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Israeli Government Response to the October 7 Attacks

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01In brief

Israeli government response to the October 7 attacks is the set of military, emergency, political, and civilian measures undertaken by Israel following the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023. By November 1, about 253,000 Israelis had been evacuated or had left their homes independently, in the largest civilian evacuation in Israel’s history. Israel formally declared war and launched Operation Swords of Iron. The response also included an emergency government and hostage negotiations. Evacuation, assistance, and long-term reconstruction programs addressed affected communities. Its stated objectives developed around dismantling Hamas’s military and governing capabilities, recovering hostages, and preventing renewed threats from Gaza. Disagreement centered on the relative priority of the war goals, while the campaign’s humanitarian consequences drew sustained criticism. Separate controversies concerned civilian preparedness and accountability for the security failure.

02Overview

Operation Swords of Iron combined air, sea, and land operations with a nationwide emergency response and efforts to recover people held hostage in Gaza.[1] The government’s response extended beyond the battlefield. Emergency legal powers and reserve mobilization formed part of the initial response.[14][15] Separate programs covered evacuation and accommodation and support for hostage families.[2] Revised public spending and long-term rehabilitation planning followed.[16][8]

The military campaign’s stated purposes included ending Hamas’s rule in Gaza, destroying its military capacity, and securing the hostages’ return.[1] Later formulations also referred to eliminating Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s military and governing capabilities and preventing future terrorist threats from Gaza.[9] These goals were accompanied by measures to protect Israel’s other borders and citizens, including preparations for a possible northern front and evacuations near Lebanon.[3][10]

The wartime political structure brought Benny Gantz and members of his National Unity party into an emergency government alongside Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s existing coalition.[6][17] A smaller war cabinet concentrated wartime deliberation among Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and Gantz, while the full cabinet retained approval responsibilities.[18] Civilian administration developed through emergency accommodation and inter-ministerial arrangements.[2] Separate management mechanisms addressed civilian wartime needs, alongside a dedicated reconstruction administration for the southern border region.[19][8]

03Origins and Initial Decisions

The first government decisions were made while attacks and fighting continued across southern Israeli communities and military sites, and while hostages were being taken into Gaza.[20] On October 7, Police Commissioner Kobi Shabtai declared Israel at war at 9:42 a.m., reported 21 active combat locations, and deployed special police units.[21] Gallant authorized extensive reserve mobilization at 10:06 a.m., and Netanyahu publicly declared Israel at war at 11:43 a.m.[21]

In his first public statement, Netanyahu said, “We are at war—not an operation, not rounds,” and announced instructions to clear infiltrators from Israeli communities and conduct a large reserve mobilization.[22] That statement came after approximately five hours of fighting, while the political-security cabinet convened more than seven hours after the attacks began.[22] Ministers were instructed not to give interviews during this initial period.[22]

A subsequently released official chronology placed Netanyahu’s first notification of an attack at 6:29 a.m. and a further conversation with his military secretary at 6:44 a.m.[23] The published chronology described a 9:55 a.m. assessment involving the defense minister, chief of staff, intelligence chiefs, national security adviser, and operations chief, at which Netanyahu ordered the Gaza border sealed, full reserve mobilization rather than the army’s recommended partial call-up, and preparations for possible fighting in the north.[23]

At the opening of the security-cabinet meeting, Netanyahu identified three immediate aims: remove infiltrating forces and restore security to attacked communities, exact a “huge price” from the enemy, including in Gaza, and reinforce other fronts to deter additional participants.[24] The immediate security priority was removing terrorists from Israeli territory.[21] The cabinet subsequently approved operational decisions intended to destroy Hamas’s and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s military and governing capabilities and prevent them from threatening Israelis for years.[4]

Discussions about broadening the government began on the first evening: opposition leader Yair Lapid proposed a small emergency government at 6:23 p.m., and Netanyahu met Lapid and Gantz at 7:32 p.m. to discuss a unity arrangement.[21] Later that evening, Netanyahu pledged to destroy Hamas’s capabilities, warned Gaza residents to leave areas of Hamas activity, and described the coming war as prolonged and difficult.[21]

04Emergency Powers and Wartime Government

Gallant declared a special home-front situation in the Gaza-border region at 8 a.m. on October 7, initially covering an area within 80 kilometers of Gaza.[14][24] The special situation was extended nationwide that evening, while a separate civil-emergency declaration covered areas outside the initial defense declaration.[14] Schools were closed and gatherings restricted in affected areas as the emergency arrangements took effect.[24]

Under the Civil Defense Law, a special home-front situation permits measures such as requiring civilians to remain in shelters, restricting educational activity, and controlling entry to and exit from areas to protect life or property.[14] A defense minister’s declaration expires within 48 hours unless extended by the government, and further extension requires approval by the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.[14] The powers also provided a framework for Home Front Command instructions to residents and emergency organizations.[4]

On October 8, Government Resolution 941 extended the special situation, and the cabinet confirmed a state of war effective from 6 a.m. on October 7.[14] The formal war decision rested on section 40 of Basic Law: The Government, which requires a government decision to initiate war or significant military action likely to lead to war.[4] The designated start time also had implications for compensation claims administered through the Property Tax and Compensation Fund.[4] This was Israel’s first formal declaration of war since 1973.[25]

The October 11 emergency-government agreement created a war cabinet comprising Netanyahu, Gallant, and Gantz, with Gadi Eizenkot and Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer as observers.[18] Five National Unity members were to enter the government, including Gantz, Eizenkot, and Gideon Sa’ar; four additional party members joined the security cabinet under the wartime arrangement.[6][17] The agreement restricted unrelated legislation and government resolutions during the war, including measures concerning the judicial system.[26][18]

Lapid did not join the arrangement at that stage, amid disagreement over the coalition’s far-right ministers.[18] Negotiations over the structure also reflected Netanyahu’s desire to retain final decision-making authority and Gantz’s preference for a small, efficient war cabinet; Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir objected to a narrow security forum that excluded them.[6]

05Military Campaign and Evolving Objectives

Israeli airstrikes in Gaza began at approximately 5 p.m. on October 7, and more than 2,600 targets were reported struck during the first two days, including tunnels, rocket-launching sites, command-and-control centers, and other infrastructure.[5] The initial response also involved recovering hostages, assembling ground forces near Gaza, and conducting operations against attackers still inside Israel.[26] Those operations inside Israel were reported to have concluded by October 11, while ground forces assembled and established a base in adjacent areas.[26]

Mobilization began on the morning of October 7, often before reservists could arrange family, employment, or study responsibilities.[15] Government authorization covered 360,000 reservists, while one subsequent assessment distinguished this authorization from approximately 220,000 actually called up across the forces.[15] Contemporary reporting described mobilization of approximately 360,000, equivalent to 3%–4% of Israel’s population, while another account recorded an initial 295,000, including 45,000 serving despite exemptions, followed by an increase to 360,000.[26][5] Combat reserve units spent the period before the late-October ground maneuver organizing and training, amid shortages of protective and other equipment.[15]

By October 19, thousands of air and artillery strikes had been reported.[26] Air and sea attacks targeted Hamas political leaders, military commanders, fighters, command centers, training facilities, rocket-launch sites, tunnels, and weapons workshops.[1] Following earlier limited incursions, Israeli ground forces entered northern Gaza in force on October 27.[1]

The wording of the war objectives developed during the opening weeks.[10] Netanyahu’s initial statements emphasized toppling Hamas without mentioning hostages, while the four objectives authorized by the war cabinet on October 16 were to topple Hamas rule and destroy its military capabilities, remove the threat from Gaza, make a maximum effort to resolve the hostage issue, and defend Israel’s borders and citizens.[10] Later official statements more clearly paired toppling Hamas with returning the hostages.[10]

Subsequent formulations described destroying Hamas’s military and governing capabilities, returning the hostages, and ensuring that Gaza would not again threaten Israel.[9] In December 2023, Netanyahu also named demilitarizing Gaza and deradicalizing Palestinian society as prerequisites for peace.[5] The government’s December policy statement presented the longer-term aim as working with international and regional partners toward Palestinian self-government in Gaza without the capacity to threaten Israel, and stated that Israel did not seek permanent occupation or permanent civilian displacement.[27]

06Hostage Recovery and Negotiations

The cabinet approved a Qatar-mediated hostage agreement in November 2023 by 35 votes to three.[7] Its initial stage provided for the release of 50 Israeli women and children over four days in exchange for 150 Palestinian prisoners and a pause in fighting.[7] The agreement allowed an additional day of pause for every further ten hostages released and included increased entry of fuel, equipment, and humanitarian aid into Gaza.[28] Ben-Gvir and the other Otzma Yehudit ministers voted against it.[28]

The published terms also included Red Cross access to remaining hostages, while the cabinet decision stated that fighting would resume after the pause to destroy Hamas’s and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s military and organizational capabilities and create conditions for returning all hostages.[7] The pause ultimately lasted seven days, with Qatar and Egypt mediating; 110 hostages were freed in exchange for 240 Palestinian prisoners during that period.[29]

By October 2024, 117 hostages had reportedly been returned alive from Gaza, many through exchanges during the November pause.[30] Additional hostages had been recovered dead or killed in encounters, while others remained in captivity at the report’s cutoff.[30] Hostage recovery therefore remained a continuing objective alongside military operations rather than a task completed by the first agreement.[30]

Civilian support accompanied recovery efforts.[2] Government Resolution 982 arranged initial assistance for families of hostages and missing people, and Resolution 1058 established a directorate coordinating responses for hostages, missing persons, returnees, and their families.[2] Its framework included the National Insurance Institute and the health, education, and welfare ministries, together with inter-ministerial medical, psychological, and social care for children and young people returning from captivity.[2]

A later account by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs described Netanyahu’s November 20, 2024 offer of $5 million, safe passage out of Gaza, and immunity for anyone freeing a living hostage and their immediate family.[31] The same account placed the offer against difficulties locating captives and the execution of six hostages as Israeli forces approached, and estimated that 100 people remained held on December 15, 2024, approximately 60 of them alive.[31]

07Evacuation and Civilian Assistance

Evacuation of communities within four kilometers of the Gaza border began on October 7.[2] Resolution 950, adopted on October 12, retrospectively approved the Safe Distance South plan for 24 localities with 15,818 residents.[2] The IDF conducted evacuations, the National Emergency Authority arranged temporary accommodation, and ministries received responsibilities including education and welfare provision.[2] Qualifying residents within seven kilometers who left or were displaced between October 7 and 13 were eligible for an initial-organization grant.[2]

On October 18, another resolution retroactively approved evacuation within two kilometers of the northern border, covering approximately 27,000 people.[3] Further decisions covered Kiryat Shmona and surrounding communities, while an October 23 decision covered Sderot and communities three to four kilometers from Gaza.[3] The combined evacuation and independent departure of approximately 253,000 people by November 1 reflected displacement associated with the October 7 attack, the Gaza war, and conflict along the northern border with Hezbollah, rather than the Gaza response alone.[3][11]

During the first three months, approximately 210,000 residents were evacuated from southern and northern communities.[12] The government facilitated evacuation of 130,000 during the first month and housed them in nearly 700 hotels, with accommodation spending reaching NIS 5.26 billion from the outbreak of hostilities through July 2024.[12] These figures describe different periods and categories from the earlier count that included people leaving independently.[3][12]

The government authorized the Socio-Economic Cabinet to oversee civilian aspects of the war on October 15 and empowered the finance minister to establish a civil command center on October 25.[19] A Prime Minister’s Office inter-ministerial economy and infrastructure team met daily from October 10 to November 9.[19] Civilian mobilization also developed outside government: within days, hundreds of Jerusalem initiatives were providing transport, food, housing, medical assistance, and support for both the home front and frontline.[32]

The economic response broadened over time to include increased assistance to businesses and evacuees and the appointment of the tourism minister to handle evacuee affairs.[33] Authorities chose not to use a 2009 accommodation plan based on community centers and schools.[33] The revised 2023 state budget added NIS 28.9 billion in expenditure, including NIS 17 billion for defense and approximately NIS 12 billion for other purposes, among them assistance to Gaza-border communities and residents.[16] The Knesset approved the revision by 59 votes to 44, with about 90% of the increase financed through a larger fiscal deficit.[16]

08Humanitarian Measures in Gaza

The October 7 cabinet decisions included stopping electricity, fuel, and goods supplies to Gaza, followed on October 9 by Gallant’s announcement of a “complete siege.”[24][26] The restrictions covered food, water, fuel, and electricity, and on October 12 the energy minister said restrictions and the cessation of Israeli water and electricity services would remain until Israeli hostages were released.[26]

On October 13, the IDF called on civilians in Gaza City to move south, presenting the evacuation as a measure for their safety and protection.[26] Israel announced the resumption of water supplies to southern Gaza on October 15 and agreed on October 18 to humanitarian assistance entering from Egypt, subject to inspections and intended for civilians rather than Hamas.[26] Aid began entering through the Rafah crossing on October 21 under arrangements involving Israeli inspection and security screening.[34]

The government’s December 2023 account of civilian-warning measures listed text messages, recorded calls, leaflets, radio and television broadcasts, social media, humanitarian corridors, and local pauses.[27] Its published figures included more than 15 million text messages, 12 million recorded calls, 4.5 million leaflets, and 45,000 individual calls intended to encourage temporary evacuation.[27] These figures represented the government’s description of its warning activity rather than measurements of how many people successfully reached safety.[27]

A January 2024 government account also listed designation of a southern humanitarian zone, pauses and corridors, Arabic-speaking civilian-affairs officers attached to ground forces, and coordination of aid consignments with international organizations.[35] That press kit reported more than 70,000 tons of aid and separately listed approximately 2,000 food trucks, 660 medical-equipment trucks, 660 bottled-water trucks, 560 shelter-equipment trucks, and 430 trucks carrying other items.[35] The figures were a dated government snapshot rather than independently established current cumulative totals.[35]

By the end of 2023, reported Palestinian deaths exceeded 21,000 and injuries exceeded 56,000, while the vast majority of Gaza’s population had been displaced and a severe humanitarian crisis had developed.[11] Humanitarian conditions had already been dire before the war, and the supply restrictions affected emergency services and health facilities during the opening phase.[26]

09Rehabilitation and Longer-Term Significance

About two weeks after the attacks, the government decided to establish the Tekuma Administration as a government point of contact for Gaza-border communities and their rehabilitation.[8] It subsequently allocated NIS 18 billion to a five-year program that included evacuation-related costs, community and infrastructure rehabilitation, and incentives to attract residents.[8]

The published plan covered housing, education, employment, security, transportation, health and welfare, agriculture, and youth programs.[36] Its reported allocations included NIS 5.4 billion for restoration and NIS 13.6 billion for “healing and growth,” alongside proposals for an additional NIS 10,000 in annual educational investment per child, up to NIS 1.2 billion for return incentives and temporary housing, and an estimated 3,600 new jobs.[36] The administration expressed its objective as “a return to a better home than before,” rather than merely restoring prewar conditions.[36]

Assistance continued through later budget decisions.[37] In August 2024, the cabinet approved a NIS 3.3 billion increase to the 2024 budget, most of it for evacuees from northern and Gaza-border communities, including grants and hotel accommodation.[37] The package included NIS 250 million for treatment of people harmed by the October 7 events and NIS 200 million for additional reserve-duty payments.[37] Temporary continuation of the evacuation program was initially to be financed as a loan from the existing budget, amid disagreement over funding the increase.[37]

The response thus linked wartime security decisions to extended obligations toward displaced residents, reservists, hostage families, and damaged communities.[2][37] Its institutional consequences also included internal probes by the IDF, Shin Bet, and police, alongside a continuing political dispute over a broader state investigation.[38] The distinction between operational lesson-learning and an inquiry capable of examining institutional and personal responsibility became central to the accountability debate.[13]

10Controversies and Accountability

The relationship between defeating Hamas and recovering hostages remained a major disagreement, with early reported cabinet minutes showing resistance to formally including hostage return among the objectives before its eventual adoption.[39][10] Approximately two and a half weeks after October 7, 58% of survey respondents considered the goals insufficiently clear, including about two-thirds of opposition voters and 48% of coalition voters; 63% of Jewish respondents prioritized eliminating Hamas, while Arab respondents were divided between that goal and hostage return.[40] In May 2024, Mosaic reported that Gallant and Gantz publicly criticized the absence of a clear postwar governance plan for Gaza.[41]

The siege, evacuation orders, and adequacy of aid provoked substantial humanitarian and legal criticism, alongside Israel’s denial that it delayed relief.[26][34] An October 2023 legal analysis argued that Israel was no longer an occupying power after its 2005 disengagement but remained obliged to permit humanitarian aid and prevent civilian starvation; this was an analytical position, not a court finding.[42] An international inquiry’s selected-incident findings also identified delayed and inadequately coordinated security-force responses on October 7, using a reasonable-grounds standard and interviews and open sources without access to Israel.[43]

Domestic audits identified inadequate evacuation planning, unclear responsibilities, poor shared information, and shortcomings affecting vulnerable evacuees.[12] They also found that the civilian command mechanism did not become operational as intended and that the government lacked an integrated picture of civilian needs.[19] A health-system review identified coordination problems and uneven hospital burdens; Soroka disputed elements of the retrospective account, while delays were also reported in reservist compensation and assistance to hostage families.[33]

Netanyahu deleted an October 29, 2023 post denying prior security warnings after criticism, while senior military figures publicly accepted responsibility and Gantz said no participant in national leadership could absolve themselves.[13] On May 5, 2025, the government decided not to establish a state commission at that time.[13] On October 22, 2025, the Knesset State Control Committee rejected a proposal for such a commission; Herzog and Lapid opposed an alternative appointment arrangement and called for an independent state commission.[38] As of October 24, 2026, Netanyahu continued opposing a Supreme Court-appointed panel on grounds of alleged bias, while victims’ families and others continued demanding an inquiry.[38][44]

Sources

  1. 1The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Israel’s Campaign Against Hamas in Gaza: War Aims and Operational Challenges, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  2. 2Government of Israel, Reply to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  3. 3Institute for National Security Studies, The Evacuation of Israeli Communities During the Swords of Iron War: Plans, Execution, and Reassessing the Criteria for Evacuation, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  4. 4Ynet, The Political-Security Cabinet Officially Approved: Israel Is at War, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  5. 5Jewish Virtual Library, The Israel-Hamas War Operation Iron Sword, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  6. 6Globes, Netanyahu and Gantz form national emergency gov't, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  7. 7Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Israel SitRep: Nov. 22, 2023, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  8. 8Mako, Stuck in October: “Does Someone Need to Set Themselves on Fire for Them to Understand the Distress?”, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  9. 9U.S. Department of State, Israel, The West Bank and Gaza, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  10. 10Institute for National Security Studies, Until Victory—Swords of Iron, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  11. 11U.S. Department of State, Israel, West Bank and Gaza, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  12. 12State Comptroller of Israel, 2026 Evacuation Audit, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  13. 13Institute for National Security Studies, Admission and Evasion: The Use of the Terms “Failure” and “Responsibility” Following the October 7 Attack and their Impact on the Discourse Space between the Political and Military Echelons, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  14. 14Library of Congress, Global Legal Monitor, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  15. 15Institute for National Security Studies, The Reserve Forces in the Gaza War: Challenges for the Continuation of the Fighting, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  16. 16Globes, Knesset approves revised 2023 budget, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  17. 17Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Secretary of State Blinken Arrives in Israel, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  18. 18The Times of Israel, Emergency War Government Agreement, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  19. 19State Comptroller of Israel, Civilian Wartime Management Audit, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  20. 20The Lookstein Center, Fact Sheet: Background Israel-Hamas War, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  21. 21Jewish Virtual Library, Timeline of the October 7 Massacre and Israel’s Initial Response, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  22. 22Mako, Five Hours into the Fighting, Netanyahu in a Statement: We Are at War, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  23. 23Ynet, Three Hours Without a Call with the Chief of Staff; Only at 9:55 Did He Order the Border Closed: Netanyahu’s Schedule on October 7, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  24. 24The Times of Israel, October 7, 2023 Live Coverage, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  25. 25The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, International Reactions to the Hamas Attack on Israel, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  26. 26Congress.gov, Congressional Research Service, Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict FAQs, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  27. 27Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 6, 2023 FAQ, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  28. 28Globes, Israel's cabinet approves hostage release deal, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  29. 29Encyclopaedia Britannica, Israel-Hamas War, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  30. 30Congress.gov, Congressional Research Service, Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  31. 31Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Will Hamas Be Emboldened by the Hostage Deal?, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  32. 32Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, Civil Society in a State of Emergency: A Snapshot of Major Jerusalem Initiatives, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  33. 33Ynet, On October 7 the Systems Collapsed, and the Public Took Control. This Is How the Government Has Functioned Since, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  34. 34American Jewish Committee, What You Need to Know About Israel’s Humanitarian Aid To Gaza, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  35. 35Government of Israel, January 2024 Israel-Hamas Conflict Press Kit, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  36. 36Globes, Tekuma Administration unveils "Gaza Envelope" plan, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  37. 37Globes, Cabinet approves extra NIS 3.3b budget for evacuees, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  38. 38Jewish Virtual Library, The Israel-Hamas War: A Commission of Inquiry, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  39. 39The Times of Israel, Early Cabinet Discussions on Hostage Objectives, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  40. 40Tel Aviv University, Peace Index – November 2023, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  41. 41Mosaic, Israel’s Wartime Political Tumult, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  42. 42Institute for National Security Studies, Israel’s Humanitarian Duties, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  43. 43United Nations Digital Library, UN Commission of Inquiry, Detailed Findings on the October 7 Attacks, accessed on November 1, 2026.
  44. 44The Times of Israel, October 2026 Demands for an October 7 Inquiry, accessed on November 1, 2026.

IsraelPedia Question & Answers

  • What was the Israeli government response to the October 7 attacks?

    The Israeli government response to the October 7 attacks was a combination of military operations, emergency measures, political arrangements, and civilian assistance undertaken after the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023. Israel formally declared war and launched Operation Swords of Iron, while also pursuing hostage recovery, evacuations, and support for affected communities. Its stated goals developed around dismantling Hamas’s military and governing capabilities, recovering hostages, and preventing renewed threats from Gaza.

  • What were the Israeli government’s stated objectives for the war?

    The Israeli government’s stated objectives included toppling Hamas rule, destroying its military capabilities, removing the threat from Gaza, and making a maximum effort to return the hostages. Later formulations also referred to preventing Gaza from threatening Israel again and eliminating Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s military and governing capabilities. In December 2023, the government said it did not seek permanent occupation or permanent civilian displacement.

  • How did Israel’s wartime government change after October 7?

    An emergency-government agreement on October 11, 2023, brought Benny Gantz and members of his National Unity party into the government alongside Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition. The agreement created a war cabinet comprising Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and Gantz, with Gadi Eizenkot and Ron Dermer as observers. The full cabinet retained approval responsibilities, while the war cabinet concentrated wartime deliberation.

  • How many Israelis were evacuated or left their homes after the October 7 attacks?

    By November 1, approximately 253,000 Israelis had been evacuated or had left their homes independently. This figure included displacement associated with the October 7 attack, the Gaza war, and conflict along the northern border with Hezbollah, rather than the Gaza response alone. During the first three months, approximately 210,000 residents were evacuated from southern and northern communities.

  • What hostage agreement did Israel approve in November 2023?

    The Israeli cabinet approved a Qatar-mediated hostage agreement in November 2023 by 35 votes to three. Its initial stage provided for 50 Israeli women and children to be released over four days in exchange for 150 Palestinian prisoners and a pause in fighting. The pause ultimately lasted seven days; 110 hostages were freed in exchange for 240 Palestinian prisoners, with Qatar and Egypt mediating.

  • What humanitarian measures did Israel take in Gaza during the war?

    Israel announced water supplies to southern Gaza would resume on October 15, 2023, and agreed on October 18 to humanitarian assistance entering from Egypt, subject to inspections and intended for civilians rather than Hamas. Aid began entering through the Rafah crossing on October 21. The government also described civilian warnings, humanitarian corridors, local pauses, and coordination of aid consignments with international organizations.

  • What accountability measures followed the October 7 security failure?

    The IDF, Shin Bet, and police conducted internal probes, while a broader dispute continued over whether to establish a state commission of inquiry. On May 5, 2025, the government decided not to establish a state commission at that time, and on October 22, 2025, the Knesset State Control Committee rejected a proposal for one. As of October 24, 2026, victims’ families and others continued demanding an inquiry.