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May 17 Agreement

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01In brief

The May 17 Agreement was a diplomatic agreement between Israel and Lebanon signed on May 17, 1983, with the United States as witness, concerning withdrawal, security, and relations between the two countries. It declared the state of war terminated but did not officially define bilateral relations as “peace” or include the word “recognition.” Its provisions combined Israeli withdrawal with a southern Lebanese security region, measures against terrorism, and mechanisms for developing relations. Implementation stalled over the withdrawal of Syrian forces, and Lebanon canceled the agreement on March 5, 1984.

02Background

Direct negotiations between Israel and Lebanon followed armed confrontations involving Israeli forces and PLO groups operating from Lebanese territory, and Israel’s incursion into Lebanon.[4] An earlier proposal for a non-aggression pact had come from Bachir Gemayel; the May 1983 agreement was subsequently negotiated with the government led by President Amin Gemayel.[5] After the Israel Defense Forces left western Beirut, American mediation sought an arrangement facilitating the departure of foreign armed forces from Lebanon, including Israeli, Syrian, and PLO forces.[6]

The negotiations therefore addressed more than the removal of Israeli troops: they also concerned the security conditions under which withdrawal would occur and the relationship between the two neighboring states afterward.[2] Israel sought a full peace treaty, while the eventual compromise went beyond security arrangements without adopting that diplomatic form.[7][8] The principal issues included ending the state of war, security in southern Lebanon, integration of Major Sa‘d Haddad’s forces, and development of bilateral relations.[2][8]

President Amin Gemayel led the Lebanese side of the diplomatic effort, while Philip Habib and his assistant Morris Draper served as American mediators.[2] Antoine Fattal headed the Lebanese delegation, and David Kimche headed the Israeli delegation.[2] At Lebanon’s insistence, military officers conducted the negotiations.[2] The talks began on December 28, 1982, and ultimately involved 35 sessions.[9]

The withdrawal of Syrian forces was central to the proposed settlement, although Syria was not included in the negotiations.[8] The United States intended instead to obtain Syrian endorsement after an Israeli-Lebanese agreement had been reached.[8] This sequence left the bilateral negotiations to establish arrangements whose implementation also depended on the conduct of a foreign power outside the negotiating process.[3][8]

03Course of Events

The 35 negotiating sessions took place in Khalde, Kiryat Shmona, and Netanya, with high-level American intervention helping bring the process to its conclusion.[9] Secretary of State George Shultz undertook approximately ten days of shuttle diplomacy between Beirut and Jerusalem after four months of negotiations had left important issues unresolved.[10] Lebanon had accepted the agreement by the time Israel’s Cabinet announced its acceptance in principle, and the final outcome involved compromises by both sides.[10]

A central compromise concerned the agreement’s diplomatic form: Lebanon’s delegation objected to a peace treaty on the grounds of Lebanon’s Arab affiliation, and Israel agreed to accept an arrangement of “good-neighbourly relations” for the time being.[7] The resulting document addressed the state of war, security, withdrawal, and future relations without officially labeling the relationship “peace.”[2] Its provisions did not include the word “recognition,” although they expressly required respect for each state’s sovereignty, independence, and borders.[2]

Signing took place in two ceremonies on May 17, 1983.[11] The Arabic and French versions were signed in Khalde, while the Hebrew and English versions were signed in Kiryat Shmona.[11] All four languages were authentic texts of the agreement.[1] The document identified the governments of Israel and Lebanon as its parties and listed the United States as witness.[1] American participation also extended beyond the signing ceremony to the machinery intended to supervise implementation.[1]

Article 1 required each country to respect the other’s sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity, and described their existing international boundary as inviolable.[1] It declared that the state of war “has been terminated and no longer exists” and committed Israel to withdrawing its armed forces in accordance with the annex.[1] The agreement also provided for the peaceful settlement of disputes and for security arrangements that included a designated Security Region in southern Lebanon.[9] These commitments combined a declaration ending belligerency with practical arrangements intended to protect Israel’s northern border and restore Lebanese authority.[8]

The security obligations were reciprocal: neither country’s territory could be used as a base for hostile or terrorist activity against the other.[1] Each party was required to prevent irregular forces, armed organizations, bases, and infrastructure on its territory from threatening the other party’s security.[1] The agreement also prohibited hostile propaganda.[1] Further provisions restricted the entry, deployment, or passage of military forces, weapons, and equipment belonging to a state hostile to the other party, covering territory, airspace, and territorial waters, subject to the agreement’s qualifications.[9]

The planned Security Region extended across southern Lebanon, with one detailed account identifying the area south of the Awali River as the security zone.[2] Lebanese authorities were to enforce special security measures there, and the organized armed forces permitted in the region were to be Lebanese forces under the Lebanese government’s authority.[9] Two Lebanese Army brigades formed an important part of the arrangement.[9] A territorial brigade was intended to operate between the international border and the Zahrani River, incorporating South Lebanese Army forces, while a regular brigade would operate between the Zahrani and Litani rivers.[2]

The annex provided for existing local military units to be integrated into the Lebanese Army and for the local civil guard to enter the Lebanese Auxiliary Force, known as ANSAR.[9] The military provisions included the integration of Major Sa‘d Haddad’s South Lebanon Army into the regular Lebanese Army.[8] Permitted weapons and equipment were detailed in the annex and its appendix.[9] The arrangement thus addressed not only the location of forces but also their governmental authority, organizational affiliation, and armament.[9]

Implementation was to be supervised through a Joint Liaison Committee with American participation and a Security Arrangements Committee containing equal numbers of Israeli and Lebanese representatives.[9] Joint supervisory teams would verify compliance with the security arrangements and report violations.[9] The Joint Liaison Committee was also assigned unresolved problems concerning the security arrangements, making it a forum for addressing implementation difficulties as well as overseeing the agreement.[1]

The annex allowed Lebanon to request the stationing of a UNIFIL unit in the Sidon area to support Lebanese authority, including in nearby Palestinian refugee-camp areas.[9] This possibility accompanied the broader requirement that Lebanese governmental forces exercise authority in the designated southern region.[9] The planned security system therefore included Lebanese military deployment, integration of local units, bilateral supervision, American participation, and a possible United Nations role around Sidon.[9]

The withdrawal timetable was tied to the agreement’s entry into force rather than simply to its signature.[9] Under the annex, all Israeli forces were to leave Lebanon within eight to twelve weeks after the agreement became effective.[9] The intended withdrawal was also linked to the departure of Syrian and remaining PLO forces.[10] Israel would not actually withdraw until those forces had left, and the withdrawal condition concerning Syrian troops subsequently became a decisive obstacle to implementation.[3][10]

Article 10 required both parties to ratify the agreement according to their constitutional procedures and made entry into force dependent on exchanging instruments of ratification.[1] It also stipulated that the agreement would supersede previous agreements between Israel and Lebanon.[1] Modification, amendment, or termination was to require mutual agreement.[1] These provisions distinguished the signing of the document from the legal steps required to make it operative.[1]

The agreement’s political and economic provisions anticipated further negotiations rather than establishing every aspect of relations immediately.[7] The Joint Liaison Committee was assigned to develop relations, including arrangements for goods, products, people, and communications.[1] Good-faith negotiations on the movement of goods, products, and people were to take place during the six months following Israeli withdrawal and the termination of the state of war.[1] Related provisions connected these arrangements to restoration of Lebanese governmental authority along the border.[9]

Gradual normalization was consequently part of the intended settlement, but some matters required additional bilateral agreements.[7] Civil, cultural, and economic relations were among the subjects covered by the agreement’s broader framework.[2] The political commitments required follow-up measures, while the southern security region also needed carefully developed implementing arrangements.[7] The accord combined immediate declarations of principle with a staged process of withdrawal, security organization, supervision, and negotiation over future exchanges.[1][7]

04Aftermath

Syria opposed the agreement and declined to discuss withdrawing its troops, stalling further progress toward implementation.[3] Because Israeli withdrawal was conditioned on Syrian departure, the refusal obstructed the planned sequence for removing foreign forces.[3] The agreement never entered into force.[12]

On July 23, 1983, Syria announced the formation of the National Salvation Front, an opposition grouping that challenged President Amin Gemayel’s government and its American and Israeli patrons.[8] The Front included Druze, Shi‘a, Sunni Muslim, and Christian elements, including groups led by Walid Jumblatt, Nabih Berri, Rashid Karami, and Sulayman Franjiyah.[8] Opposition to the agreement thus extended across several Lebanese communities and political organizations rather than belonging to a single faction.[8]

Israeli forces withdrew from the Shuf in August 1983, removing a buffer between Druze and Christian militias and triggering renewed fighting.[3] By September, Druze forces controlled most of the Shuf, while Israeli forces had withdrawn from all but the southern security zone.[3] These territorial and military changes occurred while the broader diplomatic arrangement remained stalled over the withdrawal of foreign forces.[3]

Lebanon’s government canceled the agreement on March 5, 1984, amid Syrian pressure and pressure from Muslim groups on Amin Gemayel, as the departure of American Marines appeared imminent.[3] Syrian pressure and internal Lebanese opposition were important elements in Lebanon’s retreat from the agreement.[3][6]

The cancellation ended an initiative Israel had regarded as the beginning of peace between the two countries.[13] The envisaged combination of withdrawal, southern security arrangements, and developing bilateral relations was not implemented as agreed.[12][14] The political commitments contained in the signed document therefore did not produce the intended functioning relationship between the two governments.[1][12]

05Historiography and Legacy

The agreement joined a declaration ending the state of war to provisions for withdrawal, border security, counterterrorism, and the development of relations, while stopping short of the full peace treaty Israel had sought.[7][8] Its text set out mutual obligations and supervisory institutions in considerable detail, but also left important matters to subsequent implementation and negotiation.[1][7] The distinction between those written commitments and their unrealized implementation is central to its diplomatic legacy.[1][12]

The negotiations also produced a concrete model for organizing security in southern Lebanon: Lebanese governmental authority, two army brigades, integration of local armed units, bilateral monitoring, and American participation.[9] Alongside these arrangements, the document envisaged exchanges of people and goods and improved communications rather than security cooperation alone.[1] The agreement’s scope therefore extended beyond a military withdrawal timetable to the possibility of a different relationship between the neighboring states.[1]

Later treatments differ over the document’s diplomatic classification. An Encyclopedia.com survey says it fell short of a peace treaty, while the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs calls it a “draft peace treaty.”[15][16] The Israeli foreign ministry paper, by contrast, described the negotiated formula as a pragmatic arrangement of “good-neighbourly relations.”[7] These labels reflect differing interpretations of its form; the document itself declared the state of war terminated and specified withdrawal, security, and mechanisms for developing relations.[1]

A later study based on declassified archival material reassessed bargaining over southern security arrangements, Haddad’s militia, and normalization.[17] It challenged the interpretation that Lebanese negotiators simply capitulated to an American-Israeli diktat, instead finding that Israel conceded more than it initially intended on these issues.[17] The negotiating record also contains accounts of constraints on the Lebanese delegation arising from the heterogeneous government and its reluctance to act without Syrian and wider Arab approval.[7] Former Israeli Foreign Ministry legal adviser Alan Baker recalled internal divisions within the Lebanese delegation, with some members ceasing to attend and others replacing them.[18]

The legal-status dispute concerns the difference between parliamentary support, ratification, and entry into force.[1][15] Kimche’s signing statement reported a unanimous Lebanese parliamentary vote in favor, while other accounts say the parliament failed to ratify or approve the agreement.[11][15] Another account describes ratification by both parliaments but a refusal by Gemayel to sign.[19] Article 10 supplies the relevant legal distinction: entry into force required an exchange of ratification instruments, not signature or a favorable parliamentary vote alone.[1]

Explanations of the failure likewise differ in emphasis.[12][18] Gemayel attributed it to both Syria and Israel, describing the linkage between Israeli and Syrian withdrawals as an Israeli condition that gave Syria a veto and identifying a climate of doubt fostered by Hafez al-Assad’s government.[12] Baker instead identified Syrian obstruction of Lebanese parliamentary ratification as the reason the agreement failed to enter into force.[18] The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs similarly argues that Syrian pressure prevented ratification and caused the agreement to be shelved.[20]

Chronologies also contain discrepancies, although the March 5, 1984 cancellation date appears in the principal diplomatic account used here.[3] Another country study dates abrogation to March 6, 1985, and associates it with the resignation of the Council of Ministers and its replacement by a national-unity government headed by Rashid Karami.[8] A separate retrospective places formal cancellation roughly a year and a half after signature.[14] These differing dates and descriptions accompany broader variation in whether the agreement’s end is called cancellation, abrogation, repudiation, or lapse.[3][8]

Sources

  1. 1Internet Archive, Full text of "Israel CIA - State Dept Files", accessed on October 31, 2026.
  2. 2Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Israel and Lebanon to Open Negotiations, accessed on October 31, 2026.
  3. 3U.S. Department of State, Lebanon (10/25/10), accessed on October 31, 2026.
  4. 4Jewish News Syndicate, Israel-Lebanon maritime boundary negotiations are about to begin, accessed on October 31, 2026.
  5. 5Government of Israel, Facts About Israel: The Quest for Peace, accessed on October 31, 2026.
  6. 6Ynet, The Lebanon War, accessed on October 31, 2026.
  7. 7The American Jewish Archives, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel and Lebanon: In Search of a New Relationship, accessed on October 31, 2026.
  8. 8Library of Congress, Lebanon: A Country Study, accessed on October 31, 2026.
  9. 9Jewish Virtual Library, Israel-Lebanon Relations: Peace Agreement, accessed on October 31, 2026.
  10. 10Congress.gov, Congressional Record, George P. Shultz Address to the Business Council, accessed on October 31, 2026.
  11. 11Jewish Virtual Library, Statements by Director General Kimche Regarding the Israel-Lebanon Agreement, accessed on October 31, 2026.
  12. 12Ynet, The Lebanese president who signed an agreement with Israel: “In my time, it was unforgivable”, accessed on October 31, 2026.
  13. 13Ynet, Israel did not “defeat” Lebanon. Interests defeated everyone, accessed on October 31, 2026.
  14. 14Ynet, Chronicle of contacts for peace with Lebanon, accessed on October 31, 2026.
  15. 15Encyclopedia.com, State of Israel: Historical Survey: the State and its Antecedents (1880–2006), accessed on October 31, 2026.
  16. 16Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Palestinian Compliance with the Oslo Accords: A Legal Overview, accessed on October 31, 2026.
  17. 17National Library of Israel, RAMBI Catalogue Record, accessed on October 31, 2026.
  18. 18Globes, “There is no Israeli occupation in the territories, only a Palestinian population under conditions of occupation”, accessed on October 31, 2026.
  19. 19Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Assad’s Survival Is in Israel’s Best Interest, accessed on October 31, 2026.
  20. 20Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Israel-Lebanon Maritime Boundary Negotiations - Some Unique Aspects, accessed on October 31, 2026.

IsraelPedia Question & Answers

  • What was the May 17 Agreement?

    The May 17 Agreement was a diplomatic agreement between Israel and Lebanon, signed on May 17, 1983, with the United States as witness. It declared the state of war terminated and set out arrangements for Israeli withdrawal, security in southern Lebanon, counterterrorism, and the development of relations. It did not officially define the relationship as “peace” or include the word “recognition.”

  • Why did Israel and Lebanon negotiate the May 17 Agreement?

    Israel and Lebanon negotiated the May 17 Agreement after armed confrontations involving Israeli forces and PLO groups operating from Lebanese territory, and Israel’s incursion into Lebanon. American mediation sought an arrangement to facilitate the departure of foreign armed forces, including Israeli, Syrian, and PLO forces. The talks also addressed security conditions for withdrawal and future relations between the neighboring states.

  • What security arrangements did the May 17 Agreement provide for southern Lebanon?

    The May 17 Agreement provided for a Security Region in southern Lebanon, where Lebanese authorities would enforce special security measures and permitted organized armed forces would be under the Lebanese government’s authority. Two Lebanese Army brigades were planned: a territorial brigade between the international border and the Zahrani River, incorporating South Lebanese Army forces, and a regular brigade between the Zahrani and Litani rivers. Local military units were to be integrated into the Lebanese Army, and the local civil guard into the Lebanese Auxiliary Force, known as ANSAR.

  • How was implementation of the May 17 Agreement supposed to be supervised?

    Implementation of the May 17 Agreement was to be supervised by a Joint Liaison Committee with American participation and a Security Arrangements Committee with equal numbers of Israeli and Lebanese representatives. Joint supervisory teams were to verify compliance with security arrangements and report violations. The Joint Liaison Committee was also responsible for addressing unresolved security issues and developing relations between the two countries.

  • Why did the May 17 Agreement fail to enter into force?

    The May 17 Agreement never entered into force because implementation stalled over the withdrawal of Syrian forces. Israel’s withdrawal was conditioned on Syrian and remaining PLO forces leaving Lebanon, but Syria opposed the agreement and declined to discuss withdrawing its troops. Article 10 required an exchange of instruments of ratification for the agreement to take effect.

  • When did Lebanon cancel the May 17 Agreement?

    Lebanon canceled the May 17 Agreement on March 5, 1984, amid Syrian pressure and pressure from Muslim groups on President Amin Gemayel, as the departure of American Marines appeared imminent. The cancellation ended the initiative, and its planned combination of withdrawal, southern security arrangements, and developing bilateral relations was not implemented as agreed.

  • How do accounts differ over the May 17 Agreement’s diplomatic status?

    Later accounts classify the May 17 Agreement differently: one survey says it fell short of a peace treaty, while the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs calls it a “draft peace treaty.” An Israeli foreign ministry paper described the negotiated formula as “good-neighbourly relations.” The agreement itself declared the state of war terminated and set out withdrawal, security, and mechanisms for developing relations, without officially labeling the relationship “peace.”