Independent Israel–Syria Peace Initiatives

Independent Israel–Syria peace initiatives occupy a distinct category in the diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Unlike formal governmental negotiations conducted under American or Turkish auspices, they involve private citizens, former diplomats, businesspeople, military defectors, diaspora activists, and civil-society figures acting outside official negotiating channels, sometimes with tacit official awareness and sometimes entirely on their own authority.[1][2]

The status of the Golan Heights is central to many, though not all, of the negotiation-focused efforts. Several proposals contemplated Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 lines in exchange for Syrian security commitments and normalized relations, while differing over timetables, demilitarization, water access, and cross-border arrangements.[3][4] The territorial debate also concerns a region with documented ancient Jewish communities and renewed Jewish land purchases and settlement efforts beginning in the late nineteenth century.[5]

One of the earliest documented Syrian approaches toward accommodation with Israel dates to 1949, when Syrian President Husni Zaim told the U.S. minister in Syria that he was willing to resettle 250,000 or more Palestinian refugees in Syria if they received fair compensation and Syria received adequate outside assistance.[6] Zaim said he had directed Syria's delegation to make "extreme concessions" in the ongoing armistice talks with Israel and appealed to Washington to lead and fund the resettlement effort, acknowledging that domestic opposition could accuse him of "selling out to Jews and their backers" if Syria acted openly.[6]

The diplomatic telegram recording Zaim's offer is preserved in the U.S. State Department's Foreign Relations of the United States series. It documents a refugee-resettlement proposal and a stated willingness to compromise in armistice discussions — not a formal offer of comprehensive peace or specific territorial terms — and is notable as an early example of a Syrian leader signaling flexibility toward Israel through an American intermediary rather than through direct contact.[6]

The initiatives operate along a spectrum. Some are citizen advocacy campaigns; others involve former officials, businesspeople, or intermediaries with access to decision-makers; and still others are mediated contacts whose participants have government connections but no authority to conclude an agreement. Their advocates have cited strategic, economic, and ethical rationales, including Western support, commercial prosperity, regional security, democratic reform, and an end to bilateral conflict.[1]

Recurring methods include meetings in third countries, exchanges through European, Turkish, American, or Emirati intermediaries, preparation of nonbinding papers, public appearances before Israeli institutions, and proposals for economic or humanitarian cooperation.[7][4] Because governments have often denied or minimized such contacts after disclosure, the distinction between exploratory diplomacy and individual advocacy is frequently unclear.[2][8]

The 1990s produced several overlapping private and semi-official channels running alongside — and sometimes in the margins of — formal negotiating rounds. In early 1994, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin made secret contacts with authorities in Damascus to initiate discussions on a possible peace accord, centered on a plan called "Majdal Shams First" that proposed a partial Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights over three years.[9] Later that year, formal talks between Israeli ambassador Itamar Rabinovich and Syrian ambassador Walid al-Moualem opened in Washington, giving the back-channel a more official successor track.[9]

On the economic side, Israeli negotiator Uri Savir later said that during the 1996 negotiations, parties reached broad but unwritten economic understandings, with some specifics discussed orally. Israel presented an "Economic Partnership for Peace" proposal modeled on NATO's relations with Eastern Europe, covering infrastructure, transportation, energy, and water.[10] Savir said Syria accepted the possibility of Israeli transport crossing Syria en route to Europe while insisting that infrastructure projects serve Syrian national interests.[10] A group of American, Saudi, Israeli, and Syrian businesspeople was formed under U.S. auspices and with World Bank support to help develop infrastructure discussed in those negotiations, with the reported backing of Prime Minister Shimon Peres and President Hafez al-Assad, and with Lester Pollack of Lazard Frères leading the American group.[10]

Separately, during Benjamin Netanyahu's tenure, intermittent secret discussions were reported from 1997 to 1999 through several intermediaries. The 1998 Middle East Contemporary Survey documents channels involving EU envoy Miguel Moratinos, Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi, and American businessman Ronald Lauder, all aimed at formulating principles on which formal negotiations could resume.[7] Meetings reportedly took place in Europe, Switzerland, and India, continuing through the Wye conference before ending when new Israeli elections were announced.[7]

Ahead of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad's July 1998 visit to France, President Jacques Chirac reportedly consulted with Netanyahu — directly and through National Security Adviser Uzi Arad — on a proposed "declaration of intentions" covering six principles, including Israeli recognition of Syria's centrality to regional peace, resumption of negotiations on a land-for-peace basis, and mutual acknowledgment of each side's core priority: Israeli security and Syrian recovery of the Golan.[7] Whether Chirac ultimately presented these ideas to Assad is unclear from the available record.[7]

The Lauder channel is among the most debated of the 1990s efforts. The 1998 survey reports that Lauder, a Netanyahu supporter and close confidant, held seven or eight meetings including one with Hafez al-Assad in Damascus, aiming to formulate principles for restarting negotiations.[7] A Library of Congress-hosted study states that the channel produced a ten-point paper and that a reported Israeli commitment associated with Yitzhak Rabin — to withdraw fully from the Golan subject to Israel's needs being met — was reportedly endorsed by Netanyahu in that paper.[3] Netanyahu denied agreeing to withdrawal, and the paper's full text and precise implications remain disputed.[3][11] The 1999 survey adds that Israeli participants in the broader back-channel network included Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, retired Major General Danny Yatom, and Major General Shaul Mofaz, and that no breakthrough was achieved, citing Netanyahu's unwillingness to accept full withdrawal as Assad demanded.[12]

Around the time of the U.S.-led war in Iraq, Syria reportedly proposed secret contacts through a channel to Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom.[13] After consulting Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Shalom decided to pursue the offer.[13] The Syrian representatives were described as confidants and relatives of President Bashar Assad; the Israeli participants were not publicly identified. The contacts ended after news of a meeting leaked and Syria denied that any meetings had taken place.[13]

In January 2007, Haaretz reported that private Israeli and Syrian citizens had drafted a secret document calling for the return of the Golan Heights to Syria and offering a possible outline for peace negotiations.[14] The Congressional Research Service account that relayed this report did not name the private participants or provide the document's detailed terms, and there is no evidence of endorsement by either government.[14]

The most extensively documented independent initiative of the early 2000s was an unofficial channel operating from September 2004 to July 2006. Former Israeli Foreign Ministry director-general Alon Liel led the Israeli side; Syrian-American Ibrahim (Abe) Suleiman represented the Syrian side, with senior Syrian officials described as involved in the background.[4] The channel operated mostly through a European intermediary rather than through formal government-to-government negotiations, and a politically significant but legally nonbinding "non-paper" outlining a possible peace framework was reportedly largely formulated by August 2005.[4]

The reported non-paper envisioned Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights to the June 4, 1967 lines, though the timetable remained unresolved: Syria sought a five-year withdrawal period and Israel a fifteen-year one.[4] Security arrangements included demilitarized areas in the vacated Golan and reduced-military-presence zones on both sides, with the depth of those zones set at a 4:1 ratio in Israel's favor.[4] Israel would control water use and arrangements concerning the upper Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee. A park east of the border would be administered by Syria and open to Israelis without a visa after Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of Syrian sovereignty.[4] Syria was also reported to have undertaken to end support for Hezbollah and Hamas and distance itself from Iran.[4]

The channel traced its origins to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's 2004 visit to Turkey, after which Turkish officials conveyed Syrian interest in talks to Liel. Liel approached Jeffrey Aronson of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, who proposed Suleiman as an interlocutor.[4] The contacts ended after Syria requested a secret meeting involving a Syrian deputy-minister-level representative, an Israeli director-general-level official, and a senior American representative — a request Israel did not accept.[4]

In a 2007 interview, Suleiman described meeting Liel at least eight times in Europe over more than two years and drafting a "deed of understandings" summarizing both sides' objectives.[15] He said he acted independently and did not represent Syria officially, while claiming officials in both countries knew of the contacts. He described Syrian sovereignty over the Golan Heights and the June 4, 1967 border and water as non-negotiable, while leaving other issues open; he also proposed a "peace park" under Syrian sovereignty but open to everyone.[15] Suleiman said the document reached Ariel Sharon and the Syrian administration and was seen by Israeli Foreign and Defense Ministry officials. He claimed Sharon gave the initiative his blessing "to my understanding." After the document's existence was leaked, both governments officially denied involvement.[15]

In April 2007, Suleiman appeared before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee following an invitation initiated by MK Zehava Gal-On.[16] He said he acted personally but kept authorities in Damascus informed, and called the private channel a bridge that should disappear once the governments began meeting directly.[16] He urged negotiations away from media scrutiny.[17] The appearance exposed sharply opposed Israeli positions: Gal-On argued that peace without the Golan was preferable to retaining the Golan without peace, while MK Israel Katz said he would convey to Assad that Israel would never withdraw from the Golan.[17] Committee chairman Tzahi Hanegbi said Suleiman appeared to have relayed messages between the countries more than once and that his contacts could be used to convey Israel's demands.[18]

The extent of official Israeli awareness remained disputed. One account said the contacts were known to senior figures in the Sharon and Olmert governments, but the Prime Minister's Office said it did not know of the alleged understandings, and former Sharon aide Dov Weisglass denied that Sharon had been updated.[4] Liel cautioned that the contacts constituted an exploratory process, not a completed agreement.[4] A World Jewish Congress account summarizing a Haaretz report said Bashar al-Assad had reportedly initiated the meetings and that an unidentified European took over as intermediary in summer 2004; Israel denied government involvement.[2]

On May 21, 2008, simultaneous announcements in Jerusalem, Damascus, and Ankara confirmed that Israel and Syria had begun indirect peace talks sponsored by Turkey.[5] This was a mediated diplomatic track rather than an independent civil-society initiative, but it was preceded by informal private contacts that reportedly helped pave the way; the content of those preliminary contacts was described as little known.[19] The talks ended on December 27, 2008, when Operation Cast Lead began in Gaza.[3] Some accounts also cite Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's resignation over domestic reasons as a contributing factor in their collapse.[5]

Running alongside the official track, Israeli water engineer Boaz Wachtel developed a regional water-supply plan based on a Turkish scheme first raised in the 1980s.[20] His 2008 proposal would transport two to three billion cubic meters of water annually from Turkey's Ceyhan and Seyhan rivers through Syria, supplying Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority, with infrastructure including underground pipes and canals to a dam near Mount Hermon that would also produce hydroelectric power.[20] Alon Liel, then chairman of the Israel-Syria Peace Society, viewed the water plan as a possible incentive for negotiations and reported receiving a message from a senior Syrian source stating that water need not remain an obstacle. The source proposed that Israel could use Golan water after a return of the Golan to Syria, provided Syria received a corresponding increase in its water allocation from Turkey.[20]

In 2007, Farid Ghadry, head of the Syrian Reform Party, announced plans to travel to Israel with three to five other Syrian exiles to appear before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and argue against making peace with Bashar al-Assad.[18] Ghadry distinguished between peace with Syria and peace with its ruler, contending that genuine peace should be between peoples rather than with a dictator. He favored waiting for democracy in Syria before signing an agreement and envisioned the Golan as a meeting place for Israeli and Arab youth, while saying the Heights should eventually return to Syrian control.[18]

In spring 2010, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu began secret negotiations with Syrian President Bashar Assad through American mediator Frederick Hoff.[11] Israeli negotiator Michael Herzog described the discussions as "a work in progress" and said there was "a detailed list of Israeli demands meant to serve as a basis for a peace agreement."[11] Herzog described one strategic aim as trying to "drive a wedge in the radical axis of Iran-Syria-Hezbollah."[11] Netanyahu's office said Israel had not accepted the American initiative, and the talks were ultimately cut short by the Arab Spring uprisings, which spread to Syria in early 2011.[11]

The Syrian civil war that erupted after 2011 transformed the landscape for independent peace initiatives. An INSS study documented Syrian opponents of the Assad regime operating independently outside Syria who publicly called for peace, normalization, and cooperation with Israel as part of a broader vision of a free, democratic Syria.[1] Their initiatives were not coordinated with the Syrian opposition's umbrella organizations and challenged traditional approaches to Israel. Proponents cited strategic, economic, and ethical rationales, including hopes of gaining Western support, improving prosperity through commercial ties, and treating Israel as a model of modern democracy.[1]

A Syrian opposition forum representing different groups, minorities, and political camps held quiet discussions with Israeli civilian figures in Vienna on November 10–12, 2014, about Israel's possible role in advancing a liberal vision for Syria.[1] Participants included civilian political activists, academics, religious leaders, and businesspeople. They advocated peace, stability, a strong economy, an agreed territorial settlement in the Golan Heights, recognition of Israel's right to live peacefully and integrate into the region, and future Israeli technological support and economic relations with Syria.[1]

In September 2015, Syrian political activists in exile — primarily in Turkey and Jordan — including Muhammad Adnan Hussein, chairman of the Future Syrian Revolutionary Assembly, announced a Syrian peace movement.[1] Its longer-term aim was to encourage conciliatory approaches and gradually warm Syrian attitudes toward Israel and Jews.[1] Separately, Syrian activist Thaer al-Nashef formulated a vision statement in mid-2015 for future "true peace" based on expanding social and cultural contact, including translation between Arabic and Hebrew and encouraging people to learn each other's language.[1]

Human-rights activist Kamal al-Labwani, who had been imprisoned in Syria for a decade, promoted open cooperation with Israel through a proposal combining military and diplomatic elements.[1] His plan called for establishing a protected southern zone without Israeli ground troops in Syria and asked Israel to supply moderate opposition forces with Western arms and withdraw its opposition to toppling the Assad regime. The proposed zone extended more than 100 kilometers from the Golan Heights toward Damascus, encompassing Daraa, al-Suwayda, southern Rif Dimashq, and the Syrian-Lebanese border.[1] The study reports that al-Labwani promoted the initiative independently of opposition umbrella organizations, visited Israel to present it, and made a second visit in February 2016.[1]

Al-Labwani's Southern Safe Zone plan proposed an area between the Israeli and Jordanian borders, protected from outside and controlled by Syrian civilian forces.[1] It was intended to address Israeli and Jordanian security concerns by distancing Islamist forces from their borders and to provide a humanitarian zone where refugee rehabilitation could begin. He argued that moderate forces in southern Syria could assume responsibility with outside military and civilian assistance and proposed that the model could later be extended elsewhere.[1]

The second half of 2014 also saw a proposal by local actors for an internationally and regionally supported autonomous safe zone in southern Syria, including a 25-kilometer-deep security strip along the borders with Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan. Its proposed stages ranged from emergency supplies to infrastructure and possible Syrian-Israeli cooperation on technology and water.[1] A separate June 2014 proposal by militia representatives sought an enclave in the Syrian Golan with peaceful relations and normalization with Israel.[1]

In May 2016, former Syrian brigadier general Nabil al-Dandel — who had defected from the regime in 2012 — sent a letter to Knesset Speaker Yuli Edelstein calling for peace.[1] The INSS study describes him as the most senior military officer and tribal leader to agree to engage directly with Israel. His appeal stated: "The Syrian people want peace with Israel. But Israel needs to say that it stands beside it and not the regime."[1] He also described a readiness to take steps toward religious coexistence.[1]

Syrian opposition figure Fahad Almasri, founder and leader of the National Salvation Front, promoted an initiative called "Hope" in 2019.[21] As reported by The Jerusalem Post, it called on Israel to ease travel restrictions so Syrian Druze residents of the Golan Heights could visit relatives in Syria, with a further phase in which Jewish Syrians in Israel or the diaspora could visit Syria and attend to their property and cultural, historical, and humanitarian heritage there.[21] Almasri said he was in contact with Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif, who supported the initiative as a humanitarian request to help Golan Syrians contact their families.[21] Almasri also claimed his group had communicated directly with Israeli officials and sent a message to the Israeli government and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu; the Israeli Prime Minister's Office and Foreign Ministry declined to comment.[21]

Almasri articulated a broader regional vision arguing that peace between Israel and Syria requires a just solution to the Golan issue and the departure of Assad, and that Syrians themselves must help remove Iranian influence.[22] His proposed framework includes a security council, an Arab regional force working under NATO supervision, and a regional station for security and cooperation headquartered in Damascus.[22] These are Almasri's proposals, not an agreed initiative between governments.[22]

Issam Zeitoun, a Syrian-German national, founded the Syrian Peace Initiative, whose stated aim is to achieve peace between Syria and Israel.[23] The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs identifies him and his initiative, though the documented scope of its specific terms, membership, and activities remains limited to this general identification and objective.[23]

In May 2025, Ynet reported on indirect Israel-Syria discussions held in Abu Dhabi through Emirati mediation.[8] Two Israeli academics with past security-establishment experience met three close aides to Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa; al-Sharaa confirmed that three meetings had taken place at a private residence belonging to a senior UAE official.[8] The reported agenda centered on security, including Syrian objections to Israeli airstrikes and Israeli concerns about security and the Druze community.[8]

The UAE Foreign Ministry initially denied Emirati mediation, while al-Sharaa confirmed that indirect talks were underway through an unnamed third country; the reporting identified the mediator as the UAE.[8] Participants hoped to continue the dialogue and potentially expand it to economic topics, including medical aid and academic exchanges for Syrian students.[8] An Israeli official characterized the contacts as preliminary and non-committal, placing them in the category of informal channels involving individuals with government connections rather than concluded peace agreements.[8]

Several scholars and policy institutes have proposed frameworks for reviving Israeli-Syrian negotiations without themselves constituting independent initiatives. Eyal Zisser argued that the Arab Peace Initiative — first published at the Beirut Summit in March 2002 and affirmed at the Riyadh Summit in March 2007 — could offer a convenient framework for renewing Israeli-Syrian negotiations. He suggested that treating Syria as one partner within a wider Arab framework might make dialogue easier and help avoid war.[24] The Arab Peace Initiative proposed full Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights to the June 4, 1967 lines, in return for normal relations within a comprehensive peace framework.[24] Zisser presents this as his assessment of a multilateral diplomatic proposal, not a record of an implemented initiative.[24]

Eli Podeh proposed a "multi-bilateral" negotiating mechanism combining bilateral and multilateral approaches through four parallel tracks: Israeli-Syrian, Israeli-Lebanese, Israeli-Palestinian, and Israeli-Arab.[24] The linked tracks, Podeh argued, might reduce suspicions among Arab parties and allow progress on one track to benefit others — a scholarly proposal for a diplomatic framework rather than a documented nongovernmental initiative.[24]

The significance of independent Israel-Syria initiatives lies primarily in agenda-setting and exploration rather than in completed agreements. Private channels tested combinations of territorial withdrawal, demilitarization, water arrangements, cross-border access, economic cooperation, and changes in Syrian regional alliances before governments were prepared to negotiate publicly.[4] Opposition-led initiatives broadened the discussion beyond territorial exchange to include humanitarian cooperation, language and cultural contact, democratic reform, and normalization between peoples.[1]

These initiatives also demonstrate the limits of unofficial diplomacy. Participants could transmit messages, prepare draft formulas, and identify possible areas of compromise, but they generally lacked authority to bind either state. Suleiman described the private channel as a temporary bridge to official negotiations, while the 2025 Abu Dhabi contacts were likewise characterized as preliminary and non-committal.[16][8]

Many of the initiatives surveyed here rest on contested or incompletely verified foundations. The Liel–Suleiman channel produced a non-paper that both governments ultimately distanced themselves from, and accounts differ significantly on how much official awareness existed on either side.[4][2] Suleiman acknowledged acting independently while claiming that officials in Damascus and Jerusalem knew of the contacts; the Prime Minister's Office and former Sharon aide Dov Weisglass denied this.[4]

The significance of Ronald Lauder's 1998 ten-point paper is similarly disputed: a Library of Congress-hosted study reports a withdrawal-related commitment endorsed by Netanyahu, while Netanyahu denied agreeing to withdrawal.[3][11] The INSS-documented opposition initiatives are advocates' plans and should not be read as official Syrian opposition policy or as government-to-government agreements; the study notes that they were not coordinated with umbrella opposition organizations.[1] The 2025 Abu Dhabi contacts were characterized as preliminary and non-committal by an Israeli official, and the UAE initially denied its mediating role.[8] Across nearly all documented cases, uncertainty over what was agreed — and by whom — is itself a defining feature of independent Israel-Syria peace diplomacy.