Judea and Samaria Division

The division’s organizational foundation is a network of territorial brigades responsible for defined geographical sectors, rather than a permanently fixed collection of combat formations.[3] Central Command’s organizational listing identifies six regional brigades under it: Menashe, Shomron, Ephraim, Benyamin, Etzion, and Judea.[1] Combat forces are assigned as requirements change, with additional troops available during escalation.[3] This combination of geographically stable headquarters and changing operational forces supports missions ranging from arrests and counterterrorism to guarding communities and responding to mass disturbances.[3]

The division operates in an arena shaped by Palestinian Authority institutions and security agencies, differentiated responsibilities in Areas A, B, and C, and cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security bodies against terrorist infrastructure, including Hamas-linked cells.[3] Its work therefore includes police-like tasks alongside military operations, with regular and reserve units cooperating with the Israel Security Agency.[3] The regional legal-advisory department advises the division and its brigade commanders on security, public order, and responsibilities concerning residents’ security and rights.[8]

Central Command is one of the IDF’s four regional commands, has its headquarters in Jerusalem, and is responsible for approximately one-third of Israel’s territory.[1] Its organizational listing treats the Valley Brigade, situated along the Israel–Jordan border, separately from the six brigades listed under the Judea and Samaria Division.[1] That distinction matters when interpreting operational statistics that combine the division’s activity with activity in the Jordan Valley.[9]

The division’s creation formed part of the IDF’s structural response to the First Intifada, when escalating friction and violent confrontations exposed limitations in existing operational capabilities.[4] The response included reinforcing forces, changing methods, and developing non-lethal crowd-control measures.[4] The wider process also encompassed the establishment of the Gaza Division, special units such as undercover formations, the Kfir Brigade, and deeper integration of Border Police into military activity.[4] The account linking the division’s establishment to this transformation does not specify an establishment date.[4]

The broader military-government framework in Judea and Samaria dates to the period following the Six-Day War.[3] Moshe Ya’alon became commander of the division in 1992, before subsequently becoming Central Command commander in 1998 and IDF chief of staff in July 2002.[10] Benny Gantz commanded the division’s Judea Brigade in 1994–1995 and later held divisional command at the beginning of the Second Intifada.[11]

Oslo II brought a reconfiguration of headquarters and responsibilities as Israeli forces withdrew from major Palestinian cities and transferred control to the Palestinian Authority.[5] Headquarters were established outside those cities, with the divisional headquarters exercising authority over six brigade headquarters and dozens of battalion and company headquarters.[5] The deployment prioritized security on main roads used by Israeli settlers, protection of settlements, and continued counterterrorism operations.[5]

Under the Oslo II arrangements, Area A was assigned Palestinian Authority responsibility for security and civilian administration, while Area B combined Palestinian administrative authority with Israeli security responsibility; Area C remained under Israeli control.[5] A 2016–2017 account estimated that Areas A and B contained approximately 95 percent of the Palestinian population of Judea and Samaria and described Israel as bearing complete responsibility for Area C.[3] That same historical account estimated approximately 400,000 Jewish residents in hundreds of settlements in Area C; these figures describe its reporting period rather than the present population.[3]

A retrospective account identified division commander Gabi Ofir as ordering a closure of Ramallah and surrounding it with tanks in 2000 to prevent Jibril Rajoub’s men from transferring Abd al-Salam Hirbawi to Nablus.[12] The account stated that Hirbawi was released soon afterward.[12]

Gantz recalled beginning his service as division commander one day before the Second Intifada began, saying: “A day before. That was my welcome party as a division commander.”[2] His official biography dates his command to 2000–2002.[11] In another recollection, he described a battalion pursuing people who had fired on it approximately 800 meters into Area A.[2] Gantz wanted the troops to remain until nightfall, but chief of staff Shaul Mofaz ordered their withdrawal by 1 p.m.; he presented the episode as illustrating the operational and political constraints of the period.[2]

A contemporary change-of-command report dates Gershon “Jerry” Yitzhak’s assumption of command to July 2001, approximately nine months after the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada.[13] It described the division’s initial posture as defensive, concentrated around Palestinian cities and along routes, followed by a shift toward offensive operations and renewed Israeli control of Palestinian cities.[13] Yitzhak helped drive that change, which culminated in Operation Defensive Shield in 2002.[13]

Operation Defensive Shield began on March 29, 2002, and officially ended on May 10, involving operations in Palestinian cities across Judea and Samaria.[5] A new divisional headquarters was established to improve control of forces and assume responsibility for Bethlehem and Hebron, although the historical account does not identify that headquarters by a specific division name.[5] A later military research assessment characterized Defensive Shield as pivotal in restoring operational control, while emphasizing that the operation alone did not decisively end the Second Intifada.[14]

Gadi Eisenkot replaced Yitzhak at a June 2003 change-of-command ceremony.[13] His approach included short periods of intense military activity intended to produce intervals of quiet during a protracted conflict.[15] Between 2003 and 2005, the division employed a fighting concept centered on direct, continuing contact with terrorist elements throughout its operational area.[16] Ground operations, detailed familiarity with local conditions, intelligence supporting direct action, arrests, and other disruptive measures were central components.[16]

The operational rationale contrasted sustained ground contact with standoff methods that reduced direct friction and relied more heavily on counter-strike capabilities.[16] It treated direct operations as a means to enable arrests, improve local knowledge, and reduce collateral damage, while retaining standoff fire for situations in which direct action was infeasible or an immediate threat required it.[16] A June 2025 military research article described Eisenkot’s approach as maintaining a presence and conducting repeated intelligence-led raids, and stated that his successor Yair Golan continued it over the following two years.[14]

A 2011 organizational snapshot placed the division under Central Command with the Menashe, Ephraim, Samaria, Benjamin, Etzion, and Judea territorial brigades.[17] It also listed Border Police forces in Judea and Samaria and the Jerusalem envelope, a divisional communications battalion, and an engineering-equipment company.[17] These details describe the structure at that time rather than establishing an unchanged contemporary order of battle.[17]

The six regional brigade sectors have been associated with major Palestinian cities and their surrounding areas: Menashe with Jenin, Ephraim with Tulkarm and Qalqilya, Samaria with Nablus, Binyamin with Ramallah, Etzion with Bethlehem, and Yehuda with Hebron.[18] The division’s name derives from the biblical terminology for the region.[18] These territorial headquarters provide continuity while infantry, armored, combat-engineering, field-intelligence, and Border Police forces are deployed according to operational requirements.[3]

Regular and reserve battalions have undertaken police and routine-security missions, arrests, and protection of Jewish settlements in cooperation with the Israel Security Agency.[3] The 2016–2017 organizational account described battalions receiving short preparatory training before taking up such assignments.[3] At the command level, the Lachish Command Training Center prepares forces for operational challenges in Judea and Samaria and the Jordan Valley.[1]

The arena requires familiarity with local conditions and populations, while turnover among assigned forces can limit experience in police-like military tasks and increase the likelihood of mistakes.[3] The Kfir Brigade was established as a specialized response to operational needs, although an accompanying assessment warned that developing it toward the capabilities of an ordinary infantry brigade could diminish its original specialization.[3]

In a 2010 discussion of counterinsurgency, retired major general Yaakov Amidror used an illustrative operation in Judea and Samaria to explain a territorial brigade commanding an action and its reserves while remaining subordinate to the division.[19] His scenario described cooperation among police special forces, intelligence agencies, the Air Force, and other support units, rather than recounting a particular operation.[19] He argued that relevant intelligence could lead to action within hours and that decentralized intelligence and operational capabilities depended on substantial authority for field commanders and personnel.[19]

Amidror characterized a brigade commander’s freedom of action and that of an Israel Security Agency coordinator during active fighting as “ten times greater” than during a lull.[19] His example emphasized the ability of forces in the field to gather and assess information and respond rapidly, presenting decentralized authority as an operational advantage.[19]

Strategic planning has also formed part of the division’s work: Colonel Danny Tirza headed its Strategic Planning Unit within Central Command and was the chief architect and planner of the security barrier.[20] A biographical note dates his leadership of that unit to 1994–2009.[21] The division and brigade commanders receive legal advice on the responsibilities associated with security and public order, alongside measures concerning residents’ security and rights.[8]

In 2018, the IDF announced plans to consolidate responsibility for the area surrounding Jerusalem under one brigade after increased attacks originating in surrounding areas.[18] Abu Dis and Eizariya were to move from Etzion to Binyamin, while some northern portions of Binyamin were subsequently to pass to Samaria.[18] The plan did not place the army inside Jerusalem, where responsibility remained with the Israel Police and Border Police; the distinction reflected the security and legal challenges posed by different operating authorities on either side of the municipal boundary.[18]

Operation Break the Wave, also called Operation Breakwater, brought expanded activity and reinforcement to the division beginning in 2022.[22][6] At a June 2022 General Staff assessment, Central Command commander Yehuda Fuchs and division commander Avi Bluth presented the main activities and lessons of the operation, followed by brigade commanders’ reviews of developments in their sectors.[22] The forum examined operations and readiness for possible escalation across different sectors.[22]

In February 2023, the division received two additional battalions following a situational assessment.[23] Expanded activity in Nablus was accompanied by increased checks on routes entering and leaving the city, while IDF, Israel Police, and Border Police forces operated in the Shomron Brigade area.[23] By March, chief of staff Herzi Halevi stated that 56 reserve battalions had been called up to support Operation Breakwater alongside active-duty forces.[6] Reinforcement and increased arrests, particularly around Nablus and Jenin, were among the operation’s stated aims.[6]

A March 2023 operational account reported completion of 12 kilometers of new security fence in construction led by the Judea Brigade.[6] Engineering battalions and the Heavy Machinery Unit used more than 60 dedicated machines, and two military posts were established.[6] Reported figures for the preceding weeks included more than 150 vehicles turned away and over 600 suspected illegal infiltrators apprehended.[6] Bluth credited fence construction, greater freedom of action, and thwarted attacks with improving protection, and said illegal entries into Israel had fallen from hundreds to a few each day.[6]

Bluth subsequently led the July 2023 counterterrorism operation in Jenin before becoming head of Central Command in July 2024.[24] His divisional tenure had begun in October 2021, and a planned October 8, 2023 handover was delayed by the war.[25] During this period, the division and Central Command conducted repeated brigade-level operations in refugee camps, reinforced the seam line, and carried out dozens of camp operations.[25] A December 2023 account associated the division’s offensive activity with the lowest level of terrorist incidents in the area since Operation Guardian of the Walls and described security activity as preventing dozens or potentially hundreds of attacks.[25]

By December 21, 2023, a combined operational total for the division and the separately named 417th Jordan Valley Brigade stood at approximately 2,420 wanted individuals arrested, including about 1,210 identified as Hamas-affiliated.[9] These were combined figures, not a division-only total.[9] Yaki Dolf succeeded Bluth, and a December 2024 incident illustrated the exposure of senior commanders during operations: an explosive device struck a David armored personnel carrier near Tulkarm carrying Dolf and Menashe Brigade commander Colonel Ayub Kayouf.[26] Kayouf was moderately wounded and evacuated for treatment.[26]

In February 2025, after more than a month of extensive counterterrorism activity in northern Samaria, the division was reinforced with three battalions and a tank platoon.[27] The operational figures released at that stage included more than 70 terrorists killed, approximately 250 wanted individuals apprehended, around 200 weapons confiscated, approximately 15 airstrikes, and more than 100 roadside explosives neutralized.[27] Two battalions were operating in Tulkarm and Jenin.[27]

Dolf’s command lasted a year and eight months and included Operation Iron Wall.[28] The command-transfer tally for his tenure included approximately 30 million shekels in seized terrorist funds, 6,500 arrests, more than 2,000 weapons seized, around 20,000 counterterrorism activities, 44 home demolitions, over 100 airstrikes, and approximately 850 armed operatives killed.[28] It also recorded an approximately 85 percent decline in terrorism; these totals and the decline were military performance figures presented in connection with the transfer of command.[28]

Brigadier General Kobi Heller replaced Dolf as division commander on August 31, 2025, while Dolf was appointed chief of the Northern Corps.[29] Heller grew up in Karnei Shomron and had previously commanded the Commando Brigade and Division 146.[28] At the handover, he said that the IDF had “failed in our supreme mission” to protect Israeli citizens on October 7, and that the sights he witnessed and civilians’ bravery would accompany him in his new role.[29]

In September 2026, the division under Heller was described as responsible for 23 battalions and six territorial brigades before a new allocation of command responsibilities.[7] Division 98 headquarters was assigned the southern Etzion and Judea brigade sectors, leaving the Judea and Samaria Division to command Benjamin, Samaria, Ephraim, and Menashe.[7] The additional headquarters addressed command-and-control workload and was intended to strengthen defensive and offensive capabilities.[7][30]

The deployment was initially described in connection with the holiday period, with the possibility that it would continue afterward.[31] Division 98 would operate alongside the Judea and Samaria Division and the eastern division responsible for defense along the Jordan Valley border.[31] At that stage, a senior security official said there were no specific attack warnings.[31] Division 96 had also operated alongside the Judea and Samaria Division earlier in 2026; during one week in March, the two formations conducted hundreds of operations, including seven brigade-level operations, and arrested more than 200 wanted suspects.[30]

At an October 14, 2026 Central Command assessment, chief of staff Eyal Zamir met Heller, the commanders of Divisions 98 and 96, and regional brigade and battalion commanders to review operational challenges and missions.[32] Zamir said the introduction of Division 98 was intended to improve operational control and strengthen security and stability.[32] An October 19 account described four battalions deployed in each regional brigade and Division 98 headquarters operating in the area.[33]

The same October account described an additional Border Police company specializing in combating nationalist crime being assigned to the division through IDF personnel allocations.[33] Its training had begun in August, and dedicated missions in violence hotspots were expected to start in late November.[33] The September and October arrangements describe a dated redistribution of command responsibilities, not an established permanent replacement for the division’s six-brigade organizational framework.[7][31]

The division has been a command setting for several officers who later held senior national military responsibilities, including Moshe Ya’alon, Benny Gantz, and Gadi Eisenkot.[10][34] Eisenkot’s subsequent career included command of Northern Command, service as deputy chief of staff, and the position of IDF chief of staff from February 2015 to January 2019, when he retired after service beginning in 1978.[34] Ya’alon’s progression likewise linked divisional command with Central Command and the chief-of-staff role.[10]

Operationally, its history illustrates the combination of territorial headquarters, intelligence-led arrests, reinforcing combat formations, and interagency cooperation used in sustained counterterrorism campaigns.[3][16] The division’s experience after Defensive Shield centered on repeated operations rather than a single decisive action, with precise intelligence and continued access to operational areas underpinning the approach.[14] Its subsequent campaigns incorporated fence construction, engineering work, reserve mobilization, and changes to headquarters responsibilities alongside offensive activity.[6][7]

The continued use of General Staff reviews, brigade-level assessments, and additional divisional headquarters demonstrates the importance attached to readiness and command capacity in this arena.[22][32] Its tasks remain broader than conventional combat alone, encompassing public order, protection of communities and transport routes, arrests, and cooperation with other security bodies.[3][5]

A significant controversy concerned Yair Golan’s authorization of the “prior warning” procedure while commanding the division, in which Palestinian civilians were sent to urge wanted suspects to surrender.[35] He received a formal reprimand in 2007 because Israel’s Supreme Court had prohibited the practice.[35] Golan later defended his conduct on the grounds that it reduced danger to soldiers and Palestinians.[35]

The historical interpretation of Defensive Shield and the longer campaign also involves disagreement over when the Second Intifada ended.[14] Proposed endpoints discussed in military research include the 2005 Gaza disengagement, completion of the separation barrier approximately a year later, and 2007, when suicide terrorism waned.[14] Operational casualty totals, arrest figures, and claims of reduced terrorism in later campaigns are dated military measures rather than independently verified evaluations of overall effectiveness.[27][28]