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Iran–Israel Proxy Conflict

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01In brief

Iran–Israel proxy conflict is a regional strategic and military confrontation involving Israel, Iran, and armed organizations supported by Iran across the Middle East. A central component has been Iran’s support for Hezbollah, whose arsenal expanded after the 2006 Lebanon war to more than 100,000 rockets and missiles, including precision weapons. Rooted in the transformation of Iranian policy after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the conflict has involved weapons transfers, financing, training, Israeli operations against military entrenchment, and attacks from several neighboring and more distant territories. The indirect confrontation increasingly overlapped with direct Iran–Israel exchanges in 2024 and the June 2025 war. It widened further into regional fighting involving the United States in 2026.

02Overview

Iran’s support for regional political and armed groups has been a pillar of its foreign policy since the Islamic Republic’s establishment in 1979.[1] Its partners have included Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, armed groups in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen.[1] Their relationships with Tehran combine financial assistance, weapons, training, political cooperation, and differing degrees of operational coordination.[1] Some cooperate under the shared designation “axis of resistance,” although they have distinct motives and military capabilities.[1]

For Iran, these relationships provide ways to project power beyond its borders despite limitations in its conventional military capabilities.[1] They also support objectives including reducing American regional influence, advancing revolutionary ideology, and defending Shia communities and other populations Iranian leaders characterize as oppressed.[1] Against Israel specifically, the network has supplied strategic depth, deterrence, and threats from multiple directions while allowing Iran to limit the risks associated with deploying its own forces directly.[2]

The confrontation has consequently extended beyond the territory of either principal state: Lebanon and Gaza have been major fronts, Syria an arena of Iranian military deployment and Israeli airstrikes, Iraq a base for aligned militias, and Yemen a source of long-range attacks and threats to shipping.[1] Israel’s response has included a sustained campaign against weapons transfers and Iranian military entrenchment, followed by increasingly overt operations against Iranian military capabilities.[3][5] By 2025–2026, direct warfare and armed-partner activity had become interconnected parts of the wider conflict.[3][4]

03Origins and Early Development

Iran and Israel maintained close ties under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, but that relationship ended with the 1979 revolution.[6] The new Iranian authorities treated Israel as an occupier of Jerusalem, although informal commercial links persisted.[6] The Islamic Republic blamed Israel and the United States for regional grievances, establishing an ideological foundation for the later rivalry.[3] After the revolution, Yasir Arafat told an Iranian audience that “the road to Palestine now leads through Iran.”[7]

Iran began recruiting non-state organizations into its regional strategy by the early 1980s, gradually developing a network with varying degrees of attachment to Tehran.[2] Iranian financial backing for Palestinian Islamic Jihad formed part of this early engagement with Palestinian terrorist organizations.[6] The rivalry later intensified in the early 2000s as concern about Iran’s nuclear program grew alongside the expansion of its regional influence.[3]

Hezbollah was established in 1982 by Lebanese Shia militants during Lebanon’s civil war and Israel’s invasion, with critical Iranian assistance.[8] Iranian Revolutionary Guard personnel sent to Lebanon toward the end of that year established themselves around Baalbek and helped form the organization’s core.[9] Iranian and Syrian assistance supported recruitment among the local Shia population and the construction of a military network.[9] By 1985, Iranian-backed militias in Lebanon had generally coalesced into Hezbollah, which developed into both a major armed force and a political party.[10]

Hezbollah combined military activity with political participation and community services, while Iran remained its principal benefactor and a source of training and weapons.[11] Its stated objectives included Islamic rule in Lebanon, independence from Western powers, and opposition to Zionism.[11] After Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah continued border attacks, citing the disputed Shebaa Farms as territory from which Israel had not withdrawn.[11]

On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah terrorists crossed the international border, attacked an Israeli patrol, killed three Israeli soldiers, and abducted two others while rockets were fired at Israeli border towns.[11] Israel launched a large-scale campaign, and the 33-day war ended with a ceasefire under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701.[11] Afterward, the IRGC Qods Force played a central role in rebuilding and expanding Hezbollah’s arsenal, which grew to more than 100,000 rockets and missiles, including precision weapons.[2]

The 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein opened additional opportunities for Iranian relationships with Shia militias in Iraq.[10] The Quds Force connected, trained, and armed factions across Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.[10] Some Iran-backed Iraqi militias subsequently joined the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition formally recognized by the Iraqi government, while some constituent organizations continued operating independently of the state.[10]

04Palestinian Partnerships and Coordination

Iran–Hamas cooperation developed in the early 1990s and strengthened after Hamas took control of Gaza in June 2007.[2] Hamas sought to expand its military capabilities, while Iran sought greater influence in Gaza.[2] Unlike Hezbollah, Hamas is Sunni and has been less ideologically attached to Iran; it has also been less financially dependent on Tehran than Palestinian Islamic Jihad.[2] Palestinian Islamic Jihad maintained particularly close links with Iran, Hezbollah, and pro-Iranian militias in Syria, with its military headquarters reported in Damascus.[12]

The relationship with Hamas experienced significant political strains.[2] Hamas’s support for the Syrian opposition after the civil war began in 2011, followed by its support for Saudi Arabia’s 2015 intervention in Yemen, cooled relations with Tehran.[2] Iran froze most funding to Hamas in 2012–2013 during the disagreement over Syria, although military support continued.[2][7] Tehran also used financial assistance and backing for splinter organizations to pressure Hamas.[7] Relations improved from 2017, and Iranian influence had recovered by 2019.[2][7]

Iran’s assistance to Palestinian organizations encompassed money, weapons, training, and efforts to organize political and military cooperation.[7] One estimate placed Iranian funding to Hamas in 2023 at approximately $100 million.[7] A separate Israeli financial-enforcement estimate put Iran’s annual budget for Gaza at about $100 million, distinguishing it from Qatari transfers allegedly intended for civilian needs.[13] Reported financial mechanisms included cash transfers and hawala arrangements, with one route involving Turkish money changers and merchants.[13]

The Palestinian network extended beyond Islamist groups to include leftist organizations and Fatah splinters.[7] Umbrella structures and joint operations rooms were intended to improve coordination among organizations with differing ideologies.[7] During the May 2021 Gaza fighting, a joint operations room involving Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operated in Beirut.[7] In 2022, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar said a Beirut coordination center had facilitated meetings and collaboration among network members.[10] A Hamas–Palestinian Islamic Jihad joint operations room was established in Beirut in September 2023.[7]

In a March 6, 2023 letter to Ismail Haniyeh, Sinwar wrote that Hamas should participate in a response “in case the Zionist enemy launches an attack on Iran.”[14] Qods Force official Mohammad Saeed Izadi served as an important liaison between Iran, Palestinian organizations, and Hezbollah.[14] Materials attributed to documents captured by Israeli forces described contacts between Izadi and Hamas concerning preparations for what Hamas called the “great campaign” of October 7.[14] Further documents reportedly discussed approximately $21 million in weapons transfers and another plan involving about $25 million.[14]

05Syria and the Campaign Between Wars

Iran’s intervention in support of the Syrian government from 2011 brought Iranian personnel, Hezbollah, and other Iran-backed militias into a major arena close to Israel.[5] Their assistance included manpower, training, equipment, weapons, and funding.[5] Syria also provided an important overland route for Iranian weapons destined for Hezbollah in Lebanon.[15] Iranian strategy included developing military infrastructure and allied forces near Israel’s borders, while Israeli leaders regarded permanent Iranian-backed deployments near the northern frontier as a security threat.[5][16]

Israel conducted strikes in Syria from 2012, initially concentrating largely on targets connected with weapons shipments to Hezbollah.[5] Its declared redlines included preventing permanent Iranian bases, weapons factories, and the opening of additional fronts against Israel.[5] The military effort later expanded toward Iranian forces and Qods Force assets themselves.[16] A 2019 account described hundreds of Israeli airstrikes since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, intended to prevent a permanent Iranian military presence near the frontier.[17]

Israeli defense officials called the wider effort the “campaign between wars.”[18] One account dated that campaign’s beginning to 2013, initially averaging around three operations a year.[18] By 2023, former chief of staff Aviv Kochavi said operations were occurring “on average, every week.”[18] The objective was to disrupt Iranian and allied military buildup through low-profile action while avoiding full-scale war.[18]

The Syrian theater also produced direct exchanges before the wider regional escalation of 2023.[19] On February 10, 2018, an Iranian drone crossed into Israeli airspace, followed by Israeli strikes on its launch site.[19] An April 9 strike on the T-4 base killed four Iranian military advisers.[19] In May, Iranian forces in Syria fired a barrage of 20 rockets, after which Israel struck dozens of Iranian installations.[19] Israeli and Iranian forces repeatedly targeted one another during 2018, and Israeli strikes that year appeared to mark the first direct targeting of Iranian infrastructure in Syria.[5]

Iranian activity in Iraq and Syria also supported plans for a connected weapons route toward Lebanon and an additional front near the Golan Heights.[15] The al-Bukamal area on the Syria–Iraq border was identified in reporting as an important link in this corridor.[20] Rockets were central to the projected threat, linking the prospect of a Syrian front to Hezbollah’s established position in Lebanon.[15]

06Regional Escalation After October 7

The Hamas-led terrorist assault on southern Israel on October 7, 2023, killed more than 1,200 people, injured thousands, and took more than 250 hostages.[21] Israel subsequently began a large-scale Gaza campaign with the stated aims of dismantling Hamas’s infrastructure and securing the hostages’ release.[21] The campaign caused extensive destruction and a high civilian death and casualty toll, generating international concern and allegations against Israel; the Israeli government maintained that its actions were necessary for defense.[21]

Hezbollah began firing into Israel on October 8, saying it was acting in solidarity with Hamas.[1] Its sustained attacks employed rockets, drones, anti-tank missiles, and other weapons against Israeli communities and military posts.[22] Exchanges along the northern border led to the evacuation of tens of thousands of Israelis.[21] Israel responded to the widening conflict with targeted operations on multiple fronts, including Lebanon and Syria.[21]

The Houthis claimed missile and drone attacks on Israel in solidarity with Palestinians and began attacking Red Sea vessels in November 2023.[1] Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Syria increased attacks on American forces, while Iraqi groups also targeted Israel.[1] Several Iraqi militias operated under the informal Islamic Resistance in Iraq banner.[10] Together, these developments increased the number, tempo, and geographical scope of attacks by Iran-backed organizations after October 7.[1]

Between October 2023 and February 2024, Iran-aligned Shia groups conducted roughly 175 attacks on American forces in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, mostly using rockets and drones.[23] A drone attack in Jordan killed three American service members.[23] Iran’s military helped facilitate the campaign, whose purpose included pressuring the United States to withdraw its forces.[23] The groups later reduced attacks on American forces while placing greater emphasis on Israeli targets.[23]

Iran’s approach was described as a “convergence of the arenas”: closer coordination among Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, aligned forces in Syria and Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen.[16] The intended effect was to pressure Israel across several fronts and strengthen deterrence.[16] Actual participation nevertheless differed across theaters, with Hezbollah engaging partially and Iraqi and Yemeni groups pursuing different combinations of Israeli, American, and maritime targets.[16]

07Direct Exchanges in 2024

Iran launched its first direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory during the night of April 13–14, 2024.[24] The attack followed an April 1 strike near Iran’s consulate in Damascus that killed seven IRGC members, including two generals, among them senior Qods Force commander Mohammad Reza Zahedi.[24] Iran presented its attack as retaliation for the Damascus deaths.[25]

The Israeli military reported more than 300 incoming projectiles, comprising 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles, and said 99 percent were intercepted.[24] Some ballistic missiles reached Nevatim airbase, causing slight infrastructure damage.[24] A seven-year-old Bedouin child was seriously injured by debris.[25] The United States, Britain, and Jordan helped counter the attack.[26] Israel struck near Isfahan several days later.[26]

Iran-aligned organizations also participated in attacks during the exchange.[22] Hezbollah announced rocket fire against Israeli army positions in the Golan Heights, and Houthi drones were reported launched toward Israel in coordination with Iran.[22] Drones launched from Yemen and Iraq did not reach Israel, according to the Israeli military.[22] This combined direct Iranian weapons launches with activity from several regional partners.[22]

On July 19, 2024, a Houthi unmanned aircraft struck Tel Aviv and killed one person.[23] Israel retaliated the following day against the Houthi-held port of Al Hudaydah.[23] On September 15, the Houthis launched a missile approximately 1,300 miles toward Israel, causing minor damage and no casualties.[23]

Iran launched another direct attack on October 1, firing around 180 ballistic missiles following Hassan Nasrallah’s killing.[26] Iran said it targeted airbases and intelligence headquarters in central and southern Israel.[26] Approximately 30 missiles impacted in Israel and caused limited damage, while the United States and other partners helped counter the attack.[1] Israel responded later in October with strikes on Iranian military sites.[26]

08The June 2025 War and Network Setbacks

Israel began Operation Rising Lion on June 13, 2025, attacking Iranian nuclear, military, missile, and leadership targets.[27] The operation developed into a 12-day direct confrontation ending on June 24.[3] Iran retaliated with waves of ballistic missiles; the Israeli military reported more than 500 missiles in 18 barrages, most of which it said were intercepted.[27] Iranian attacks targeted civilian, military, energy, and government sites in Israel.[21]

On June 22, the United States struck three Iranian nuclear sites, including Fordow.[28] The other sites were Natanz and Isfahan.[3] After further attacks, Israel and Iran indicated they would observe a ceasefire announced for June 24 while retaining the right to defend themselves.[28]

Iran’s regional partners played only a limited role in the war after nearly two years of fighting had weakened important parts of the network.[14] Iraqi militias launched approximately 40 drones toward Israel and the Houthis fired two or three ballistic missiles, based on Israeli military figures.[14] Hezbollah did not join the fighting.[27] Most aligned organizations instead issued statements supporting Iran and threatened intervention if circumstances changed.[14]

This limited response contrasted with the network’s intended role as a deterrent against attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities and as a means of responding to such attacks.[14] Damage to Hamas and Hezbollah during the 2023–2024 fighting had reduced that deterrent.[14] The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in December 2024 further weakened the territorial connection between Iran and Lebanon.[10] Decentralized cooperation, mutual training, and the ability to manufacture or procure weapons nevertheless reduced members’ dependence on direct Iranian supply routes.[10]

The postwar challenges differed across organizations.[14] Hezbollah faced difficulties rebuilding and renewed pressure over disarmament, while debate over disarming Iran-aligned militias resurfaced in Iraq.[14] The Houthis continued operating and sought a more prominent regional role.[14]

09Renewed Regional Warfare in 2026

American and Israeli forces began strikes on Iran on February 28, 2026, launching operations named Epic Fury and Roaring Lion.[4] The resulting war included extensive strikes on Iranian military targets and Iranian attacks across the region, including Israel, Gulf states, and shipping.[4]

Hezbollah resumed attacks on Israel on March 2, citing Israeli operations in Lebanon and the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader.[4] Its missile and drone attacks ended the fragile 2024 ceasefire, and Israel launched large-scale military operations in Lebanon.[4][29] Iran-aligned Iraqi militias attacked bases hosting American troops.[29] The Houthis launched missiles and drones toward Israel on March 28 and began attacking ships passing through or originating from Saudi ports in July.[29]

A June American-brokered framework between Israel and Lebanon envisioned restoring Lebanese government sovereignty and a staged redeployment of Israeli forces, conditional on verified disarmament of non-state armed groups.[4] Israeli operations in southern Lebanon were still ongoing in September.[4]

The diplomatic arrangements concerning Iran remained fragile and distinct from the Lebanese framework.[4][30] An April U.S.–Iran ceasefire was followed by a June memorandum of understanding that collapsed amid renewed fighting and formally expired in August.[4] By September, Washington and Tehran were again exchanging limited strikes.[4] A November account nevertheless treated the April ceasefire as still in place but on “life support,” with intermittent fighting since May and a continuing risk of broader war.[30]

10Methods and Strategic Significance

The IRGC coordinates Iranian support for regional groups, while its Qods Force is responsible for covert lethal activity abroad, including asymmetric and terrorist operations.[1] Support has included advanced weapons and tactics, financial assistance, training, guidance, and unmanned aircraft systems.[23] Hezbollah has also trained and advised other network members, extending the system beyond direct bilateral relationships with Iran.[10]

A patron–proxy partnership allows a stronger actor to advance foreign-policy objectives through a weaker local partner sharing an enemy.[31] The patron gains local intelligence and tactical capabilities while potentially avoiding the use of its own troops and retaining some deniability.[31] The local organization gains material assistance, advanced weapons, and diplomatic backing.[31] Iran’s relationship-building model has combined religious, political, and military activity and has been particularly effective in weak states with substantial Shia populations, including Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.[31]

The network crosses religious divisions: Hezbollah and many Iraqi groups are Shia, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are Sunni, and the Houthis belong to Yemen’s Zaydi Shia tradition.[10] Coordination has included training, weapons acquisition, operations rooms, and support for common objectives.[10] Its strategic value for Tehran lies partly in relatively low-cost power projection and the possibility of threatening adversaries from several directions.[1][23]

Cyber operations and psychological messaging have accompanied the military confrontation.[32] Reported targets included Iranian fuel-supply systems and Israeli companies holding personal data or providing access to customer information.[32] Attackers selectively published stolen information and used separate channels to sustain attention and anxiety.[32]

The conflict’s development also exposed the tension between indirect deterrence and escalation.[14] Partners intended to help discourage attacks on Iran were substantially weakened before the June 2025 war, when their military contribution was limited.[14] Renewed participation in 2026 showed that weakened organizations could still adapt and rejoin regional fighting.[29] The result was not a simple replacement of proxy warfare by direct war, but the continued interaction of both forms of confrontation.[4][29]

11Controversies and Limits of Attribution

The term “proxy” can imply a degree of unified Iranian command that does not apply equally to every organization or operation.[1] Analysts disagree over whether particular groups directly follow Tehran’s orders or act with substantial autonomy rooted in local grievances and priorities.[1] Iran’s management became more decentralized after Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani was killed in January 2020.[33] The Houthis in particular have autonomous leadership and a local agenda; reporting has described them continuing attacks even after Iran requested a lower profile.[33][34]

Iranian support for Hamas does not establish Iranian planning or advance knowledge of the October 7 attack.[1] The U.S. Intelligence Community assessed that Iranian leaders “did not orchestrate nor had foreknowledge of” it.[1] A December 2023 analysis likewise found no direct evidence establishing Iranian involvement or approval while documenting extensive longer-term assistance.[7] In a SAPIR interview, Reuel Marc Gerecht argued that involvement was likely on circumstantial grounds but acknowledged lacking direct sources inside Iran’s leadership and wanting more evidence.[35]

Assessments of military outcomes also differ: Gerecht characterized Hezbollah’s 2006 war as a “devastating defeat,” whereas another account described an ambiguous outcome without a clear victor.[35][11] Attribution of some Syrian operations and control of particular military facilities could not be independently verified.[5] Estimates of the June 2025 strikes’ damage and their effect on Iran’s capabilities remained uncertain.[28]

Sources

  1. 1Congress.gov, Congressional Research Service, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  2. 2Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Development of Iranian–Hamas–Hezbollah Cooperation, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  3. 3Encyclopaedia Britannica, 12-Day War, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  4. 4Congress.gov, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Conflict with Iran, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  5. 5Congress.gov, Congressional Research Service, Iran and Israel: Tension Over Syria, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  6. 6The Times of Israel, Iran and Israel: From Allies to Arch-Foes, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  7. 7Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, The Path to October 7: How Iran Built Up and Managed a Palestinian ‘Axis of Resistance’, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  8. 8Congress.gov, Congressional Research Service, Iran-Supported Groups in the Middle East and U.S. Policy, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  9. 9Jewish Virtual Library, Hezbollah: History & Overview, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  10. 10Encyclopaedia Britannica, Axis of Resistance, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  11. 11Ynet, Hezbollah, the 'Party of God', accessed on November 20, 2026.
  12. 12Globes, Islamic Jihad, Iran's proxy, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  13. 13Globes, Israel thwarts Hamas on the financial battlefield, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  14. 14Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, The Resistance Axis and the Israel–Iran War, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  15. 15Globes, All roads lead to Tehran as Israel hits back, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  16. 16Institute for National Security Studies, From Ideological Animosity to Strategic Rivalry: The Evolution of Iran’s Perception of Israel, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  17. 17The Times of Israel, Israel’s Shadow War with Iran Bursts into the Open, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  18. 18Jewish News Syndicate, Amid strikes against Iran, Israel’s strategy remains long-term, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  19. 19Jewish Virtual Library, Military Threats to Israel: Syria, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  20. 20Ynet, Iran's hasty, failed attempt at revenge for Syrian-Iraq border attack, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  21. 21Institute for Jewish Policy Research, Two-Year Account of the Regional Conflict, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  22. 22The Times of Israel, Iran Hails Proxies for Joining Attack on Israel, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  23. 23Jewish Virtual Library, ODNI Report: Iran’s Terrorism and Nuclear Threat - Regional and Global Terrorism Assessment, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  24. 24The Times of Israel, Iran’s First Direct Attack on Israel, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  25. 25Globes, Iran launches massive aerial attack on Israel, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  26. 26Encyclopaedia Britannica, Israel-Hamas War, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  27. 27The Times of Israel, Why Israel Set Out for War Against Iran, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  28. 28Congress.gov, Congressional Research Service, Israel-Iran Conflict, U.S. Strikes, and Ceasefire, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  29. 29Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2026 Iran War, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  30. 30Congress.gov, Congressional Research Service, U.S.-Iran Ceasefire and Negotiations, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  31. 31The Times of Israel, Iran’s Proxy Network and Patron–Proxy Partnerships, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  32. 32CTech by Calcalist, The horror movie that is cyberwars, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  33. 33Institute for National Security Studies, The Need to Reexamine the Concept of the “Shiite Axis”, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  34. 34Globes, Houthis threaten independently of Iran, accessed on November 20, 2026.
  35. 35Sapir, Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran | SAPIR Journal, accessed on November 20, 2026.

IsraelPedia Question & Answers

  • What is the Iran–Israel proxy conflict?

    The Iran–Israel proxy conflict is a regional strategic and military confrontation involving Israel, Iran, and armed organizations supported by Iran across the Middle East. It has included Iranian weapons transfers, financing and training, Israeli operations against Iranian military entrenchment, and attacks from several territories. The indirect confrontation increasingly overlapped with direct exchanges in 2024 and the June 2025 war, then widened into regional fighting involving the United States in 2026.

  • Why does Iran support armed groups across the Middle East?

    Iran uses relationships with regional groups to project power beyond its borders despite limitations in its conventional military capabilities. Against Israel, the network provides strategic depth, deterrence, and threats from multiple directions while helping Iran limit the risks of deploying its own forces directly. Iran’s objectives also include reducing American regional influence and advancing revolutionary ideology.

  • How did Hezbollah become central to the Iran–Israel conflict?

    Hezbollah was established in 1982 by Lebanese Shia militants during Lebanon’s civil war and Israel’s invasion, with critical Iranian assistance. After the 2006 Lebanon war, the IRGC Qods Force played a central role in rebuilding and expanding its arsenal to more than 100,000 rockets and missiles, including precision weapons. Hezbollah became a major armed force and political party, and later attacks from Lebanon formed a major front in the conflict.

  • What was Israel’s campaign between wars in Syria?

    The “campaign between wars” was Israel’s effort to disrupt Iranian and allied military buildup through low-profile action while avoiding full-scale war. Israel’s strikes in Syria began in 2012, initially concentrating largely on targets connected with weapons shipments to Hezbollah, and later expanded to Iranian forces and Qods Force assets. By 2023, former chief of staff Aviv Kochavi said operations were occurring “on average, every week.”

  • What changed in the Iran–Israel conflict after October 7, 2023?

    After the Hamas-led terrorist assault on southern Israel on October 7, 2023, Iran-backed organizations increased attacks across several fronts. Hezbollah began firing into Israel on October 8, the Houthis claimed missile and drone attacks and began attacking Red Sea vessels, and Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Syria increased attacks on American forces. The resulting escalation broadened the attacks’ tempo and geographical scope, though the groups did not participate uniformly.

  • When did Iran attack Israel directly?

    Iran launched its first direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory during the night of April 13–14, 2024, after a strike near Iran’s consulate in Damascus killed seven IRGC members. Iran launched another direct attack on October 1, firing around 180 ballistic missiles following Hassan Nasrallah’s killing. Israel responded to the April attack with a strike near Isfahan and to the October attack with strikes on Iranian military sites later that month.

  • What happened in the June 2025 Iran–Israel war?

    Israel began Operation Rising Lion on June 13, 2025, attacking Iranian nuclear, military, missile, and leadership targets. The 12-day direct confrontation ended on June 24 after Iran retaliated with waves of ballistic missiles and the United States struck three Iranian nuclear sites on June 22. Iran’s regional partners played only a limited role: Iraqi militias launched approximately 40 drones toward Israel, the Houthis fired two or three ballistic missiles, and Hezbollah did not join the fighting.