Kahan Commission

The killings investigated by the commission took place in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps between September 16 and 18, 1982, during the war that had begun on June 6.[1] Lebanese Christian Phalangist forces carried out the massacre after Israeli officials permitted them to enter the camps.[4] The commission subsequently examined both the circumstances surrounding that entry and the conduct of Israeli officials and officers before and during the killings.[1]

Israel had longstanding political and military connections with Lebanese Christian forces, including the provision of arms, uniforms, and training, as well as contacts with Phalangist leaders.[1] Israeli intelligence organizations differed in their assessments of these relationships: the Mossad favored closer relations, while Military Intelligence emphasized the Phalangists’ unreliability and military weakness.[1] Statements by Bashir Gemayel and other Phalangist leaders about removing large numbers of Palestinian refugees from Lebanon, including through violent means, formed part of the background examined by the inquiry.[1] Reports of earlier Phalangist violence against civilians had also led some experienced intelligence officers to fear that the forces might massacre Palestinians if given the opportunity.[1]

Following Gemayel’s assassination on September 14, 1982, Israel decided to send the IDF into West Beirut, where Israeli troops began entering early the following morning.[1][1] The initial operational orders did not direct entry into the refugee camps.[1] A later order, issued on the morning of September 16, specified that the IDF was not to enter the camps and that searching and clearing them would be undertaken by the Phalangists or the Lebanese Army.[1] Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan supported the Phalangists’ entry, and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon approved the arrangement on September 15.[1]

The massacre prompted broad shock and protests within Israel, alongside international criticism.[4][3] Demands for an investigation and for those responsible to be brought to justice became central to the public response.[2] Peace Now organized a large demonstration in Tel Aviv in late September, at which participants called for the resignations of Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Sharon and demanded an inquiry.[3] The demonstration became known as the “400,000 Demonstration,” reflecting the reported attendance, although that figure was challenged.[3][5]

The government initially considered an investigation with more limited powers than a statutory commission.[6] On September 24, the Cabinet asked Supreme Court President Yitzhak Kahan to lead an inquiry that would not have possessed formal powers to subpoena witnesses and seize documents.[6] A High Court order issued that day required the government to explain why it had not established a statutory commission.[6] Public and political pressure continued, and on September 28 the Cabinet resolved to establish a commission under the Commissions of Inquiry Law of 1968.[1][6]

The statutory mandate directed the commission to investigate “all the facts and factors connected with the atrocity” committed by a unit of the Lebanese Forces against civilians in the Sabra and Shatila camps.[1] Under the governing law, the president of the Supreme Court appointed the commission’s members.[6] Its establishment also heightened tensions between Sharon and senior military commanders as the inquiry began examining the decisions and responsibilities of both the political and military leadership.[2]

Yitzhak Kahan chaired the three-member commission alongside Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak and retired Major General Yona Efrat.[1] Barak had previously served as attorney general, while Efrat had headed Central Command and retired from active military service in 1977.[6] Formal hearings began at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem on October 20, 1982.[6]

The commission confined its investigation to facts and factors connected with the killings of September 16–18.[1] It did not undertake a general investigation of the war or of government policy decisions unless they were directly related to the events under examination.[1] Its members visited Beirut but were not permitted to enter the area where the killings had occurred; they also viewed television footage filmed near the time of the events.[1] Some hearings were public, but most were held in camera because of state-security and foreign-relations concerns.[1]

The completed inquiry comprised 60 sessions and testimony from 58 witnesses.[1] Staff investigators separately collected 180 statements from 163 witnesses, while government and military bodies supplied documentary material.[1] Investigators included Dorit Beinisch, Edna Arbel, and police officer Alex Ish-Shalom, with Judge David Bartov serving as coordinator.[1] The inquiry’s evidentiary base included intelligence reports, field logs, recordings, and situation assessments.[6]

By the end of 1982, an interim accounting recorded 49 witnesses, nine of whom had appeared twice, producing 58 testimonies over 65 hours.[6] Their recorded testimony filled 1,692 pages, and 23 testimonies had been delivered in open session.[6] The commission had received 245 exhibits and documents totaling 3,000 pages, together with approximately 12,000 additional pages of government and IDF material.[6] These interim figures described the inquiry’s progress before the final report’s accounting of its work.[1][6]

Among the political figures who testified were Begin, Sharon, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and Communications Minister Mordechai Zippori.[6] Their evidence exposed differing recollections about when officials learned that the Phalangists had entered the camps and when reports of killings reached them.[6] Zippori testified that he had heard of a “slaughter” on the morning of September 17 and had contacted Shamir; Shamir disputed that characterization of their conversation and said he assumed that intelligence officials would already know if something was wrong.[6]

On November 24, the commission notified nine people that its findings might adversely affect them: Begin, Sharon, Shamir, Eitan, Military Intelligence Director Yehoshua Saguy, Northern Command chief Amir Drori, division commander Amos Yaron, the Mossad chief, and Sharon aide Avi Dudai.[6] They were given 15 days to request a further appearance, examine relevant material, cross-examine witnesses, and submit evidence, and were informed of their right to legal counsel.[6] The notice to Begin raised his failure to consider the Lebanese forces’ role and the danger of revenge against camp residents; Sharon’s notice addressed the danger, preventive measures, and the response to reports of misconduct.[6]

The commission reconstructed the arrangements for the Phalangists’ entry in considerable detail.[1] At a September 16 coordination meeting, the proposed force was described as a company of about 150 fighters, whose entry would be coordinated with Brigadier General Amos Yaron.[1] Yaron identified locations where armed opponents were believed to be and warned the Phalangists not to harm civilians, saying he knew their conduct norms differed from those of the IDF.[1] The force began entering the camps at approximately 6 p.m.[1] Israeli observation posts were positioned so that seeing what happened inside the camps was difficult or impossible.[1]

Evidence concerning the first evening included several warnings received by Israeli personnel.[1] An Israeli officer testified that he overheard a Phalangist ask Elie Hobeika by radio what to do with 50 women and children.[1] Hobeika replied: “This is the last time you’re going to ask me a question like that, you know exactly what to do.”[1] Another account concerned a radio question about what to do with 45 people.[1] A liaison officer reported approximately 300 people killed, including civilians, before revising that figure to 120.[1]

At a subsequent briefing, an intelligence officer raised the presence of women, children, and older people, but Yaron responded that they would not be harmed.[1] The commission found that information about killings was not adequately passed upward or acted upon promptly.[1] Its examination therefore addressed not only the original decision to admit the Phalangists but also the handling of information after their operation had begun.[1]

The commissioners signed their report on February 7, 1983, and it was published on February 8.[1] The published report included Appendix A, while Appendix B was withheld on national-security and foreign-relations grounds.[1] The report distinguished direct responsibility for perpetrating the killings from indirect responsibility arising from the failure to foresee the danger, take precautions, and respond effectively once reports arrived.[1]

Direct responsibility rested with the Phalangist forces.[1] The commission found no evidence that Israeli soldiers were inside the camps during the massacre, and no evidence of an Israeli-Phalangist conspiracy to commit atrocities or an intention by an Israeli element to harm civilians.[1][1] It also concluded that no organized military force other than the Phalangists entered the camps during the relevant period.[1]

The decision to allow the Phalangists into the camps had considerations in its favor, including avoiding further IDF casualties and their claimed expertise in identifying terrorists.[1] Nevertheless, the commission found that decision-makers should have foreseen the danger of a massacre and had not taken precautions sufficient to prevent or reduce it.[1] Once reports of killings emerged, they were not properly heeded, and sufficiently energetic and immediate action was not taken to stop the violence.[1] These failures constituted Israel’s indirect responsibility, distinct from the Phalangists’ direct responsibility for carrying out the killings.[1]

The commission could not establish an exact death toll.[1] It recorded a Red Cross delegation count of 328 bodies and a separate count of 460 victims whose bodies were found between September 18 and 30.[1] The latter list included 109 Lebanese and 328 Palestinians, as well as people of other nationalities.[1] An IDF intelligence estimate placed the number of victims at 700–800, which the commission considered possibly closest to reality.[1] It also noted much higher Palestinian-source estimates, sometimes in the thousands, and the difficulty of distinguishing combat deaths from victims of slaughter.[1]

Begin was not party to the decision to send the Phalangists into the camps and did not receive a report of that decision until the September 16 Cabinet meeting.[1] The commission accepted that he was initially entitled to rely on Sharon’s reassuring reports, but rejected his claim that the danger of revenge killings was entirely unknown to him.[1] His failure to show interest in the Phalangists’ activities after learning of their entry cast a degree of responsibility on him, although the commission made no further recommendation concerning him.[1]

Sharon bore personal responsibility for disregarding the danger of revenge and bloodshed when approving the Phalangists’ entry and for failing to order effective IDF supervision or other appropriate safeguards.[1] The commission characterized this as a grave mistake and recommended that he draw the appropriate personal conclusions.[1] If necessary, the prime minister should consider exercising his authority to remove Sharon from office.[1] The commission did not fault Sharon for failing to order the Phalangists’ removal after the first reports reached him, because he had been told their operation was halted and they would leave by 5 a.m.[1]

Shamir was criticized for taking no action after Zippori conveyed information about Phalangist operations in the camps.[1] He had not made a real effort to check that information, apparently because of his skeptical attitude toward Zippori.[1] The commission considered the identification of Shamir’s responsibility sufficient and made no additional recommendation.[1]

Eitan failed to consider the danger of revenge and bloodshed and did not order appropriate preventive measures, placing him in breach of duty.[1] The commission also criticized his failure to investigate reports of excesses after Drori told him that the Phalangists had “overdone it,” and cited his order to provide tractors to the Phalangist forces.[1][1] It made no recommendation about Eitan’s continued service because his term was due to end in April 1983 and an extension was not under consideration.[1]

Saguy was faulted for failing to issue sufficiently explicit warnings before the operation and after reports of Phalangist actions reached him.[1] Fear that such warnings would be dismissed did not excuse inaction, and the commission recommended that he not continue as Director of Military Intelligence.[1] The Mossad chief should likewise have expressed his assessment of the danger at the Cabinet meeting, but his inaction was not judged serious enough to warrant a further recommendation.[1]

Drori failed to warn Eitan adequately that civilians remained in danger and that the Phalangists should be removed or the population otherwise protected.[1] Although Drori had taken some measures to end the Phalangists’ actions, he had not continued them; identifying his responsibility was considered sufficient.[1] Yaron was found in breach of his duties for failing to act effectively on reports of killings or inform Drori, and the commission recommended that he not serve as an IDF field commander for at least three years.[1][1] It found insufficient evidence to determine that Dudai had received a report about 300 deaths.[1]

The report’s recommendations produced an immediate confrontation over Sharon’s position in the government.[3][7] Sharon initially refused to resign, while Begin hesitated to remove him, and further public protests followed.[3] In February 1983 Cabinet discussions, Sharon challenged the meaning and implications of the commission’s finding of indirect responsibility.[7]

Sharon argued that accepting the report would amount to accepting that Israel had knowingly ignored the danger of a massacre, and warned that Israel could consequently be accused of genocide.[7] Begin rejected that argument.[7] Sixteen ministers voted to adopt the recommendations, with Sharon the only Cabinet member voting against them.[7] The Cabinet voted on February 10 to remove him as defense minister, and he subsequently remained in the government as a minister without portfolio.[8]

The practical consequence was therefore Sharon’s departure from the defense portfolio rather than his departure from the Cabinet altogether.[3][8] The commission’s recommendation concerning Saguy was also accepted, and he was dismissed as head of Military Intelligence.[9] Its recommendation concerning Yaron specified exclusion from IDF field command for at least three years rather than permanent removal from military service.[1]

Beyond individual responsibility, the commission recommended an expert investigation of institutional shortcomings and ways to correct them.[1] That investigation was to be appointed by a Ministerial Defense Committee.[1] This institutional recommendation accompanied findings about failures to consider foreseeable risks, communicate warnings, supervise the Phalangist operation, and respond to evidence of killings.[1][1]

The massacre also generated a separate international response while the inquiry was underway.[3] On December 16, 1982, the UN General Assembly condemned the events in Resolution 37/123 by a vote of 123–0, with 22 abstentions and 12 countries not voting.[3] Section D characterized the massacre as an act of genocide, a formulation separate from the Kahan Commission’s distinction between direct Phalangist responsibility and indirect Israeli responsibility.[3][1]

The commission closed its report with an explicit statement about military ethics: “the end never justifies the means, and basic ethical and human values must be maintained in the use of arms.”[1] It called for the IDF to continue fostering basic moral obligations in wartime.[1] These closing remarks accompanied concrete findings against senior political officials and commanders, as well as recommendations for changes in office and an examination of institutional failures.[1][1]

Its treatment of political responsibility distinguished the inquiry from the Agranat Commission’s approach to the Yom Kippur War.[10] The Kahan inquiry held the political echelon accountable, particularly Sharon, whereas the Agranat inquiry placed responsibility on the military command without addressing the political echelon’s culpability.[10] The Kahan report’s findings extended across the prime minister, defense and foreign ministers, senior intelligence leadership, and operational commanders, while differentiating the seriousness of their failures and the consequences recommended for each.[1]

The commission’s criticism of Saguy also concerned the obligation of an intelligence officer to make his assessment heard.[11] It described him as having “stepped aside” when the prime minister invited him to speak freely at a Cabinet meeting, treating that silence as a failure of a fundamental duty of an IDF officer.[11] In its final findings, the commission expressly rejected anticipated dismissal of a warning as a justification for not giving it.[1]

The inquiry’s conclusions also entered Israeli high-school history education.[12] A reproduced textbook passage identifies the Phalanges as the perpetrators, describes Israel’s responsibility as indirect, and summarizes the recommendation that the defense minister be removed.[12] The same passage connects Begin’s approval of the commission’s establishment with public pressure.[12] This educational treatment preserves both the identification of those who committed the massacre and the inquiry’s findings concerning Israeli failures.[12]

The meaning of indirect responsibility was publicly disputed, most notably in Sharon’s objections during the Cabinet’s consideration of the report.[7] The UN General Assembly’s genocide characterization belonged to a separate political and international debate and was not the commission’s own formulation of its findings.[3][1] The casualty total also remains uncertain: the commission itself declined to determine a precise figure and presented several counts and estimates rather than a single verified total.[1] These disputes should be distinguished from its explicit attribution of the killings themselves to the Phalangists and its separate findings concerning failures by Israeli officials and officers.[1]