Folke Bernadotte

Bernadotte was born in Stockholm on January 2, 1895, into Sweden’s royal family.[2] A grandson of King Oscar II and nephew of King Gustav V, he descended from Jean Bernadotte, who was elected Swedish crown prince in 1810 and later became King Charles XIV.[2] He held the title Count of Wisborg.[3]

After graduating from Karlberg military school, Bernadotte continued his training at the Stromsholm military riding school and became a cavalry officer in the Royal Horse Guards.[2] He received his Swedish army commission in 1918.[1] On December 1, 1928, he married Estelle Romaine Manville of New York.[2]

His public duties extended beyond the military to international exhibitions and youth organization.[2] He represented Sweden at Chicago’s Century of Progress Exposition in 1933 and served as Swedish commissioner general at the New York World’s Fair in 1939–1940.[2] He also became head of the Swedish Boy Scouts, a position through which he organized wartime service by young people.[2]

At the beginning of World War II, Bernadotte integrated the Swedish Boy Scouts into Sweden’s defense system, arranging training in anti-aircraft work and service as medical assistants.[2] He became vice chairman of the Swedish Red Cross in 1943 and its president in 1946.[3]

As a Red Cross representative, he supervised exchanges of disabled British and German prisoners of war.[2] These responsibilities required journeys to London and Berlin and conferences with officials from both countries.[2] His wartime humanitarian work subsequently expanded to securing the release and transportation of prisoners held in Nazi concentration camps.[3]

In March and April 1945, Bernadotte negotiated with Heinrich Himmler for the release of more than 7,000 Scandinavian nationals, including over 400 Danish Jews imprisoned in Theresienstadt.[3] A later account of Denmark’s Jewish community recorded that 472 Danish Jews had been deported to Theresienstadt in October 1943, that 52 died, and that 420 were released and repatriated through Bernadotte’s efforts.[4] That account placed their release and repatriation in June 1945 and noted that most Danish Jews who had escaped to Sweden returned to Denmark after the war.[4]

The rescue expedition operated from March to May 1945, taking prisoners from German concentration camps, other camps, and prisons to Sweden through Denmark.[5] Known as the White Buses, it brought Norwegian, Danish, and western European inmates to safety and to treatment in Swedish hospitals.[2] Dozens of buses participated, some converted into Swedish Red Cross ambulances, accompanied by medical personnel and volunteers and supplied with food and medical equipment.[6]

Bernadotte’s work also intersected with the efforts of World Jewish Congress representative Norbert Masur to obtain the release of women imprisoned at Ravensbrück.[7][3] After Masur met Himmler in April 1945, Bernadotte helped arrange the release and transfer to Sweden of thousands of female prisoners, including Jewish women.[7][3] One account identifies a group of 10,000 women, including 2,000 Jews, who were transferred to Sweden.[8] Survivor Irene Fainman-Krausz was among the women whose rescue formed part of this effort.[8]

Masur’s negotiations took place during the final collapse of Nazi Germany.[7] Himmler arrived at the meeting at 2:30 a.m. on April 21, having been delayed by attendance at Hitler’s birthday gathering in the Berlin bunker.[7] In his discussion with Masur, Himmler defended the concentration camps by saying, “We could not tolerate such an enemy at our backs,” and describing their treatment as “severe but just.”[7]

Bernadotte also became an intermediary for a separate German surrender initiative.[2] While working at the Swedish legation’s temporary headquarters at Friedrichsruh in spring 1945, he was summoned by Himmler and met him at Lübeck on April 24.[2] Himmler claimed that Hitler was dying and offered Germany’s surrender to Britain and the United States on condition that German forces could continue fighting the Soviet Union.[2]

The Swedish foreign office transmitted the offer to Winston Churchill and Harry Truman, who informed Joseph Stalin.[2] The Allied response was that only unconditional surrender to all three governments would be accepted.[2] The initiative therefore did not secure the separate western surrender Himmler sought.[2]

The United Nations General Assembly created the position of mediator for Palestine through Resolution 186 (S-2) on May 14, 1948.[9] On May 20, the five major powers on the Security Council agreed on Bernadotte as mediator in the Arab-Jewish conflict.[2] His responsibilities encompassed mediation between the parties, supervision of the truce ordered by Security Council Resolution 50, and attention to the emerging Arab refugee problem.[9]

Bernadotte arrived on May 30, one day after the fall of Jerusalem’s Jewish Quarter.[10] He began conferences with Arab and Jewish leaders in Palestine and with Arab leaders in Cairo and Amman.[2] The negotiations took place during Israel’s War of Independence, with the new Jewish state fighting the Arab countries that had invaded it.[11]

He secured agreement to a four-week truce beginning June 11.[2] His principal assistant, the American diplomat Ralph Bunche, helped draw up the truce arrangements.[11] Bunche later credited Bernadotte’s seven days of intensive negotiations in Tel Aviv and Arab capitals with obtaining agreement on the terms and starting date.[12]

The truce interrupted the general fighting, but Bernadotte could not secure the Arab states’ agreement to extend it.[3] He reported to the Security Council on July 12 and subsequently returned to Palestine.[2] Alongside efforts to stop the fighting, he worked on a political settlement dealing with territorial boundaries, the relationship between Jewish and Arab areas, immigration, Jerusalem, and displaced people.[2][13]

Bernadotte’s June 28, 1948, proposal envisaged a union of Arab and Jewish states, with a central council exercising responsibilities that included decisions about Jewish immigration.[14] His initial scheme linked Arab parts of Palestine with Transjordan and contemplated economic and military union between Arab and Jewish areas.[13] The proposal was submitted to the Arab League and the Israeli government, neither of which accepted it.[2]

The territorial proposals included transferring the Negev to Transjordan.[15] The initial treatment of Jerusalem placed it under Arab control, while the relationship between the Jewish political entity and Transjordan would have been structured through the proposed union.[16] Other elements included free-port status for Haifa and free-airport status for Lydda.[13]

Immigration was a central question because the plan would have limited Israel’s independent authority over the admission of Jews.[14] Under the proposed arrangement, the union’s central council would determine the scale of Jewish immigration within two years.[14] If the council could not agree, the UN Economic and Social Committee would assess the Jewish state’s economic capacity to absorb immigrants.[14] American delegates did not support this approach, preferring that Israel voluntarily regulate immigration according to its own assessment of absorption capacity.[14]

Israeli objections included the proposed Arab control of Jerusalem and the union of the Jewish entity with Transjordan.[16] Arab leaders opposed provisions allowing unrestricted Jewish immigration for two years and maintaining a permanent Jewish political entity in the land.[16] The two sides thus rejected the proposal for different reasons.[16]

The territorial plan also encountered Soviet opposition.[17] Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov urged Stalin to reject the transfer of the Negev to Transjordan, arguing that it would place four-fifths of Israel’s territory under Transjordanian control, which he regarded as effectively British control.[17] The Soviet Union also preferred that the refugee issue be resolved through peace negotiations rather than by adopting Bernadotte’s proposal for return to the Jewish state.[17]

Bernadotte discussed alternatives with Judah Leib Magnes, who sent him a confederation proposal in July as a compromise between partition and a united Palestine.[18] They agreed on much of the proposal but differed over Jerusalem.[18] Magnes favored an internationalized, demilitarized city serving as the federal union’s capital, whereas Bernadotte at that stage assigned Jerusalem to the Arab state and doubted whether an international area could function inside another state.[18]

Refugee return became a separate subject of discussion with Israeli officials.[9] In an August 1 telegram, Bernadotte reported that he had proposed to Moshe Sharett the return of a limited number of refugees, particularly former residents of Jaffa and Haifa, without prejudicing wider political questions.[9] Israel replied that it could not readmit Arabs on a substantial scale while the war continued and that the issue belonged within a general peace settlement.[9]

Bernadotte completed his progress report, UN document A/648, on September 16, 1948, and sent it to the secretary-general for the approaching General Assembly session.[9] He explained that his written suggestions of June 27 had been rejected by both Arab and Jewish authorities and that he had not formally submitted further proposals, although oral discussions had continued in Arab capitals and Tel Aviv.[19] He still considered political and economic union potentially desirable in principle, but judged the time unsuitable for it.[19]

The report explicitly recognized Israel’s continuing existence: “A Jewish State called Israel exists in Palestine and there are no sound reasons for assuming that it will not continue to do so.”[19] It proposed that boundaries be settled through agreement or, if agreement proved impossible, by the United Nations.[19] Rather than rigidly maintaining the territorial arrangements of the November 29, 1947, resolution, Bernadotte advocated geographically integrated Arab and Jewish territories.[19]

His boundary recommendations assigned the Negev south of a line running from the coast near Majdal to Faluja to Arab territory, including both towns.[19] The proposed boundary then ran northeast toward Ramleh and Lydda, likewise allocated to Arab territory, before following the November 29 resolution’s boundary from Lydda.[19] Galilee would become Jewish territory.[19]

For Arab territory outside Israel, Bernadotte recommended that Arab governments determine its disposition in consultation with Palestine’s Arab inhabitants.[19] He considered merger with Transjordan a potentially compelling arrangement, subject to practicable boundary adjustments.[19] These were recommendations for a future settlement, rather than terms adopted by the parties.[20]

Jerusalem received a different treatment from that in the earlier proposal.[16][19] The September report called for effective UN control, with the maximum feasible local autonomy for the city’s Arab and Jewish communities.[19] It recommended safeguards for holy places, freedom of religion, and access to Jerusalem.[19] Haifa would be a free port, and Lydda’s airport a free airport.[19]

Bernadotte also proposed international guarantees for minority rights, including the political, economic, social, and religious rights of Arabs in Jewish territory and Jews in Arab territory.[20] United Nations supervision would support implementation of settlement arrangements.[19] A further proposed mechanism was a conciliation commission answerable to the United Nations.[18]

The refugee recommendations called for Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date.[19] The United Nations would assist with repatriation, resettlement, and rehabilitation, while people choosing not to return would receive adequate compensation.[19] Bernadotte argued that preventing Arab refugees from returning while Jewish immigrants entered would be “an offense against the principles of elemental justice.”[21]

The report separately addressed immediate relief rather than only refugees’ eventual political status.[20] It identified infants, children, pregnant women, and nursing mothers among those requiring assistance, and warned that the loss of property and assets would leave many dependent on host communities for at least a year.[20] Its appeal described the immediate choice as “saving the lives of many thousands of people now or permitting them to die.”[19] It also identified approximately 7,000 Jewish refugees as needing aid in Palestine and neighboring countries.[19][20]

The final report appeared in Paris three days after Bernadotte’s death.[2] It received immediate American and British support but was rejected by Israel’s government and Arab leaders.[2] Israel objected particularly to assigning the Negev to Arab territory; George Marshall and Ernest Bevin endorsed the report.[18]

On September 17, 1948, Bernadotte and French UN observer Colonel André-Pierre Sérot were assassinated in Jerusalem’s Katamon neighborhood.[2][22] Bernadotte was traveling in a three-car convoy from Government House toward the YMCA when attackers stopped the motorcade and fired into his car at close range.[22] The convoy was blocked near the corner of Palmach and Hagdud Ha’ivri streets.[10]

General Aage Lundström, who was traveling with Bernadotte, survived the attack.[21] He recalled an armed man firing through the car window at close range.[21] Sérot was killed instantly, and Bernadotte died within minutes of reaching Hadassah Hospital.[22] The Israeli military governor and commander expressed regret and said that the authorities would pursue the assailants.[22]

Lehi, also called the Stern Gang, carried out the assassination.[2][16] The group regarded Bernadotte’s proposals as threatening its objective of Israeli independence on both banks of the Jordan.[15] Yehoshua Cohen is identified as the gunman in later accounts, while Meshulam Makover is identified as the driver of the attackers’ jeep.[15] Yitzhak Shamir is believed to have been among the planners.[16]

On September 20, the provisional Israeli government invoked Regulation 8 of the Emergency Regulations (Prevention of Terror) to declare Lehi and the group calling itself Homeland Front terrorist organizations.[23] Homeland Front had claimed responsibility for the assassination in leaflets distributed in Jerusalem.[23] Israeli security forces arrested hundreds of Lehi members in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa, and imposed a Jerusalem curfew that continued until early Sunday morning.[24]

The government confiscated weapons, and Lehi disbanded amid public condemnation.[15] Nevertheless, no one was charged with the assassination itself.[16][21] A public admission of the organization’s responsibility came in 1977.[21] Sweden declared a week of mourning, and the killing caused diplomatic repercussions as Swedish officials criticized Israel’s investigation.[21][24]

UN work continued after the attack.[22] General Lundström directed truce-supervision activities in consultation with the Truce Commission and senior observers.[22] Acting UN secretary-general Sobolev instructed Bunche to assume full authority over the Palestine Mission pending a decision by the General Assembly or Security Council.[22] Bunche subsequently served as acting mediator.[12]

In his 1949 report, Bunche described the four-week truce beginning June 11, 1948, as a turning point that checked the general fighting.[12] He credited Bernadotte’s intensive negotiations with securing agreement on its terms and commencement.[12] Magnes had offered a similarly emphatic assessment during Bernadotte’s lifetime, declaring on August 23 that he had “done more to advance the cause of peace and conciliation in Palestine than all other persons put together.”[18]

Bernadotte’s humanitarian work also had a direct connection to the other man killed beside him.[25] Sérot’s Jewish wife, Berthe Grunfelder, was arrested by the Gestapo and sent to Auschwitz in 1943.[25] In 1945 she was rescued through Bernadotte’s operation and transported out of Germany on a white bus.[25]

The Jewish National Fund planted a forest in Bernadotte’s honor.[3] His book, Instead of Arms, appeared in 1949.[2] The Folke Bernadotte Memorial Forest was planted in 1952.[25] In 1995, Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres apologized to Sweden’s government for his killing.[24]

His rescue work formed part of a wider Swedish reception of Jewish survivors.[26] Through several efforts, including Swedish Red Cross activities during the closing stages of the war and shortly afterward, approximately 11,000–13,000 Jewish concentration-camp prisoners were transported to Sweden, with an estimated one-third remaining there.[26] That broader population included people brought through efforts beyond Bernadotte’s individual expedition.[26]

Historical debate about the White Buses concerns both Bernadotte’s negotiating role and the operation’s priorities.[5][27] One scholarly interpretation assigns Felix Kersten, Himmler’s masseur, the principal negotiating role and emphasizes Bernadotte’s organization of transportation, whereas other accounts credit Bernadotte directly with negotiating prisoner releases.[5][16] One critical account says the initial plans did not include rescuing Jews and that Bernadotte did not originally plan to rescue them.[28] Other reported interpretations dispute whether he excluded or discriminated against Jewish prisoners and discuss whether Danish pressure affected the inclusion of Danish Jews.[27]

Published rescue totals reflect differing estimates and scopes. One account gives around 15,000 people taken to safety, including a few thousand Jews, while another reports more than 20,000 prisoners, mostly women and including several thousand Jews.[2][6] A National Library of Israel record separately estimates 6,500 Jewish passengers in the March–May expedition.[5] Ravensbrück figures also differ: one account describes about 7,000 women, about half Jewish, while another gives 10,000 women, including 2,000 Jews.[7][8]

The assassination’s effect on the fate of Bernadotte’s proposals remains a matter of interpretation.[15] Former Lehi member Geula Cohen maintained that the killing prevented Jerusalem’s internationalization, while historian Joseph Heller argued that it could have strengthened support for the plan by making Bernadotte a martyr.[15] The failure to implement the proposals cannot be established as a consequence of the assassination alone.[15]