Islamic Movement in Israel

Religious outreach, often termed da’wa, and the provision of everyday community services have been central to the Islamic Movement’s public presence alongside its electoral activities.[7][8] Its institutions have addressed education, healthcare, recreation, and welfare, while its political development has involved a persistent question: whether Muslim religious and communal goals should be pursued through Israel’s national political institutions or outside parliamentary representation.[1][2] The division between its Northern and Southern branches made these alternative approaches organizationally distinct.[2]

The movement developed among Arab Muslims in Israel during a period of increasing religious observance and expanding Islamic activism across the Middle East.[3] Its social activity addressed local needs shaped by socioeconomic disparities between Jewish and Arab communities and dissatisfaction with the ability of secular Arab political organizations to improve local conditions.[7] Community work and religious education were therefore not separate from its public influence: volunteers, charitable associations, mosques, and local institutions were important parts of its relationship with residents.[7][9]

The branches also acquired different geographical centers of strength.[3] Around 2000, the Southern Branch was particularly strong in the Triangle and the Negev, while the Northern Branch had stronger bases in Wadi Ara and the Galilee.[3] Kafr Qassem was associated with Darwish and the parliamentary camp, while Umm al-Fahm became closely associated with Raed Salah and the Northern Branch.[1][10] These regional descriptions concern the movement’s development at that time rather than a current membership census.[3]

Jerusalem and al-Aqsa became another major focus of the movement’s religious and communal activity, encompassing transportation for worshippers, fundraising, renovation work, Quran study, and assistance to Palestinian residents.[4][11] Its later history consequently followed two prominent paths: the Southern Branch’s participation in Israeli electoral and coalition politics, and the Northern Branch’s mobilization around Islamic holy sites before its prohibition in 2015.[6][5]

Most cited accounts date the movement’s establishment by Sheikh Abdullah Nimr Darwish to 1971.[1][4] A 2004 RAND publication instead described an Israeli Arab Muslim Brotherhood branch called the Islamic Movement as having been established in 1980, leaving a discrepancy in the secondary literature.[12] Darwish was associated with Kafr Qassem, led the movement until 1991, and initially concentrated on welfare facilities and community services.[1] Its emergence followed greater access by Arab citizens of Israel to religious figures and Islamic colleges in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and Gaza.[2] The movement’s early principles resembled those of the Muslim Brotherhood, although accounts distinguish ideological influence and cooperation from formal organizational subordination.[2]

The regional Islamic revival gained momentum in the late 1970s, especially after Iran’s 1979 revolution, and contributed to the environment in which the movement expanded.[3] Among Arab citizens of Israel, renewed religious observance was especially visible among younger people, with economic hardship and influences from Islamic circles in Judea and Samaria contributing to the trend.[3] The slogan “Islam is the solution” gained currency in some Arab Israeli circles during this period.[3]

Raphael Israeli, in a 1999 analysis, traces an earlier revival of Islamic activity to the period after 1967, when Palestinian clerics preached in Israeli Muslim communities and students returned from Islamic institutions in the territories with revivalist ideas.[10] He argues that the movement’s social and cultural projects appealed to young people, workers, and professionals whose needs were not adequately met by existing institutions.[10]

Darwish’s early career included involvement in Usrat al-Jihad, or “Families of Jihad,” an underground organization established in 1979 that stockpiled weapons and carried out violent activity.[2] He was arrested in 1981, and a retrospective Ynet account says that after his release in 1985 he shifted toward public, social, and educational activity and opposed violent action by Palestinians inside Israel.[2] The movement subsequently expanded its volunteer work, branches, and community organizations during the 1980s.[9]

Accounts differ over the starting point of the movement’s municipal participation. One INSS account places its initial local-election campaign in 1983, when it reportedly won two local council mayoralties, while a later Ynet account identifies the 1989 elections as the prominent expression of its turn toward municipal politics.[3][2] By the end of the decade, its candidates held leadership positions in several Arab localities, and Raed Salah, a longtime pupil of Darwish, won the mayoralty of Umm al-Fahm.[13] A retrospective account gives its 1989 strength as five mayoralties and 45 seats on 11 municipal and local councils.[13] Its strongest local electoral base lay in the central district bordering Samaria, with more modest success in the Galilee.[7]

The movement’s local representation extended to 16 localities in 1993, 13 in 1998, and nine in 2003.[7] In Umm al-Fahm’s 2003 election, its mayoral candidate, Sheikh Hashim Abd al-Rahman, won 75 percent of the vote, maintaining the movement’s dominance there since 1989.[7] In Nazareth, its candidate Ahmad Zu’aby received 48 percent.[7] Raphael Israeli’s 1999 account also describes an expanding presence in Jaffa, Acre, and Negev Bedouin communities, and identifies Rahat’s election of an Islamist mayor in 1989 as part of this development.[10]

Local electoral successes brought participation in Knesset elections to the forefront.[2] In May 1995, leaders discussed national participation but initially decided against an independent list, while allowing supporters freedom to decide whether and for whom to vote.[7] Religious consultation accompanied the political debate: a delegation traveled to Egypt in 1995, was referred to religious authorities in Jordan, and prepared information about the Knesset and Arab parties.[2] Salah’s camp understood the resulting advice as prohibiting participation, whereas Darwish’s supporters considered it inconclusive and sought further opinions from Muslim jurists in Europe that they presented as permitting participation.[2]

The General Congress endorsed participation in a unified Arab party in March 1996.[7] Darwish led the supporting camp, while Salah and Kamal Khatib rejected the decision and led the Northern Branch.[7] Disagreement over the Oslo Accords reinforced the electoral division: Darwish supported the agreement, while Salah opposed it.[4] The split produced a Southern Branch committed to parliamentary participation and a Northern Branch that remained outside national electoral representation, although the latter initially supported local election participation.[3]

The United Arab List, known by its Hebrew acronym Ra’am, contested the 1996 election jointly with Abd al-Wahab Darawshe’s Arab Democratic Party.[2] The joint list won four seats, two associated with the Islamic faction, and increased its total to five seats in 1999.[14][15] Ra’am became the Southern Branch’s parliamentary representative, while the Northern Branch rejected participation in Israeli national political institutions.[2]

By 2013, the Northern Branch had also begun boycotting local elections in Umm al-Fahm.[14] It continued to attract thousands to annual gatherings, but those gatherings had social and communal functions as well as political ones, and attendance did not necessarily indicate commitment to political protest.[14] Its rejection of electoral participation meant that public attendance did not translate directly into parliamentary or local electoral strength.[14]

On November 17, 2015, the government announced that the Northern Branch had been declared an unlawful organization under British Mandate-era emergency regulations retained in Israeli law.[5][16] The designation applied to the Northern Branch, not the Southern Branch.[17][5] Membership, providing services to the organization, or acting on its behalf could constitute criminal offenses punishable by imprisonment, and the organization’s property could be seized.[5][16]

Authorities issued closure orders for 17 affiliated institutions and associations and searched 13, seizing computers, documents, materials, and funds and freezing bank accounts.[5] A religious-freedom report recorded that one person had been arrested specifically over suspected ties to the branch by the end of 2015.[18] Subsequent meetings between representatives of the two branches sought reunification but produced no agreement.[9]

In November 2019, Haifa Magistrate’s Court convicted Salah of incitement to terrorism and supporting the organization he had headed after it was outlawed.[19] He received a sentence of two years and four months; the indictment concerned speeches praising or encouraging terrorist acts.[19] A later report recorded his release on December 13, 2020, after serving 17 months, and the attendance of about 1,000 supporters when he returned to Umm al-Fahm.[20]

The Southern Branch continued along its parliamentary path.[6] Ra’am ran independently in the election for the 24th Knesset after a strategic disagreement with the Joint List, retained four seats, and joined the coalition formed in 2021.[6] Its approach emphasized cooperation with either Jewish political bloc in pursuit of practical civic priorities.[6] The coalition government remained in office until its collapse in 2022.[15] Sheikh Safwat Frij was elected head of the Southern Branch in 2022.[17]

Schools, preschools, low-fee medical clinics, and mosques functioning as community centers formed part of the movement’s service network around 2000.[3] Other activities included libraries, bookstores, sports clubs, computer courses, volunteer welfare work, and an ambulance service.[3] Its Islamic football league had 38 teams, illustrating the extent to which its institutions reached beyond formal worship into leisure and everyday community life.[3] These figures describe the network at that historical stage, rather than establishing the continued operation of each institution.[3]

During the 1970s, welfare institutions were developed in parallel with state services.[9] Activities included daycare centers, wedding organization, marital counseling, and assistance to schools with computers, alongside the better-known educational and healthcare programs.[9] Volunteer community work included building village roads and opening kindergartens, libraries, clinics, and drug-rehabilitation centers.[7] Religious outreach also involved mosque construction and Quran study, linking service provision with efforts to increase Muslim observance.[3]

The two branches maintained their own media and institutions after the split.[3] Around 2000, Sawt al-Haq wa-al-Hurriyya was associated with the Northern Branch, while the Southern Branch distributed al-Mithaq.[3] Raphael Israeli’s 1999 account describes the Northern Branch’s Umm al-Fahm institutions as including a printing house, weekly newspaper, Islamic college, sports and religious associations, and zakat welfare committees.[10] He describes Darwish’s faction as establishing parallel organizations and a new journal while emphasizing parliamentary activity and rapprochement between Arabs and Jews.[10]

The movement also organized around Muslim religious property.[7] In 1991, it established the Al-Aqsa Association for the Preservation of the Waqf and the Islamic Holy Sites, which campaigned for the return of waqf properties to Muslim community ownership.[7] In March 2001, it established a Supreme Muslim Council intended in part to provide an elected Islamic body to which those properties could be reinstated.[7]

Jerusalem activism became especially prominent from 1996, when annual rallies began under the slogan “Al-Aqsa is in Danger.”[4] An annual gathering in Salah’s hometown of Umm al-Fahm raised funds for Jerusalem activities, with one estimate placing attendance at about 50,000.[4] During the late 1990s, the movement helped rehabilitate the underground Marwani and Ancient Al-Aqsa mosques, adding space for several thousand worshippers.[4] Work on the prayer hall in Solomon’s Stables began in 1996 in cooperation with the Waqf and was intended to accommodate additional worshippers and strengthen Muslim presence at the site.[21]

Transportation projects extended the movement’s Jerusalem activity beyond rallies and construction.[4] The Northern Branch launched Masirat al-Bayariq, or the “Flag Parade,” in April 2001, following Ariel Sharon’s Temple Mount visit and the outbreak of the Second Intifada.[11] The Southern Branch operated a similar initiative called Shad al-Rihal.[11] Free buses brought worshippers from towns and villages inside pre-1967 Israel to al-Aqsa, with annual participation estimated in the tens and possibly hundreds of thousands.[11]

The Journey of the Banners initiative combined prayer visits with shopping in Jerusalem’s Old City.[4] One expert estimate put its cumulative total at more than two million visits between 2001 and 2009; this figure concerns visits, not distinct individuals.[4] Kamal Khatib explained the initiative in terms of sustaining a human presence: “if Israel prevents us from reconstructing Al-Aqsa with stones, we would do so with people.”[4] Associated social work included house renovations, neighborhood planning proposals, children’s activities, and legal assistance in the Old City, Silwan, and Sheikh Jarrah.[4]

Quran study circles at al-Aqsa began in 2010 with 30 students and grew to more than 1,000 participants after three years.[11] The circles were intended to sustain a Muslim presence at the site.[11] Their director, Hikmat Na’amna, described them in 2013 as “a way to undermine the plans to Judaize al-Aqsa.”[11] Their development occurred alongside restrictions on West Bank access to Jerusalem and increased Jewish visits to the Temple Mount.[11]

Other campaigns combined fundraising with broader religious mobilization.[21] An annual essay competition called “Jerusalem is in Danger” received 20,000 submissions from Muslims in 20 countries in 2001.[21] Organizers of a 2002 event, “Fund for the children of Al-Aqsa,” reported that 12,000 children attended with their parents and announced a goal of raising three million shekels for compound renovations.[21] Activities during 2003–2005 also included Al-Aqsa Fund events and donations collected from schools.[21]

The movement addressed violence within Arab communities through its “Safe Society” campaign, launched in 2010 with support from the Higher Arab Monitoring Committee.[22] The program called for rejecting incitement, maintaining nonviolent public discourse, establishing mediation committees, and encouraging Arab council heads to serve as unifying figures.[22] Salah stated that community action did not remove the police’s responsibilities, but that residents would not wait for police to solve the problem.[22]

Ra’am’s participation in the coalition formed in 2021 marked an unprecedented Arab-party role in an Israeli governing coalition.[6][15] Its strategy prioritized violence and crime, housing, employment, and development budgets, and treated cooperation with Jewish political partners as a means of pursuing these civic concerns.[6] This approach extended the Southern Branch’s longstanding acceptance of electoral participation into direct involvement in coalition politics.[6]

Ra’am presented the Knesset as an arena for practical politics rather than the primary forum for pursuing broader ideological goals.[6] Its willingness to cooperate with either Jewish political bloc distinguished it from Arab parties that imposed tighter ideological limits on potential coalition partners.[6] Parliamentary representation from 1996 onward gave the Southern Branch’s institutional strategy a continuing political expression.[2][15]

The movement’s earlier municipal record demonstrates that its political significance was not confined to Knesset representation.[7] Local offices, volunteer projects, and welfare associations established a public presence before the split over national elections.[7][9] Its dominance in Umm al-Fahm from 1989 and its representation across numerous localities show the importance of municipal government in its development.[7]

Its rise also formed part of a wider transformation in Muslim religious and community life in Israel.[7] The number of mosques increased from 60 in 1967 to 80 in 1988, 240 in 1993, and 363 in 2003.[7] These national figures describe the broader religious environment associated with the movement’s growth; they are not a count of mosques owned or constructed by the movement.[7]

A 2022 INSS assessment characterized the outlawed Northern Branch as a small and shrinking minority with negligible influence across Arab society, while retaining some influence among more radical elements.[8] The Southern Branch, by contrast, remained active through community institutions and Ra’am’s electoral strategy.[6][17]

The movement’s early underground history and alleged external relationships remain sensitive subjects.[3][12] Accounts of Usrat al-Jihad differ over specific violent acts and the chronology of Darwish’s release, although they describe his subsequent turn toward lawful social and religious activity.[3][2] Allegations of money-laundering and operational assistance to Hamas appeared in a 2004 discussion based partly on an interview with a former Israeli official; that discussion also recorded the arrest of sixteen movement leaders in May 2003 on charges including conspiracy and money-laundering.[12] Such allegations do not establish the responsibility of both branches or all movement members.[12]

The “Al-Aqsa is in Danger” campaign generated disputes over both its claims and its methods.[21] The campaign followed developments including the 1996 opening of the northern end of the Western Wall tunnels, which Khatib portrayed as part of a plan to Judaize the surroundings of al-Aqsa.[4] It promoted fears of Israeli harm to the mosque despite the absence of an official Israeli policy to destroy it.[21] Israeli authorities also objected to unilateral underground construction and the handling of soil and archaeological material.[4] Some Jerusalem Palestinians valued the movement’s practical assistance, while critics objected to confrontational rhetoric, religious framing of the conflict, and the influence of activists from outside Jerusalem.[4]

Authorities closed Northern Branch offices near the Mercy Gate in 2005 under periodically renewed orders.[21] During 2013–2015, male murabitun and female murabitat activists confronted some Jewish visitors to the compound; police clashes preceded the women’s group being outlawed and activists being removed.[21] The groups presented themselves as protecting al-Aqsa, while the Israeli government alleged that paid activists were organized to provoke incidents.[5][21]

The government justified the 2015 ban by alleging incitement, contributions to terrorist attacks, close cooperation with Hamas, and participation in the global Muslim Brotherhood.[5][16] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described its objective as stopping dangerous incitement and terrorism.[5] Arab political figures and the Southern Branch called the decision political, while reported Shin Bet concerns included the possibility that prohibition would inflame tensions and drive activity underground.[5] Civil-liberties objections concerned the breadth of the emergency powers and potential effects on charitable and religious work.[16]

The Southern Branch’s coalition strategy divided Arab political opinion. Ra’am’s supporters emphasized practical gains on violence, housing, employment, budgets, and local development, while its opponents argued that joining a government crossed established political boundaries.[6] In a 2022 commentary, Jonathan D. Halevi reported both historical-contact claims involving Hamas figures and Mansour Abbas’s denial of a Southern Branch connection to Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood.[23] He also reported that the movement rejected Yahya Sinwar’s demand that Ra’am leave the coalition, asserting that its legitimacy came from Palestinian Arab citizens inside Israel and its focus was their interests.[23]