Propaganda and Psychological Warfare in the Gaza Wars

Information operations in the Gaza conflicts are understood by analysts as coordinated use of communications and other capabilities to influence an audience's perceptions, decisions, or behavior, with effects that are most powerful when synchronized with actions and broader policy.[1] The term "psychological warfare" is applied across sources to activities as different as armed-group messaging, hostage videos, government public diplomacy, advance-warning leaflets, and management of public narratives; these activities share an aim of influencing audiences but are not identical in character.[8][1]

Glen Segell's 2020 study of Israeli cognitive campaigns describes influence efforts as continuous across the periods before, during, and after military operations, employing tools that range from traditional leaflets and spokespeople to television, social media, and diplomatic channels.[8] The study distinguishes between efforts to prevent an unwanted audience response and efforts to actively create a desired one, and identifies domestic populations, adversary publics, regional audiences, and international media as distinct targets that may require different messaging.[8] Digital-communications expert Yuval Dror, reporting on the 2014 conflict, characterized this contest as "a war over public opinion" and "an inseparable part of battle in the modern age."[5]

Both sides have addressed multiple audiences simultaneously: their own populations, the civilian population of the other side, the broader Arab and Muslim world, Western governments and publics, and international institutions. The messages directed at each audience often differ markedly in tone, framing, and stated objective, creating tensions within each side's overall communications strategy that analysts have documented across multiple conflicts.[3][9]

The pattern of parallel military and information campaigns visible in later Gaza conflicts was already present during Operation Cast Lead in 2008–2009. During that operation, the IDF's psychological-warfare unit — known by its Hebrew acronym Malat — dropped hundreds of leaflets disparaging Hamas's combat capability and took over Hamas media to broadcast Israeli messages.[2] One Arabic leaflet read: "Your death is near; you have no chance against the IDF's special units and its weapons. Your leaders have fled and abandoned you alone in the field."[2]

Israel also deployed protective-warning messaging at scale. The IDF dropped over 900,000 leaflets, assigned a complete air squadron to leaflet drops, phoned over 30,000 Palestinian households in Arabic, and used text messages and Arabic radio broadcasts to warn residents about impending attacks or urge them to leave targeted areas.[10] Other IDF leaflets during the same operation bore the IDF emblem and a phone number urging Gaza residents to report weapons caches and booby traps to protect their lives and property, along with humanitarian information such as when and where food would be distributed.[11] Analysts distinguished these as overt messages because the sender identified itself, in contrast with covert messaging that disguises its source.[11]

Hamas and Hezbollah, according to expert analysis of Cast Lead and the Second Lebanon War, sought images from fighting that would portray Israel as attacking and merciless, with analysts arguing that selecting and circulating combat images could blur the distinction between public diplomacy and psychological warfare.[11] This competition between Israeli efforts to demonstrate restraint and Hamas efforts to publicize civilian harm recurred in later rounds of fighting documented by the sources.

Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014 produced an extensively documented information campaign. Hamas used al-Aqsa and al-Jazeera television, websites, Facebook pages, and text messages to address Palestinian, Arab, international, and Israeli audiences, with objectives that included mobilizing support, shaping perceptions of the campaign, and influencing relevant actors.[3]

The organization's messaging was calibrated differently for different audiences. To Palestinian audiences in Gaza, Hamas communications claimed that its forces had inflicted losses on Israel, had abducted a soldier, had surprised the IDF with its tunnel network, and had eroded Israeli deterrence.[3] To Israeli civilians, Hamas sent text messages directly — one boasted that Hamas had "forced you to hide in shelters like mice" — and released videos of rockets and naval commandos intended to intimidate and demoralize, spread disinformation, and undermine confidence in the IDF.[3][5] The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operated Arabic-, English-, and Hebrew-language Twitter accounts; all three were eventually disabled during the operation, though not before the Arabic-language account issued frequent near-real-time operational announcements suggesting a communications link with field elements.[12]

For Arab and international audiences, Hamas messaging portrayed Palestinians as victims of Israeli aggression and presented Hamas as a national liberation movement whose attacks were directed at military targets.[3] Analysts noted an internal tension: while Hamas's international appeals emphasized the humanitarian goal of lifting Gaza's blockade, messaging directed at Arab-Palestinian audiences framed that goal as a platform for broader objectives.[3] The slogan displayed behind Hamas political bureau chief Khaled Mashaal at a 2014 press conference — "Palestine is resisting, our people are victorious" — was interpreted by INSS researcher Ofir Winter as deliberately emphasizing Palestinian national representation over Hamas's Muslim Brotherhood identity, a framing choice suited to winning broader Arab sympathy.[3]

Segell's 2015 study describes what he calls Hamas's "victim doctrine": the deliberate effort to provoke Israeli military action that would produce civilian casualties or damage to civilian and international facilities, thereby generating imagery and narratives that could strengthen Hamas's position as a victim, erode Israel's international legitimacy, and build pressure for a ceasefire on terms favorable to Hamas.[9] Sustained rocket fire was simultaneously intended to disrupt Israeli daily life, undermine morale, and be presented — along with Israeli community evacuations — as evidence of Hamas's battlefield success to Palestinian audiences.[9] Hamas spokesman Mushir al-Masri publicly claimed the media campaign helped unify Gazans and win the media battle; that assessment was Hamas's own characterization of its results.[5]

Control of the information environment inside Gaza was also part of Hamas's strategy. An HonestReporting account summarizing an ITIC report said Hamas authorities instructed social-media users not to publish information or photographs showing rocket-launching sites or resistance operatives' movements and that the Hamas-affiliated Palestinian Journalist Bloc told correspondents not to photograph rocket fire.[13] The U.S. Department of State's 2014 human-rights report documents that Hamas restricted independent media in Gaza during that year's hostilities, with journalists harassed to prevent coverage that could reflect unfavorably on Hamas or reveal sensitive military information, including photographs of fighters and rocket-launch locations.[14] The Foreign Press Association condemned what it called "blatant, incessant, forceful and unorthodox methods" used against visiting international journalists in Gaza, and some foreign correspondents reported on rocket launchers' proximity to civilian areas only after leaving Gaza.[13]

Israel's 2014 information campaign operated on several tracks simultaneously: civilian-protection warnings directed at Gazan residents, public-diplomacy messaging aimed at international audiences, and digital content targeting domestic and global opinion. The IDF used leaflets, phone calls, and text messages to warn residents in the Zeitoun and Shujai'iya areas to evacuate before planned strikes, with the IDF attributing approximately 100,000 warning leaflets dropped on July 17 alone and hundreds of thousands of evacuation messages sent to residents.[15] An Arabic flyer with evacuation instructions was dropped over Beit Lahia on July 13; on July 16, a flyer for Shuja'iya and Zeitoun directed residents toward Gaza City; and before the July 17 ground operation, leaflets covered 14 areas with instructions to evacuate designated zones.[16]

Hamas's Interior Ministry urged residents to ignore those warnings, calling them "psychological warfare" intended to disrupt the domestic front — a framing that illustrated how both sides contested the meaning and purpose of the same communications.[17] At least one promised assault on Beit Lahiya did not materialize after residents fled, prompting criticism from human-rights groups.[17]

The IDF's Spokesperson's Office posted more than 40 videos online during the fighting, ranging from cockpit footage to polished productions. One video — showing what the IDF described as an attempted Hamas sea infiltration in which four Hamas terrorists were killed — reportedly received more than one million YouTube views.[5] A Ben-Gurion University study of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Twitter activity during the war analyzed 795 tweets and identified 14 linguistic frames used to legitimize Israeli policy, finding that images helped connect those frames to broader Israeli strategic narratives involving the past, present, and future.[18]

A study of the civic initiative "Israel Under Fire" examined 926 posts on its English-language Facebook page during the 2012 and 2014 Gaza conflicts and identified four message strategies: Israel's right to defend itself, a "What Would YOU Do?" scenario asking audiences to imagine themselves in Israel's position, exposure of Hamas propaganda, and a call to free Gaza from Hamas. The "What Would YOU Do?" strategy generated significantly greater audience engagement than the other three.[19]

The demolition of three Gaza City high-rises on August 23 and 25, 2014 — al-Zafer Tower 4, the Italian Compound, and al-Basha Tower — illustrated how military operations were calibrated with psychological objectives in mind. Residents were warned by cellphone, leaflets, and the "knock on the roof" procedure before the buildings were struck. Segell characterizes the strikes as causing relatively few casualties but having a substantial psychological effect on Gaza's economic and social elite, with social-media discussion reflecting increased public pressure on Hamas to end the fighting.[9]

Segell argues that Israel's military results in 2014 did not automatically translate into informational or political success. Iron Dome's interception of rockets limited Israeli civilian casualties, but images of Palestinian casualties and destruction accumulated in international coverage, contributing to erosion of Israel's international legitimacy in his assessment.[9] He frames public perception as a major arena of the conflict, and describes Israeli warnings, evacuation notices, responses to ceasefires, legal investigations, and public diplomacy as efforts to maintain legitimacy in that arena.[9]

The 2014 conflict extended into cyber and digital spaces alongside the physical fighting. Segell's account documents distributed-denial-of-service and DNS attacks, website defacements, database exposures, leaked login credentials, mass text messages falsely attributed to Israeli institutions or Hamas, and brief interference with a private television satellite that caused pro-Hamas messages to appear on Israeli channels.[9] Activity was attributed to a mix of actors including amateur hacking groups, the Syrian Electronic Army, and participants in "OpIsrael"; attacks reportedly increased during the Israeli ground operation and declined after it ended.[9]

On the civilian disinformation front, Israeli civilians received false English-language text messages on July 14, 2014. One, signed "Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades," threatened continued rocket fire until Hamas's demands were met; another falsely claimed a suicide bomber was near bomb shelters and warned, "Beware of strangers in shelters."[15] Israeli authorities did not establish whether the messages originated abroad or inside Israel.[15] Hamas and its supporters also used social networks extensively: WhatsApp, SMS, websites, and online posters disseminated images of destruction and casualties, posters emphasizing casualty and destruction figures, and disinformation intended to frighten Israeli residents or magnify perceptions of suffering abroad.[12] Some rumors circulated especially through WhatsApp mixed information with material disseminated by Hamas.[12]

A Jerusalem Post report from October 2023 relayed claims by Israeli technology companies CHEQ and Cyabra about fake WhatsApp messages, a forged White House press release, and selectively edited hostage footage circulating in the early days of the October 2023 war.[20] A Blavatnik Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center report alleged that authentic and fake social-media profiles were being used to spread disinformation, sow panic in Israel, undermine trust in Israeli institutions, and influence international opinion.[20]

One of the defining analytical problems in the Gaza information wars is the gap between military outcomes and perceived victory. Segell's 2015 account calls Operation Protective Edge a 50-day campaign, while his 2020 volume describes it as lasting 51 days.[9][8] The later volume argues that Hamas's survival could be presented as a victory even when Israel claimed operational success because the conflict did not produce a simple, widely understood image of decisive Israeli triumph. Explaining the operation's goals and results to Israeli, Palestinian, regional, and international audiences thus became part of the postwar cognitive contest.[8]

On August 29, 2014, Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh stated publicly: "Our narrative has gained the upper hand."[21] Whether or not that assessment was accurate, it reflected Hamas's strategic framing of the information contest as a parallel campaign with its own criteria for success. In this framing, organizational survival and the continuation of armed resistance could be presented as victory despite physical losses.[8]

The 2018 Gaza border events also illustrated this dynamic. Segell argues that Hamas gained public-relations ground in international media and among Palestinians by presenting the border demonstrations as a just cause organized around the blockade narrative, even as Israel achieved what Segell identifies as its operational objectives of preventing border penetration and intercepting rockets and mortars.[8] The split-screen television juxtaposition on May 14, 2018 — showing Gaza-border clashes alongside the opening ceremony of the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem — is cited as a particularly consequential visual moment in that contest.[8] Hamas also emerged with what Segell calls a "victory image" after the November 2018 escalation, in part because Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman resigned in the aftermath.[8]

The May 2021 Operation Guardian of the Walls produced a more detailed picture of social-media dynamics than previous conflicts. An INSS study of that campaign documents social-media activity aimed at Israeli, Palestinian, Arab, and international audiences across Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Instagram, Telegram, and TikTok, noting that the material included real and false reports, images and videos taken out of context, and emotionally charged content.[4] The authors caution that effects were difficult to measure and that it was often impossible to identify who was behind specific messages.[4]

A particularly striking example of disinformation during Guardian of the Walls involved a widely shared message claiming that Arab citizens had received texts from Gaza warning of a heavy rocket barrage at 19:00. The message generated fear as the stated time approached — but there was no evidence the underlying messages had been sent, and the forecast barrage did not occur.[4] The origin of the message and any possible foreign involvement remained unknown.[4]

On the official communications front, Hamas used social media to communicate military updates, present a Palestinian narrative, and portray Israel as weak.[4] IDF messaging in Hebrew, Arabic, English, and Russian sought to support the military operation, provide civilian instructions, and communicate Israeli claims. Arabic-language IDF messaging specifically emphasized the harm Hamas was causing Gaza residents and warned people to stay away from Hamas sites.[4]

The volume of messaging activity revealed an asymmetry between the two sides' online footprints. Based on Foreign Ministry sources, up to half a billion visits to ministry channels were recorded during the ten days of fighting.[4] IDF Spokesperson's Unit figures cited in the same study showed roughly 2,000 pro-Israel tweets per hour compared with approximately 50,000 tweets per hour attributed to Hamas and activists in Gaza.[4] These figures show attributed reach and volume, not persuasive effect or verified organizational control of every account.

Violence in mixed Jewish-Arab cities during Guardian of the Walls was accompanied by social-media activity that the INSS study describes as increasing fear and contributing to the online organization of violent incidents, without claiming that online activity alone caused the violence.[4]

Documents analyzed by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center and reported through multiple outlets suggest that Hamas's information campaign for the October 7, 2023 attack was planned well in advance. A memorandum attributed to Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, dated August 24, 2022, reportedly included a deception phase and instructions to document and broadcast atrocities during the assault.[22] The associated media plan reportedly framed the attack as a humanitarian act tied to the Palestinian "right of return," using the slogan "Returning Home."[22]

An ITIC analysis of what were described as seized Hamas documents described a 2022–2025 media plan under a project titled "Strengthening Psychological and Media Warfare Against Rivals and Enemies."[23] This plan reportedly included fabricated news reports, satire mocking Israeli leaders, videos presenting alleged Israeli military failures, and geographically targeted paid social-media advertising aimed at Israeli audiences.[23] The plan also included English-language content, international-facing media infrastructure, weekly reports, and training for English-speaking spokespeople.[23] The outlets Shehab and SAFA were identified in the ITIC analysis as presented publicly as independent but allegedly controlled by Hamas.[23]

A Washington Institute analysis by Noga Halevi frames the abduction of 251 people on October 7, 2023 — including both civilians and soldiers — as a central element of Hamas's cognitive warfare strategy, creating leverage over Israeli decision-makers and exploiting public concern for hostages.[6] The analysis describes proof-of-life videos, the timing of releases, deliberate uncertainty about captives' conditions, and pressure on hostage families as mechanisms designed to deepen Israeli divisions and affect diplomatic calculations.[6]

From the opening hours of the October 7, 2023 attack, Hamas conducted a parallel media operation alongside the physical assault. An FBI affidavit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York alleges that Hamas published video and social-media material during and after the attacks, including videos showing hostages and footage of the Re'im music festival massacre.[24] The affidavit further alleges that videos and images were posted contemporaneously through accounts apparently used by Hamas attackers and through victims' own accounts, and that attackers took victims' electronic devices and used them to access their social-media accounts.[24] A video showing Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh celebrating the operation and referring to captives — declaring "A conflict is resolved in the battlefield" — was among the material described in the affidavit.[24]

Hamas spokesman Abu Obeida threatened in the first days of the war to execute hostages if Israeli airstrikes did not stop.[25] A video of an apparently injured Israeli hostage receiving medical care was interpreted by analysts as an attempt to improve Hamas's image after footage of the October 7 attacks and abductions had circulated widely.[25] The IDF described hostage videos released during the war as "psychological terror," and Israeli media outlets chose not to broadcast them.[26]

The scale of imagery and disinformation flooding social media was recognized internationally almost immediately. A Pew Research Center briefing from October 12, 2023 described a flood of violent imagery and false information about the war on social media, including on X (formerly Twitter).[7] In a survey cited in the briefing, 65% of U.S. adults supported technology companies taking steps to restrict false information online, and 71% supported steps to restrict extremely violent content — measures of U.S. public concern about the information environment rather than of the scale or origin of the disinformation itself.[7]

The al-Ahli hospital explosion on October 17, 2023 became a defining episode in the early information contest. Hamas announced 500 deaths and attributed the explosion to an Israeli airstrike; the claim was attributed to a member of Gaza's Hamas-run health ministry and reported by Al Jazeera.[25] Israel, the United States, and France disputed Israeli responsibility, while the FDD author also argued that initial casualty reports were inflated.[25] Israeli military sources attributed the explosion to a failed Palestinian Islamic Jihad rocket launch and released an audio recording they said involved two Islamic Jihad operatives.[27] Psychological-warfare researcher Ron Schleifer argued that rapid attribution — whoever makes it — can fix blame in public perception before any investigation is complete.[27] The incident illustrates how a single contested event, amplified by satellite television and social media, could alter international discussion within hours.

Hamas's use of the 251 hostages taken on October 7 as instruments of psychological and political pressure constitutes one of the most extensively analyzed information operations of the 2023 war. The organization released videos in which hostages read prepared scripts calling on Israel to stop the war or negotiate; after six hostages were found dead in late August or early September 2024, videos of four of them showed them reading such scripts.[28] The videos were understood to increase psychological pressure on Israelis and hostage families.[28]

A document reportedly obtained from a computer belonging to Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar described the strategy explicitly: "continue to exert psychological pressure on the families of the [hostages] ... so that public pressure on the enemy government increases."[29] The strategy was reflected in the periodic release of hostage videos, timed to moments when negotiations over a hostage deal reached an impasse.[26]

On April 24, 2024, Hamas released a video showing Hersh Goldberg-Polin, followed by another showing two hostages on April 27.[30] The first video was followed by demonstrations demanding a hostage deal, and the second was shown at a Tel Aviv rally — events that analysts interpreted as reflecting the videos' intended domestic effect.[30] By late December 2023, the Telegram channel Gaza Now had approximately 1.9 million registered users, up from approximately 350,000 before October 7.[31] It disseminated carefully edited hostage-related content, including a roughly 30-second video using a threatening musical score and the voice of a hostage pleading, ending with "time is running out" in Hebrew and Arabic.[31] Another video showed three elderly hostages — Yoram Metzger, Haim Perry, and Amiram Cooper — with the Israeli song "Al Tashlicheni Le'et Zikna" ("Do not cast me away in old age") playing in the background.[31]

Hamas also employed what the ITIC described as a macabre guessing game: a Jerusalem Post report described Hamas releasing videos featuring hostages and, in one sequence, encouraging viewers to guess whether three captives were alive, injured, or dead.[32] Security and strategy experts attributed this tactic to an intent to maximize psychological pressure and uncertainty.

Staged hostage-release events during the January–February 2025 ceasefire were choreographed as media productions: armed guards, decorated stages, filming crews, hostage tags, and release certificates bearing the Hamas logo.[33] Hamas used the ceremonies to claim that Israel had failed to recover most hostages through military pressure and to present each exchange as a victory.[33] Additional staging included showing hostages Guy Gilboa-Dalal and Evyatar David watching another hostage release and releasing a video featuring Iair Horn alongside his still-captive brother Eitan.[28]

As the January 2025 ceasefire took shape, Hamas's official and affiliated media promoted a "victory" narrative before and after it took effect on January 19.[33] Hamas highlighted the release of Palestinian prisoners, the return of displaced residents to northern Gaza, and the Israeli withdrawal from the Netzarim Corridor as evidence that Israel had failed to achieve its war objectives.[33] Hamas media also selected and circulated statements by Israeli commentators that supported that narrative, amplifying internal Israeli debate as part of its outward messaging strategy.[33]

Above and beyond the military exchange, Hamas systematically reframed the ceasefire's terms as a vindication of its strategy: the organization that had initiated the October 7 massacre was presenting its survival and negotiated concessions as proof that armed resistance against Israel could succeed. The ITIC report presents these as Hamas's claims and communications strategy, while noting that they should not be treated as independent proof of either side's actual achievement of its stated objectives.[33]

The rocket-timing data from the early weeks of the war adds another dimension to Hamas's strategy. An analysis of Home Front Command alert data from noon on October 7 through October 17, 2023 found that 8 p.m. was the most common time for longer-range rocket launches, coinciding with Israeli prime-time news broadcasts.[34] Researcher Ido Zelkovitz interpreted the timing as an effort to create fear, weaken Israeli motivation, shorten the fighting, and deepen social divisions — though he acknowledged those purposes are his analysis rather than directly measured conclusions.[34]

Israel's information response after October 7 operated on overt and covert tracks simultaneously. The overt effort included public diplomacy, media briefings, social-media campaigns, evidence-based rebuttals, and outreach to foreign governments, journalists, influencers, and public figures.[1] Israeli government and military channels publicized Arabic leaflets, calls, text messages, evacuation warnings, and documentation of humanitarian assistance as part of a sustained effort to show measures being taken to reduce civilian harm.[1]

By November 2023, Israel's Foreign Ministry had spent more than $1.5 million on online advertisements — including on YouTube and within the game Angry Birds — featuring footage of the October 7 attack.[1] The IDF's international communications office expanded to more than 200 people and communicated in 14 languages.[1] IDF leaflets dropped on October 13 urged residents of northern Gaza to move south, warning that Hamas fighters were operating in tunnels under homes and in buildings with civilians; COGAT chief Ghassan Alian addressed Gaza residents directly in Arabic on Facebook the following day.[27] Former Israeli psychological-warfare officer Saar Raveh described a system combining leaflets, phone calls, and physical pressure to influence civilian decisions, incorporating intelligence gathering and coordination across multiple agencies, and subject to ethical and legal-approval constraints.[27]

Dostri's analysis reports that a covert IDF psychological-operations body called the Influence Unit planted stories and shaped perceptions of the war. It cites the unit's December 2023 release of photographs of Palestinian men whom the IDF identified as surrendering Hamas members, with the stated aim of demonstrating battlefield success and demoralizing Hamas.[1] The analysis notes that covert influence activity can conflict with open public diplomacy because exposure of a planted story can undermine the credibility of overt messaging.[1]

During the November 2023 Israeli operation around Shifa Hospital, the IDF placed fuel containers holding 300 liters of diesel approximately 200 meters from the hospital. IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari stated that Hamas leadership had prevented the hospital administration from collecting the fuel.[27] Ynet quoted an official involved in planning the placement as describing it as an attempt to create a favorable public-relations outcome either way: collection would provide relief, while rejection could be presented as evidence that Hamas was indifferent to the hospital's needs.[27]

The National Library of Israel cataloged a collection of pro-Israel hasbara materials relating to October 7 and the ensuing war, dated 2023–2024, as part of a national-memory initiative.[35] The materials — videos, pictures, drawings, and ephemera in multiple languages — were created and published on social media by various organizations and communities to explain the October 7 Hamas attack to audiences around the world and to justify Israel's existence and actions during the war.[35]

Dostri's analysis identifies Iran, Russia, and China as state actors that amplified narratives hostile to Israel through media and digital platforms during the 2023 war, giving examples that include claims about the Al-Ahli hospital explosion, online content portraying Hamas as a liberation movement, and efforts to connect the conflict to broader anti-U.S. narratives.[1] These characterizations reflect the analysis's attribution of influence activity rather than independently established findings.

Hamas's information operations across the Gaza conflicts have relied on a layered and centrally managed media ecosystem. In 2014, al-Aqsa TV — Hamas's satellite television channel — served as a primary broadcast platform; the FBI affidavit filed in the U.S. case against Ismail Haniyeh et al. describes the channel's continued use for propaganda dissemination at the time of the October 2023 attack.[24] The al-Qassam Brigades also published a video in or around 2021 on their website showing rocket production and launch in detail — depicting pipes being dug up, loaded onto trucks, made into rocket bodies, filled with apparent explosives, and fired from buried launchers — presenting the footage as evidence of military capability.[24]

The ITIC's analysis of seized Hamas documents describes the group's media plan as involving centrally managed infrastructure with international reach, including English-language content and English-speaking spokespeople trained to address Western audiences.[23] Outlets presented publicly as independent — including Shehab and SAFA — were identified in the ITIC analysis as allegedly controlled by Hamas, illustrating a strategy of extending media reach through nominally independent platforms.[23]

Hamas spokesman Abu Obeida's evening appearances on Al Jazeera became a recognizable feature of the 2023 war's information environment. Appearing with his face concealed, summarizing the day's events without revealing Hamas's plans, he became an admired figure on Arab social media — an example of how a masked spokesman's persona could itself function as a propaganda instrument.[26] Hamas also distributed accounts of clashes and viral images of Palestinians killed or wounded, particularly children, with a Hamas official describing the aim as "humanizing" victims to sway public opinion.[36]

Studies of the 2014 conflict found that Hamas's anti-Israel social-media messaging correlated with shifts in Israeli public support for the military campaign, with reductions in the intensity of conflict accompanying periods of greater audience exposure to that messaging — though researchers note the relationship is correlational rather than a simple causal measure.[36]

The Gaza conflicts have established information operations as an inseparable component of modern asymmetric warfare, with implications that extend well beyond the specific parties involved. Each round of fighting has produced new platforms, new tactics, and new challenges for analysts attempting to measure actual effects — a task complicated by the rapid evolution of social media, the participation of state and non-state actors simultaneously, and the fundamental difficulty of attributing particular messages to particular senders in a dense disinformation environment.[4]

The conceptual framework developed in Segell's 2020 study — distinguishing between efforts to prevent unwanted audience responses and efforts to generate desired ones, and identifying domestic, adversary, regional, and international publics as distinct targets — provides a useful analytical structure, though the bundle of tools it describes covers activities as different in kind as leaflet drops, hostage videos, and paid digital advertising.[8] Dostri's treatment of information operations as most effective when synchronized with actions and broader policy reflects a similar understanding: the information dimension is not a parallel campaign running alongside the military one, but an integrated element of the overall strategy.[1]

For Israel, the central challenge documented across multiple conflicts is that military success does not automatically translate into informational or political success.[9] Segell writes that Iron Dome's interception of rockets limited Israeli civilian casualties while images of Palestinian casualties and destruction accumulated in international coverage, contributing in his assessment to erosion of Israel's international legitimacy.[9] Explaining why a war was being fought and what it was achieving therefore became a continuous communication requirement rather than a one-time task.

Analyses in the source bundle treat the information contest as a means by which Hamas sought to pressure Israel toward ceasefires, sustain international condemnation of Israeli operations, and maintain Palestinian support without attaining military superiority.[9][6] The "victim doctrine" analyzed by Segell, the hostage cognitive-warfare strategy analyzed by Halevi, and the pre-planned media framework described in the ITIC analysis of seized documents reflect an attributed view of Hamas's information strategy as coherent and long-range.[9][23]

The engagement of global social-media platforms as battlegrounds — with questions about content moderation, disinformation, and platform responsibility for amplifying violent content — has added a new dimension to the conflict that neither the Israeli government nor Hamas fully controls, and in which the participation of state actors such as Iran adds further complexity to an already crowded information environment.[1][7]

Many of the most consequential claims in the Gaza information wars rest on contested attribution and incomplete evidence. The al-Ahli hospital explosion of October 17, 2023 illustrates the problem starkly: Hamas announced 500 deaths and attributed the explosion to an Israeli airstrike.[25] Israel, the United States, and France disputed Israeli responsibility, while the FDD author separately argued that the initial casualty reports were inflated.[25] Israeli military sources attributed the explosion to a misdirected Palestinian Islamic Jihad rocket.[27] No source in the research bundle provides an independent adjudication of the dispute.

Attribution of specific disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks presents similar difficulties. Israeli authorities did not establish who sent the false 2014 text messages warning of a suicide bomber near shelters; the origin of the false 2021 Guardian of the Walls warning about a 19:00 rocket barrage also remained unknown.[15][4] Segell's account attributes the 2014 cyber activity to a mix of actors including amateur hacking groups, the Syrian Electronic Army, and "OpIsrael" participants, but those attributions are reported by the author rather than independently corroborated in the bundle.[9]

The reported contents of seized Hamas planning documents — including the Sinwar memorandum and the 2022–2025 media plan — are presented through Israeli intelligence analyses and secondary reporting rather than as reproduced document text.[22][23] Similarly, claims about Hamas's alleged "victim doctrine," its use of civilian areas, and the effectiveness of its messaging are the analytical interpretations of specific researchers and institutions, not consensus findings independently established across multiple sources. Several of the most detailed analyses come from organizations — the INSS, ITIC, FDD, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, and HonestReporting — with identifiable national-security or pro-Israel orientations, a context that does not invalidate their research but is relevant to how their conclusions should be weighed.

The State Department's account of Hamas monitoring Gaza residents' internet activity specifically notes that the claim rested on anecdotal reports from Palestinian civil-society groups, and its account of journalist harassment also records that some journalists disputed parts of the Foreign Press Association's statement.[14] These qualifications illustrate the general challenge: in an environment saturated with competing propaganda, establishing what actually happened — as distinct from what each side wanted audiences to believe happened — requires more independent verification than is available in most individual episodes.