01In brief
Disinvestment from Israel is the withdrawal or exclusion of investments connected to Israel, undertaken through campaigns or institutional policies directed at Israeli companies, particular business activities, or companies with wider ties to the country. The Palestinian civil-society call of July 2005 urged international supporters to impose “broad boycotts and implement divestment initiatives against Israel similar to those applied to South Africa in the apartheid era.” Campaigns have involved churches, pension funds, university organizations, and other institutions, but resolutions recommending divestment are distinct from decisions by investment managers to sell assets. The scope, political implications, and economic effects of these measures—and their relationship to the broader Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement—have generated significant debate.
02Overview
University endowments, public pension funds, and corporate investments are prominent targets of disinvestment campaigns connected to Israel.[3] Institutional measures can include selling portfolio holdings, excluding future investment, or canceling contracts to exert economic pressure on a company or country.[2] In the Israeli context, proposals range from excluding individual companies over specified activities to withdrawing investments from a wider group of businesses with connections to Israel.[1][4]
Some campaigns concentrate on companies involved in settlement construction or the separation barrier in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[1] Others seek investment restrictions involving companies with broader commercial ties to Israel, including foreign corporations.[4] These different targets mean that disinvestment is not one uniform policy: a company-specific exclusion, a settlement-focused investment screen, and a demand for wider economic separation can involve substantially different portfolios and objectives.[1][2]
Disinvestment is also one component of the broader Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement, commonly abbreviated BDS, rather than a synonym for all its activities.[5] Its tactics include divestment campaigns, consumer boycotts, pressure on artists to cancel performances, and efforts to isolate Israeli institutions.[3][4] Its stated objectives include ending what it describes as Israel’s occupation and colonization of Arab lands, full equality for Palestinian citizens of Israel, and a right of return for Palestinian refugees.[2][3]
Both state and non-state actors have participated in investment-related pressure, including protest organizations, nongovernmental organizations, interest groups, and multinational companies.[1] Within institutions, the body promoting a measure may not control the investments concerned: student governments, for example, can recommend divestment, while university administrators and governing boards retain investment authority.[6]
03Origins and History
The contemporary campaign developed during the early 2000s, against the background of the Second Intifada, which began in 2000.[3] Boycott calls emerged in 2002 amid escalating violence and Israeli military operations in the West Bank, while construction of the security barrier gave additional momentum to campaigning.[3] The 2001 Durban Conference was an early point in the development of the modern campaign, followed in July 2004 by a call from the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel for academic and cultural boycotts.[1]
In July 2005, a coalition of 170 Palestinian civil-society organizations formally launched the BDS campaign.[1] Its call asked international civil society and individuals to pursue boycotts and divestment and to press governments for embargoes and sanctions.[2] It explicitly invoked the campaign against apartheid South Africa as a model and described the proposed measures as nonviolent.[2] The declaration also referred to the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on the barrier, issued the previous year.[3] The economic and political campaign extended efforts that had already sought Israel’s exclusion from academic and cultural settings.[1]
Church investment initiatives were developing during the same period.[7] In July 2004, the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) approved targeted divestment from businesses it believed bore particular responsibility for Palestinian suffering, initially giving the companies an opportunity to change their behavior.[7] A church spokesman subsequently explained that the initiative originated with a Florida congregation and regional presbytery seeking withdrawal from companies earning more than $1 million from business with Israel.[8] The national church instead adopted a phased, selective approach focused on specified activities, including work connected to the security fence and support for violence against civilians.[8]
By 2005, the World Council of Churches had also decided to withdraw investment money, while the United Church of Christ’s leadership rejected a divestment proposal but called for companies to use economic leverage to promote peace.[9] Protestant-Jewish disagreements over these initiatives accompanied efforts at dialogue, including a visit to Israel by 17 Protestant and Jewish religious and lay leaders.[9] The Jerusalem-based Palestinian Christian organization Sabeel, founded in 1990, published a 2005 document titled “A Call for Morally Responsible Investment: A Nonviolent Response to the Occupation.”[8]
The modern civil-society movement is distinct from the Arab League boycott, a state-associated system formalized against Israel in 1948.[10] That boycott included primary, secondary, and tertiary tiers, whereas BDS developed as an informal grouping of civil-society organizations without direct participation by a foreign state.[10] Its organization did not reproduce the Arab League system’s formal secondary tier targeting companies for doing business with Israel.[10]
04Practice and Application
Investment campaigns have sought both sales of existing holdings and exclusions preventing future investment, alongside related measures such as contract cancellations.[2] European pension funds and companies have withdrawn investments or canceled contracts connected to settlement activity, while American church councils have voted on company-specific exclusions.[2] Endowment campaigns can reach beyond directly owned shares because universities invest through private-capital funds, venture-capital funds, and other pooled vehicles.[11]
In 2024, campus demands included ending business with weapons manufacturers supplying Israel, stopping research funding for projects protesters said assisted Israeli military activity, and withdrawing endowment investments from managers profiting from Israeli companies or contractors.[12] At the University of Michigan, students pointed to more than $6 billion invested through managers; university officials said the institution held no direct investments in Israeli companies and that indirect exposure through funds amounted to a fraction of one percent of its $18 billion endowment.[12] The distinction between the total assets managed by an intermediary and the institution’s actual Israel-related exposure was therefore consequential to the demands.[12]
Institutional discussions do not necessarily result in asset sales.[11] In June 2024, administrations at Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Brown, and the University of Minnesota had pledged to hear or discuss student arguments, while meetings or votes were planned or considered at institutions including Washington, Rutgers, Wisconsin, Occidental, and the University of California.[11] These developments concerned proposals and deliberations, not a uniform set of completed divestment decisions.[11]
05Church Investment Decisions
The Presbyterian Church’s investment policy changed repeatedly after its 2004 initiative.[7] It joined a boycott of Caterpillar in 2005, but in June 2006 adopted a replacement resolution emphasizing investment in companies engaged in “peaceful pursuits” in Israel and the Palestinian territories.[7][13] In 2012, Presbyterian and United Methodist bodies supported settlement boycotts while rejecting divestment calls.[13] Presbyterian delegates rejected a proposal concerning Caterpillar, Hewlett-Packard, and Motorola by 333 votes to 331, with two abstentions.[14]
In June 2014, the Presbyterian General Assembly reversed its earlier rejection, voting 310–303 to divest from Caterpillar, Hewlett-Packard, and Motorola Solutions.[15] The action called on the church’s foundation and pension board to withdraw their investments.[16] Church objections concerned Caterpillar bulldozers used in home demolitions, Hewlett-Packard systems at checkpoints and supporting the Gaza blockade, and Motorola surveillance and communications systems in settlements.[15] The companies expressed regret over the decision.[15]
The resolution affirmed Israel’s right to exist and stated that divestment from the three companies did not amount to alignment with the broader BDS movement.[17] Church advocates similarly presented the decision as separate from that movement.[15] In 2015, the United Church of Christ voted to divest from companies profiting from Israel’s occupation or control of Palestinian territories and to boycott settlement products.[7]
In January 2016, the United Methodist Church’s investment agency announced that it would no longer invest in Israel’s five principal banks.[7] Its spokeswoman denied that the decision was related to BDS and said the funds remained invested in approximately 18 Israeli companies meeting its criteria.[7] The pension fund had $20.9 billion in assets; the five banks were among 39 companies from various countries excluded under its investment policy, and 13 other Israeli companies, including Shikun u’Binui, were also blacklisted.[18] BDS leaders welcomed the decision, while a United Methodist group advocating constructive peacemaking had denounced boycotts of Israel.[18]
06Pension Funds and Financial Institutions
In January 2014, Dutch pension manager PGGM announced that it had divested from Bank Hapoalim, Bank Leumi, First International Bank of Israel, Israel Discount Bank, and Mizrahi Tefahot over their financing of settlement construction.[19] PGGM said dialogue had failed to resolve its concerns because the banks had little room to end the activities involved.[19] The banks said Israeli law prevented them from refusing services in settlements, while Israel rejected the legal characterization underlying the decision.[19][20] The investments represented several tens of millions of dollars against more than $170 billion managed by PGGM.[19]
In 2019, the five banks were reported to have been removed from PGGM’s blacklist and were again presumed eligible for investment and other transactions.[21] Removal did not establish that PGGM had actually resumed investing in them.[21] A 2016 legal analysis also recorded the Dutch government’s May 2016 position that boycott activity was protected by constitutional freedom of expression.[22]
Norway’s Government Pension Fund made a series of company exclusions over several years, including Elbit Systems in 2009, Shikun & Binui in 2012, and Danya Cebus in 2013.[23] A 2021 account described withdrawals from Mivne Real Estate and Shapir Engineering, whose holdings were estimated at approximately $12 million and $1 million respectively.[23] The exclusions concerned Mivne’s leasing of settlement-linked industrial property and Shapir’s construction of settlement homes, with the fund citing an unacceptable risk of contributing to serious rights violations in war or conflict.[23]
On December 3, 2024, Norway’s fund sold its remaining Bezeq shares following a Council on Ethics recommendation.[24] Its holding had already fallen from 2.2% to 0.76% during that year.[24] The council’s rationale concerned telecommunications services facilitating the maintenance and expansion of settlements; Bezeq responded that the small holding would not affect the company and that its Area C operations complied with the Oslo Accords.[24]
In August 2025, the fund announced immediate divestment from 11 Israeli companies, without initially disclosing all their names.[25] Reporting that month identified sales involving Bank Hapoalim, Bank Leumi, Mizrahi Tefahot, First International Bank of Israel, and its parent FIBI; the status of Discount Bank’s stake remained unclear.[26] Holdings in six banks had been valued at $678 million at the end of the first half-year.[26] The ethics council characterized bank financing as a necessary prerequisite for settlement construction and cited risks of serious rights violations.[26]
The fund also acted on a recommendation to disinvest from Caterpillar, in which it held a 1.23% stake.[26] The council cited the use of bulldozers in destruction of Palestinian property that it characterized as unlawful, and the company’s failure to prevent such use.[26] Fund chief executive Nicolai Tangen said further Israeli-company withdrawals were expected but that the fund did not intend to liquidate its Israeli investments entirely.[26]
Other investment sales have required caution in interpreting motives.[27] In May 2010, Deutsche Bank’s chief executive confirmed the sale of all its Elbit Systems shares without stating a reason.[27] Its holding had been 50,000 shares, approximately 0.1% of the company, at the end of March.[27] Groups campaigning against the separation fence claimed success, but the bank itself did not establish a campaign-related explanation for the transaction.[27]
07University Campaigns
In February 2015, student bodies at Northwestern, Stanford, and the University of California Student Association passed divestment resolutions within two weeks.[28] Contemporary reporting described only a few dozen student-government votes since 2012, of which about a dozen had passed, while administrators and boards widely rejected divestment.[6] University leaders raised concerns about investment responsibilities, whereas student activists said resolutions encouraged discussion of Palestinian rights.[28]
A longer-period tally listed 194 proposals across 92 schools, with 110 classified as defeated; student-government resolutions did not themselves determine university investment policy.[29] Because campus tallies use different periods and definitions, they should not be treated as directly comparable with annual counts.[29][30]
During the 2023–2024 academic year, a campus tally recorded 77 BDS resolutions passing and nine being voted down among undergraduate, graduate, and professional student organizations and faculty or staff unions—86 resolved measures—with another ten tabled or lacking a definitive outcome.[30] An earlier account of that protest period used a tally of 80 resolutions, including 71 passed and nine rejected, and reported that no institutions had adopted or implemented BDS measures at that point, although some agreed to discussions.[31] Neither tally represents a count of universities that sold investments.[30][31]
Brown University’s 2024 encampment ended after the administration agreed that students could present a divestment case at a fall board meeting.[32] That agreement provided an opportunity for consideration rather than an announced decision to divest.[32] Estimates of university exposure also varied: investor Zeev Holtzman estimated that endowments supplied 2%–3% of foreign capital entering Israeli technology, while Minnesota protesters claimed $2.4 million in Israeli-company holdings, or 0.11% of the university’s portfolio.[11] A 2020 student-newspaper estimate put direct Israeli-company investments made on Harvard’s behalf at about $200 million.[11]
Harvard’s 2010 share sales illustrate the importance of distinguishing transactions from political divestment.[33][34] A regulatory filing showed sales of 483,590 Teva shares for $30.5 million, 52,360 NICE Systems shares for $1.67 million, 102,940 Check Point shares for $3.6 million, 32,400 Cellcom shares for $1.1 million, and 80,000 Partner Communications shares for $1.8 million.[33] An initial report described the sale of all Israeli holdings, but Harvard subsequently denied divesting from Israel and said it remained invested there.[33][34] Its spokesman attributed the transactions to economic considerations and portfolio rebalancing after Israel moved from an emerging-markets benchmark to the EAFE developed-markets index; the filing represented only a small part of Harvard’s $26 billion portfolio.[34]
08Significance
Foreign investment in Israel tripled between 2005 and 2016 despite individual institutional withdrawals.[2] This trend documents the coexistence of divestment decisions and expanding investment, rather than establishing that BDS caused the broader change. CRS assessed boycotts and divestment as having little overall effect on Israel’s economy while recognizing specific withdrawals.[2]
Potential losses and observed outcomes are different measures. CRS described the economic impact of European Union settlement-product labeling as muted and cited an estimate placing the affected trade below 1% of Israel’s annual trade with the EU.[2]
The older Arab League boycott likewise combined economic and symbolic dimensions, with enforcement varying among countries and over time.[10] A cited study of the 1994 Israeli automobile market estimated that continued exclusion of Asian car exports would have left the market 12% smaller, raised prices by $790 per car, and produced an estimated $89 million welfare loss.[10] Its symbolic importance persisted even as its economic effect appeared limited.[10]
Company relocations also affected Palestinian employment.[2] SodaStream closed its West Bank factory in September 2015 and moved operations inside Israel; its chief executive described BDS’s role in the changes as marginal.[2] Between 500 and 600 Palestinian employees lost their jobs because they lacked permits for the new location, while 74 obtained permits in May 2017 after repeated company requests.[2]
Governments have responded through investment and contracting rules of their own.[35] On June 5, 2016, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed an executive order requiring state agencies to divest funds from entities engaging in BDS activity.[35] The proposed Combating BDS Act, introduced as H.R. 2856 on June 8, 2017, sought to permit state and local restrictions on investments and contracts involving entities knowingly engaging in specified BDS-related activity.[36] It was referred to the House Financial Services Committee and remained listed as introduced, rather than enacted.[36]
09Controversies
Whether settlement-focused exclusions constitute BDS is disputed, including among people who oppose economic measures against Israel generally but support measures directed at settlements.[2] Disagreement also extends to related policies: the European Commission presented its 2015 settlement-product origin-labeling notice as consumer information rather than a boycott, Israel’s Foreign Ministry called it discriminatory and boycott-inspired, and the Palestine Liberation Organization’s secretary general welcomed it as a step toward a total settlement boycott.[2]
BDS’s political implications and relationship to antisemitism are fiercely contested.[4][5] The movement rejects antisemitism and distinguishes it from anti-Zionism, while Israel and many Jewish institutions argue that its demands threaten Israel’s character as a Jewish state or reflect antisemitic targeting.[4] A British survey of 4,005 people aged 16 and older, conducted between October 2016 and February 2017, found 10% supporting a boycott of Israeli goods to some extent and 47% opposed; it measured consumer-boycott attitudes, not institutional disinvestment.[5] Its authors emphasized that context matters and that criticism or boycott support is not necessarily antisemitic in every case.[5]
The constitutional status of American anti-BDS restrictions has also been disputed, including whether boycott activity is protected expression and whether investment restrictions suppress a disfavored message.[35] Economic and employment claims remain debated as well: opponents argue that pressure can harm Palestinian workers, while Palestinians and human-rights groups emphasize settlement policy and movement, access, and zoning restrictions as constraints on employment and investment.[2]
Sources
- 1Institute for National Security Studies, The Delegitimization Phenomenon: Challenges and Responses, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 2EveryCRSReport, Congressional Research Service: Israel and BDS, 2017, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 3My Jewish Learning, What Is BDS?, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 4Anti-Defamation League, Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement (BDS), accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 5Institute for Jewish Policy Research, The Apartheid Contention and Calls for a Boycott, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 6The Times of Israel, The Times of Israel / AP: BDS Push at U.S. Colleges, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 7Jewish Virtual Library, The History of the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) Movement, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 8Globes, ADL: Palestinian group behind church divestment campaign, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 9Globes, Protestant-Jewish group in Israel to meet on divestment, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 10EveryCRSReport, Arab League Boycott of Israel, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 11Globes, Divestment by US universities could hit Israel hard, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 12The Times of Israel, University Protest Divestment Demands, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 13Foundation for Defense of Democracies, War by Other Means, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 14The Times of Israel, Presbyterian Vote Against Divestment, 2012, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 15The Times of Israel, Presbyterian Divestment, 2014, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 16American Jewish Committee, AJC: Presbyterian Divestment A Breach with Jews, Undermines Israeli-Palestinian Peace, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 17Congress.gov, Congressional Record: Presbyterian Divestment Resolution, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 18Globes, US United Methodist Church blacklists Israeli banks, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 19The Times of Israel, PGGM Divests from Israeli Banks, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 20Globes, Dutch pension fund disinvests from Israel, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 21The Times of Israel, PGGM Removes Israeli Banks from Blacklist, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 22Institute for Jewish Policy Research, Talia Naamat: Anti-Israeli Boycott and Legal Trends, JPR Archive, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 23Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Norwegian divestment illustrates weakness of campaign to boycott Israel, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 24Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Claiming ‘Ethics Concerns,’ Norway’s Sovereign Fund Divests From Israeli Telecommunications Company, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 25Anti-Defamation League, ADL and JLens Condemn Norway’s Double Standard in Singling Out Israel, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 26Globes, Norwegian wealth fund disinvests from Israeli banks, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 27Globes, Deutsche Bank divests Elbit Systems stake, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 28The Times of Israel, The Times of Israel / JTA: Campus Resolutions and Changing Tactics, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 29Jewish Virtual Library, Campus Divestment Resolutions in the USA, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 30Anti-Defamation League, Anti-Israel Activism on U.S. Campuses, 2023-2024, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 31Institute for National Security Studies, How Israel Should Respond to Pro-Palestinian Protests on US Campuses, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 32World Jewish Congress, Jewish Life on Campus During the Israel-Hamas War, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 33Globes, Harvard University fund sells all Israel holdings, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 34Globes, Harvard denies divestment from Israel, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 35EveryCRSReport, Israel and the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) Movement, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 36Congress.gov, H.R. 2856, Combating BDS Act of 2017, accessed on November 5, 2026.
IsraelPedia Question & Answers
What is disinvestment from Israel?
Disinvestment from Israel is the withdrawal or exclusion of investments connected to Israel through campaigns or institutional policies. Measures may target particular companies or activities, or a wider group of businesses with ties to Israel. A resolution recommending divestment is not the same as an investment manager deciding to sell assets.
How did the modern disinvestment campaign against Israel begin?
The contemporary campaign developed during the early 2000s, against the background of the Second Intifada, which began in 2000. In July 2005, a coalition of 170 Palestinian civil-society organizations formally launched the BDS campaign, calling for boycotts and divestment and urging governments to impose embargoes and sanctions. The call invoked the campaign against apartheid South Africa as a model and described the proposed measures as nonviolent.
How is disinvestment from Israel related to the BDS movement?
Disinvestment is one component of the broader Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement, or BDS, rather than a synonym for all its activities. BDS also includes consumer boycotts, pressure on artists to cancel performances, and efforts to isolate Israeli institutions. Its stated objectives include ending what it describes as Israel’s occupation and colonization of Arab lands, full equality for Palestinian citizens of Israel, and a right of return for Palestinian refugees.
What did the Presbyterian Church decide about divestment from Israel?
In June 2014, the Presbyterian General Assembly voted 310–303 to divest from Caterpillar, Hewlett-Packard, and Motorola Solutions, calling on the church’s foundation and pension board to withdraw their investments. The decision followed earlier changes in the church’s investment policy, including a 2012 vote rejecting a divestment proposal concerning those companies. The 2014 resolution affirmed Israel’s right to exist and said the action did not amount to alignment with the broader BDS movement.
What did Norway’s Government Pension Fund do about Israeli companies?
Norway’s Government Pension Fund excluded several companies over the years, including Elbit Systems in 2009, Shikun & Binui in 2012, and Danya Cebus in 2013. On December 3, 2024, it sold its remaining Bezeq shares following a Council on Ethics recommendation. In August 2025, it announced immediate divestment from 11 Israeli companies; its chief executive said further withdrawals were expected, but the fund did not intend to liquidate its Israeli investments entirely.
Do university divestment resolutions mean that universities have sold their investments?
No. Student-government resolutions and other campus proposals do not themselves determine university investment policy, and discussions or votes do not necessarily result in asset sales. In June 2024, several university administrations had agreed to hear or discuss student arguments, while other institutions had meetings or votes planned or under consideration. A campus tally of resolutions is not a count of universities that sold investments.
What has been the overall economic impact of disinvestment from Israel?
Foreign investment in Israel tripled between 2005 and 2016 despite individual institutional withdrawals. The Congressional Research Service assessed boycotts and divestment as having little overall effect on Israel’s economy while recognizing specific withdrawals. These facts show that investment growth and individual divestment decisions occurred at the same time; they do not establish that BDS caused the broader investment trend.