Israel–Vietnam Relations

Israel–Vietnam relations encompass formal diplomacy and a growing range of practical cooperation, including trade, agriculture, technology, health, and defense. Their development has been shaped by Vietnam’s economic growth and efforts by both governments and businesses to deepen commercial and technical ties.[4][2] The relationship combines agricultural exchange and training with expanding trade and defense-industry contacts and culminated institutionally in VIFTA, which entered into force on November 17, 2024.[3]

The partnership has government-to-government and people-to-people dimensions. An Israeli government account says the countries’ foreign ministers have held annual meetings since 2005.[6] Israel’s MASHAV development-cooperation program reports that hundreds of Vietnamese participants have received training in Israel.[7] Commercial activity predated the opening of a resident Vietnamese embassy in Israel: Netafim reported operating in Vietnam from 1986, while Vietnam opened its embassy in Israel in 2009.[8][9]

Published trade totals do not align across sources, making it important to distinguish broad bilateral estimates from product-level goods figures and projections.[5][3] Defense activity likewise includes reported contracts and cooperation in sensitive fields; some prominent claims are attributed to secondary reports rather than independently verified in the sources that repeat them.[4][10]

Formal diplomatic relations were established on July 12, 1993. During a July 11–14 visit to Israel, Vietnam’s deputy foreign minister and Israeli officials signed a memorandum of understanding on establishing relations; Israel opened a resident embassy in Hanoi in December 1993.[1][11] Vietnam established its resident embassy in Israel in 2009, when President Shimon Peres received the credentials of Dinh Xuan Luu, its first ambassador to operate from an embassy in the country.[3][9]

An earlier episode is associated with a reported 1946 meeting in Paris between David Ben-Gurion and Ho Chi Minh. A Jerusalem Post account says the two spoke regularly for about two weeks while staying at the Le Royal Monceau, and that Ben-Gurion later recalled Ho suggesting that a Jewish government-in-exile be established in North Vietnam. The reported suggestion is known here through Ben-Gurion’s later recollection, rather than as an independently corroborated formal proposal.[11]

The period before formal relations unfolded amid the Cold War and Vietnam’s division. A Jerusalem Post account characterizes North Vietnam as cultivating ties with the Soviet Union, China, and Arab states after the 1954 partition, while saying Israel provided technical assistance to South Vietnam without establishing diplomatic channels and supported the Geneva Agreements. These are the account’s descriptions of a politically sensitive history, not a detailed independent record of the governments’ contacts.[11]

The same account reports that the Israeli freighter Yuvali rescued approximately 66 Vietnamese refugees at sea on June 10, 1977. It says more than 300 people fleeing Vietnam arrived in Israel between 1977 and 1979, and that Prime Minister Menachem Begin directed Israeli diplomats to offer them asylum.[11]

The 1993 establishment of relations was part of a wider period of renewed Israeli diplomatic ties after the Cold War and the Madrid Conference. In an interview marking the relationship’s 25th anniversary, Israeli Ambassador Nadav Eshcar described Vietnam as initially reserved in its dealings with Israel. He suggested that Vietnam’s traditional relationship with Yasser Arafat and Fatah may have contributed to that reserve, and said Vietnam’s rapid development about a decade before the interview coincided with opportunities for closer contact. These explanations are the ambassador’s assessment.[2]

Eshcar also said that Shimon Peres’s 2011 visit to Vietnam was regarded as a turning point in the outlook of senior Vietnamese leaders toward Israel and the potential for more active relations.[2] Peres’s visit was a state visit accompanied by a large entourage; a Globes account also described visits by Israeli defense officials to Hanoi as becoming more routine by 2012 after previously being uncommon.[9]

Institutional diplomatic ties broadened over time. Israel’s resident embassy in Hanoi and Vietnam’s representation in Israel provided a standing framework for relations. Israel also added a trade attaché in Vietnam as part of a wider expansion of trade representation in Asia announced in 2014.[12] An Israeli government account describes bilateral economic, trade, and agricultural cooperation as developing rapidly after 1993 and says foreign ministers have met annually since 2005.[6]

Presidents’ visits have featured prominently in diplomatic engagement. Reuven Rivlin made a state visit to Vietnam in late March 2017. A BESA Center account said he encouraged continued cooperation and sought Vietnamese political support for Israel, particularly in multilateral settings such as the United Nations; this description of the visit’s aims is attributed to that account.[4] In 2023, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Vietnamese Deputy Premier Trần Lưu Quang marked 30 years of diplomatic relations and discussed direct flights and expanded cooperation in agriculture and tourism.[3]

Commercial links developed before the two countries had fully staffed diplomatic missions. In a 2005 report, Netafim’s East Asia representative said the company had operated in Vietnam since 1986, first building contacts and establishing its presence and later beginning to benefit from the country’s economic growth. The report also identified Israel Aerospace Industries, Comverse, and other Israeli telecommunications companies as operating in Vietnam, with agriculture and communications among the areas of mutual interest.[8]

Business contacts continued to grow in the early 2000s. A 26-person delegation of Israeli industrialists and businesspeople planned a 2001 visit intended to increase commercial cooperation. The Manufacturers Association said that 50 Israeli companies were then trading with Vietnam. The delegation was also to examine a Vietnamese government proposal for the association to identify Israeli companies willing to sponsor an industrial park that would export Israeli technologies to other countries.[13]

The countries signed an Agreement of Economic and Trade Cooperation in 2004. A BESA Center account described Vietnam’s exports to Israel as including cellular phones, electronic components, seafood, coffee, textiles, and footwear; Israeli exports to Vietnam included machinery and equipment, high-tech goods, and fertilizer.[4] Commercial relations were supported by other arrangements as well: a 2008 report described reciprocal foreign-trade-risk insurance as improving conditions for Israeli exporters and said a convention to prevent double taxation was expected to take effect in 2009.[14]

Trade figures in the sources vary considerably and are not consistently defined. The Jewish Virtual Library reports that bilateral trade increased fivefold from $200 million in 2009 to $1.1 billion in 2014.[3] AJC described annual trade as more than $700 million as of 2016.[5] A BESA Center paper published in 2017 instead put trade in the preceding year at $1.3 billion and said the two countries aspired to reach $2 billion annually.[4]

A BESA Center paper published in August 2018 put bilateral trade at about $1.1 billion and reported a nearer-term potential of $1.5 billion, alongside a Vietnamese officials’ estimate that it could eventually reach $3 billion. The paper framed Vietnam as a possible route for expanding Israeli trade with other Southeast Asian states, including some with which Israel lacked diplomatic relations.[15]

For 2022, the Jewish Virtual Library reports trade rising 18 percent to $2.2 billion, while a Globes account gives $175 million in Israeli goods exports to Vietnam and $278 million in goods imports from Vietnam.[3][16] Globes lists Israeli exports such as chemicals, machinery, medical and optical equipment, rubber, and plastics; imports included machinery, fresh agricultural produce, and food products. These goods-trade figures are substantially lower than the broader bilateral total reported elsewhere, and the sources do not explain the difference in coverage or measurement.[16]

Reports for 2023 also do not form a clear, comparable series. The Jerusalem Post reported that trade grew 21 percent to about $1.3 billion.[17] That figure does not align straightforwardly with the JNS report of $2.2 billion in 2022, and the sources do not explain whether they used different measurement bases.[18]

Vietnamese goods listed in accounts of the trade relationship include smartphones, footwear, seafood, coffee, textiles, clothing, and fresh agricultural produce. Israeli exports include electronics, fertilizers, chemicals, machinery, medical and optical equipment, and other high-tech goods.[3] A 2015 business conference in Hanoi, “Meet Israel,” brought together 130 participants to discuss commercial opportunities; Vietnam’s ambassador to Israel identified interest in Israeli medical equipment, drip irrigation, male shrimp-breeding techniques, and agricultural advances.[3]

Investment and health cooperation have also been part of the economic relationship. A BESA Center paper reported 25 Israeli foreign direct investment projects in Vietnam in the first quarter of 2017, worth more than US$46 million. It also described a health-sector agreement under which Israel would assist Vietnam in constructing a 300-bed hospital using Israeli technology and equipment.[4]

In December 2015, Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Hoang Trung Hai visited Israel, and the two sides formally began discussions on a free trade agreement. A BESA Center account said the proposed agreement could support growth in investment, finance, services, science and technology, and labor.[4] In a 2018 interview, Ambassador Eshcar said the negotiating teams had completed a fifth round of talks in Israel and described significant progress. He characterized the economies as complementary and said the goal was to improve business conditions, including by linking Vietnamese food and agricultural exports with Israeli technologies that could improve the quality and quantity of Vietnamese goods.[2]

The negotiations took years and involved multiple government bodies. Globes reported that the agreement followed seven years of negotiations.[16] A Ynet account described Israel’s Foreign Trade Administration as working with representatives of the foreign affairs, agriculture, justice, and finance ministries, as well as the Population and Immigration Authority and Customs Administration.[19]

Israel and Vietnam signed the Vietnam–Israel Free Trade Agreement in Jerusalem on July 25, 2023. Israeli Economy Minister Nir Barkat and Vietnamese Minister of Industry and Trade Nguyễn Hồng Diên signed it, with Netanyahu and Deputy Prime Minister Trần Lưu Quang attending. The agreement provides for the removal of duties on at least 86 percent of Vietnamese products and 93 percent of Israeli products.[3][20]

VIFTA entered into force on November 17, 2024.[3] The U.S. Department of State’s 2024 investment-climate statement, published before that outcome, listed the agreement among Israel’s signed agreements but said it was not yet in force.[21] A November 1 Jerusalem Post report said the agreement was expected to take effect during that month, while a later Globes report confirmed that it came into force in November 2024.[17][22]

VIFTA covers more than tariff reductions. A Ynet account describes provisions concerning services, standards, and investment, as well as staged tariff changes. It reports that Vietnam was to remove tariffs immediately on Israeli plastic products, irrigation equipment, and medical equipment; duties on Israeli dates were to be eliminated from a stated 30 percent rate, while duties on orange concentrate and juice and wine were to be removed over seven years. For imports into Israel, it reports that tariffs on Vietnamese vehicles were to be removed over seven years, cashews over five years, and cheese substitutes over ten years; canned tuna was assigned an annual duty-free quota of 1,000 tons.[19]

The agreement’s stated significance includes widening market access. During the 2023 signing, Netanyahu called it an “important turning point” after several decades of good relations.[20] The Jewish Virtual Library describes Vietnam as the second East Asian country, after the Republic of Korea, and the first ASEAN member with which Israel concluded a free trade agreement.[3] A BESA Center paper also presented Vietnam as a potential channel for Israeli commercial expansion elsewhere in Southeast Asia.[15]

Trade and tourism connections have been discussed alongside the agreement. During the 2023 anniversary meetings, the leaders discussed direct flights as well as agricultural and tourism cooperation.[3] In August 2023, JNS reported that the two countries had signed an agreement in Hanoi to launch their first direct flights, with Hanoi–Tel Aviv service expected to begin in October.[23] A later Globes report said Arkia planned a Tel Aviv–Hanoi route, initially once weekly in January 2026 and twice weekly from March; Vietnam’s ambassador said direct service would support tourism, trade, business, people-to-people contacts, and cultural exchange.[22]

Visa access was another practical issue connected to travel. In July 2023, Vietnam agreed to add Israelis to its electronic-visa program. Ynetnews said Israelis would be able to use e-visas from October 2023, while a JNS report in August said the change took effect immediately.[24][23]

The available forward-looking figures should not be mistaken for achieved results. A Jerusalem Post opinion article discussing a 2026 agricultural-cooperation seminar described bilateral trade as on track to approach $4 billion that year; this was a projection, not a final annual total. The article also reported participation by around 20 Israelis from municipal authorities, kibbutzim, and technology companies and more than 80 Vietnamese participants online, including local officials and university researchers.[25]

Agriculture has been one of the principal pillars of Israel–Vietnam cooperation since diplomatic relations began. Israeli experts have worked in Vietnam, and agricultural courses have addressed dairy cattle, aquaculture, orchards, and agricultural marketing. The Jewish Virtual Library reports 18 courses attended by 850 trainees, as well as more than 180 Vietnamese people trained in Israel since 1995.[3]

Training arrangements have included long-term study as well as courses and seminars. A framework between Israel’s Arava International Centre for Agriculture Training and Vietnam’s National Agriculture Promotion Centre brought about 60 Vietnamese agricultural students to Israel for 11-month programs in 2004–2005. The two countries also took part in agricultural exhibitions in each other’s countries, including Israeli pavilions at AgroViet, Green Week, and the Can Tho international agriculture exhibition.[3]

Israel’s MASHAV development-cooperation program and the Israeli embassy in Hanoi have implemented training for Vietnamese citizens. MASHAV reports that since 1993 more than 600 Vietnamese participants have attended short courses, international seminars, or workshops in Israel under its scholarship program. Listed areas include agriculture, education and community development, economic and social development, rural and urban development, and medicine and public health.[7]

Agricultural research and technology cooperation has included a proposed joint research-and-development program. In December 2013, Israeli Agriculture Minister Yair Shamir and Vietnamese officials agreed to establish one, with areas of cooperation including breeding, preservation technology, and water use.[4] A 2023 anniversary event in Hanoi displayed Israeli irrigation and water-treatment technologies alongside fashion and virtual-reality exhibits; Vietnam’s deputy foreign minister praised the joint program for agricultural experts.[26]

Dairy cooperation developed through a five-year bilateral memorandum of understanding. A Dairy Demonstration and Experimental Farm opened near Ho Chi Minh City in 2013, managed by the city’s Department of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Israeli Embassy, with operations overseen by MASHAV. The farm held 174 animals and offered training and visits for farmers.[3]

The farm’s program aimed to raise annual milk production among Vietnamese cows from 3,500 to 8,000 liters; the source reports Israeli cows producing up to 13,000 liters. The account identifies heat, nutrition, living conditions, and metabolic problems as factors affecting Vietnamese dairy output. It also notes that the cost of specialized equipment slowed some farmers’ adoption of new practices, illustrating practical constraints involved in transferring agricultural methods.[3]

Agricultural exchange has continued to connect technology with local production. Vietnamese interest noted at the 2015 “Meet Israel” conference included drip irrigation and shrimp-breeding techniques.[3] A 2026 opinion article recounted a Vietnamese community leader’s description of cultivating Israeli crop varieties on Vietnamese soil and described a seminar involving municipal authorities, kibbutzim, technology companies, Vietnamese local officials, and university researchers.[25]

Cooperation extends beyond farming. The health-sector proposal for a 300-bed hospital with Israeli technology and equipment, as well as the trade relationship in medical devices and equipment, shows the place of health technology in the bilateral agenda.[4] Accounts of VIFTA also identify electronics, medical devices, AgriTech, WaterTech, and cybersecurity as areas of expanded cooperation.[3]

Defense and security cooperation has grown alongside the larger civilian relationship. A BESA Center paper published in 2017 characterized civilian cooperation as the larger focus but reported that defense ties were also expanding, including arms trade, weapons upgrades, and joint ventures to develop or produce weapons systems.[4]

Israeli defense officials visited Vietnam as political and commercial engagement developed. In March 2015, a delegation from Israel’s Ministry of Defense led by director general Dan Harel met in Hanoi with Vietnam’s police minister, Trần Đại Quang. The minister said agreements covered defense and security and called for closer cooperation; Harel likewise said the countries should strengthen security ties.[27]

The BESA Center’s 2017 account said Israel established a defense attaché in Vietnam in 2015. It also reported that the countries had worked in 2014 toward a formal framework for defense ties, potentially including technology transfer and industrial cooperation.[4] A 2012 Globes report had described defensive arms transactions, a project for a Vietnamese plant to assemble advanced rifles using transferred Israeli know-how, and possible upgrades to Soviet-era tanks. It said four or five Israeli defense companies had made deals in the preceding couple of years, together worth “a few tens of millions of dollars.”[9]

That earlier report also described limitations on defense exports at the time. Israeli defense authorities were rejecting proposals to sell advanced unmanned aerial vehicles, while sales of offensive weapons and transfers of classified know-how were described as not yet ready. These points indicate that cooperation was not unrestricted and that the scope of transactions varied by product and sensitivity.[9]

Later accounts list more extensive reported transactions, including Rafael SPYDER air-defense systems, IAI Heron drones, tank upgrades, radar systems, and a plant in Vietnam to assemble Tavor rifles. The Jewish Virtual Library frames Vietnamese military procurement in the context of tensions with China; that explanation is the source’s characterization of the strategic setting, rather than a statement independently establishing Vietnam’s motive for each purchase.[3]

The Jewish Virtual Library reports a 2025 Israel Aerospace Industries contract to supply Vietnam’s Military Intelligence with two spy satellites for $680 million. A Congressional Research Service report also lists a March 2025 sale of two spy satellites for that amount while attributing the claim to another report rather than presenting it as independently verified.[3][10]

The political context of security ties is also discussed in a 2023 Ynet opinion article. It said that the countries had signed more than 15 bilateral and multilateral agreements since the 1990s and described a 2011 confidentiality commitment concerning security relations. The article attributed later acceleration of security ties to that commitment and characterized Vietnam as a major customer of Israel’s defense industry, including an assertion about Israel’s ranking among arms suppliers. These are reported claims in an opinion article, not independently established measures in the available material.[28]

Diplomatic ties have included efforts to widen political support as well as expand practical cooperation. Rivlin’s 2017 state visit was described by a BESA Center account as an occasion to encourage continued cooperation and seek Vietnamese support for Israel, particularly in multilateral forums such as the United Nations. The purpose and significance are the account’s description of the visit.[4]

In a 2018 interview, Ambassador Eshcar characterized Vietnam’s voting record on issues concerning Israel as traditionally negative and related it to Vietnam’s history and membership in the Non-Aligned Movement. He said Israel was seeking to persuade Vietnam to change its voting pattern. This is the ambassador’s assessment; the interview does not provide an independent accounting of particular votes.[2]

The broader relationship has nonetheless continued to deepen through official visits and regular contact. An Israeli government account reports annual meetings between the countries’ foreign ministers since 2005.[6] The 2023 anniversary discussions joined trade, agricultural cooperation, tourism, and direct flights on the same diplomatic agenda.[3]

Diplomatic relations have also been presented as a platform for economic and cultural exchange. At an event in Hanoi marking Israel’s Independence Day and 30 years of relations in 2023, the Israeli embassy hosted Vietnamese officials, National Assembly members, business representatives, and friendship organizations. The event presented Israeli technologies in irrigation, water treatment, fashion, and virtual reality. Vietnam’s deputy foreign minister praised the agricultural-experts program and the prospective free-trade agreement, while Israeli ambassador Yaron Meir described the anniversary as marking three decades of cultural exchange as well as formal diplomatic relations.[26]

The relationship illustrates how diplomatic ties can develop through practical cooperation in fields that address shared economic and technical interests. Agricultural training has linked Israeli expertise with Vietnamese needs in dairy production, water use, aquaculture, and crop development; commercial ties have involved consumer goods, machinery, electronics, fertilizer, medical equipment, and other technologies.[4][3]

VIFTA is a major institutional development in that evolution. Signed in 2023 and in force from November 17, 2024, it provides a framework for tariff reductions and wider trade facilitation.[3] The agreement’s product schedules, including provisions for Vietnamese tuna and Israeli dates, irrigation equipment, and medical equipment, give concrete form to the commercial objectives discussed over years of negotiation.[19]

The ties also have a strategic dimension. Defense-industry deals and security contacts have accompanied civilian cooperation, while Israeli officials have sought Vietnamese political support in multilateral forums.[4][3] The sources portray these elements as part of a relationship with potential beyond trade alone, though particular strategic explanations and sensitive defense claims remain attributed to the accounts that report them.

The relationship’s importance is also reflected in its institutional breadth: resident diplomatic missions, recurring ministerial meetings, training programs, commercial delegations, and agricultural exhibitions.[6][3] Agreements and plans for direct air links further illustrate efforts to expand exchanges between the two societies.[23][22] Together, these areas show a partnership built through ongoing contacts and agreements rather than a single diplomatic or commercial initiative.

Published trade totals differ sharply. AJC put annual bilateral trade above US$700 million as of 2016, while a BESA Center paper published in 2017 reported US$1.3 billion for the preceding year.[5][4] For 2022, the Jewish Virtual Library reported US$2.2 billion, while Globes reported only US$453 million in combined Israeli goods exports and imports.[3][16] The Jerusalem Post later reported about US$1.3 billion for 2023 after 21 percent growth, a figure that does not align straightforwardly with the JNS total for 2022.[17][18] The sources do not reconcile their methods or coverage, so the numbers should remain attributed to the reports that published them.

Several descriptions of Vietnam’s political approach to Israel—including the explanation for its earlier reserve and assessments of its voting record—come from an Israeli ambassador’s interview. Likewise, claims about the aims of Rivlin’s visit are the reporting account’s characterization. They are relevant to the diplomatic history but should not be treated as independently verified explanations of Vietnamese policy.[2][4]

Defense reporting calls for similar care. The CRS passage attributes the reported $680 million satellite sale to another report rather than independently verifying it.[10] Accounts of other arms contracts, supplier rankings, and strategic motives also vary in their evidentiary basis; they establish what particular sources reported, not independent verification of every transaction or rationale.[3][28]

The 1946 Ben-Gurion–Ho Chi Minh story is also based on Ben-Gurion’s later recollection, particularly the claim that Ho suggested a Jewish government-in-exile in North Vietnam. The anecdote is part of the reported history of the relationship’s antecedents, but the account presents it as remembered testimony rather than as a documented government proposal.[11]