Corrective Revolution (Egypt)

Gamal Abdel Nasser died in September 1970. Vice President Anwar Sadat became interim president and was confirmed in an October referendum.[2] Egypt remained a one-party state organized around the Arab Socialist Union (ASU).[1][4] Many inside and outside the regime regarded Sadat as a transitional figure unlikely to retain power for long.[3]

The political system Sadat inherited contained overlapping power centers. Senior figures controlled the army, the ASU apparatus, propaganda organs, and internal security, giving them leverage to challenge or obstruct the new president.[1] Ali Sabri, whom Sadat had appointed as one of Egypt's two vice presidents, was the most prominent rival; the Soviet Union supported his faction.[2][3] Other key figures included Interior Minister Sharawy Jumaa, who also headed internal security, and War Minister Muhammad Fawzi.[5]

Sadat also faced a strategic problem. He wanted to recover the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula and was considering military options.[6] At the same time, he believed Egypt's economic recovery depended on Western investment, which required reduced Soviet influence and an eventual peace with Israel.[5] The Nasser-era figures surrounding him obstructed both this foreign-policy shift and his effort to establish personal authority.[3]

Sadat dismissed Ali Sabri from the vice presidency on May 2, 1971.[7] Four days later, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers visited Cairo. Sadat said he was fully in control and had authority to make decisions; Rogers's report quoted him declaring, "I am the President; nobody else" and "I rule this country." Sadat also credited the prospect of Rogers's visit with forcing him to dismiss Sabri before the meeting.[7] He told Rogers that the United States was the only country capable of helping Egypt reduce its dependence on Soviet personnel and support, an extraordinary overture while the two countries lacked formal diplomatic relations.[7]

Rogers reported to President Nixon that he found no evidence of Soviet intervention in the Egyptian crisis. He nevertheless judged that Moscow was unhappy about the removal of its supporters and retained influence through Egypt's dependence on Soviet arms and advisers.[8] In a May 9 report, Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco relayed Sadat's account that roughly 100 of the ASU's 150 members opposed him. Sadat also said War Minister Fawzi and the military had resisted his February proposal to U.N. representative Gunnar Jarring concerning an interim Suez Canal settlement.[9]

On May 13, several prominent officials resigned, apparently in preparation for a takeover. Sadat anticipated their moves, arrested them and other Nasser-era figures, and installed his own followers in their positions.[5] On May 14 or 15—sources give different dates—he announced that Sabri and more than 100 others had been arrested and charged with plotting a coup.[5][8] The armed forces pledged support for Sadat on May 15, popular demonstrations backed his actions, and he announced new elections and a complete reorganization of the ASU.[5] Sadat also supervised the symbolic burning of thousands of wiretap recordings and secret-police files, although the practices of wiretapping and maintaining such files continued.[3]

Despite Sadat's overtures to Washington, Egypt and the Soviet Union signed a 15-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on May 27, 1971, following three days of secret negotiations.[8] A high-ranking Soviet delegation headed by President Nikolai Podgorny had traveled to Cairo amid concern over the purges and Egypt's political direction. The delegation arrived roughly ten days after the purges, and the treaty was concluded after it had spent two days in Egypt.[10]

Before the treaty was signed, Rogers reported Sadat saying that he needed a new Soviet agreement even as he promised that Soviet ground troops would leave within six months of an interim Suez settlement.[8] Sadat was simultaneously cultivating Washington, believing that American influence over Israel offered Egypt better prospects than reliance on Moscow alone.[3] In July 1972, after attempts to obtain advanced Soviet weapons systems failed, he removed Soviet military advisers from Egypt.[6][3]

Sadat framed the events as a "Corrective Revolution" and proclaimed a new "state of institutions." Shimon Shamir credits the episode with removing the top echelon of the previous regime but cautions that a gap remained between the institutional promise and political reality.[1]

Following the purge, Sayyid Marʿi became ASU secretary-general and issued a document hinting at political liberalization within the organization.[4] Sadat presented a new constitution on September 11, 1971, and it was approved by the electorate.[5] He also released Muslim Brotherhood members from prison and allowed them to expand their social influence while withholding legal recognition. The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs interprets this policy as an effort to enlist the Brotherhood against Sadat's opponents on the Egyptian left.[11]

The political opening broadened incrementally. In 1975 Sadat permitted factions within the ASU to form freely, and in 1978 he founded the National Democratic Party, which replaced the ASU as the ruling organization.[6] Shamir credits Sadat with introducing genuine political pluralism through political platforms, dates its formal reintroduction to 1976, and notes a major setback in September 1981.[1]

The Corrective Revolution ended the period in which Sadat was widely underestimated and established him as Egypt's principal decision-maker.[3][7] The authority he gained preceded his decision to launch the October 1973 war against Israel. The initial Egyptian offensive restored national pride and raised Sadat's diplomatic standing, even though Israel later counterattacked.[3]

For Israel, the events were closely watched. In a June 9, 1971 statement to the Knesset, Prime Minister Golda Meir noted that Sadat had announced the discovery of a plot against his rule on May 14 and characterized the subsequent purges as chiefly intended to consolidate his position. She also observed that attacks on left-wing leaders led some in the West to hope Sadat would move Egypt away from Soviet influence—a hope complicated by the Soviet-Egyptian treaty signed two weeks after the purges.[10]

Analysts differ over the revolution's institutional significance. Shamir credits Sadat with real political reforms but emphasizes the gap between his proclaimed "state of institutions" and reality.[1] The Library of Congress country study describes the action as the beginning of Sadat's move away from Nasser's policies. U.S. State Department records characterize the crisis as rooted in domestic politics while noting that the dismissed officials had opposed Sadat's efforts to obtain American rather than Soviet support for his foreign policy.[5][8]

Several aspects of the Corrective Revolution remain matters of attribution. The charge that the arrested officials plotted a coup was announced by Sadat and repeated in later accounts, but the reviewed sources do not independently establish that the alleged plot existed. The State Department account instead describes the crisis as arising from domestic political conflict while acknowledging an associated foreign-policy dispute.[5][8]

The date of Sadat's public announcement also varies by one day. The Library of Congress country study places it on May 15, while the State Department's FRUS volume and Golda Meir's contemporary statement use May 14, possibly reflecting different stages of the announcement.[5][8] Sadat's symbolic burning of surveillance records was presented as a break with earlier repression, but a Washington Institute account notes that wiretapping and the maintenance of secret files continued.[3]