Harel Brigade

The Harel Brigade emerged in April 1948 as a Palmach formation whose central early task was to operate along the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem road and help move supplies to Jerusalem. The city’s Jewish population was under blockade, and food, water, medicine, equipment, and ammunition were difficult to bring in by road. Harel’s history is therefore closely connected to the campaign for Jerusalem, the convoys sent to the city, and repeated efforts to hold or reopen its approaches.[1][2]

The brigade took part in operations extending beyond convoy escort. Accounts describe its role in Operation Nachshon and Operation Harel and in fighting in the Jerusalem hills.[3][4] During Operation Yoav in October 1948, it operated in the mountain region between the Jerusalem corridor and Bet Guvrin, widening the approaches to Jerusalem and cutting an Egyptian route.[5]

“Harel” became a continuing military name rather than only a designation for the 1948 Palmach formation. A later Harel formation served as an armored brigade in the Six-Day War.[6] During the 2023 Gaza war, the name belonged to a reserve armored brigade in the IDF’s Division 252, reflecting the persistence of its military heritage.[7]

The Palmach formed Harel in April 1948 from battalions assigned to the Jerusalem front. Its mission was to keep the Jerusalem road open so that food, medicine, and weapons could reach the besieged city.[1] The brigade was based at Kiryat Anavim and was reported to have approximately 1,400 men and women.[8]

The route was vulnerable because it passed below fortified heights, from which Arab forces could attack vehicles and obstruct traffic.[8] The blockade of Jerusalem had begun in February 1948, and residents faced rationing of food, water, and other necessities. Convoys consequently travelled through dangerous terrain, and supply delivery could become difficult or impossible.[1][2]

Yitzhak Rabin recalled taking command of the new formation on April 15, 1948. In his memoirs, as quoted in a later account, he wrote: “On April 15, 1948, I was placed in command of the newly established Harel Brigade of the Palmach, which was assigned to complete Operation Nachshon by eliminating the Arab bases along the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road.”[1]

Rabin was the brigade’s first commander, while Yosef Tabenkin replaced him on May 17, 1948. The apparent disagreement between accounts naming Rabin or Tabenkin as commander therefore reflects different stages in the brigade’s wartime command.[7][3]

The Harel name was connected with Operation Harel, which followed Operation Nachshon. One account says that a message from Yigal Yadin designated the campaign for control of the Jerusalem road as Operation Harel from April 16 and presents the brigade as formed during that transition.[3] A broader account dates Operation Harel to April 15–21 and describes dozens of supply trucks reaching Jerusalem during the operation.[9]

Operation Nachshon, conducted in April 1948, was the Haganah’s first major operation and its first use of a brigade-sized force. It was part of the transition under Plan D from a primarily defensive strategy to major offensive operations intended to open the road to Jerusalem.[9][4]

Three battalions totalling about 1,500 men were organized for Nachshon and equipped with Czech weapons smuggled into the country on April 1. The operation began on April 6 in the Latrun area, while Palmach forces attacked Beit Machsir near Bab el-Wad to clear the mountain road.[4]

The campaign at the Castel formed part of the struggle to open the route. After six days of fighting there, Abd el-Kader el-Husseini was killed and Arab forces retreated on April 10. Supplies then reached Jerusalem more safely, and five convoys carrying reserves and additional troops arrived by April 20. The improvement proved temporary: the road again became impassable, convoys had to turn back, and Jerusalem’s siege continued.[4]

Two days after Harel’s establishment, a convoy led by Rabin set out for Jerusalem under fire from Arab irregulars. Its journey followed a Palmach victory at the Castel on April 9, which helped the convoy reach the city. Rabin later recalled that political leaders pressed for the breakthrough to be used to send further supplies, leading to preparations for four additional convoys.[1]

Rabin gave the first follow-up convoy as about 300 trucks, stretching for 15 miles. Arab forces regained control of the roads into Jerusalem on April 20, and, after Israel’s establishment in May, Transjordan’s Arab Legion reinforced the blockade. The route was not truly broken until Israeli forces built the Burma Road in June.[1]

Accounts differ on the dates and scope of Operation Harel. Maariv describes it as lasting three days, April 17–19, during which two large food convoys travelled to Jerusalem and back without the road being blocked.[3] Mako gives a broader April 15–21 range, saying dozens of supply trucks reached the besieged city after Operation Nachshon.[9]

The April 20 convoy is described in one account as the “Convoy of Blood.” It comprised 350 vehicles under Rabin’s command: 50 trucks returned to the coastal plain, 50 were looted and destroyed, and 250 reached Jerusalem and unloaded their cargo. The article argues that trucks left in Jerusalem, allegedly in part because they carried property looted from Katamon, contributed to the road remaining closed. This is that writer’s contested interpretation rather than an uncontested explanation for the renewed closure.[10]

Harel forces under Rabin brought supplies to Jews besieged in the Old City on April 17. The relief lasted only briefly: Jerusalem was cut off again three days later. The campaign account emphasizes the city’s isolation from other Jewish settlement centers and the bloody fighting faced by supply convoys.[11]

Harel’s campaign was not confined to the immediate escort of supplies. The Palmach operated through three brigades during the War of Independence: Yiftach, Negev, and Harel. Its forces defended isolated settlements and strategic supply routes and participated in major offensives. Harel’s particular theater remained strongly associated with Jerusalem and its approaches.[12]

The brigade’s contribution to opening the Jerusalem road is described differently by different sources. Mako credits Harel with fighting around Latrun, the Castel, and Mount Adar and with breaking through the Burma Road.[13] A Maariv historical feature challenges the conventional breakthrough account, arguing that Harel did not open the road and may instead have contributed to Jerusalem’s continued isolation.[3]

The distinction between the temporary opening during Nachshon and the later loss of control is important. Operation Nachshon allowed supplies to reach Jerusalem, but the road soon became impassable again.[4] The Burma Road, built in June, was the bypass that finally broke the blockade.[1]

Rabin’s involvement in the first battle for Latrun is recorded in an account of the May 24–25, 1948 engagement. Jordan’s Arab Legion held the British-built fort, strengthening the siege of Jerusalem. The Israeli assault failed, with approximately 75 Israeli soldiers killed; many were recent Holocaust survivors who had arrived from displaced-persons camps without military training. The source identifies Rabin’s involvement but does not establish that Harel participated as a brigade.[14]

Other biographical accounts place Rabin in fighting at Latrun and along the Lydda–Ramla road between May and July 1948 and describe him as responsible for the safe passage of Jewish supply convoys and for the campaign for Jerusalem. These descriptions concern Rabin’s activities and do not by themselves establish that every operation mentioned was fought by Harel as a unit.[15]

During Operation Maccabi in May 1948, Harel and Givati Battalion 51 were assigned roles in an effort to reopen the Jerusalem road, capture positions and villages around Sha’ar HaGai, and return convoy trucks to the coastal plain. The plan provided for 1,700 fighters. In the allocation attributed to Rabin, Harel’s Fifth Battalion was to take northern positions overlooking Sha’ar HaGai, the Fourth Battalion southern positions and Beit Mahsir, and Givati’s Battalion 51 Latrun.[10]

The same account says that Harel deputy commander Itiel Amihai and battalion commander Yosef Tabenkin opposed the operation, while Rabin commanded it. Harel repeatedly attempted to take the Masrek position and Beit Mahsir. The brigade was exhausted by May 11 and could not capture Deir Ayyub; the operation ended with 60 members of “our forces” killed, without a brigade-only breakdown.[10]

Harel forces advanced from the Beit Shemesh area on October 19, 1948, captured parts of the Judean plains, took Nes Harim and Tsur Hadassah, and reached Hussan near Bethlehem before receiving orders to withdraw. Commander Yosef Tabenkin then issued an unauthorized order to take Beit Jala and Bethlehem with the aim of reaching Jericho. Proposed explanations for halting the broader advance include operational priorities, concern about the Christian world’s reaction to taking Bethlehem, and a possible understanding with Arab armies; none is presented as settled.[16]

A Ynetnews report on archival material describes a retaliatory dimension to the October operation connected with the killing of 35 fighters ambushed while travelling from Gush Etzion toward Jerusalem. Harel’s Fifth Battalion was assigned to take Bayt Nattif, and, after residents were told to leave, a local commander requested engineers to demolish the village’s buildings. The report says troops were told that the village housed men who had killed the 35 fighters. Equipment belonging to the dead and photographs of their bodies were reportedly found among items left in a nearby village. These claims remain attributed to the news report’s account of archival documents and participant testimony.[17]

In Operation Yoav, dated October 15–22, 1948, Harel played a major role in the mountainous area between the Jerusalem corridor and Bet Guvrin. Its tasks included widening the approaches to Jerusalem and cutting the Egyptian route from Bet Guvrin to Bethlehem. The operation’s broader objectives were to open a corridor to the Negev, cut Egyptian lines of communication, isolate and defeat Egyptian forces, and drive them from the country. A truce was ordered for 3 p.m. on October 22, although some action continued afterward.[5]

Harel later participated in operations leading to the capture of the Negev and the occupation of northern Sinai.[12] Other accounts associate it with fighting around Beersheba and additional Negev battles, extending its wartime record beyond the Jerusalem corridor.[13]

The brigade’s service in the Jerusalem fighting came at a severe cost. One report states that 418 Harel soldiers were killed during the War of Independence and buried at Kiryat Anavim, nearly a third of the brigade’s total number. The cemetery became a burial place for Harel members, and casualties accumulated so quickly that graves were dug before troops left for the battlefield.[8]

Other sources give different measures of loss. An Encyclopedia.com biography of Rabin says that every third soldier in his brigade was injured or killed and that Rabin later called the experience the most difficult of his life.[15] My Jewish Learning gives Harel a 50 percent casualty rate.[18] The Jewish Standard reports more than 200 brigade soldiers killed and 600 wounded for the period it describes as November 1947 to July 1948.[19] These figures use different scopes and measures and should not be combined into a single total.

The memorial record also uses differing counts. The Harel memorial garden in Jerusalem bears the names of more than 400 brigade members who fell in the battles for the city.[20] Mako gives a more exact memorial count of 431 fallen Harel soldiers.[13] The figure of 418 applies to soldiers reported killed during the War of Independence and buried at Kiryat Anavim; the available accounts do not establish that these totals use identical criteria.[8]

The Harel Brigade was part of the Palmach during the transition to Israel’s state military. On September 14, 1948, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion summoned Palmach commanders and announced that the unit would be dismantled and integrated into the Israel Defense Forces. The Palmach had retained organizational autonomy within the IDF, including a separate command structure and training. Ben-Gurion sought to depoliticize the army and create a single military organization encompassing the underground forces that had previously operated separately.[21]

Accounts give different dates for stages of the transition. Encyclopedia.com says the three Palmach brigades were merged with other IDF units in May 1948 and separately dates the provisional government’s decision to disband the Palmach’s staff to November 7.[12] The Jewish Virtual Library says the Palmach was disbanded under Ben-Gurion’s order on November 7 and integrated into the IDF, with its forces reorganized into the Negev, Yiftach, and Harel brigades.[22] The accounts appear to distinguish the merger of operational units from the later end of the separate Palmach staff.

Rabin later argued that, with Palmach brigades dispersed across several fronts, there was no longer a place for a separate command. He nevertheless expressed ambivalence about the motives behind the decision. His retrospective perspective appears alongside the government’s stated objective of creating one military organization.[21]

The Harel name was used for an armored formation in the Six-Day War. It operated on the Jordanian front, chiefly around Jerusalem, Ramallah, and the Jordan Valley, under Uri Ben-Ari, and was later known as the 10th Brigade.[6]

The brigade breached fortified Jordanian positions north of the Jerusalem corridor and captured sites including Radar Hill, Khirbet Luza, Nabi Samuel, Beit Hanina, Tel el-Ful, and Ramallah.[6]

Brigade intelligence officer Hagai Man recalled that the initial orders focused on capturing northern corridor outposts, advancing quickly, blocking the Jerusalem–Ramallah axis, and standing by to link up with Mount Scopus. In his recollection, Jerusalem as a city was not named as an objective in those orders.[6]

Tanks from Harel’s 95th Battalion joined paratroopers from Brigade 55 during the advance into the Old City. Harel’s armored actions and cooperation with the paratroopers are documented, while popular memory of the Old City’s capture is particularly associated with the paratroopers. The sources do not suggest that Harel alone carried out the entry.[23]

Harel also fought in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in which it lost 35 soldiers. It had initially been planned for the northern front with Centurion tanks but was sent south under commander Avraham Baram after regular forces took its tanks.[24]

In a report published during the 2023 Gaza war, Harel was described as a reserve armored brigade in Division 252, equipped at that time with Merkava Mark 3 tanks. The formation had existed in some form since the War of Independence, with Rabin identified as its first commander. It had been an infantry brigade before becoming an armored formation prior to the Six-Day War, and its number changed over time while the Harel name and heritage remained.[7]

During the 2023 Gaza war, Harel Brigade (10) was made up mainly of reservists from armor, engineering, and infantry. Its commander, Colonel Itamar Michaeli, said personnel reported before receiving call-up orders and that the brigade began fighting within 12 hours. Its tank-equipped battalions initially operated in communities near Gaza, helping clear the area and repel Hamas terrorists, including in the Be’eri Forest area, before taking on defensive and maneuver tasks.[25]

The brigade raided the al-Karman neighborhood of Beit Hanoun before the start of the ground maneuver. It destroyed anti-tank launch positions, long-range launchers, tunnel shafts, and observation positions. Claims that it eliminated the Hamas Beit Hanoun battalion, struck senior terrorists, destroyed infrastructure, and collected weapons from houses were reported in connection with Michaeli’s account. He also said that the brigade suffered casualties and that wounded commanders returned to the fighting.[25]

The reports describe a reserve formation with a combined-arms composition, operating first around communities near Gaza and later inside the Gaza Strip. They present its enduring name as a connection to the Palmach formation while documenting a substantially changed role and equipment from the original infantry brigade.[7][25]

Harel’s memory is commemorated at Kiryat Anavim, where a memorial honors fallen members of the Palmach brigade and describes them as those who “opened the road to Jerusalem.”[2] The sculptural design was created by Menahem Shemi and, depending on the viewer’s position, resembles either a resting lion or a rifle ready to fire. Shemi’s son Aharon, known as Jimmy, was killed in the battle for the Joint Outpost on October 18, 1948, and buried there with his comrades.[8]

A second Harel memorial garden stands at the edge of Sacher Park in central Jerusalem. Sculptor Danny Karavan, landscape architect Zvi Dekel, and typographer Yank Yontaf designed it. The inner face of its wall bears the names of more than 400 members who fell in the battles for Jerusalem. The memorial was inaugurated 65 years after the War of Independence.[20]

The brigade is also commemorated in the Radar Hill area. Harel fought around Mount Adar during the War of Independence, while the later armored formation captured Radar Hill in the Six-Day War.[6][13]

In an honorary-doctorate address at the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus on June 28, 1967, Rabin reflected on the soldiers he had led in the Six-Day War. He said: “The elevation of our fighters is not due to iron, but due to their consciousness of a higher mission, of recognizing the righteousness of our cause, of deep love for the homeland and for each other at the cost of their lives…”[26]

The Harel legacy encompasses both the Jerusalem campaign and later formations carrying its name. Memorials in Kiryat Anavim and Jerusalem honor the fallen.[8][20] The continued use of “Harel” by an armored reserve brigade connects the name to later wars and military service, including the Six-Day War, the Yom Kippur War, and the 2023 Gaza war.[7][24]

Accounts differ on the precise relationship between Harel’s formation and Operation Harel and on the operation’s dates.[3][9] They also differ on whether Harel should receive primary credit for reopening the Jerusalem road: one account associates it with the Burma Road breakthrough, while another argues that it did not open the road and may have contributed to Jerusalem’s continued isolation.[3][13]

Casualty totals use different populations, periods, and definitions. Counts of 418 and 431 refer respectively to reported wartime burials at Kiryat Anavim and names on a memorial wall.[8][13] Other accounts give more than 200 killed and 600 wounded for a specified period, every third soldier injured or killed, or an overall casualty rate of 50 percent.[15][19] These figures cannot be assumed to measure the same group or timeframe.

The October 1948 advance toward Bethlehem, the Bayt Nattif demolition, and the interpretation of the April convoy’s aftermath are politically and historically sensitive. Reports offer several possible explanations for the October withdrawal and describe the Bayt Nattif episode through archival documents and participant testimony.[16][17] The claim that looted property contributed to the failure to return convoy trucks remains the interpretation of the Maariv account that advances it.[10]