion.[1]

His ethnic democracy model became a reference point beyond the Israeli context and was applied in research concerning a range of multiethnic states in Europe and Asia.[1][4] At an INSS panel on the meaning of Israel's definition as a Jewish and democratic state, Smooha argued that the existing formula does not adequately address the needs of the Arab minority and that Israel could be a state of the Jewish people and all its citizens without becoming binational. He also argued that democracy is central to Arab citizens' observance of the law and to the state's stability.[18]

The Index of Arab-Jewish Relations, conducted regularly without interruption since 2003, provides a sustained longitudinal record of intergroup attitudes in Israeli society.[3] Smooha's broader research since 1976 has identified what he regards as a durable basis for coexistence between Israel's Jewish and Arab communities, even as individual survey cycles have recorded significant deterioration in measured attitudes.[8]

Smooha's ethnic democracy model has attracted sustained criticism from multiple directions. Ghanem, Rouhana, and Yiftachel published a direct scholarly response in 1998, and critics have raised objections concerning equal and inclusive citizenship, minority rights, and consent.[12][11] Tamar Amar-Dahl, while presenting the model's logic, argues that it leaves unresolved how much legal inequality it tolerates and questions its presentation as stable and sustainable.[2] Amar-Dahl also contrasts Smooha's scope—Israel within the pre-1967 borders—with Oren Yiftachel's ethnocracy model, which examines all territories under Israeli control, as part of a broader contested debate about how to define and assess Israeli democracy.[2]

The model has drawn criticism from two opposite directions simultaneously: some argue that it characterizes Israel as a second-rate democracy, while others object that it grants Israel legitimacy by classifying it as a democracy at all.[4] Smooha's findings on Arab political attitudes, identity, and responses to events such as the Second Lebanon War concern politically sensitive subjects. The methodology should also be read with the qualification that even large face-to-face surveys are not entirely free of bias.[3]