Military Advocate General of the Israel Defense Forces

The Military Advocate General is the senior legal authority within the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and heads the Military Advocate General’s Corps (MAG Corps). The Corps is responsible for implementing the rule of law throughout the military, advising commanders on legal questions, and enforcing military law through investigation, prosecution, and related procedures.[1][2] Its work spans domestic and military law as well as international law, including the law of armed conflict.[1]

The office has a dual institutional character: it provides legal advice to military authorities and participates in the system that investigates and prosecutes alleged offenses. Its authority therefore touches both operational decision-making and accountability for alleged misconduct. Israeli government reports describe the MAG’s professional decisions as binding on military units and the office as subject to no authority but the law when exercising its powers.[1] These are institutional descriptions of the system; questions about how independence and impartiality operate in practice have been debated.

The Corps’ advisory work is intended to be available before and during operations, not only after an incident. Legal advisers can identify legal risks and constraints, and can also help commanders determine lawful means of pursuing military objectives. In the Israeli government’s account of the 2008–09 Gaza operation, lawyers advised at General Staff, regional-command, and divisional levels, reviewed planned targets, took part in operational planning and situation assessments, and advised on operational orders and humanitarian efforts.[3] The government report said the lawyers belonged to the MAG Corps rather than being subordinate to the commanders they advised.[3]

The Corps’ centrality to the IDF’s legal work has grown over time. In a 2024 interview, then-MAG Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi described advice on the legality of targets and weapons and on General Staff fire policy as part of the Corps’ wartime role. She characterized its lawyers as both partners in operational decisions and gatekeepers when legal limits on command authority were needed.[4] The interview also reported that roughly 100 Corps lawyers in regular and reserve service were at operational centers within hours of October 7, including command headquarters, divisions, the air force, the navy, and operations and intelligence branches.[4]

The IDF traces the Corps’ origins to the Haganah’s pre-state “Legal Service.” After the IDF was established in 1948, the body operated as the “Military Prosecution”; it was renamed the Military Advocate General’s Corps in 1950.[5] An INSS historical account likewise describes the Legal Service as active during the War of Independence, although it notes that the available reproduced material does not establish a precise formal-establishment date.[6]

The development of a formal legal process was connected to complaints about conduct within the pre-state forces. An INSS account says David Ben-Gurion raised allegations in February 1948 of revenge, theft, torture, and other lawlessness by some Palmach members. He called the alleged conduct “a political and moral danger” and argued that the harshest measures should be used to root it out.[6] A report by Yaakov Riftin called for clear and effective legal procedures, prompt and comprehensive investigation of complaints, immediate handling of complaints, prosecution where necessary, and proper observance of law.[6]

The early system handled a substantial volume of military proceedings. An account summarizing the MAG’s work for 1948 recorded an average of 400 court-martials per month. It also cited a report by Justice Minister Pinhas Rosen to the Knesset stating that 2,424 verdicts were handed down from July 1, 1948, through June 15, 1949.[6] Those figures describe military proceedings overall; the account cautions that many cases did not concern violations of the laws of war and that it is not possible to determine from the information presented how many were war-crime prosecutions.[6]

The Military Justice Law, enacted in 1955, established the system for adjudicating alleged military or criminal offenses by active-service soldiers, reservists, and military contractors while in service.[7] The law governs investigation, indictment, prosecution, and the court-martial system. A 2013 Law Library of Congress account describes two principal routes: military-court proceedings and disciplinary proceedings, with the appropriate route depending on factors including the offense’s gravity and the accused person’s rank.[7]

Meir Shamgar served as MAG from 1961 to 1968, before going on to serve as Israel’s Attorney-General from 1968 to 1975 and President of the Supreme Court from 1983 to 1995.[8] During the 1960s, he developed a legal and command framework for Israel’s administration of territories after the Six-Day War, including orders and proclamations issued upon entry into the territories in June 1967.[9] That framework and its legal premises became a lasting subject of dispute, discussed below.

A 2010 Israeli government report described the Corps’ legal-guidance units as separate from the units that examine and prosecute alleged crimes.[1] In October 2007, the MAG established the Office of the Military Advocate for Operational Affairs within the military prosecution. The office oversees investigations and prosecutions of alleged operational misconduct, particularly allegations concerning soldiers’ conduct toward Palestinian civilians during military operations.[3][1] The government report says prosecutors assigned to these cases receive specialized training and experience.[1]

The MAG serves on the IDF General Staff, but the office’s legal authority is described as professionally independent from the military chain of command. Under section 177 of the Military Justice Law, as summarized in a 2013 Law Library of Congress report, the Minister of Defense appoints the MAG, who is not professionally subordinate to the Chief of General Staff.[7] Israeli government reports describe the MAG as subject to no authority but the law when exercising the office’s powers and state that the Chief of General Staff has no authority over the office on legal matters.[1]

The appointment process is described as ministerial, on the recommendation of the Chief of General Staff. An Israeli government report presents appointment by a minister, rather than by the Chief of General Staff as with other IDF officers, as a means of protecting professional independence.[1] The 2015 implementation team reviewing the Turkel Commission’s recommendations proposed adding the Attorney General’s consent to the process and putting the procedure into law; those were recommendations, not evidence by themselves that the changes were enacted.[10]

The Corps includes a Military Prosecution, an International Law Department, a Legal Advice and Legislative Affairs Division, a department advising authorities in the Judea and Samaria region on security and civil affairs, and a Military Defense component.[5][2] The Military Prosecution enforces military law against soldiers and brings certain cases involving residents of Judea and Samaria before military courts. The International Law Department advises on international law, including the law of armed conflict; the advice-and-legislation division covers constitutional, public, administrative, and civil law.[5] Military Defense represents soldiers under investigation or trial when they request it. Although it sits within the Corps, institutional descriptions state that it has complete professional independence.[5][2]

The School of Military Law trains IDF personnel in military law and supports professional development within the Corps. It also trains and accredits officers who conduct disciplinary proceedings, supervises those proceedings, and coordinates requests for pardons or sentence mitigation.[11] A 2003 account of IDF legal education also describes instruction for commanders in military, criminal, and international law, alongside training for military lawyers and judge-advocates. It says the school linked the legal corps, the Judge Advocate-General, and commanders, and that computer-based simulations were used to teach commanders and soldiers in the field.[12]

The MAG’s powers include choosing whether a matter should proceed in a military court. The 2013 Law Library of Congress report says the office decides whether a case is tried in a military court and exercises discretion over whether certain non-military offenses involving service members should be heard in military or civilian court, considering the offense’s connection to military service.[7] Military courts conduct criminal adjudication under Israeli criminal law and criminal-procedure requirements. The report describes five courts of first instance and an Appeal Court Martial, and quotes the Military Justice Law’s rule that a military judge is subject only to law, not commanders’ authority.[7]

Disciplinary proceedings are generally decided by commanders rather than by military prosecutors, but the report identifies exceptions for sexual offenses: only MAG attorneys may decide whether those cases are handled through disciplinary proceedings. Findings from the Military Investigative Police or investigative officers must be forwarded to the MAG. For sexual-harassment disciplinary cases, the MAG maintains a roster of qualified adjudication officers and selects the officer rather than leaving the choice to a commander.[7]

The military justice system’s main components are the MAG Corps, the Military Police Criminal Investigation Division (MPCID), and the Military Courts.[1] MPCID is the IDF’s primary body for investigating alleged crimes by soldiers. The military prosecution reviews investigative files and can request supplemental investigation; if the evidence supports prosecution, a military advocate may direct that an indictment be filed in a military court or, where appropriate, that a commander hold a disciplinary hearing.[1] The government report says indictments are filed when the evidence is sufficient and identifies a reasonable likelihood that an offense has been committed as the threshold for directing prosecutorial action.[1]

Reports of possible misconduct can come from victims and family members, witnesses, commanders, human-rights organizations, journalists, embassies, international bodies, and law-enforcement agencies.[3] The 2009 Israeli report says anyone may complain about IDF personnel at a civilian police station in Israel, while Gaza residents could submit complaints in writing through an NGO or through the liaison mechanism for the Palestinian civilian population.[3] The MAG reviews field-investigation findings and may order a full criminal investigation if the facts create reasonable suspicion of an offense; it may also direct such an investigation without waiting for a field inquiry to conclude.[3][1]

The IDF describes an initial screening process for allegations of operational misconduct. Cases presenting reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct may be referred directly for criminal investigation; other cases may undergo factual assessment by the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism, whose findings go to the MAG Corps for a decision on whether a criminal investigation is justified.[13] The mechanism was established during the 2014 Gaza conflict following a Turkel Commission recommendation and an order by the Chief of General Staff.[13] The government has likewise said clearly criminal allegations can go straight to criminal investigation, while other complaints may be assessed using available material, including a command-investigation record.[1]

The 2014 fact-finding process illustrates the distinction between examination and criminal investigation. A U.S. Department of State report said that, by December 9, the MAG had referred about 100 incidents for examination, about 50 had been returned for a decision, five had been referred for criminal investigation, and nine had been closed without a criminal investigation after the MAG found no reasonable grounds to suspect criminal conduct.[14] The same report noted that a state comptroller investigation into Gaza military operations was proceeding in parallel.[14]

The MAG’s decisions are subject to review. The Israeli government says the Attorney General may review decisions on opening investigations and filing indictments, and that complainants or organizations may petition the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.[1] The Court may review and reverse decisions by the MAG, the military prosecution, or the Attorney General concerning whether to investigate or indict.[1] The 2009 report gave examples of Supreme Court intervention in decisions about charges or investigations in 1989, 2005, and 2009.[3]

Historical figures published by the Israeli government show the scale of investigations during particular periods, but are not current totals. For January 2002 through December 2008, the government reported 1,467 criminal investigations concerning alleged misconduct by soldiers, leading to 140 indictments related to crimes against the Palestinian population; as of December 2008, it said 103 defendants had been convicted and 10 cases remained pending.[3] For the first six months of 2009, it reported 123 criminal investigations, 10 of which led to indictments.[3] These figures are the government’s account and cover the specified periods and categories only.

Following the Gaza operation of December 27, 2008, to January 18, 2009, Israel reported that the IDF had investigated 150 separate incidents, with 36 referred for criminal investigation. An Israeli update said investigators had taken evidence from almost 100 Palestinian complainants and witnesses and approximately 500 IDF soldiers and commanders, while noting challenges in accessing battlefield evidence and locating witnesses.[15] The government’s later account also described 150 incidents as investigated and said the MAG referred 36 for criminal investigation.[1]

Legal advisers in the MAG Corps are intended to participate in operational planning and decision-making, providing guidance before actions are taken as well as reviewing conduct afterward. An INSS account argues that early legal advice can identify risks and obstacles while helping commanders find lawful ways to accomplish their objectives; it presents this role as both supporting command decisions and helping prevent unlawful conduct.[6]

In the Israeli government’s account of the 2008–09 Gaza operation, Corps lawyers examined the legality of planned targets, participated in operational planning and situation assessments, and advised on operational orders and procedures. The report also says lawyers helped direct humanitarian efforts.[3] The account describes the advisers as Corps members, not subordinates of the commanders receiving their advice.[3] Tomer-Yerushalmi later described operational advice on target and weapon legality and fire policy, and said legal advice was binding.[4]

Legal education is one means of embedding legal requirements in military practice. The IDF’s School of Military Law provides training and professional development, while an earlier account describes instruction for commanders and soldiers using computer-based simulations.[11][12] The Corps’ work therefore includes both direct advice in operational settings and training intended to give personnel legal tools before they face particular decisions.

Former MAG Avihai Mandelblit described the office as not professionally subordinate to the Chief of Staff and characterized its decisions as independent, subject to the rule of law. His account distinguishes criminal investigations from operational debriefings: not every incident under the laws of armed conflict must become a criminal investigation, but irregularities discovered through command channels or debriefings may be referred to military police.[16] This is a former officeholder’s description of the system, rather than a determination that debate about independence is settled.

The Office of the Military Advocate for Operational Affairs was created to handle operational-misconduct cases, including allegations of mistreatment of detainees, pillage or theft, unnecessary force, and abuse of authority.[17][3] An Israeli report said the office and a special prosecution unit were intended to develop expertise and handle such offenses efficiently, and that its creation enabled automatic criminal investigations in specified categories.[3] The report’s table recorded 152 investigations in listed categories in 2006, 351 in 2007, and 323 in 2008; it attributed the increase to the new office and to other measures, including command and educational activity that increased reporting by soldiers.[3]

A separate account gives military-police figures for 2000–2007 in four categories: illegal firing of weapons, property damage, violence, and crimes in Palestinian areas. It lists, respectively, 272 investigations, 31 indictments, and 17 convictions for illegal firing; 330, 36, and 36 for property damage; 475, 37, and 34 for violence; and 128, 20, and 18 for crimes in Palestinian areas.[18] The article says complaints, investigations, and convictions rose substantially in 2008 and suggests that the new operational-affairs office may have contributed, but provides neither 2008 figures nor unit-specific counts.[18]

Then-MAG Danny Efroni told Ynet in 2014 that, under a procedure adopted the previous year, military-police investigators went immediately to military outposts in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — after Palestinians were killed outside exchanges of fire. He reported 24 such incidents in 2013: 12 required immediate investigation and 12 were under review; one case in the southern Hebron Hills resulted in an indictment and conviction.[19] The interview also reported his view that a disturbance should end without casualties.[19]

In discussing Operation Pillar of Defense, Efroni said the army had reviewed 82 cases in which uninvolved people were killed. He reported that 60 were closed and that in five cases the military was considering referral for Military Police investigation.[19] He stated that an attack on a lawful target could be lawful under international law even if uninvolved people were killed, and said lawyers had not blocked any strikes during the operation.[19] These are figures and characterizations from a 2014 interview about specific past events, not a current accounting or a comprehensive statement of all military legal review.

The system has also handled individual cases involving rules of engagement and civilian protection. Former MAG Amnon Straschnov described prosecutions during the First Intifada, which he dates to 1987–1991, of soldiers who exceeded rules of engagement despite the army’s displeasure. He recounted a case in which a soldier and a lieutenant-colonel battalion commander were court-martialed after a soldier was told—or understood he was told—to fire near a Palestinian’s feet to frighten him; the article says the case began with a human-rights organization and attracted substantial criticism.[20] Straschnov also recounted the court-martial of two soldiers who asked a nine-year-old to check a bag suspected of containing explosives. He said the bag was empty and that compelling a civilian to assist in military operations violated international humanitarian law.[20]

The same account discusses a Supreme Court ruling against the army’s practice of sending a neighbor to warn people in a building harboring terrorists to surrender. It says the Court found the practice illegal and contrary to international law, including because apparent consent could be given under pressure.[20] These examples illustrate how legal review and military prosecution have intersected with contested operational practices; the cited article provides particular cases, not a complete record of the Corps’ work.

As MAG in the 1960s, Meir Shamgar developed the legal and command structure used for Israel’s administration of territories after the Six-Day War. Military proclamations and orders were issued upon entry into the territories in June 1967, including West Bank Force Commander’s Proclamations Nos. 2 and 3, dated June 7.[9] The accounts describe those orders as referring to accepted international-law norms concerning matters such as property and local law.[9]

The framework presented the territories’ status as sui generis. The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs account says Israel did not accept the formal application of the Fourth Geneva Convention while undertaking to apply its humanitarian provisions de facto; it also says residents were given access to Israel’s Supreme Court.[9] This characterization is politically and legally contested. The account presents the framework as leaving permanent status unresolved, while critics quoted in the same article argued that it helped normalize or prolong Israeli control and that the “administered areas” designation contributed to legal and planning disorder.[9]

The legal framework’s history is also described in a Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs account, which says Shamgar argued in a 1971 publication for the sui generis approach and for distinguishing formal applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention from observance of its humanitarian provisions. It reports that he supported access to the Supreme Court as a means of reviewing Israeli authorities’ conduct.[21] The discussion presents both the rationale for the system and criticism that it normalized and prolonged occupation; these remain disputed legal and political assessments, not settled descriptions of the territories’ permanent status.[9][21]

The Corps’ contemporary remit includes advice to authorities in Judea and Samaria on security and civil affairs, and military prosecutors bring certain cases involving residents of the area before military courts.[5] These functions are part of the IDF’s institutional description of its legal system and concern issues with significant political and historical dimensions.

The Turkel Commission examined Israel’s mechanisms for investigating alleged violations of the laws of armed conflict. An INSS account of its 2013 report says the Commission concluded that the mechanisms generally complied with Israel’s international-law obligations and considered the military justice system sufficiently independent to conduct effective investigations, while also finding that structural and procedural improvements were warranted.[22] It recommended expanded civilian oversight, including an international-law unit in the Justice Ministry’s Department of Legal Advice and Legislation to complement the MAG Corps’ International Law Department.[22]

The Commission also identified a concern about the appearance of bias because the MAG headed both the military’s prosecution and legal-counsel systems. The 2015 implementation-team report says the Commission recommended strengthening the Chief Military Prosecutor’s status and independence and regulating appeals to the Attorney General against MAG decisions.[10] The implementation team discussed possible follow-up measures; its account distinguishes those proposals from proof that each recommendation was adopted.[10]

The assessment of investigative independence has not been uniform. The UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza conflict described a system involving disciplinary proceedings, operational debriefings, special investigations requested by the Chief of Staff, and Military Police investigations. It said operational debriefings were conducted by soldiers from the same unit or chain of command with a superior officer and were intended for operational purposes.[23] The Mission concluded that the system did not meet all standards of impartiality, independence, promptness, and effectiveness, called the role of debriefings a “major flaw,” and expressed serious doubts about Israel’s willingness to conduct genuine investigations to those standards.[23]

Israel’s January 2010 update rejected parts of the Mission’s account. It disputed, among other claims, that criminal investigations had to await completion of command investigations and that command investigators were all within the direct chain of command. Israel said it disagreed with the Mission’s findings and recommendations, which it characterized as resting on misunderstandings and fundamental mistakes about the operation and Israel’s legal system.[15] The update also said 22 of the 34 incidents addressed by the Mission were already under investigation before publication of its report and that the remaining 12 were referred for investigation upon publication.[15] The Mission’s conclusions and Israel’s response are competing institutional assessments, not interchangeable findings.

NGOs have also criticized the transparency, impartiality, and effectiveness of military accountability processes. The U.S. Department of State’s 2014 report records B’Tselem’s statement that it rejected a MAG request for information about “irregular” incidents during Operation Protective Edge, saying MAG-led investigations had not produced meaningful investigations and prosecutions; the report also recounts wider NGO criticism of the mechanisms.[14] These are reported criticisms, not findings by the State Department that each criticism was established in a particular case.[14]

Public debate has extended to whether legal oversight strengthens military operations or constrains them excessively. In 2018, Chief of General Staff Gadi Eisenkot described the Corps as a source of IDF strength that helped commanders and soldiers carry out the military’s mission. Former MAG Avihai Mandelblit likewise said Corps officers worked alongside commanders toward operational goals while complying with law. Then-minister Naftali Bennett offered the opposing political claim that legal restrictions placed excessive constraints on soldiers.[24] The exchange reflects a political dispute over the balance between operational freedom and legal limits, rather than an established finding about the effect of legal advice in every operation.

In May 2024, Tomer-Yerushalmi said the Military Criminal Investigation Division was investigating about 70 cases involving suspected violations of the laws of war. Reported allegations included detention conditions at Sde Teiman, deaths of detainees in IDF custody, deaths of noncombatants during operations, violence, property offenses, and looting; the report did not break down the total by category.[25] In a separate account, the Congressional Research Service said the MAG Corps had conducted investigations since the start of the Gaza war in 2023 into alleged human-rights abuses by Israeli soldiers, police, and prison guards.[26]

The Sde Teiman cases generated further public controversy. A 2025 account says the Corps approved a Military Police investigation in July 2024 into suspected abuse of a Palestinian detainee, and that an indictment against five reservists was filed in February 2025. It also describes attacks on the MAG and the Corps and a separate investigation into the leak of a video related to the case.[2] A CRS account reports a military-court conviction of a reservist in February 2025 as well as the later indictment of five reserve soldiers.[26] These are distinct case outcomes and procedural stages: allegations, investigations, indictments, and convictions must not be conflated, and the reports do not establish guilt beyond the specific outcome they state.[26][2]

Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi was appointed MAG in 2021 by Defense Minister Benny Gantz on the recommendation of Chief of General Staff Aviv Kochavi, after consultation with the Attorney General. Maariv reported that she was the first woman appointed to the office in the IDF’s history, was promoted to major general with the appointment, and replaced Sharon Afek, who had served nearly six years.[27] Before becoming MAG, she had headed the Corps’ Advice and Legislation Department, served as a military judge, and advised the Chief of General Staff on gender matters.[27]

The IDF reports that Major General Itay Offir entered office as MAG on November 27, 2025, when he was promoted to major general at a ceremony at Rabin Camp. The ceremony was led by Chief of the General Staff Eyal Zamir and attended by Defense Minister Israel Katz.[28]

The MAG’s independence and the quality of military investigations are recurring points of dispute. Institutional accounts describe legal independence and review mechanisms, while the Turkel Commission recommended additional safeguards and civilian oversight.[22] The UN Fact-Finding Mission criticized the role of operational debriefings and the system’s impartiality and effectiveness, while Israel rejected key parts of the Mission’s assessment.[15][23] NGOs have separately criticized transparency and accountability.[14]

The MAG’s role in legal advice and prosecution has also prompted concern about an appearance of bias, while public debate has contrasted claims that legal oversight supports lawful military effectiveness with claims that it restricts soldiers unduly.[10][24] The post-1967 territorial framework developed under Shamgar remains contested, including its characterization of the territories’ status and the effect of its administrative terminology.[9][21] Recent investigations and proceedings, including those connected to Sde Teiman, have attracted political pressure and public criticism; allegations and investigative steps should be distinguished from adjudicated outcomes.[26][2]