European Union Reactions to the Gaza War

The EU’s response combined support for Israeli security and hostage release with humanitarian assistance and efforts to advance a two-state solution.[1] Its initial common position condemned Hamas’s attacks and recognized Israel’s right to defend itself within international humanitarian law; subsequent policy also addressed Palestinian Authority finances, maritime security, sanctions, and possible European roles in Gaza’s postwar administration.[1][2]

European institutions and national governments did not speak with a single voice on every issue: disagreements emerged over aid payments immediately after October 7 and later extended to ceasefire language, recognition of Palestinian statehood, international legal proceedings, and the EU-Israel Association Agreement.[1][2] Between October 7 and May 10, EU countries voted together on only three of eight United Nations General Assembly resolutions concerning the Palestinian issue and the Gaza war.[2]

The institutional level of each response mattered. A European Parliament resolution could be non-binding,[4] while a Commission proposal could require subsequent Council approval.[5] A statement supported by most member states could still fall short of an agreed position of all 27.[6] Likewise, statements signed by EU officials alongside non-EU governments were joint diplomatic initiatives rather than declarations by the Union alone.[7][8] These distinctions remained important as debate moved from humanitarian pauses in 2023 to proposed economic restrictions in 2025 and targeted sanctions in 2026.[2][3]

The European Commission displayed the Israeli flag at its Berlaymont headquarters on October 7, 2023, and raised it beside the EU flag the following day.[9] Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Parliament President Roberta Metsola visited Israel five days after the attack, including Kibbutz Kfar Azza, condemning the atrocities and supporting efforts to bring the hostages home.[9] These gestures accompanied the broader European diplomatic engagement that accounted for about 80 high-level visits to Israel through May 2024.[2]

Von der Leyen’s early declaration of support for Israel’s right to defend itself did not include the international-humanitarian-law qualification voiced by EU foreign-policy chief Josep Borrell and other Western leaders.[10] Some EU governments objected that she had acted without consulting member states, which held authority over foreign policy.[10] The developing common position nevertheless combined condemnation of Hamas, the demand for hostage release, support for lawful Israeli self-defense, humanitarian assistance, and renewed efforts toward a two-state solution.[1]

On October 19, the European Parliament adopted a non-binding resolution by 500 votes to 21 condemning Hamas’s attacks, demanding unconditional hostage release, and expressing sympathy for civilian victims on both sides.[4] The resolution called for a humanitarian pause to enable aid delivery, rather than a ceasefire, and made Israel’s right to defend itself subject to international law.[4] It also called for Hamas’s elimination.[2]

Aid policy produced an immediate institutional dispute.[1] On October 9, Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi announced a review of €691 million in development assistance and said payments would be suspended; the Commission subsequently disavowed the suspension announcement.[1] Borrell said the review would not suspend payments already due, while von der Leyen said humanitarian assistance was not in question and that EU funds would not go to Hamas or another terrorist entity.[11] Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden suspended funding while examining its destination, whereas Belgium, France, Italy, and Malta said they would not do so.[1] On October 14, the Commission announced that humanitarian assistance to Gaza would be tripled to €75 million.[1]

The distinction between a pause and a ceasefire became central to early diplomacy.[2][12] On October 23, Borrell expected EU leaders to work toward a humanitarian pause allowing aid into Gaza; the United States was discussing humanitarian access with European governments, Israel, and Egypt, while arguing that a ceasefire could give Hamas time to regroup.[12] The European Council’s late-October conclusions called for humanitarian corridors and “pauses for humanitarian needs.”[2] Leaders spent hours agreeing on the plural “pauses,” avoiding wording that might suggest a permanent halt.[2]

On October 27, EU countries divided over a UN General Assembly resolution calling for a sustained humanitarian truce: eight supported it, fifteen abstained, and four opposed it.[2] Opponents objected that the text omitted Hamas and the October 7 massacre.[2] In November, all 27 EU states condemned Hamas’s use of hospitals and civilians as human shields, and leaders of Germany, Spain, Denmark, and Romania jointly supported Israel’s self-defense and demanded hostage release.[13]

The EU High Representative joined the November 28 G7 foreign ministers’ statement welcoming the recent pause in hostilities and increased humanitarian assistance.[7] That joint statement supported extending the pause and arranging future pauses to increase aid and enable hostage releases, demanded the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, and affirmed Israel’s right to defend itself in accordance with international law.[7] It also called for civilian protection and compliance with international humanitarian law.[7]

During the first months of the war, strong European solidarity with Israel increasingly coexisted with criticism as civilian deaths and humanitarian concerns in Gaza grew.[2] In February 2024, 26 member states, with Hungary the exception, called for an immediate humanitarian pause leading to a lasting ceasefire, unconditional hostage release, and humanitarian assistance.[6] They also urged Israel not to launch an operation in Rafah that could worsen the humanitarian situation and impede aid.[6] During the May Rafah operation, the EU urged Israel to halt it, warning of heavy strain on bilateral relations, while also condemning a Hamas attack on the Kerem Shalom crossing and demanding unconditional hostage release.[14]

From October 7, 2023, through September 2024, EU member-state humanitarian assistance to Palestinians exceeded €678 million, more than four times the equivalent prewar amount.[2] EU-level assistance increased ninefold, from €28 million to €262 million.[2] Separately, grants totaling €45 million were authorized in 2024 for World Food Programme emergency assistance to people affected by hostilities in Gaza; the reported authorization did not establish a disbursement amount or delivery schedule.[15]

Funding for UNRWA followed a different trajectory after allegations that some employees had participated in the October 7 attacks.[2] The EU and eleven European countries briefly suspended funding, while eight countries did not, and governments differed over conditions for resumption.[2] The EU and Germany later resumed contributions, partly because of Gaza’s urgent humanitarian needs and partly because of UNRWA’s reported assurances of additional steps to reduce the risk of staff or assets being involved in terrorist activity.[16]

Maritime delivery supplemented financial assistance.[2] In March 2024, the Commission, Cyprus, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates launched the Amalthea aid route from Cyprus.[2] Contemporaneous plans also envisaged amphibious supply vessels funded by the EU and the UAE, although the reported plan did not establish that those vessels had completed a journey.[17] The maritime initiative delivered about 7,000 tons of aid, equivalent to roughly 350 truckloads; the jetty operated for only twelve days between May and July because of bad weather and repairs and was dismantled at the end of July.[2]

The Palestinian Authority was another major focus of European financial policy.[2] The EU was its largest external assistance provider, and in July 2024 the Commission’s Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations signed a letter of intent for a €400 million emergency package, payable through September and conditional on reforms in eight fields.[2] The intended role included sustaining the PA and preparing for a possible return of PA governance in Gaza.[2] A Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs commentary reported a further €202 million allocation announced on June 23, 2025: €150 million for PA public services, including public-sector salaries, and €52 million for UNRWA.[18] The commentary described the broader 2025–2027 support programme as linked to PA commitments on governance, public finances, institutions, education, and anti-corruption.[18]

European planning for a postwar role included civilian security missions.[2] On May 27, 2024, the Foreign Affairs Council agreed in principle to reactivate the EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah, which had operated until Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007.[2] Reactivation required approval and coordination with the PA, Egypt, and Israel, and Israel rejected the option.[2] The EU police and rule-of-law mission, EUPOL COPPS, was also identified as a possible capacity-building instrument whose activities could be expanded in connection with PA revitalization.[2]

Borrell circulated a twelve-point non-paper in January 2024 proposing a preparatory peace conference involving Arab states, Israel, and the PA.[2] Internal objections among member states and Israel’s rejection prevented the proposal from advancing.[2] A September meeting in Madrid on international engagement and a two-state solution drew only four European foreign ministers, alongside Palestinian and Arab representatives.[2] European governments supporting Palestinian statehood also encountered difficulties over the Israeli government’s rejection of a ceasefire and of a postwar PA role in Gaza.[2]

Broad support for a two-state solution did not produce agreement on recognition timing.[2] Spain and Ireland recognized Palestine on May 28, 2024, alongside Norway, and Slovenia followed on June 5.[2] These were national decisions, not collective EU recognition.[2] The European Council’s June 27 conclusions again strongly condemned the October 7 attacks by Hamas and other terrorist groups, while condemning extremist settler violence in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — including East Jerusalem.[5] The conclusions invited further restrictive measures against extremist settlers, called for safe access to holy sites and preservation of the status quo, and urged Israel to reverse settlement-expansion decisions.[5]

Sanctions policy targeted both Hamas-related actors and violent Israeli settlers.[2] On January 19, 2024, the EU adopted additional sanctions against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, including asset freezes affecting several leaders, and expanded the list in June.[2] After measures by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France against violent settlers, the EU reached unanimity on March 18 to sanction four individuals and two organizations.[2] A July 15 round added five individuals and three organizations; listed individuals faced asset freezes and travel bans, and supplying funds or economic resources to listed persons or organizations was prohibited.[2]

The EU-Israel Association Agreement became a principal instrument considered for economic and diplomatic pressure.[19] In force since 2000, it provides a framework for trade and relates to scientific cooperation and student exchanges, including Horizon and Erasmus; Article 2 makes respect for human rights and democratic principles a foundation of relations.[19] Spain and Ireland requested an urgent compliance review in February 2024, but the March Foreign Affairs Council made no resulting change.[2] On May 27, ministers discussed possible steps concerning international humanitarian law, with the stated outcome being an Association Council meeting to discuss concerns and seek Israel’s response.[2]

In November 2024, Borrell proposed suspending political dialogue under the agreement’s human-rights clause, citing serious concerns about possible breaches of international humanitarian law.[20] Foreign ministers did not agree at their November 18 meeting; suspension required unanimity, and the Netherlands argued that the diplomatic channel should remain open.[20] By May 2025, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, and France supported examining Israel’s Article 2 commitments.[19] The Netherlands sought an urgent review and suspended progress on a future bilateral action plan while aid remained blocked; Finland proposed discussion if the halt continued, Sweden supported investigation, and France called a review legitimate.[19]

France also joined the United Kingdom and Canada in a May 20 statement calling Israel’s announced allowance of basic food supplies wholly inadequate, demanding an end to military operations and immediate humanitarian access coordinated with the United Nations.[21] The leaders demanded the release of remaining hostages and condemned statements they characterized as threatening permanent displacement of Gaza’s civilians.[21] Separately, European countries including Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom took steps limiting arms trade or defense-industry ties with Israel; in October 2024, President Emmanuel Macron called for stopping supplies of weapons usable in Gaza or Lebanon.[22]

A June 20, 2025, EU review document reported indications of a breach of Article 2.[23] In the ensuing ministerial discussion, Spain, Ireland, Malta, and Slovenia favored suspending the agreement, while Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, and Romania opposed suspension.[23] Later in 2025, ministers discussed concrete measures but did not vote on them, instead relying on an EU-Israel understanding under which Israel was expected to improve Gaza’s humanitarian situation.[24] The Netherlands, joined by sixteen other member states in requesting exploration of suspension, said implementation would be monitored and future sanctions remained an option.[24] Kaja Kallas described the objective as “not to punish Israel, but to promote a ceasefire and a hostage release deal.”[24]

In July 2025, the Commission proposed restricting Israeli companies’ access to EIC Accelerator grants in certain dual-use Horizon fields, including drones, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity.[25] The proposed restriction did not cover Israeli universities or researchers participating in academic collaborations and required a qualified majority of member states representing 65 percent of the EU population.[25] At an informal meeting in Copenhagen in August, ministers also discussed trade-agreement suspension, settlement-product boycotts, and sanctions on ministers and violent settlers.[26] Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Slovenia favored stronger measures, while Germany and the Czech Republic opposed sanctions on the agenda; Germany objected to measures affecting the civilian sphere.[26]

Joint statements broadened the diplomatic calls for humanitarian access.[8][27] On July 21, foreign ministers from 24 countries and the EU crisis-management commissioner demanded a permanent ceasefire, unconditional hostage release, and the lifting of aid restrictions.[8] They criticized Israel’s aid-delivery model, opposed permanent displacement and proposals for a humanitarian city, warned that the E1 settlement plan would undermine a two-state solution, and supported American, Qatari, and Egyptian mediation.[8] On August 12, ministers from 24 countries and three EU officials called for large-scale humanitarian access, authorization of international NGO shipments, use of all crossings and routes, civilian and aid-worker protection, a ceasefire, and hostage release.[27]

On September 10, 2025, von der Leyen announced plans for sanctions on extremist ministers and violent settlers, a hold on bilateral support except for civil society and Yad Vashem, and partial suspension of trade-related provisions.[28] The Commission subsequently presented proposals for Council consideration, linking them to its Article 2 assessment, Gaza’s humanitarian situation, aid restrictions, intensified operations, and the E1 plan.[5] The package specified four draft legal acts, nine proposed listings concerning ministers and settlers, and reinforced listings against ten Hamas politburo members.[5] A related recommendation included establishing a fund for Palestinians.[29]

The proposed trade suspension would remove preferential access for Israeli goods and subject them to duties applied to countries without a free-trade agreement with the EU.[5] Trade measures required a qualified majority, while individual sanctions required unanimity; the qualified-majority threshold was described as fifteen of 27 member states representing at least 65 percent of the population.[5][28] Ireland, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands supported trade-pact suspension, while Germany’s support remained undecided when the formal package was reported.[30] These proposals did not themselves suspend trade preferences or establish that the Council would approve them.[5][3]

In October 2025, plans to restrict trade and sanction Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich were frozen after a US-brokered ceasefire, although the proposals had not been formally withdrawn.[31] They had also lacked adequate member-state support.[31] Spain, Ireland, and Slovenia renewed pressure for Association Agreement suspension at the April 21, 2026, Foreign Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg, while Germany, Italy, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Austria opposed the move.[32]

Targeted sanctions nevertheless advanced separately in May 2026.[3] The EU sanctioned violent settler actors and Hamas leaders, subsequently listing four settler organizations and three associated individuals and expanding restrictive measures to ten Hamas political-bureau members on the grounds that they influenced the military wing’s actions.[33] The measures included asset freezes and travel restrictions and were distinct from a general trade restriction on Israel.[33] On October 7, 2026, Kallas marked the attacks’ anniversary by saying Hamas had brought unspeakable suffering to Israelis, calling for its disarmament so the Gaza Peace Plan could advance, and firmly rejecting antisemitism.[34]

The EU’s position as Israel’s biggest trading partner gave the Association Agreement debate substantial economic significance, even when proposed restrictions did not secure approval.[3] A September 2025 report put total bilateral trade at €43 billion and described the free-trade agreement as applying to 37 percent of it.[29] The relationship also extended into scientific cooperation and student exchanges, making proposals concerning Horizon and other programmes consequential beyond conventional merchandise trade.[19][25]

European involvement was not confined to the Israeli-Palestinian arena.[2] Following Houthi attacks that disrupted Red Sea shipping, the EU launched the defensive naval operation EUNAVFOR Aspides on February 19, 2024, to protect merchant shipping and freedom of navigation rather than attack Houthi positions directly.[2] By July, five European frigates had escorted more than 170 merchant ships and intercepted nineteen Houthi missiles and drones.[2]

Protection of Jewish life in Europe formed another part of the response after October 7.[9] The Commission publicly condemned antisemitic incidents on November 5, 2023, and the European Council adopted conclusions condemning all forms of antisemitism on December 15.[9] Within a €30 million call for proposals, the Commission made €5 million available specifically to improve protection for Jewish places of worship, schools, and community gatherings.[9]

By 2025, the relationship combined substantial strategic ties with widening value-based differences, a tension identified in a scholarly publication on Israel-EU relations.[35] The continuation of aid and security activity[2] alongside failed or deferred suspension initiatives[24][31] illustrated that European criticism did not automatically translate into agreement on punitive measures.

International legal proceedings and assessments of Israeli conduct sharply divided European governments.[2] Germany said it would intervene on Israel’s behalf in the International Court of Justice proceedings initiated by South Africa; Austria, the Czech Republic, Italy, Hungary, and France expressed support for Israel, while Ireland, Slovenia, Belgium, and Spain supported South Africa.[2]

The leaked June 2025 EU review was non-binding and reported indications of violations rather than adjudicated findings.[23] It included allegations concerning indiscriminate attacks and restrictions contributing to starvation, while explicitly placing Hamas’s violence outside its scope; Israel rejected the review as factually incorrect and morally flawed.[23] The August humanitarian statement’s description of famine was likewise the position of its signatories.[27]

Israeli officials also rejected the 2026 sanctions, objecting to what they characterized as a moral equivalence between Israeli citizens and Hamas.[33] More broadly, the distinction between proposed and adopted measures remained essential: approval of targeted sanctions did not establish adoption of the separate proposal to suspend trade-related provisions of the Association Agreement.[3]