National Guard of Israel

The National Guard developed around the need for forces capable of responding rapidly to simultaneous outbreaks of severe violence, particularly after the May 2021 disturbances in mixed Jewish-Arab cities and along major roads in the Negev.[2] Its intended functions have included reinforcing police, counterterrorism, responding to nationally motivated disorder, assisting during emergencies and strengthening public security in areas where existing enforcement capacity was considered insufficient.[3]

The name has covered different organizational initiatives rather than a single unchanged design: the Israeli Guard announced under Prime Minister Naftali Bennett in June 2022 was located within the Border Police, while National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir subsequently sought a force with a different command arrangement.[4][3] The distinction concerns both institutional subordination and the balance between regular personnel, reservists and volunteers envisioned in successive plans.[2][3] One 2022 analysis argued that the label “National Guard” did not properly fit the initiative because it primarily reinforced the Border Police rather than creating a comprehensive civilian-emergency system.[2]

By February 2026, the Guard was functioning as an operational body within the Border Police, with recruitment, dedicated budget lines and deployments under its northern, central and southern operational regions.[1] Its development nevertheless combined operational implementation with continuing questions about the approval of its founding arrangements, the publication of rules and the division of authority between the ministry and police institutions.[1]

The immediate impetus for the Guard was the May 2021 unrest accompanying Operation Guardian of the Walls, when authorities lacked sufficient forces to respond to disturbances occurring in several places at once.[5] The subsequent police initiative sought a force that could arrive quickly and prevent disorder from escalating.[5] A month after the riots, the government adopted Decision 1701, an emergency plan to strengthen public peace, security and order through measures that included reinforcing the Israel Police and Border Police.[3]

Existing police institutions supplied the organizational foundation for the proposals.[2] The Border Guard was already the police’s principal mobile task force for internal-security problems and included a special anti-terrorist unit.[6] Mishmar Ha-Gvul, commonly abbreviated MAGAV, was a branch of the Israel National Police whose personnel received combat, counterterrorism, crowd-control and police training.[7] Its deployment areas included rural districts, Arab towns and villages, border areas and the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[7]

The existing Civil Guard was a separate volunteer institution, established in 1974 after citizens sought to help protect their communities against terrorist threats.[6] Its neighborhood-security arrangements included command centers, armed patrols and training programs.[6] The later National Guard proposals drew on volunteer policing but did not simply rename that existing Civil Guard.[2][6]

Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, Public Security Minister Omer Bar-Lev, Police Commissioner Kobi Shabtai and Border Police commander Amir Cohen launched the first National Guard initiative on June 21, 2022.[4] Also called the Israeli Guard, it was to operate within the Border Police under the police commissioner’s direct responsibility.[4] The plan envisioned rapidly activating experienced personnel during nationwide emergencies, including simultaneous disturbances, earthquakes and missile strikes.[4]

The proposed force had three main components: regular and career Border Police personnel, reserve companies and volunteers.[4] Its two-year organizational buildup included a command staff, another brigade intended to double the regular operational forces of the Border Police Tactical Brigade, an additional brigade intended to double the reserve force and an expanded volunteer component.[2] One account described expansion from 20 existing reserve combat companies through the addition of approximately 26 companies over subsequent years.[4]

The existing Matmid volunteer force numbered about 8,000, largely in peripheral areas, and the plan called for another 1,500 volunteers.[4] Combat-unit veterans were also to serve in rapid-response Spearhead Companies, with reported targets of 1,000 reserve volunteers by the end of 2022 and 2,000 during 2023.[2][8] The broader reinforcement package included approximately 3,500 additional volunteers for the regular police’s Civil Guard.[4]

A preliminary May 2022 description presented a force combining 8,000 regular Border Police personnel, 46 reserve companies with approximately 5,000 fighters, around 1,000 special-unit veterans and 300 volunteer police officers.[9] That report estimated one-time expenditure of NIS 111 million and annual operating costs of NIS 61 million.[9] These figures described the proposed force and funding at that stage, rather than subsequently verified staffing or expenditure.[9]

Related measures extended beyond the police: 12 new IDF reserve companies were planned for internal-security tasks within the Home Front Command, together with four companies in the Northern and Southern Commands.[2] Their chief emergency mission was to secure major routes so the IDF could move forces without interference.[2] A separate reserve-based contingency model discussed in May 2023 likewise concerned keeping roads open during military operations, including through population centers, rather than creating the ministerially controlled force proposed by Ben-Gvir.[10]

In January 2023, Itamar Ben-Gvir announced a National Guard as part of the Israel Police, presenting it as a means of strengthening the police and doubling Border Police strength.[3] His proposal envisioned additional police personnel and 10,000 combat-veteran volunteers, with a model based on Border Police forces deployed in the West Bank.[3] In March, he proposed separating the Guard from both the Border Police and Israel Police and placing it under the Ministry of National Security.[3]

The proposal became linked to the March 2023 crisis over the government’s judicial-overhaul legislation. After nationwide protests and a general strike, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu postponed the legislation; Ben-Gvir reportedly accepted the delay as part of an arrangement under which Netanyahu agreed to advance a National Guard unit derived from the Border Police under Ben-Gvir’s direct authority.[11] The cabinet’s subsequent April decision did not immediately grant that authority, instead ordering an interagency review of the force’s role and command structure.[12]

Government Resolution 442, adopted on April 2, 2023, set out a conditional plan to establish the National Guard of Israel in the Ministry of National Security.[13] Its stated goals included strengthening public safety and order, including during emergencies, combating nationalist crime and terrorism, and improving governance where needed.[13] Establishment depended on committee recommendations receiving government approval; creation outside the police would additionally require a legal basis.[13]

Rather than immediately settle the command structure, the resolution required examination of whether the Guard should be independent of the police, what powers it should possess and how it would relate to existing security bodies.[13] By mid-April, Netanyahu appeared to favor a police-based arrangement rather than direct authority for Ben-Gvir.[12] An April assessment found operational planning incomplete, recruitment of additional Border Police personnel at an early stage and discussions continuing over missions, reporting lines and organizational structure.[3]

The government also approved a 1.5 percent across-the-board budget cut, reported as NIS 1 billion, primarily to finance the initiative.[14] Officials around Ben-Gvir described a NIS 1.4 billion plan for a force of 1,800 people.[14] The resolution itself specified that funding in 2023 and 2024 would come from the approved budget framework for the Ministry of National Security and its bodies.[13]

Resolution 442 assigned the national security minister responsibility for establishing an interagency committee chaired by the ministry’s director-general.[13] Its membership included representatives of the Prime Minister’s Office, National Security Council, Shin Bet, Defense Ministry, Justice Ministry, Finance Ministry, Israel Police and IDF.[13] A May 2023 appointment letter named ministry director-general Shlomo Ben Eliyahu as chair and required recommendations within 90 days.[15]

The committee’s remit covered missions and powers, possible transfers of Border Police units, command arrangements and safeguards, operational doctrine and relations with the IDF.[13] It also included reservist call-up authority, staffing, funding and necessary legislative changes.[13] The minister was to submit recommendations for government approval, after which necessary legislation and government decisions concerning the Guard’s powers were to be advanced within another 90 days.[13]

The committee met on nine days between June 7 and August 2, 2023; a later parliamentary research account recorded submission of its report in November 2023.[1] Reporting on recommendations presented to Ben-Gvir in December described a force remaining within the Border Police and under the police commissioner, rather than becoming a separate ministerially controlled organization.[16] The recommendations sought to distinguish the Guard from routine police duties while providing its commander functional independence for assigned missions.[16]

The proposed structure covered six regional arenas—Jerusalem, South, North, Coast, Center and Tel Aviv—alongside existing Jerusalem Envelope and Judea and Samaria arrangements.[16] It envisioned regional commanders, generally three operational brigades per arena, and investigative, intelligence and specialist capabilities, including dog handlers, drones and mobility resources.[16] Its multiyear personnel projections included approximately 17,500 regular fighters, 5,460 reservists and volunteer formations; these were recommendations, not established later staffing totals.[16]

The committee also recommended expanding the Border Police tactical brigade from 500 fighters to 7,500 over four years, supported by another 500 administrative personnel.[16] It cited the tactical unit’s role during the October 7, 2023 attack as a reason to increase capacity.[16] The chair suggested that a larger force and local alert squads might have changed the outcome, expressing an assessment rather than an established counterfactual.[16]

The Ministry of National Security’s 2024 work plan treated establishment of the Guard as a core objective. It set targets to publish 1,350 permanent Border Police positions for northern and southern sectors in 2024, add 12 reserve companies and recruit 2,100 Spearhead Company volunteers by December 2025.[17] The program was framed as improving responses to severe, multi-front security emergencies and widespread nationalist disturbances.[17]

The Guard held an inauguration ceremony in January 2025.[1] Police Commissioner Danny Levy described its mission as addressing multi-front public disorder and crime, especially in Arab communities.[5] Ben-Gvir identified the Negev, Galilee, villages and mixed cities among locations where it would operate to address what he characterized as governance problems.[5] Border Police commander Barik Yitzhak announced an aim of establishing five brigades within two years, supported by motorcycle, canine, drone, counterterrorism and special Border Police units.[5]

At its January 2025 inauguration, the Guard was operating through the Border Police, and the February 2026 Knesset report described it as an operational body within that force rather than as the separate organization Ben-Gvir had proposed.[5][1] The 2023 committee had likewise recommended placement within the Border Police under the police commissioner; Defense Ministry and Finance Ministry representatives disputed aspects of its scale, timing and personnel transfers.[16]

By February 2026, recruitment was taking place through the Border Police, and the Guard had dedicated budget lines and operational activity.[1] Its Southern and Central brigades were being organized.[18] The 2026 budget proposal characterized it as a Border Police operational body strengthening internal security through counterterrorism, responses to disturbances and emergencies, and reinforcement of routine and emergency police activity.[1]

At a February 2026 Knesset committee discussion, the head of the National Guard and Civil Defense Administration said the force was intended to respond only to emergencies and received orders through the Border Police and Israel Police chain of command.[19] Reported deployments nevertheless included a raid in Tarabin al-Sana and anti-government demonstrations.[1][18] Ramadan checkpoints were also reported.[19] These accounts documented activity beyond the inauguration and recruitment stages, without resolving the full scope of its authorized duties.[1]

Rapid reinforcement during simultaneous disturbances was central to the original operational concept.[2] The 2022 initiative brought together professional police personnel, reserve formations and trained volunteers so that a larger force could be activated across multiple sectors during emergencies.[4][8] Later plans added regional brigades and specialist capabilities to support responses to terrorism, nationally motivated violence and other security emergencies.[16]

Volunteer participation required particular attention to professional control: the 2022 analysis identified strict procedures and close supervision as necessary when volunteers were deployed during severe civil disturbances, including incidents involving Arab citizens.[2] The same analysis emphasized sensitivity, restraint, training and protection of uninvolved civilians.[2] The proposed emergency role therefore involved not only mobilizing personnel but preparing them for policing situations affecting civilian populations.[2]

The road-security proposal represented a distinct application of emergency manpower.[10] It concerned reserve soldiers maintaining routes for military movement during an operation, rather than assuming an unrestricted domestic policing mission.[10] Its associated planning questions included clear rules, relevant training, policing powers and the possible attachment of police officers to military groups.[10] Keeping that model separate from Ben-Gvir’s proposal preserves the distinction between military mobility support and a standing police-reinforcement organization.[10]

The Guard’s development connected the lessons of the May 2021 disturbances with efforts to increase Israel’s capacity for rapid domestic security reinforcement.[3][5] Successive plans emphasized the ability to respond in several locations simultaneously, mobilize additional personnel and sustain public order without relying exclusively on the ordinary staffing of local police stations.[2][4] Its later brigade-based planning expanded that approach into a more substantial national operational framework.[16]

The initiative also highlighted the relationship between civilian policing, military support and emergency preparedness.[2][10] Its planning encompassed public disturbances, terrorist threats, earthquakes, missile strikes and securing transport routes, although these tasks appeared in different proposals rather than one uniformly adopted mandate.[4][10] The broader institutional question was how to connect these capabilities while maintaining defined responsibilities and command arrangements.[3]

The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs interpreted the proposed Guard as a lesson drawn from May 2021 and as a means of restoring governability in the Arab sector and responding to widespread disturbances in mixed cities.[20] Its publication stated that 13 Israeli citizens were killed in the riots accompanying Operation Guardian of the Walls and identified events in east Jerusalem and on the Temple Mount as triggers of that violence and of an earlier wave in October 2000.[20]

The central institutional dispute concerned political control, police independence and operational coordination.[14] Police Commissioner Kobi Shabtai warned that a separate force directly subordinate to the minister could seriously harm internal-security operations, while the attorney general objected to insufficient professional groundwork.[14] The attorney general, police chief and opposition leader also raised questions about whether the initiative might increase sectarian tensions.[12] Security researchers favored unified police command and warned that separating forces or changing Border Police arrangements in the West Bank could impair coordination among the IDF, police districts and Border Police headquarters.[3]

Civil-rights advocates warned that direct ministerial control could facilitate disproportionate action against Arab residents and demonstrators.[11] Arab citizens and local and national leaders expressed concern about the Guard’s role in crime enforcement and mixed cities; Heritage Minister Amihai Eliyahu’s suggestion that it would target “citizens who identify with the enemy” intensified questions about its intended use.[21] The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs also described Arab-sector apprehension and a January 9, 2023 letter from Arab local-authority leaders to Netanyahu concerning Ben-Gvir’s appointment and broader policies.[20]

The planning process generated further disagreements: Finance Ministry representatives questioned recruitment feasibility and effects on regular police staffing, while a Defense Ministry representative favored awaiting wartime lessons and raised concerns about personnel transfers.[16] Researcher Meir Elran supported strengthening the Border Police but regarded the 2022 initiative as too narrow for comprehensive civilian emergency management, advocating broader disaster planning and interagency coordination.[2]

The February 17, 2026 parliamentary research report found that the government had not approved or publicly released the committee report, identified no publicly available operating regulations and recorded no ministry response to its inquiry.[1] Questions remained about legal authority, missions, command, recruitment, resources and budget, while reported protest deployments sharpened scrutiny of oversight and operational scope.[1][19]