Israel–Italy Relations

Italy and Israel maintain full diplomatic relations, which the World Jewish Congress describes as generally good; Israel’s embassy is in Rome.[11] The relationship has included supportive public statements and high-level visits, alongside differences over the Palestinian question and regional policy.

A 1989 U.S. diplomatic briefing described Italy as an influential Mediterranean state with a significant interest in Middle East peace. It said Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti maintained contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization while also consulting the Israeli government, and had visited Israel to meet Yitzhak Shamir and Shimon Peres after Israeli elections. The briefing acknowledged tactical disagreements but described a shared basic objective of a secure Israel and a peaceful region; it also reported Italian support for an international Middle East conference and calls for moderation, particularly regarding terrorism.[12]

A 1985 American Jewish Committee memorandum described strains in the preceding years, which it attributed to Israeli perceptions that Italy was tilting toward Arab states. It reported that Andreotti had met Yasser Arafat twice, including in Rome in 1982, and that Prime Minister Bettino Craxi met Arafat in Tunisia in December 1984. The memorandum called Craxi’s meeting the first between a Western European prime minister and a PLO leader. It also said that fears of an anti-Israel shift in the European Community during Italy’s 1985 presidency did not materialize.[2]

Notes from an AJC delegation’s February 1985 meeting record Andreotti affirming Israel’s security and existence as firm positions, asserting that the Italian parliament was unanimous on the issue and that there had never been doubt about it. The same notes record his support for the Camp David agreements and his view that a political solution to the Palestinian issue was necessary. These are the delegation’s notes of a meeting, rather than an independent transcript.[13]

The bilateral relationship was reinforced by a broad agreement signed in December 1983, covering economic, agricultural, scientific, technological, and cultural relations. A 1985 memorandum also mentions agreements intended to address possible problems for Israeli agricultural exports if Spain and Portugal joined the European Economic Community, and records visits by officials from both governments.[2]

Relations improved significantly under the Berlusconi government, according to the historical account. It describes Foreign Minister Gianfranco Fini’s 2003 visit to Jerusalem as historic and reports that he repudiated the Nazi-Fascist Republic of Salò during the visit. The account credits Giulio Terzi di Sant’Agata, Italy’s ambassador to Israel from 2001 to 2003, with working to improve relations. It also notes continuing political differences within Italy: most Italian leftists, it says, supported the Palestinian cause, while the newspaper Il Foglio organized a well-attended Israel Day demonstration in Rome in 2002.[1]

In July 2015, Prime Minister Matteo Renzi visited Israel for three days, met Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at a Jerusalem press conference, and addressed the Knesset. Renzi said Israel’s security was connected to Europe’s, affirmed Israel’s existence, and criticized boycotts. He stated that Italy would stand for cooperation rather than boycott.[14]

An AJC delegation visiting Rome in April 2017 met Foreign Minister Angelino Alfano and other Italian and Israeli officials. AJC chief executive David Harris described the relationship at the time as robust, citing frequent official visits, security cooperation, research and development, and other areas of collaboration.[15]

In March 2023, Netanyahu met Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in Rome. Their joint statement set out an intention to expand cooperation in the economy, cyber technology, security, defense, culture, and water management. They also discussed regional developments and normalization between Israel and other countries in the region. Meloni said Italy would work to restore security and calm in Israel and the region and that her government opposed antisemitism.[16]

Netanyahu also met Italian business leaders during the Rome visit. Discussions included Israeli water innovations in the context of Italian droughts and cybersecurity. Netanyahu’s office said Israeli exports to Italy had doubled over the preceding two years, reaching $1.5 billion by the end of 2022.[17]

In May 2023, Netanyahu asked Meloni to consider moving Italy’s embassy to Jerusalem. A report said senior Italian officials were considering the proposal, but assessed that a lower-level diplomatic office in Jerusalem was more likely than a transfer of the embassy. The report did not say that the embassy had moved.[18]

The Israeli Embassy in Italy reported that the Italian Senate held an event in 2024 to mark the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations. The anniversary provided a formal occasion to recognize the length of the official relationship.[19]

Italy was among the first countries in which the young State of Israel established a diplomatic mission. The bilateral diplomatic network later included an Israeli embassy in Rome and consulate-general in Milan, and an Italian embassy in Tel Aviv. The available account does not give opening dates for these missions; in 2024, the Italian Senate marked the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.[1][19]

The early development of ties was described as slow, in part because postwar Italy prioritized resolving territorial questions directly concerning the country and restoring its equal standing among nations. Contacts subsequently strengthened as Italy’s influence in European institutions and Mediterranean affairs grew. Israel’s assessment of France’s regional influence also changed after French policy shifted on the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War, a development identified as part of the context for closer Israeli-Italian engagement.[1]

Relations had practical dimensions by the 1950s. Israeli State Archives records document exchanges between Israeli minister in Rome Eliahu Sasson and Italian officials in 1955. Their discussions included the Czech-Egyptian arms deal, the Soviet role in the Middle East, bilateral relations, and the presentation of the Italian ambassador’s credentials in Jerusalem. Other records noted Israeli concern about delays in Italian arms deliveries and discussion of Western powers slowing arms supplies to the region.[20]

A U.S. diplomatic record from May 1956 describes Italy taking part in discussions about evaluating arms requests from Israel and Arab states. The Italian ambassador proposed that a committee request an inventory of requests, particularly those from states bordering Israel; a French ambassador said that Italy and the United Kingdom were making some deliveries to Israel. The record does not identify the arms or quantities involved.[21]

In another May 1956 discussion, Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban said Israel had sought F-86K fighter aircraft from Italy. The contemplated purchase depended on whether a separate Canadian aircraft deal went ahead: Israel sought 12 aircraft from Italy if it also obtained 24 from Canada, or 36 Italian aircraft if the Canadian deal failed. The record says the Italian manufacturer Fiat wanted the contract but could not deliver immediately; it documents proposals, not completed deliveries.[22]

A mid-1960s U.S. memorandum describes talks about carrying out some work on tanks in Italy, following discussions involving Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres. It distinguishes this conversion work from procurement of the tanks themselves: the general plan was direct delivery to Israel, and the amount of work to be carried out in Italy or Israel would depend on cost.[23]

The postwar years also included a consequential Italian role in clandestine Jewish immigration. A study description from the University of Haifa’s Herzl Institute examines diplomatic negotiations and conflicts between Britain and Italy alongside Jewish refugees, Mossad and Palyam emissaries, and Zionist leaders active between 1945 and 1948. It highlights relations between Italian senior officials and Mossad representatives Yehuda Arazi and Ada Sereni, and identifies the 1946 La Spezia affair as a significant episode.[24]

In 1968, Italian diplomatic intervention secured the release of an El Al aircraft, crew, and passengers after the plane was hijacked to Algeria. The following year, after a TWA aircraft was hijacked to Damascus and most passengers were released, six Israelis remained held, according to the historical account.[1]

Economic ties were initially complicated by overlapping production interests. Italy and Israel both had citrus industries, and the historical account says Italy placed obstacles in the way of Israeli affiliation with the Common Market because of that competition. It characterizes Italian policy toward the Israel-Arab dispute as cautious and oriented toward a negotiated peace, reflecting Italy’s wider interests in the Middle East.[1]

Commercial exchange has grown over decades, though the historical figures available in the sources should not be mistaken for current totals. One account reports that Italian exports to Israel increased from $13.6 million in 1960 to $314.9 million in 1980, while imports to Italy rose from $10.6 million to $285.1 million in the same period. For 2004, it gives Israeli exports to Italy of $810 million and imports from Italy of $1.566 billion. Tourism also expanded: Italian visitors to Israel rose from 2,400 in 1960 to 55,800 in 1980, while 42,000 visited in 2004.[1]

A 2018 INSS paper places Italy’s trade with Israel in the wider European context. It says Europe had been Israel’s most important trading partner since the 1960s and that the 1995 EU–Israel Association Agreement intensified this relationship. Italy appeared among leading countries of origin for Israeli imports, and Israeli exports to Italy rose by 3% during the period discussed; the paper gives no Italy-specific trade value for that period.[25]

Figures reported for later years show further growth. A report quoting a representative of bilateral economic ties said total trade approached $4.5 billion in 2012, with Italian exports to Israel up 16% and Israeli exports to Italy up 5% that year. Italy was described as ranking between second and third among Israel’s trading partners.[26] The Jerusalem Post later reported bilateral commercial exchange of €3.331 billion in the preceding year and a 1.6% increase in the first three months of 2019 compared with the same period in 2018, from €843 million to €857 million.[27]

Italy and Israel have pursued economic cooperation through business events and sector-specific partnerships. In 2010, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and several ministers visited Israel. Berlusconi urged Netanyahu to strengthen economic ties, invited him to Italy, and tried to persuade him to purchase Italian jet trainers for Israeli Air Force cadets.[28]

In 2011, Israel’s embassy in Rome planned the first joint Israeli-Italian business conference, a two-day event in Milan expected to draw 100 Israeli companies in agriculture, water, medical devices, homeland security, and other sectors. Ambassador Gideon Meir said at least 15 commercial contracts were expected. The embassy was also promoting reciprocal recognition of drivers’ licenses and joint research agreements in agriculture, science, medical devices, and welfare.[28]

At a 2013 government-to-government meeting in Rome, Israeli and Italian ministers discussed possible exports of Israeli natural gas to Italy. One proposal involved liquefying Israeli gas at Egypt’s Idku facility for export to Europe; alternative routes through Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus were also discussed. Israel’s Mekorot and Italian water utility Acea signed a collaboration agreement at the meeting, where officials also discussed compressed natural gas for public transport and reciprocal expert delegations.[29]

Italy and Israel also participated in broader regional energy initiatives. In January 2019, both were represented at a Cairo meeting hosted by Egypt’s petroleum minister to establish the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. The participants—Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority—announced official talks on the Forum’s structure and recommendations for a later meeting. The initiative was intended as a framework for dialogue and cooperation on regional gas resources, rather than a separate bilateral Italy-Israel agreement.[7]

In 2018, a JCFA preface described Israel, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy as appearing to move toward an intergovernmental agreement to conduct a feasibility study on a pipeline carrying Eastern Mediterranean gas to Europe. The account described a prospective study and did not say that the agreement was signed or a pipeline built.[30]

Investment in Israeli technology has continued amid political strains. In August 2025, an Italian government-backed investment fund, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, was reported to have begun investing in Israeli companies. The fund, which the report said managed €4.7 billion, was seeking to invest tens of millions of euros or more in Israeli startups, especially in artificial intelligence and quantum computing, with the stated aim of bringing activity to Italy and developing the Italian technology industry. The report described the investments as continuing despite the Italian government’s critical stance toward Israel and the Gaza war.[31]

Scientific and cultural collaboration has been a recurring element of bilateral agreements. A cultural agreement became fully operative, and renewed cultural and scientific agreements enabled the Italia Judaica conference series. Conferences took place in Genoa in 1984, Tel Aviv in 1986, Siena in 1989, and Palermo in 1992; the account does not specify the agreement’s date or terms.[32]

A scientific, technological, and industrial collaboration agreement reached its fifteenth anniversary in 2016. Italy’s education minister described Israel as an important partner in research and innovation, particularly in nanotechnology, robotics, and startups. A delegation from the Conference of Italian University Rectors also took part in academic conferences during the minister’s visit to Israel.[33]

Joint research laboratories have been established in fields identified by the two countries as areas of excellence. The reported facilities include neurology and brain research in Tel Aviv, solar research at Sde Boker, health sciences at Ben-Gurion University, and physics and magnetism at the Weizmann Institute, as well as a joint space laboratory. Italy and Israel each allocated €3 million to the broader project, while Israel’s Council for Higher Education added €3 million, producing an annual budget of €9 million.[3]

An industrial cooperation program linked an Israeli company with an Italian company or academic entity to finance preindustrial development of new products over 12 to 24 months. If a product succeeded, the funding parties would receive royalties. A separate basic-research program offered $50,000 per project, with applicants required to raise an equal amount in supplementary financing. The fields listed included cyber research, water and land treatment, and personalized medicine.[3]

A 2022 joint call by Italy’s foreign ministry and Israel’s Ministry of Innovation, Science and Technology invited research teams from both countries to submit collaborative proposals under their agreement on industrial, scientific, and technological research and development. The call named hydrogen-based renewable clean energy and smart materials for soft and bio-robotics as priority areas. Projects were planned for 24 months; each side could provide up to €100,000 per project, and the governments intended to support up to eight projects subject to budgetary and scientific considerations.[34]

Water technology also featured in the 2013 collaboration between Mekorot and Acea.[29] In 2023, political leaders and business representatives discussed Israeli water innovations in the context of Italian droughts.[16][17] These exchanges place practical infrastructure and resource management alongside research and high-technology cooperation.

Security cooperation has included formal arrangements, defense procurement, military exercises, and collaboration against organized crime. In December 1986, representatives of the countries’ police and interior ministries signed a counterterrorism agreement in Jerusalem. It established a bilateral committee to cooperate on terrorism, illicit drugs, and other serious crime, including organized crime. The committee was to meet at least annually, alternating between the two countries, and the agreement provided for information and expert exchanges, transport-security cooperation, and measures against money laundering. It entered into force upon signature.[35]

Defense trade has included reciprocal procurement. A government-to-government arrangement described in 2012 provided for Israel to buy 30 Alenia Aermacchi jet trainers for its air force. In return, Israel Aerospace Industries contracted to supply Italy with two Gulfstream G550 airborne early-warning and control aircraft and an observation satellite. The report valued the aircraft, support systems, and logistics at $750 million and the satellite at $182 million, within a jet-trainer deal described as worth $1 billion.[4]

A 2018 account said a reciprocal trade and defense-technology deal worth 4 billion NIS was completed in January of that year. It reported that Israel received 30 Leonardo M-346 Lavi training aircraft while Italy acquired Israeli technology, including satellites and two G550 Conformal Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft. The account said the deal had been signed six years earlier. A separate 2020 account describes a related agreement as signed in 2011, so the available material does not establish whether the dates refer to distinct agreements or reflect a discrepancy.[36]

In September 2020, Israel and Italy finalized another defense exchange, according to the same source: Israel agreed to sell Spike anti-tank guided missiles and aircraft simulators in return for Italian training helicopters. The report describes this as a continuation of an agreement signed in 2011, under which Israel bought 30 training aircraft in exchange for a reconnaissance satellite and two airborne early-warning systems.[36]

Israel Aerospace Industries signed contracts worth about $550 million with Italy in 2022 to supply two early-warning aircraft and provide support and ground-logistics services for the Italian air force. The aircraft were described as equipped with radar, advanced sensors, and intelligence-gathering systems.[36]

Italy also took part in multinational military activity hosted in Israel. A JCFA account lists Italy among countries participating in the Blue Flag air-force exercise at Ovda base in November 2017, alongside Germany, France, Greece, Poland, India, and the United States. The report documents participation in the multinational exercise, not a separate bilateral agreement.[37]

Following the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni visited Israel between October 17 and 24, among several European leaders who traveled to express solidarity with Israelis.[8] In Tel Aviv, she met Netanyahu and expressed solidarity with Israel and support for its existence, defense, and security. A joint statement with U.S., Canadian, French, German, and British leaders supported Israel’s right to self-defense while also calling for civilian protection, release of hostages, humanitarian assistance in Gaza, and diplomatic coordination to prevent the conflict from spreading.[38]

Italy also joined regional emergency-assistance efforts. Alongside Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, it participated in the Amalthea maritime route for emergency aid from Cyprus to northern Gaza, launched in March 2024.[8]

In March 2023, Meloni met Netanyahu in Rome and reiterated her government’s commitment to fighting antisemitism. The U.S. State Department’s 2023 religious-freedom report also records that the Italian and Roman Jewish Communities held a “No antisemitism, no terrorism” rally in Rome on December 5. Israeli President Isaac Herzog opened the event with a video message, and senior Italian government ministers and leaders of major political parties attended.[9]

The same report recorded 454 antisemitic acts in Italy in 2023, up from 241 in 2022 and 220 in 2021. It said 213 incidents occurred after the October 7 attacks on Israel; recorded incidents included online hate speech. Experts monitoring antisemitism believed the figures undercounted the actual number of incidents.[9]

A June 2025 article reported that more than 1,150 additional people signed an Italian petition titled “In Support of Israel and Against the Hunt for Jews” within two days of publication. The article said signatories included public figures from both left and right and described the petition as condemning antisemitic and anti-Israel protests. Its further characterization of the Italian government’s tone toward Israel as increasingly critical is the article’s assessment.[10]

Italian policy toward Israel has not been uniform across issues or periods. An INSS analysis characterizes Italy, together with Germany, as opposing recognition in the 2012 debate over UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19, which granted Palestine non-member observer-state status. The analysis presents this as a division among EU countries and does not give a separate account of Italy’s reasoning.[25]

A later INSS study identified Italy among five EU member states—alongside Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and France—that expressed support for Israel in relation to South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice. The same study describes Italy, Spain, and Belgium’s Walloon region as taking steps to fully suspend military exports to Israel, but does not specify the details or timing of Italy’s measures. It characterizes the wider European response as divided.[8]

Reports on Italian arms policy describe different stages and give differing dates. A January 2024 report quoted Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani as saying that Italy had stopped defense exports to Israel on October 7, 2023. It estimated Italian defense exports to Israel at about €120 million over 2013–2022, with annual exports increasing from €3.77 million in 2016 to about €17.32 million in both 2021 and 2022. The reported exports included parts for training and combat aircraft, among them the M-346, and components for the AW 119 light helicopter.[5]

A separate April 2026 report said Italy suspended arms transfers after October 8, 2023, citing laws requiring an arms embargo for conflict zones. The two reports therefore give different dates for the reported halt. Another account described Italy as announcing in late 2023 that it had stopped sending new weapons while continuing existing orders under conditions intended to prevent their use against civilians; it separately reported Meloni telling parliament in October 2024 that Italy had ceased supplying weapons and ammunition and frozen related contracts. The accounts may describe a changing policy, but they do not reconcile the statements.[6][36]

A Congressional Research Service report updated in July 2026 lists Italy among countries that took steps to limit arms trade with Israel or ties with its defense industry, particularly in connection with Israeli operations in Gaza. It provides no Italy-specific dates, scope, or official statements. One of its footnotes cites a March 2024 Reuters headline saying Italian arms exports to Israel continued despite a block, a qualification that cautions against treating the restrictions as a complete or precisely defined halt.[39]

Italy’s defense-cooperation framework was first approved in 2005, renewed automatically every five years, and covered military and security trade and research and development. On April 14, 2026, Meloni announced that Italy would suspend automatic renewal, citing the current situation.[6] The Times of Israel later reported that the memorandum expired without renewal and quoted Israel’s Foreign Ministry characterizing it as an old document without substantive content and saying its nonrenewal would not affect Israel’s security.[40]

Globes linked the decision to disputes over Israeli military actions in Lebanon and incidents involving Italian UNIFIL personnel; it reported Italian criticism of the operations and a summons of Israel’s ambassador.[6] Other reports described warning fire near Italian personnel and reciprocal diplomatic summons between the two countries.[41][42]

Italy’s position on proposed EU action has been distinct from its decision on the bilateral defense memorandum. At an EU foreign ministers’ meeting in April 2026, Tajani said no decision would be taken that day on proposals to suspend the EU–Israel Association Agreement. The report said full suspension would require unanimity among EU member states, while Italy’s separate defense memorandum had already not been renewed.[43]

Israel–Italy relations connect Israel with a major European Union and Mediterranean state across diplomacy, security, energy, water management, technology, and academic research. During his 2015 visit, Matteo Renzi summarized the strategic dimension by saying, “The security of Israel is the security of Europe.”[14] Continued Italian investment in Israeli technology and jointly funded research laboratories demonstrate how practical cooperation has persisted even during periods of political disagreement.[31][3]

The relationship also extends beyond Rome and Jerusalem through regional frameworks such as the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and multilateral emergency-assistance initiatives. These activities give the bilateral relationship broader relevance to Mediterranean energy, humanitarian coordination, and regional security.[7][8]

Some assessments of Italy’s political climate and its relations with Israel are explicitly interpretive. An article on Italian Jewish experience characterizes the late 1970s and 1980s as a period when Israel was delegitimized in some influential Italian political and media circles, reaching a low point in 1982, and says Israel had been relegitimized in important quarters by the 2000s. The author presents Silvio Berlusconi’s rise as a major factor and notes that President Giorgio Napolitano linked anti-Zionism with antisemitism before a visit to Israel. These are the author’s historical assessments rather than neutral consensus statements.[44]

Historical allegations have also been raised about threats to Jewish targets in Italy. A 2021 report recounted allegations, attributed to documents published in Italian media, that Italian authorities received warnings before the October 9, 1982 attack on Rome’s synagogue. It said former president Francesco Cossiga alleged that an arrangement known as “Lodo Moro” allowed Palestinian terrorists to target Jewish sites in Italy in return for avoiding Italian targets; Italian officials had previously dismissed his claims. The report said Italian intelligence sent 16 warnings between June 18 and October 9, three of which explicitly mentioned the synagogue. The attack killed two-year-old Stefano Gaj Taché and injured 37 people. The alleged arrangement and claims of official foreknowledge remain contested, rather than an uncontested account of the episode.[45]