Intifada

English renderings of intifada include “uprising,” “awakening,” and “shaking off.”[1][2] The term became particularly associated with the Palestinian uprisings beginning in 1987 and 2000. The designation Al-Aqsa Intifada refers to the mosque at the site where the confrontations accompanying the second uprising began.[9]

The two intifadas differed considerably in organization, methods, and intensity.[7] The first featured broad civilian participation, strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, rioting, stone-throwing, and attacks that became increasingly armed as popular participation declined.[7][4] Neighborhood committees organized resistance while providing services such as health care and schooling.[4] The second moved relatively quickly from mass disturbances into armed confrontation, involving Palestinian Authority security personnel, Fatah-associated organizations, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other factions.[7][6]

For Israelis, the Second Intifada brought suicide bombings and shootings into buses, restaurants, markets, and other ordinary civilian settings, as well as attacks on military targets.[10][11] Israeli responses included military operations, targeted killings, closures, and construction of a security barrier in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[7][5] For Palestinians, both uprisings involved casualties, arrests, movement restrictions, and disruption of education, employment, and daily life.[3][12]

The uprisings also involved competition within Palestinian politics rather than confrontation with Israel alone.[7] Local activists in the First Intifada challenged the authority of the established Palestine Liberation Organization leadership abroad, while Hamas emerged as an independent competitor to Fatah.[7][4] The first uprising was followed by political developments culminating in the Oslo framework, whereas the second unfolded after negotiations had faltered and disappointment with the peace process had widened.[7][8]

The First Intifada developed against the political and territorial consequences of the 1967 war and continued Israeli occupation and settlement activity in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip.[7] Its buildup included the emergence of a local generation of Palestinian activists, restrictions on political organization, population growth, declining Arab aid, and economic recession.[7]

Unrest preceded the December 1987 outbreak.[13] Between April 1986 and May 1987, Judea and Samaria experienced a reported weekly average of 56 violent demonstrations, involving such activities as stone-throwing, roadblocks, tire-burning, flag-raising, leaflet distribution, and nationalist graffiti.[13] Another reported weekly average covered four incidents involving firearms, knives, explosives, or petrol bombs.[13] Poor conditions in Gaza’s refugee camps, unemployment, grievances among Palestinians working in Israel, and the inability of university graduates to find work formed part of this social setting.[13]

On December 8, 1987, a collision involving an Israeli truck and vehicles carrying Palestinian workers killed four Palestinians and injured seven.[1] Demonstrations erupted in Jabalia refugee camp the following day and spread across Gaza and into Judea and Samaria.[1] Rumors that the collision had been deliberate retaliation for the earlier killing of a Jewish businessman in Gaza circulated among Palestinians.[1] Funeral gatherings, stone-throwing at an Israeli military outpost, and roadblocks formed part of the early sequence of unrest.[14]

Israeli officials initially treated the disturbances as a passing wave rather than a popular revolt with sustained organizational potential.[15] Within days, however, clashes had spread to Nablus and Qalandiya near Jerusalem, and Yasser Arafat called for a strike.[15] The scale of the confrontation required a rapid expansion of Israeli forces in Gaza from two battalions before the outbreak to a full division afterward.[16] Israel initially lacked dedicated units, equipment, and training for policing this kind of mass confrontation in civilian areas.[16]

The early uprising was largely spontaneous but developed a local coordinating leadership.[13][4] The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising brought together activists associated with Fatah, the Palestinian Communist Party, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other organizations.[4] Its neighborhood-level networks organized resistance while providing services such as health care and schooling.[4] The PLO leadership in Tunis was initially outside the uprising’s organization and feared being overshadowed by local leaders.[13]

Hamas developed as a separate organizational center during the uprising. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood organized it in Gaza in January 1988, and it operated independently of the unified leadership.[4] Both Hamas and the unified leadership used leaflets, and later electronically distributed texts, to issue instructions concerning strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of resistance.[4]

Political changes accompanied the unrest.[3] Jordan dissolved its legal and administrative ties with the West Bank in 1988, after which the Palestinian National Council issued a political communiqué and a declaration establishing a State of Palestine.[3] In December, Arafat explicitly affirmed the right of Israel, Palestine, and other regional states to exist in peace and security; the United Nations booklet describes the PLO’s 1988 documents as effectively recognizing Israel’s existence.[3]

The First Intifada weakened during the Gulf War in early 1991.[1] Security-force actions, arrests, closures, and Palestinian economic hardship also accompanied the decline in violence.[15] The Madrid Conference followed in October 1991, while the broader diplomatic environment included the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent unsuccessful Washington talks.[8] Within Israel’s leadership, the Rabin- and Peres-led approach increasingly emphasized a political process with the PLO rather than an exclusively military response.[8]

Secret Israeli-PLO negotiations produced the Oslo Accords in 1993.[4] On September 13, the parties signed a Declaration of Principles establishing an interim framework for transferring governing functions in Judea and Samaria and Gaza to a Palestinian council while negotiating a permanent agreement.[7][4] The agreement provided the basis for the veteran Palestinian leadership’s arrival in the territories and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority.[7]

The Second Intifada began in September 2000 after the failure of the July Camp David negotiations between Ehud Barak and Arafat.[7] Accumulated Palestinian grievances included economic hardship, restrictions on movement, continued Israeli military presence, settlement construction, land expropriations, bypass roads, frustration with Oslo, and dissatisfaction with Palestinian Authority governance.[8] On September 28, Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, and confrontations between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli police followed.[9] Widespread violence developed over the following days in Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria, and Gaza.[9]

The confrontation soon extended beyond its initial demonstrations.[8] About two weeks after Sharon’s visit, a Palestinian mob killed Israeli reservists Yossi Avrahami and Vadim Norzhich in Ramallah and mutilated their bodies, in an episode that became known as the Ramallah lynching.[17] Subsequent attacks included shootings at Israeli vehicles, killings of Israelis in Palestinian Authority-controlled areas, and ambushes of Israeli soldiers.[8] A suicide bombing on March 4, 2001, killed three people.[8]

On March 27, 2002, the Park Hotel Passover dinner bombing in Netanya killed 30 people.[5] The attack became a turning point, followed by Operation Defensive Shield and Israeli forces’ re-entry into major West Bank cities.[5] The operation began two days after the bombing and continued until the end of May.[10] Its reported Israeli military toll was 29 soldiers killed and 127 wounded; Palestinian reporting gave at least 250 deaths, 400 injured, and more than 5,000 arrests.[10]

Violence declined substantially in the following years.[5] Annual suicide-bombing totals fell from 53 in 2002 to 26 in 2003, 12 in 2004, and eight successful bombings in 2005.[5] At the February 8, 2005, Sharm el-Sheikh summit, Sharon and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas declared the Second Intifada over, although sporadic violence continued.[18] Sharon agreed to release 900 Palestinian prisoners and end military operations in Judea and Samaria and Gaza, while Abbas agreed to call for an end to violent attacks on Israelis.[18] Egypt and Jordan also agreed to return their ambassadors to Israel.[18]

Commercial strikes, general strikes, tax refusal, and boycotts of Israeli-made products were central practices of the First Intifada.[3][4] Protest activity shifted between locations as Israeli authorities reestablished control in particular areas, and participation crossed social boundaries.[3]

Leaflets conveyed instructions from the unified leadership and Hamas, with electronically distributed texts subsequently also used.[4] These instructions frequently called for civil disobedience, including withholding labor and taxes, boycotts, demonstrations, and general strikes.[4] Neighborhood committees combined political organization with practical services, including schooling and health care.[4] Such local structures operated alongside factional networks rather than replacing competition among Palestinian organizations.[7][4]

Street confrontations included stone-throwing, roadblocks, and Molotov cocktails.[7] Accounts also describe a progression to grenades, shootings, stabbings, and attacks on civilians as well as soldiers.[14][19] The early months nevertheless involved widespread civilian participation that was largely nonviolent alongside rioting and violence.[7] As civilian participation waned, armed attacks increased.[7]

Israeli measures during the First Intifada included troop reinforcements, arrests, administrative detention, deportations, house demolitions, curfews, and closures of schools and universities.[13][4] Security forces used tear gas, beatings, live ammunition, and later rubber and plastic bullets; Israeli tactics drew international condemnation.[13]

The Second Intifada’s initial popular phase was comparatively short.[7] Palestinian Authority security personnel and Fatah-associated factions assumed leading roles in violent disturbances, while Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and other organizations joined the conflict.[7][6] Palestinian attacks subsequently included suicide bombings, shootings, and rocket or mortar fire.[17][11] Buses, restaurants, markets, and other civilian locations became targets of the terrorist campaign.[10]

Hamas and Islamic Jihad conducted suicide bombings directed mostly against civilians.[6] The Fatah-associated al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade initially focused on Israeli military incursions and settlers before beginning suicide bombings aimed mostly at Israeli civilians in January 2002.[6] By the end of September 2004, one retrospective counted 138 suicide bombings and thousands of violent incidents during the uprising.[17]

Israeli responses included operations against Palestinian terrorist organizations and Palestinian Authority institutions.[7] Operation Defensive Shield restored an extensive Israeli military presence in West Bank cities and substantially curtailed the Palestinian Authority’s governing power there.[11] Other measures included targeted killings, closures, economic restrictions, checkpoints, and construction of the security barrier.[7][6]

The reduction in suicide bombings followed a combination of Israeli operations, construction of the separation barrier, and changes in Palestinian organizations’ incentives.[5] The contribution of each individual factor is difficult to isolate from the combined effect.[5] The decline in attacks was substantial by 2005, even though violence did not cease completely after the leaders’ summit declaration.[5][18]

The First Intifada brought the costs of governing the territories into sharper focus for Israelis and helped increase support for political and territorial compromise.[7] It also raised the Palestinian issue on regional and international agendas.[7] Within Palestinian politics, it strengthened locally based organization while intensifying competition between established nationalist factions and the emerging Hamas movement.[7][4]

Michael Milshtein argues that the uprising marked the first struggle centered in the territories after a period in which Palestinian national activity had largely been led by the PLO abroad.[20] He emphasizes the role of an educated generation that had grown up after 1967 and organizers’ attempts to mobilize broad public participation rather than rely on armed struggle alone.[20] Milshtein also argues that television coverage and attacks inside Israel brought the consequences of Israeli rule into Israeli homes and helped make the Palestinian issue prominent in the 1992 election campaign.[20]

The economic consequences were immediate as well as political.[1] By February 1988, Israel was reportedly spending $5 million a day on additional troops, while Israeli businesses were estimated to be losing $19 million daily.[1] Tourism had fallen by half by the summer of that year.[1] Palestinian strikes, boycotts, restrictions, arrests, and closures also disrupted employment and economic activity.[3][15]

The diplomatic sequence from the First Intifada through Madrid and Oslo transformed relations between Israel and the PLO.[7][8] The transfer of governing responsibilities established a new institutional framework for Palestinian self-government and negotiations.[7] The creation of the Palestinian Authority also enabled the veteran Palestinian leadership abroad to move into the territories.[7]

The human toll of the First Intifada was severe.[3] The United Nations booklet reports that between 1987 and 1993 more than 1,000 Palestinians were killed, tens of thousands were injured, and thousands were detained.[3] Deportations, house demolitions, prolonged curfews, and closures of schools and universities also disrupted Palestinian daily life, while Palestinian attacks killed Israeli civilians and security personnel.[3][4]

The Second Intifada inflicted particularly heavy losses on Israeli civilians. Figures reported through September 27, 2005, counted 1,064 Israelis killed, including 745 civilians and 319 members of the security forces, as well as 7,462 wounded.[17] Attacks in routine public settings made buses, restaurants, and markets prominent scenes of terrorism and public fear.[10]

The conflict heightened mutual hostility and mistrust between Israelis and Palestinians.[8] For Palestinians, the confrontation brought thousands of deaths, extensive injuries, imprisonment, destruction of homes, military incursions, and restrictions on movement and economic life.[3][12]

The Israeli economic cost of the 2000–2004 confrontation was estimated at NIS 50 billion, alongside substantial increases in poverty and the social gap during those four years.[8] A contemporary 2003 estimate put that year’s direct and indirect defense costs at NIS 3 billion, in addition to NIS 7 billion in defense spending during 2000–2001.[21] Operation Defensive Shield was estimated to have cost the IDF approximately NIS 1.5 billion, seam-line protective measures about NIS 500 million, and civilian costs associated with attacks and incidents around NIS 4 billion.[21] The uprising contributed to a severe Israeli recession.[21]

The second uprising also left a lasting security infrastructure in the form of the barrier, checkpoints, and associated restrictions.[7] Suicide bombings declined markedly by 2005, and Israeli and Palestinian leaders declared the uprising over at Sharm el-Sheikh, although sporadic violence continued and the precise endpoint remains disputed.[5][18]

Responsibility for the Second Intifada’s outbreak remains a major interpretive dispute.[9] The Israeli government argued that Palestinian Authority leaders planned the violence after the breakdown of the Camp David talks, while the PLO denied that the uprising was planned and emphasized the political deadlock and events surrounding Sharon’s Temple Mount visit.[9] Israeli intelligence assessments also differed: some researchers regarded the outbreak as a popular eruption that Arafat later exploited, while senior Military Intelligence figures held that he initiated and controlled it.[8]

An international fact-finding inquiry found no persuasive evidence that the Palestinian Authority had planned the uprising and no basis for concluding that either side had a deliberate plan to initiate the subsequent violence.[9] It judged Sharon’s visit poorly timed and foreseeably provocative but not itself the cause, placing greater weight on subsequent lethal police force, failures of restraint, and the breakdown of trust.[9] Its conclusions were limited by its inability to compel testimony or documents.[9]

Periodization and casualty accounting also differ.[7][5] The First Intifada is variously treated as having petered out by 1990, ended around the October 1991 Madrid Conference, or continued until the September 1993 Oslo agreement.[1][2] Proposed endpoints for the second include Arafat’s death in November 2004, the February 2005 truce, or a gradual decline without a single concluding event.[5]

Fatality totals must therefore retain their dates and categories. For the First Intifada through September 13, 1993, one count gives 1,060 Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces and 54 by Israeli civilians, while another gives 1,205 Palestinians and 172 Israelis killed between December 8, 1987, and that date.[7][4] A separate defense-establishment-based account lists 223 Israeli fatalities, 808 Palestinians killed in clashes with Israeli forces, and 985 Palestinians killed by other Palestinians.[19]

For the Second Intifada period through June 30, 2008, one compilation records 4,712 Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces and 47 by Israeli civilians, with about 1,700 Palestinian dead definitely involved in fighting against Israel.[7] The same compilation records 1,056 Israelis killed, including 334 security-force members.[7] A different accounting through September 27, 2005, gives 1,064 Israelis killed and 7,462 wounded, alongside 3,315 Palestinians killed by Israeli forces.[17] These figures describe different reporting periods and categories rather than a single interchangeable total.[7][17]