Homesh

Homesh is a hilltop in northern Samaria, north of Shavei Shomron and along Route 60. It lies in Area C, abuts Burqa, and is surrounded by Palestinian villages; the site overlooks nearby villages. Before the 2005 evacuation, a wall marked the settlement’s boundary.[3] The road to Homesh passes through Palestinian villages and has been described as difficult from a security perspective; reporting records several shooting attacks along the route over the years.[4]

Its elevation figured in the settlement’s planning. An Israeli government profile describes Homesh as occupying the area’s highest hilltop, with a panoramic view that was considered a security factor. The profile characterizes the community, before its evacuation, as a mixed secular-religious residential settlement with 30 families.[5] Another account says Homesh had reached a peak of 70 families, illustrating that published descriptions capture different periods or measures of the community’s size.[4]

Homesh’s history is inseparable from changing Israeli policy in northern Samaria and from disputes over the land’s ownership and use. The site has been described as a settlement, an outpost, and a settlement site; these labels reflect different periods and legal or political descriptions rather than a single, consistently applied status. In particular, accounts distinguish the original community and the yeshiva’s former location on privately owned land from a later yeshiva site described as state land.[1][6]

Homesh originated in 1978, when Israel requisitioned land near Burqa for military purposes and established a Nahal outpost. The INSS account says the land was privately owned by Palestinians and was expropriated for the outpost; a Globes report identifies it as land registered in the names of Burqa residents and says military requisition order 4/78 was used to take it. The outpost, initially called Ma’ale Nahal in the Globes account, was later converted into the civilian settlement of Homesh.[1][7]

Accounts differ on the precise chronology of civilian construction. An Israeli government profile and one Times of Israel report say Homesh began or was established in 1978.[5][8] Ynetnews, by contrast, says the military issued a requisition warrant that year and Homesh was built two years later; Globes likewise says the outpost was civilianized about two years after its establishment.[7][9] The available accounts thus agree on the 1978 requisition and Nahal origins but do not give a uniform date for the settlement’s construction or civilianization.

The initial military rationale for taking the land was followed by a change in policy. The INSS authors say that after a Supreme Court ruling and a subsequent policy change in 1979, establishing settlements on privately owned land requisitioned for military purposes ceased to be accepted practice. They describe the later policy as limiting settlement establishment to state-owned land or land purchased by Jews.[1] A Times of Israel account similarly describes a 1979 High Court decision barring settlements on land confiscated for security purposes, while reporting a researcher’s view that the ruling was not retroactive and that Homesh remained in place even though Palestinians could not return to their land.[8]

Land access remained a matter of dispute after Homesh was evacuated. The original requisition order remained in force after the 2005 withdrawal, and reporting says it prevented Burqa residents from accessing the land. A closed-zone order issued in 2002 had also barred Palestinians from the area, according to Ynetnews; that account says the state agreed in June 2013 to cancel the closed-zone order and annulled the seizure warrant three months later following a legal appeal. It reports that dozens of Burqa residents then returned to work the land.[9]

Other reporting describes later changes to access restrictions. Globes says the state agreed in May 2013 to cancel the original requisition order after a petition by Burqa residents, but that a military demarcation order in October 2017 again barred entry to the disputed area. A further petition in 2019 led to removal of the entry ban for Palestinians, while the order continued to bar Israelis. The timelines and legal instruments are described differently across the reports, but both indicate that landowners’ access was pursued through petitions and that restrictions changed over time.[7]

Homesh was one of four Israeli settlements in northern Samaria selected for evacuation under the 2004 disengagement plan. The others were Ganim, Kadim, and Sa-Nur. The plan placed the northern Samaria withdrawal within a wider disengagement intended to improve security, diplomatic, economic, and demographic conditions. For northern Samaria, it said withdrawal would reduce interaction with the Palestinian population and provide territorial contiguity for Palestinians, facilitating ordinary life and economic and commercial activity.[10]

The plan called for evacuating the four settlements and all permanent military installations in the area, with Israeli forces redeploying outside it. It set the end of 2005 as the target for completing the withdrawal. Accounts describe the northern Samaria evacuations as part of the Ariel Sharon government’s broader disengagement, which also involved Gaza; one Ynet account characterizes the northern Samaria move as a gesture to the United States that was overshadowed by the Gaza evacuation.[10][4]

The Knesset approved the Disengagement Implementation Law on February 16, 2005, by a vote of 59 to 40, with five abstentions. The law empowered the government to compensate approximately 9,000 settlers from Gaza and the northern West Bank and to begin evacuations; Homesh was among the four northern West Bank settlements named for removal.[11] A Congressional Research Service report says Sharon had affirmed in writing to President George W. Bush in 2004 that Israel was committed to evacuating settlements and outposts in the region.[12]

Preparations restricted new residence in the communities marked for evacuation. On March 20, 2005, the head of IDF Central Command, Maj. Gen. Yair Naveh, signed a decree prohibiting Israeli citizens from relocating their residence to Homesh and the other three northern communities. Under the implementation law, Israelis were prohibited from entering or remaining in an evacuated area from the date of evacuation, except with a military commander’s permit; a separate military order also barred Israeli entry.[13][7]

The evacuation took place in 2005. The U.S. State Department’s human-rights report records the withdrawal of civilians and military personnel from four northern West Bank settlements, as well as 21 settlements in Gaza, and identifies Homesh as scheduled for evacuation. It also reports that, on August 22, settlers damaged Palestinian homes and cars nearby, and that no settlers were charged.[14] Homesh was destroyed during the evacuation, according to a later account, and the removal of civilian and army infrastructure preceded the IDF’s departure.[8]

The IDF exited Homesh on September 16, 2005. Redeployment from all four communities was reported complete by September 20, and entry by Israeli citizens into the evacuated areas was forbidden until further notice under the disengagement law and military order.[15] The Israeli government’s stated plan presented the northern Samaria withdrawal as a measure intended to facilitate Palestinian territorial continuity and activity; the evacuation also became a focus of later disputes over the commitments and policies embodied in the disengagement.[10][12]

Efforts to maintain an Israeli presence at Homesh began after the evacuation. Rabbi Elishama Cohen and director Benny Gal established Yeshivat Homesh in September 2006, a year after the pullout. The yeshiva sought to operate continuously at the site, although its early activity was small: students were recruited through extensive persuasion, and residents called students to come for Shabbat. A contemporary report described 26 students traveling from caravan dormitories in Shavei Shomron to study at Homesh.[8]

Students continued to visit and sometimes stay overnight despite the prohibition on Israeli entry. The makeshift study hall was destroyed in a fire, after which students returned the next day to clear rubble and begin again. The authorities removed the yeshiva several times and restricted construction, but students repeatedly returned. The INSS account says a yeshiva was open at the site from 2009, on privately owned Palestinian land and in violation of the no-entry order; a separate Ynet report says the institution was established about a year and a half after the 2005 evacuation.[8][1]

In 2011, Yesh Din and residents of Burqa petitioned the High Court to revoke the land seizure order. Shortly before the case was due to be heard in 2013, the state said it would revoke the order.[8] Despite the cancellation of relevant orders and subsequent directions concerning landowners’ rights, reporting says Palestinians continued to face difficulty accessing the land. The INSS authors say that landowners sought access, the right to work their land, and removal of the yeshiva, but did not obtain practical access despite later court orders directing the IDF to allow it.[1]

The legal dispute also concerned which restrictions applied to whom. Ynetnews reports that the closed-zone order was cancelled in June 2013 and the seizure warrant annulled in September, after which Burqa residents returned to cultivate the land.[9] A later account says a 2017 military demarcation order again barred entry, followed by a 2019 decision removing the ban for Palestinians but retaining it for Israelis.[7] A Jerusalem Post report says the High Court had granted Palestinian landowners the right to farm their property in 2013.[16]

The yeshiva’s presence and land access became further flashpoints after the 2021 killing of Yehuda Dimentman. Some later confrontations around the outpost were described differently by the parties: the military alleged that settlers had acted violently in a subsequent confrontation, while Homesh residents denied the allegation. Those differing accounts were reported alongside calls by Dimentman’s relatives, Homesh residents, and settler leaders for the yeshiva to be secured and legalized.[17]

On December 16, 2021, a shooting attack near Homesh killed Yehuda Dimentman and wounded two other Israeli civilians.[18] Dimentman, a yeshiva student, was 25, and a victim listing describes the attack as an ambush on a car near the site.[19] The U.S. State Department reported that police detained six Palestinians: two were alleged to have carried out the attack and four to have aided the attackers. Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility, and the investigation was ongoing at the end of that year.[18]

After Dimentman’s death, thousands of Israeli citizens went to Homesh to support retroactive legalization of the yeshiva and the establishment of a settlement in his memory. The State Department reported that some demonstrators entered nearby Burqa, vandalized homes and tombstones, and attacked residents. It recorded approximately 100 Palestinians injured, one of whom was hospitalized, and said no arrests were reported despite a substantial Israeli security-force presence.[18]

The attack also intensified public calls to secure and legalize the yeshiva. Dimentman’s widow and father joined Homesh residents and settler leaders in making those calls, according to Ynet. The killing thus became a pivotal moment in the site’s post-evacuation history, connecting security concerns and advocacy for a renewed Israeli presence with the continuing disputes over the yeshiva’s location, land ownership, and access.[17][18]

A separate Jewish Virtual Library listing records earlier deaths of people identified as residents of Homesh: Shalom Har-Melekh, killed in a shooting attack in 2003, and Dan Yehuda and Ilya Krivitz, killed in separate attacks in 2001. The listing also records Dimentman’s killing and the wounding of two other Israelis in 2021.[19]

The Knesset changed the legal framework for the evacuated northern Samaria communities in March 2023. A Congressional Research Service report dates passage of the legislation to March 20, while the INSS account says the amendment was approved on March 21.[12][1] INSS describes the amendment as revoking the ban on Israelis entering and remaining in the evacuated northern Samaria territories.[1]

The change’s practical and legal reach was described differently. The INSS authors say the amendment revoked the ban on Israelis entering and remaining in the evacuated northern Samaria territories, but did not itself legalize the yeshiva, particularly on privately owned Palestinian land. In their account, relocating the yeshiva to state land would still require licensing and permits.[1] The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, by contrast, described the action as a repeal that would allow Israelis to return and legalize the status of Homesh yeshiva students.[20]

The IDF Central Command commander signed an implementing order on May 20, 2023, according to the INSS account. On the night of May 28, the building that had housed the yeshiva was moved a few hundred meters from land described as privately owned by Palestinians to a site described as state-owned. Mobile homes replaced tents at the new location. The INSS authors characterize the move as having been carried out without the required legal process and as illegal, while also describing it as a significant step toward a permanent settlement. They call it the first erection of permanent structures in Homesh and on territory evacuated in northern Samaria since the 2005 disengagement.[1]

The transfer did not resolve every issue related to the site. In May, the U.S. State Department described a government order allowing Israeli citizens to establish a permanent presence in Homesh, called it an outpost in the northern West Bank, and said it was built on private Palestinian land and illegal under Israeli law. The department said the order was inconsistent with commitments made by former Prime Minister Sharon to the Bush administration and by the current Israeli government to the Biden administration.[6] The INSS authors’ account distinguishes the yeshiva’s former private-land location from the new location described as state land, while also noting that the move did not by itself supply the permits they considered necessary.[1]

A Supreme Court petition seeking the evacuation of settlers from Homesh was later dismissed after circumstances changed. The Jerusalem Post says the court considered the petition exhausted in its current form and noted the state’s position that there was no obstacle to landowners exercising access rights. It did not prevent rebuilding at the state-land site and left open the possibility of further petitions. Ynet reports that the court treated the petition as concerning the former location, noted that most illegal construction on private land had been removed, and said access roads to the new site also crossed private land. The court reserved arguments about those roads and said the state should ensure landowners could reach their property.[16][21]

The 2023 changes removed entry restrictions and relocated the yeshiva, while the later court decision dealt with a specific petition after circumstances had changed.[1][16] The cited court accounts do not present a single ruling that settled every question of land ownership, access, construction, or settlement status.[16][21]

Efforts to make the renewed presence permanent continued after the 2023 relocation. In September 2025, a kindergarten opened at Homesh, 20 years after the evacuation. The Times of Israel reported that it was supported by the Education Ministry and its religious-education department. At the time of that report, existing Homesh structures, principally the yeshiva, had not yet been legalized.[22]

In May 2025, the security cabinet approved 22 new settlements or retroactive recognitions in the West Bank, including Homesh and Sa-Nur.[23] Reporting in March 2026 described the approval as formally authorizing Homesh’s legalization.[24] A Jewish Virtual Library overview also names Homesh among former settlements evacuated in 2005 that were to be reestablished, but its account of later developments gives no Homesh-specific details for its statement that families moved into Kadim in August 2026 and that resettlement of the four communities had been completed.[23]

In March 2026, government and settlement officials marked Homesh’s reestablishment as 10 families took up residence. The Times of Israel described this as the culmination of a process to legalize and repopulate the settlement and reported that the rebuilt community was at a slightly different location. The ceremony was attended by Settlements and National Missions Minister Orit Strock, Likud MK Yuli Edelstein, Samaria Regional Council head Yossi Dagan, and Amana head Ze’ev Hever.[24]

The September 2025 report that the yeshiva’s existing structures remained unlegalized and the March 2026 report of the settlement’s legalization and repopulation concern developments at different times and may address distinct matters.[22][24] Approval of the settlement’s status does not, on the information available here, establish that every structure or land-use question was resolved. The site’s renewed presence therefore developed through multiple stages—amendment of entry restrictions, relocation of the yeshiva, cabinet approval, educational infrastructure, and the arrival of families—against the background of property and access disputes.[1][23]

Homesh’s status has been debated in Israeli, Palestinian, and international contexts. The U.S. State Department’s 2023 statement called the site an outpost built on private Palestinian land and illegal under Israeli law. The Meir Amit center reported that the Palestinian Authority and Hamas condemned the 2023 legislative change; PA spokesman Nabil Abu Rudeineh asserted that settlements built on Palestinian land, including Homesh, were illegal and violated international law.[6][20] These are attributed positions, while the INSS account of the Israeli legal changes distinguishes the repeal of restrictions on entry and presence from the separate questions of land rights, permits, and construction.[1]

The legality of Israeli settlements in the West Bank is disputed more broadly. Encyclopaedia Britannica says most international bodies, including the United Nations, consider the settlements illegal under international conventions. It also reports that Israel’s Foreign Ministry disputes applying the Fourth Geneva Convention to Israel’s presence in the West Bank, citing the territory’s lack of a previous legitimate sovereign and other historical grounds.[24] These broad international and Israeli positions do not by themselves resolve the distinct questions in Homesh concerning the original requisition, ownership claims, access, and the later relocation to a site described as state land.

The 2023 legislative change also drew criticism in the United States. The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs reports that former U.S. ambassador Dan Kurtzer called it “an egregious violation of a commitment to the United States, as well as a reversal of law and policy enacted back in 2005 in the context of the disengagement.” The same organization disputes the breadth of that criticism and presents a different interpretation of the change. Its commentary describes the legislation’s stated rationale as addressing residents’ property rights and discrimination, and argues that the measure was intended to allow return rather than authorize new settlement construction; it also treats return as conditional on legal and security arrangements and the resolution of Palestinian ownership claims.[25]

Descriptions of the March 2023 law vary, including whether it should be called an amendment or a repeal and whether it legalized the status of yeshiva students. The accounts also distinguish the removal of the entry ban from the separate authorization of construction and from questions of land ownership. These differences are consequential to how the legal change is characterized, but the available reporting does not present one source as resolving all of them.[1][20]

The central land dispute is likewise not exhausted by the yeshiva’s relocation. Reporting identifies the original site as privately owned by Burqa residents and the later yeshiva site as state land.[7][16] It also notes that access roads to the new site crossed private land and that landowners’ access remained a concern.[21] The court proceedings described in the reporting addressed particular petitions and circumstances; they should not be read as a blanket determination of every land or planning question at Homesh.[16][21]