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COVID-19 Pandemic in Israel

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01In brief

The COVID-19 pandemic in Israel was a public-health crisis that began in late February 2020 and brought successive waves of infection, nationwide lockdowns, and a mass vaccination campaign. By early February 2021, close to one third of Israel’s population had received at least one vaccine dose, making vaccination a defining feature of the national response. Israel combined restrictions on movement and gatherings with expanded testing, digital contact tracing, military logistical assistance, and medical research. By May 2023, the country had recorded more than 4.8 million cases and 12,500 deaths, while the response had also produced far-reaching economic, educational, social, and legal consequences.

02Background

Israel began preparing prevention guidelines in January 2020, before the virus surfaced domestically, including quarantine requirements for symptomatic people and restrictions on tourists arriving from some countries.[3] On January 26, officials advised against nonessential travel to China, and the health minister declared the virus a serious danger to public health on January 27.[5][6] Flights from several countries with high infection rates were suspended in the following weeks, and on February 26 the government urged Israelis to cancel foreign travel.[5]

The response subsequently drew on institutions extending well beyond the health sector: the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance, Prime Minister’s Office, Mossad, Ministry of Defense, and Israel Defense Forces all participated.[3] The defense establishment supplied administrative, technological, and logistical support, while the health system’s universal coverage, electronic records, emergency preparedness, and connections between public and private organizations provided resources for rapid action.[3][7] These arrangements became the institutional setting for restrictions, testing, tracing, and eventually vaccine distribution.[1][7]

03Course of Events

The virus surfaced in Israel in late February 2020, with early positive tests involving people returning from abroad.[3][8] Two returnees from the Diamond Princess cruise ship tested positive before the February 27 announcement of an infected traveler from Italy; the earlier returnees had not been classified as ill in that announcement.[8] The traveler from Italy was transported by Magen David Adom to a designated facility at Sheba Medical Center, and people who had been in contact with him were instructed to isolate at home.[8] By March 2, more than 5,000 Israelis were in self-isolation, and separate voting booths were provided for them during the election.[9]

On March 9, with 42 confirmed cases reported, Israel required returning citizens to quarantine at home for 14 days; foreign citizens could enter only if they could meet the home-quarantine requirement.[10] Schools and universities closed on March 12.[5] By March 15, confirmed cases had reached 200, and restrictions included a ten-person limit on public and religious gatherings and the closure of gyms, pools, malls, bars, cinemas, and other nonessential venues.[11] Restaurants and cafés could provide takeaway service, while supermarkets, pharmacies, banks, and health clinics remained open; employers were instructed to prepare for home working, and people were urged to maintain two meters of separation.[11]

A national emergency was declared on March 19, making restrictions legally enforceable.[9] On March 22, private-sector activity was limited to 30 percent of normal capacity and the public sector moved to emergency staffing; private-sector capacity was reduced further to 15 percent on March 30.[6] From March 25, most people could not move more than 100 meters from home except for specified purposes, including medical treatment and obtaining food.[5] The first full national lockdown lasted from March 25 to May 4, while public mask-wearing requirements followed the initial movement restrictions.[12][5]

Restrictions became particularly strict during Passover, beginning April 8, and in majority-Muslim areas during Ramadan, which began April 25.[5] A three-day Passover closure prohibited intercity travel, police and army units staffed major junctions, and Jerusalem was divided into zones.[9] Some high-infection cities and neighborhoods were placed under full quarantine, with the army supplying basic services and support.[5]

Israel’s first recorded COVID-19 death was that of Aryeh Even, an 88-year-old Holocaust survivor, in March 2020.[13] In a newly built, fully occupied, 20-bed isolation ward at Jerusalem’s Shaare Zedek Medical Center, patients communicated with staff through monitors and video intercoms.[14] Around 20 staff members had volunteered for the unit, and fellow patients gathered around Even as he was dying, said the Shema, and told him, “Aryeh, we’re with you, we love you.”[14]

Testing expanded during March from several hundred tests daily to more than 2,000.[15] The initial testing strategy sought to understand the virus’s behavior in Israel and guide choices between prepared response scenarios, rather than diagnose every infected person.[15] A Mossad operation brought 100,000 testing kits, although the immediate shortage identified by the Health Ministry was of sample-collection swabs, which were not included in that shipment.[15] By May 22, Israel had conducted 531,124 tests, diagnosed 16,690 patients, recorded 13,915 recoveries, and reported 279 deaths.[16]

Digital contact tracing developed alongside physical restrictions.[16] Emergency regulations issued on March 17 authorized the Israel Security Agency, also known as Shin Bet, to process technological information identifying patients’ locations and movements during the 14 days before diagnosis and locate people potentially exposed to them.[16] The information was intended for Health Ministry epidemiological investigations, rather than direct patient contact or enforcement by the security agency, while separate police powers concerned quarantine enforcement.[17] The voluntary HaMagen application, launched in March, compared users’ GPS histories with records of locations visited by diagnosed patients and let users confirm or reject possible-exposure alerts.[16] Available in Hebrew, Arabic, English, Russian, and Amharic, it was installed on 1.5 million devices, although GPS limitations made proximity within buildings difficult to determine.[16]

Gradual easing began in the last week of April, with schools, some businesses, and public spaces reopening under strict rules from early May.[5] April recorded 10,151 positive diagnoses and 205 deaths, compared with 1,187 diagnoses and 63 deaths in May.[13] On May 26, the government approved the removal of restrictions, while warning that restrictions could return if morbidity increased.[13] Much of public life and the economy reopened during the summer, with masking and distancing requirements remaining in place.[5]

The decline proved temporary: daily new cases increased from dozens in mid-May to about 2,000 by late July.[18] On July 8, Israel reported a then-record 1,319 new infections over 24 hours, 343 cumulative deaths, and 83 critically ill patients.[19] Hospitals were instructed to reduce some non-COVID outpatient and surgical activity to redirect staff and resources.[19] Renewed restrictions closed gyms, nightclubs, bars, and event halls, while restaurants and cafés were limited to 20 indoor and 30 outdoor diners.[19] Beitar Illit entered lockdown after 179 new cases in seven days and a test-positivity rate of 16 percent; school infections also led to closures or pupil isolation.[19]

On July 23, the Knesset enacted the Special Authorities to Combat the Novel Coronavirus (Temporary Provision) Law, replacing reliance on emergency regulations with a statutory framework.[1] Initially scheduled to remain in effect until June 30, 2021, the law authorized declarations of a coronavirus state of emergency and regulations covering businesses, workplaces, education, transport, distancing, and gatherings.[20] It also permitted designation of high-morbidity restricted areas, subject to time limits and parliamentary review.[20]

A second nationwide lockdown began on September 18, following the renewed rise in infections.[1][13] September recorded 130,462 positive diagnoses and 651 deaths, and the lockdown lasted 21 days.[13] Infection numbers fell during the first two lockdowns but rose again as restrictions were eased.[21] A third lockdown began on December 27, overlapping with the opening of the vaccination campaign.[13][1] Across 2020, Israel recorded 425,516 positive diagnoses and 3,372 deaths.[13]

The first Pfizer shipment arrived on December 9, and mass vaccination began in December 2020.[22] Israel had reached agreements with Pfizer, Moderna, and AstraZeneca, while its early distribution effort relied on universal health coverage, the health funds’ digital records, and an established dose-distribution network.[22] Priority groups included people aged 60 and older, younger people with health conditions placing them at risk, medical personnel, and certain essential role holders.[1] About two weeks into the campaign, nearly 15 percent of approximately 9.3 million residents had been vaccinated.[22]

The early-2021 wave was associated with Alpha: January recorded 220,155 positive diagnoses and 1,444 deaths, and February recorded 131,568 diagnoses and 948 deaths.[13] The January peak included approximately 10,000 newly confirmed cases in a single day.[1] Meanwhile, close to one third of the population had received at least one vaccine dose by early February.[2] On February 21, Israel began a broad reopening: shops were open to everyone, but gyms and theaters admitted vaccinated or recovered people displaying the Health Ministry’s Green Pass status.[23] More than 45 percent of the population had received at least one Pfizer dose by that point, while distancing remained mandatory, dancing at banquet halls was prohibited, and worship venues were required to halve attendance.[23]

The Green Pass subsequently operated as a legal requirement for entry to certain businesses and public settings beginning in March.[24] Eligibility included people with two vaccine doses, people recovered from COVID-19, and participants in an Israeli vaccine-development clinical trial.[24] Border restrictions also intensified: foreign air travel was halted from January 25, 2021, and land borders closed on January 28, with returning citizens initially subject to quotas and exceptions-committee approval.[25]

Cases declined in the spring before rising again from mid-June during a fourth wave associated with Delta and waning immunity.[13][26] Daily confirmed cases increased from fewer than 30 in mid-June to about 11,000 in early September.[26] Israel introduced boosters for people over 60 in late July, then extended eligibility to those over 50 and, on August 20, to people aged 40 and older.[27] More than 1.2 million Israelis had received a Pfizer booster by August 20, when Prime Minister Naftali Bennett received his third dose.[27]

By the end of July, 5.78 million people had received a first dose, 5.38 million a second, and 14,000 a third.[1] Booster uptake subsequently expanded during a period when August and September recorded 202,273 and 207,019 positive diagnoses respectively.[13] Severe hospitalizations and death rates during the fourth wave were lower than in earlier waves and were largely concentrated among people not fully vaccinated.[26] No lockdown was imposed during the Bennett government’s later-2021 rise in cases; the year ended with 961,906 positive diagnoses and 4,890 deaths.[13]

Omicron brought much larger reported case counts in early 2022.[13] January recorded 1,537,701 positive diagnoses, averaging 49,603 daily, with a one-day record of 85,283 on January 23.[13] No lockdown was imposed despite those totals.[13] February recorded another 714,225 diagnoses and 1,266 deaths, while the full-year totals were 3,376,628 diagnoses and 3,807 deaths.[13] Israel lifted its indoor mask mandate in April 2022.[4]

04Aftermath

By May 2023, Israel had recorded more than 4.8 million cases and 12,500 deaths, and mandatory home isolation for infected people was scheduled to end on May 15.[4] The Health Ministry continued publishing data nearly daily, with approximately 2,000 tests and 200 positive diagnoses each day; actual infections were likely higher because many people were not tested.[13] By then, 18,649,240 vaccine doses had been administered: 6,723,118 people had received a first dose, 6,159,824 two doses, 4,513,463 a booster, 846,413 a fourth dose, and 406,422 a fifth, Omicron-adapted dose.[13]

The economic shock was immediate and uneven.[28] An April 2020 assessment estimated monthly lost GDP above NIS 40 billion and nearly 1.5 million people unemployed or on unpaid leave; these were contemporary estimates rather than final measurements of the pandemic’s cumulative effects.[29] A separate early account put unemployment at 17.6 percent on March 23.[9] By July 2020, approximately 500,000 people, or 12 percent of the labor force under the cited statistical measure, were out of work.[28] Private-sector workers in tourism, restaurants, culture, leisure, transportation, and retail were particularly affected.[28]

School disruption extended well beyond the first closure.[1] Between March 2020 and February 2021, the education system recorded only 11 days of full operation, 81 days of distance learning alone, and 128 days combining remote and in-person instruction.[1] NGOs estimated that about 50,000 Bedouin students lacked computers, tablets, or school infrastructure necessary for distance learning after the March closures.[30] These gaps accompanied broader difficulties sustaining ordinary family and working life under restrictions.[30]

The mental-health hotline Eran reported that its daily call volume had tripled early in the outbreak, with callers describing loneliness, financial anxiety, and uncertainty about the pandemic’s duration.[9] Police received 19 percent more calls concerning violence against women during March–May 2020 than during the same months of 2019.[30] Reports of domestic violence nearly tripled between March and October compared with the corresponding period in 2019.[30]

Older institutional residents experienced a concentrated burden of mortality.[31] Approximately 71,100 older adults lived in residential institutions in April 2020, and residents accounted for 36 percent of recorded COVID-19 deaths through October.[31] Recommendations included examining better isolation arrangements and increasing weekend testing of residents and staff; general-population testing on weekends had been more than 50 percent lower than on other days in the available August data.[31]

The distribution of infection changed between waves.[32] A retrospective analysis covering March 11, 2020, through December 1, 2021, and data representing 98.8 percent of the population found higher initial caseloads in Jewish localities.[32] During the second and third waves, low-socioeconomic-status localities and Arab minority populations experienced two to three times higher morbidity, with a similar but weaker pattern in the fourth wave.[32] Hospitalizations followed a comparable pattern, but COVID-associated mortality showed no clear socioeconomic gradient.[32]

Vaccination also displayed substantial socioeconomic differences by December 2021.[32] Two-dose coverage was 71 and 74 percent in the two highest socioeconomic clusters, compared with 43 and 27 percent in the two lowest.[32] Third-dose coverage reached 57–60 percent in the highest clusters but only 25–31 percent in the lowest.[32] Differences were larger among younger age groups and widened between first and third doses.[32]

The crisis reshaped national politics as well as everyday life.[33] Netanyahu and Benny Gantz agreed in April 2020 to form an emergency unity government, and the government took office in May, citing the pandemic and its health and economic consequences as a major reason for ending the political stalemate.[33][34] Netanyahu’s corruption trial was postponed following the national emergency declaration.[33] The failure to pass a budget subsequently led to the Knesset’s dissolution in December 2020 and another election in March 2021.[33]

Local relations also changed under the pressure of the outbreak.[35] Research on Jerusalem’s March–May 2020 first wave examined the heavily affected Haredi community in West Jerusalem and Palestinian community in East Jerusalem, finding changes in public stereotypes and temporary shifts in relationships with the authorities managing the crisis.[35]

05Historiography and Legacy

Israel’s vaccination campaign produced large-scale evidence about vaccine performance outside clinical trials.[36] A nationwide observational study matched 596,618 newly vaccinated people with an equal number of unvaccinated controls using data from December 20, 2020, through February 1, 2021.[36] At least seven days after the second dose, estimated Pfizer-BioNTech BNT162b2 effectiveness was 92 percent against documented infection, 94 percent against symptomatic disease, 87 percent against hospitalization, and 92 percent against severe disease.[36]

Research on the Delta wave found that the morbidity gap between vaccinated and unvaccinated groups, which had narrowed several months after vaccination began, widened again following third-dose uptake.[26] High vaccine coverage may have contributed to the lower hospitalization and mortality seen during that fourth wave.[26] A 2023 review identified Israel as the first country to implement booster vaccination and highlighted collaboration among health authorities, care providers, academia, the military, and other sectors, together with expanded laboratory capacity and surveillance, as strengths of the response.[37]

Technological adaptation was another distinctive feature.[3] The Defense Ministry’s Directorate of Defense Research and Development pursued a breathalyzer designed to detect COVID-19 in one minute and an “artificial nose” intended to diagnose it in 30 seconds; these were development projects, not demonstrations that all the tools were validated or deployed at scale.[3] The directorate also adapted border radar to measure temperature, pulse, and breathing rate from three meters away.[3] IDF assistance extended to COVID-19 hotels, lockdown enforcement, food distribution, and technological projects.[3]

The testing infrastructure expanded to 40 laboratories and approximately two million tests by August 9, 2020.[31] The broader public-health toolkit included wastewater monitoring, partial border closures, physical distancing, digital tracing, and Green Pass certificates.[7] Universal health coverage, electronic records, emergency preparedness, innovation, and an internationally connected scientific community supported rapid implementation.[7]

Contemporary policy frameworks illustrate the changing strategic priorities during the crisis.[29] An April 8, 2020, framework assessed that restrictions had slowed transmission after roughly two weeks and preserved a substantial margin between severe cases and ventilation and intensive-care capacity.[29] It proposed three phases: slowing spread while building health capacity; gradually restoring economic and daily activity while the virus remained present; and establishing a routine of “living with corona” until infection risks receded or vaccination or treatment became available.[29] Expanded testing, screening, monitoring, protective isolation of high-risk populations, and continued restrictions in high-risk areas were recommendations within that framework, rather than a record that every measure was adopted.[29]

An October framework distinguished between an initial government easing threshold of 2,000 daily cases with a reproduction rate of 0.8 and a recommended lower range of 500–1,000 daily cases for nationwide easing.[38] It favored maintaining restrictions in red zones and limiting mass gatherings, reflecting the search for alternatives to repeated broad closures.[38] Earlier resilience planning emphasized credible public information, public trust, civic involvement, and IDF logistical support; a February survey found that 76 percent of respondents had not tried to verify rumors, while the same proportion said they would comply with voluntary quarantine instructions.[39]

Retrospective assessments identified staffing shortages, changing early case definitions, quarantine difficulties in underprivileged communities, and problems of communication, trust, and cooperation with some ethnic and religious minorities.[37] Operational reviews found that approximately 64 percent of a sample of 76 Jerusalem epidemiological investigations began four or more days after diagnosis, rather than within the identified effective window of 24–48 hours, and that investigators initially recorded information manually.[31] Between April 2020 and February 2021, 96 percent of approximately 551,000 incoming airport travelers were directed to home isolation and only about 4 percent to government quarantine hotels, exposing difficulties of compliance and enforcement.[21]

The early mortality experience differed from the later cumulative toll.[40][4] Deaths in spring 2020 were only 3–7 percent above the 2016–2019 average, with no noticeable excess mortality in March–May among either Jewish or Arab populations in the cited demographic analysis.[40] Later health-system reviews emphasized the value of stronger public communication and formal mechanisms to revisit or reverse rapid decisions as evidence changed.[7]

06Governance and Rights Debates

Security-agency tracing generated significant disputes over privacy, proportionality, effectiveness, and parliamentary oversight.[16] On March 19, 2020, the Supreme Court froze police tracking authority and required parliamentary oversight of emergency surveillance; on April 26, it unanimously required legislative authorization for the ISA program.[41][16] The government announced a halt on June 8, but legislation passed on July 21 later permitted limited tracking for renewable 21-day periods when daily confirmed cases exceeded 200.[16][30] A March 14, 2021, ruling limited tracking to patients who did not cooperate with epidemiological investigations; the authorizing law expired in July, and a brief Omicron-related renewal lasted from November 28 to December 2.[25]

Restrictions on movement and protest also underwent judicial review.[25] On March 17, 2021, the Supreme Court held that airport entry quotas violated citizens’ right to enter Israel and ordered the regulation not renewed after March 20, while allowing limits based on effective capacity.[25] On April 4, it struck down a rule limiting demonstrations to within half a mile of home and canceled nearly 11,000 related fines, but upheld 20-person group limits and distancing requirements.[25] Green Pass restrictions raised questions of equality, proportionality, fairness, solidarity, and trust.[24] After Acre restricted beach access to Green Pass holders, the attorney general advised in September 2021 that the municipality lacked a legal basis for doing so.[25]

Religious access was affected across communities.[42] During Ramadan in April 2021, entry from the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — to Jerusalem for worship at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount was limited to 10,000 vaccinated people, with authorities citing high morbidity and the need to protect health while permitting worship.[42] Other measures limited worshippers at the Western Wall and required Green Passes for synagogue entry.[42] A contemporary Jewish Review of Books essay described resistance to school closures among some Haredi leaders followed by increased compliance, and reported that Bnei Brak accounted for 16 percent of cases despite comprising about 2 percent of the population.[43]

Palestinian vaccine access became a separate legal and political dispute.[2] Human-rights organizations argued that Israel had legal, moral, or humanitarian responsibilities, while Israel maintained that public-health powers had transferred to the Palestinian Authority under the Interim Agreement.[2] Early coordination included medical training and transfers of testing kits and protective equipment; on January 29, 2021, Israeli leaders approved 5,000 vaccine doses for Palestinian medical teams, following an earlier 100-dose transfer.[44][2] A proposed June exchange of up to 1.4 million doses collapsed when the Palestinian Authority rejected doses over approaching expiration dates and returned 90,000 already received.[45][44]

Official audits identified shortcomings in decision-making and coordination.[21] The coronavirus cabinet initially lacked delegated decision-making authority, did not meet between July 3 and August 2, 2020, and restrictions were eased faster than the expert roadmap recommended without evaluating each step’s effects.[21] Public-health chief Sigal Sadetzki resigned while criticizing rapid reopening; explanations of the second wave included schools, mass events, and compliance, rather than one established cause.[19] A 2024 audit found that the Pfizer exclusivity decision had not been submitted to the cabinet, while recognizing its significant contribution to preventing severe illness and deaths.[46] By October 2022, Israel had paid NIS 3.4 billion for vaccines and options and received 29 million doses; the same audit identified inadequate transfer of organizational knowledge between successive national coordination bodies and significant decisions made outside cabinet approval.[46]

Sources

  1. 1State Comptroller of Israel, Introduction to the COVID-19 Crisis Response, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  2. 2Institute for National Security Studies, The Palestinians and COVID-19 Vaccines: An Israeli Responsibility?, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  3. 3Institute for National Security Studies, The Role of Advanced Technology in the Struggle against Covid-19, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  4. 4The Times of Israel, COVID-19 Milestone as the Global Emergency Ends, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  5. 5National Library of Israel, COVID-19 Crisis Response, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  6. 6Israeli Government, Investor Newsletter, July 2020, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  7. 7Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, The Israeli Health System’s Rapid Responses, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  8. 8Ynet, First coronavirus patient in Israel, arrived from Italy four days ago, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  9. 9HonestReporting, How Israel Is Dealing with Coronavirus, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  10. 10CTech by Calcalist, For Fear of Coronavirus, Israel Closes all Borders, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  11. 11CTech by Calcalist, Israel Shuts Down Non-Essential Activity as Number of Patients Jumps to 200, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  12. 12State Comptroller of Israel, COVID-19 Management and Local Authorities, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  13. 13Ynet, Between waves of morbidity, lockdowns, and 12,500 victims: Coronavirus in Israel—from the first patient until today, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  14. 14The Times of Israel, Patients’ Farewell in an Isolation Ward, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  15. 15CTech by Calcalist, As Number of Covid-19 Cases Increases, Mossad Brings 100,000 Testing Kits to Israel, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  16. 16Library of Congress, Electronic Tracing and COVID-19 in Israel, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  17. 17CTech by Calcalist, Israeli Government Bypasses Parliament, Approves Surveillance on Civilians to Fight Covid-19, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  18. 18Encyclopaedia Britannica, Israel, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  19. 19CTech by Calcalist, Second wave: Israel registers record-breaking 1,300 new daily Covid-19 infections, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  20. 20Library of Congress, Special Coronavirus Authorities Law, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  21. 21State Comptroller of Israel, Managing the Pandemic at the National Level, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  22. 22CTech by Calcalist, These are the key ingredients of Israel's rapid Covid-19 vaccine rollout recipe, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  23. 23CTech by Calcalist, With nearly half the population vaccinated, Israel eases lockdown measures, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  24. 24Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Lessons from Israel's COVID-19 Green Pass program, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  25. 25Jewish Virtual Library, Report on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Israel, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  26. 26Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Changes in infectivity, severity and vaccine effectiveness against delta COVID-19 variant ten months into the vaccination program: The Israeli case, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  27. 27National Library of Israel, i24NEWS, August 2021 Booster Expansion, Archived, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  28. 28Institute for National Security Studies, The Israeli Economy on the Eve of the Second Lockdown: A Strategic Outline for the Future, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  29. 29Institute for National Security Studies, The National Struggle against the Coronavirus: An Integrated, Multi-Phase Systemic Campaign | The INSS Strategic Framework, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  30. 30Jewish Virtual Library, Report on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Israel, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  31. 31State Comptroller of Israel, Special Interim Report on the COVID-19 Crisis, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  32. 32Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Sociodemographic disparities in COVID-19 burden: changing patterns over four pandemic waves in Israel, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  33. 33Encyclopaedia Britannica, Britannica Kids, Israel, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  34. 34EveryCRSReport, Congressional Research Service, Israel Report, May 18, 2020, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  35. 35Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, Publications, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  36. 36Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, BNT162b2 in a Nationwide Mass Vaccination Setting, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  37. 37Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Review of Israel’s action and response during the COVID-19 pandemic and tabletop exercise for the evaluation of readiness and resilience—lessons learned 2020–2021, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  38. 38Institute for National Security Studies, Exiting the Second Lockdown, Living in the Presence of Covid-19, and Anticipating the Stage Beyond: Recommended Strategy, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  39. 39Institute for National Security Studies, The Corona Epidemic: Systemic Challenges for Israel, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  40. 40Institute for Jewish Policy Research, COVID-19 Mortality and Jews, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  41. 41CTech by Calcalist, Supreme Court Review of Emergency Surveillance, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  42. 42Jewish Virtual Library, U.S. State Department, 2021 Religious Freedom Report: Israel, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  43. 43Jewish Review of Books, Holiness and Public Policy: The Haredi Response to COVID-19, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  44. 44Jewish Virtual Library, Israel, COVID-19, Palestinians, and Israeli Arabs, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  45. 45Congress.gov, Congressional Research Service, Statement on Palestinian Vaccine Access, June 2021, accessed on November 3, 2026.
  46. 46State Comptroller of Israel, Managing the COVID-19 Crisis, 2024 Audit, accessed on November 3, 2026.

IsraelPedia Question & Answers

  • What was the COVID-19 pandemic in Israel?

    The COVID-19 pandemic in Israel was a public-health crisis that began in late February 2020 and brought successive waves of infection, nationwide lockdowns, and a mass vaccination campaign. Israel responded with movement and gathering restrictions, expanded testing, digital contact tracing, military logistical assistance, and medical research. By May 2023, the country had recorded more than 4.8 million cases and 12,500 deaths.

  • How did the pandemic first spread in Israel, and what restrictions followed?

    The virus surfaced in Israel in late February 2020, with early positive tests involving people returning from abroad. On March 9, returning citizens were required to quarantine at home for 14 days, and schools and universities closed on March 12. A national emergency was declared on March 19, and the first full national lockdown lasted from March 25 to May 4.

  • How did Israel use digital contact tracing during the pandemic?

    Emergency regulations issued on March 17 authorized the Israel Security Agency, also known as Shin Bet, to process technological information about diagnosed patients’ locations and movements during the 14 days before diagnosis, to help the Health Ministry identify potentially exposed people. The voluntary HaMagen application compared users’ GPS histories with locations visited by diagnosed patients and issued possible-exposure alerts. It was installed on 1.5 million devices, but GPS limitations made it difficult to determine proximity within buildings.

  • How did Israel’s COVID-19 vaccination campaign develop?

    Israel’s mass vaccination campaign began in December 2020, with the first Pfizer shipment arriving on December 9. Priority groups included people aged 60 and older, younger people with health conditions placing them at risk, medical personnel, and certain essential role holders. Close to one third of the population had received at least one dose by early February 2021, and Israel later introduced booster doses as cases rose during the Delta wave.

  • What were the pandemic’s effects on education and society in Israel?

    School disruption was extensive: between March 2020 and February 2021, Israel’s education system recorded 11 days of full operation, 81 days of distance learning alone, and 128 days combining remote and in-person instruction. NGOs estimated that about 50,000 Bedouin students lacked the devices or school infrastructure needed for distance learning after the March closures. The crisis also coincided with increased mental-health hotline calls and more police calls concerning violence against women.

  • Why was Israel’s use of security-agency contact tracing controversial?

    Security-agency tracing prompted disputes over privacy, proportionality, effectiveness, and parliamentary oversight. On April 26, 2020, the Supreme Court unanimously required legislative authorization for the Israel Security Agency program. A law passed on July 21 later allowed limited tracking for renewable 21-day periods when daily confirmed cases exceeded 200; the authorizing law expired in July 2021, with a brief Omicron-related renewal from November 28 to December 2.

  • What did research find about the effectiveness of Israel’s Pfizer vaccination campaign?

    A nationwide observational study matched 596,618 newly vaccinated people with an equal number of unvaccinated controls using data from December 20, 2020, through February 1, 2021. At least seven days after the second dose, estimated Pfizer-BioNTech BNT162b2 effectiveness was 92 percent against documented infection, 94 percent against symptomatic disease, 87 percent against hospitalization, and 92 percent against severe disease.